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his report examines collaborative planning within the context of state trust lands.  By 
analyzing eight case studies, the report aims to inform trust land agencies, local 
communities and other interested parties about the benefits, costs, challenges, facilitating 
factors and lessons learned associated with these collaborative planning efforts. The report 
concludes with a look ahead to future collaborative planning opportunities on state trust 
lands, providing a set of best management practices and recommendations for overcoming 
barriers to this trust land management approach.  
 
State trust lands are a category of land distinct from traditional state and federal public land. 
These lands were granted to states by the federal government upon statehood to support 
specific beneficiaries, including public schools. As a result, state trust lands are held in 
perpetual, intergenerational trust with the state acting as trustee. The state thus has a specific 
legal responsibility, known as a fiduciary duty, to conscientiously manage these lands for the 
designated beneficiaries. Today, there are approximately 46 million acres of state trust lands 
in the continental United States, mostly concentrated west of the Mississippi River. States 
historically have managed trust lands to generate revenue, primarily from natural-resource 
based activities.  In recent years, rapid urbanization coupled with growing public interest in 
recreation opportunities, wildlife habitat, open space and ecosystem services have imposed 
new pressures on state trust lands in the West. These changes have provided new sources of 
revenue and created conflict over trust land management decisions. In response, some states 
have explored new ways to plan and manage state trust lands. With its promise of reducing 
conflict, creating mutual gains, minimizing poorly-planned development, creating flexible 
strategies and producing durable solutions, collaborative planning has been one approach that 
states have taken to balance their fiduciary duty with other interests.   
 
To examine the experience of collaborative planning on state trust lands, the research team 
selected eight cases from a larger pool of identified processes. These cases span seven 
western states and represent a range of issues, including land use planning, land management 
for oil, gas and ranching practices, open space conservation and forestry and watershed 
management. The cases also vary in the impetus for collaboration, size of trust land parcel(s) 
examined, level of completion of the process and scope of the outcome. To develop the case 
studies, researchers conducted on-site and telephone interviews of participants and studied 
the technical, legal and political issues involved in the case.  
 
A comprehensive cross-case analysis, informed by an extensive literature review, provided 
answers to several common questions about collaborative planning on state trust lands. First, 
in regards to what makes a process “collaborative,” the research showed that the breadth of 
stakeholders involved in the process affects the durability of the solution. Processes that were 
internally and externally transparent enjoyed low levels of public scrutiny and controversy. 
Most participants believed that they had influence over decision making and the outcome, 
although state trust land agencies did not give up their decision-making authority.  
 
Second, the research identified a number of factors that motivate and sustain collaborative 




pursuing collaboration included a sense of place, a set of common goals and public pressure.  
Participants joined collaborative processes because of a professional or personal interest or 
because of a direct financial stake. The researchers found that career changes and process 
restrictions, such as an advisory committee charter, were the main barriers to sustaining 
collaboration. Factors that maintained collaboration included financial incentives, investment 
in the process, leadership and lack of attractive alternatives. 
 
Third, the research identified a variety of benefits and costs of collaborative planning on state 
trust lands.  The primary benefits of collaboration included an increase in the value of the 
trust, an improvement in the natural environment and/or urban environment and a higher 
quality solution in terms of durability, creativity and the incorporation of science and outside 
knowledge. Secondary benefits included new and improved relationships, greater 
understanding and public awareness of state trust lands and better state and federal agency 
coordination. Costs associated with the process included direct planning costs, opportunity 
costs, periods of poor public relations and personal and emotional costs. In one case, 
participants identified a reduction in the value of the trust asset as a cost, whereas in another 
case, participants identified a potential loss of environmental protection as a cost. While 
benefits and costs were not quantified in each case, the majority of participants interviewed 
in each case study said they thought the process was successful or that they would 
collaborate again in the future. 
 
Fourth, the research addressed how legal constraints affect collaborative planning on state 
trust lands. In some cases, the trust mandate empowered stakeholder groups and, in others, 
created a division between the trust land agency and other participants. The clarity and 
flexibility of the mandate influenced participation, allocation of decision-making power and 
group dynamics. External legal constraints like federal and state laws posed a challenge for 
some cases by introducing new timelines and constraints, and served as a facilitating factor 
for others by keeping people at the table. Many of the cases strategically used the law to 
initiate or influence the process, define issues, create options or shape the final outcome. 
Several participants mentioned that collaboration is easier in the state trust land context than 
other natural resource contexts because trust land agencies are afforded greater legal 
flexibility than other agencies. 
 
Fifth, the research showed how agency structure, culture and politics affect collaborative 
planning. Access to the state land board, changes in agency institutional structure and land 
commissioner term limitations were some of the structural elements that influenced the 
processes. Cultural factors that influenced the process included trust land agency interaction 
with communities and other agencies, integration of collaboration with agency operating 
procedures, concern about abdication of decision-making power and uncertainty about 
accepting help from outside sources. Politics affected the process either as a means to gain 
influence over decision making or to impede or facilitate the process. 
 
Sixth, in regards to how to structure an effective collaborative process, the research showed 
that process structure, decision making and management are important. Process elements 
included deciding upon process design, dealing with representation and participation, 
defining roles and responsibilities and organizing subcommittees or task forces. Key steps for 
 
 v
addressing decision making were setting ground rules and establishing decision rules. Setting 
objectives and timelines, conducting activities that build understanding and coordinating with 
other state and federal processes were important strategies for effectively managing the 
process. 
 
Seventh, the research addressed how leadership and facilitation affect collaboration. Official 
and unofficial leaders helped guide, inspire or represent others. These leaders often, but not 
always, benefited the process. Professional or internal facilitators in many cases proved to be 
invaluable resources that assisted the groups in running meetings, communicating and 
making decisions. 
 
Eighth, the research showed how interpersonal dynamics influence collaborative planning on 
state trust lands. Positive relationships among stakeholders helped facilitate progress, 
provided an incentive to stay involved, fostered respect and built a greater understanding of 
the issues. Several participants observed that the collaborative process improved 
relationships and anticipated that these relationships would help with implementing the 
planning outcome and addressing future resource management issues. Many groups achieved 
a more even distribution of power by consensus decision making. Power imbalances did 
arise, but in most cases they did not prevent the groups from achieving their goals. 
 
Finally, the research addressed how collaborative planning processes incorporate scientific 
information. In many of the cases in this report, science had a significant influence on the 
process, whether scientific and technical information was explicitly central to the process or 
became an important tool along the way. The origin of this information impacted the process 
through strengthening group relationships or increasing the perception of the legitimacy of 
information. In some cases, science acted as a major facilitating factor to informed decision 
making while in other cases, the lack of information or the uncertainty of information 
significantly delayed the process. Incorporating science and technical information into the 
process often influenced the process structure and could act as a significant resource drain on 
participants who produced such information. While science influenced the process, 
collaborative processes also determined what science was gathered, how it was collected and 
by whom. 
 
From this cross-case analysis, the research team developed a set of best management 
practices (BMPs) and recommendations. The BMPs provide guidance to state trust land 
managers and other stakeholders interested in creating and/or guiding a collaborative process. 
The BMPs address effective ways to set the groundwork for a process, determine 
membership composition of the collaborative group, merge the people with the process, 
create a decision-making structure, effectively manage the people and the process, deal with 
information or lack thereof and implement the outcome. The recommendations address the 
broader context of challenges that impede collaboration on state trust land. They identify 
areas for change in regards to resource allocation, knowledge and skill sets, organizational 
structure, organizational culture, policy and law. The recommendations conclude with advice 
for continued dialogue and learning among agencies regarding collaboration on state trust 
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pproximately 46 million acres of state trust lands are located in the continental United 
States, most of which are concentrated in 11 states west of the Mississippi River. State 
trust lands are the third largest category of western public lands, with a history that dates 
back to the late 18th century. Pursuant to the General Land Ordinance of 1785 and the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, states were granted land upon admission into the Union to 
support a variety of public beneficiaries, including common schools, state universities and 
hospitals. While some of the states that received these grants sold all or most of their state 
trust lands, many of the western states have retained a significant percentage of their original 
trust land grants and continue to manage these lands. 
 
State trust lands encompass a diverse range of landscapes, including rolling grasslands, arid 
deserts and expansive forest and mountain ranges. Unlike other categories of public land, 
state trust lands are held in perpetual, intergenerational trust with the state acting as trustee. 
State trust lands thus impose a specific legal responsibility, known as a fiduciary duty, on the 
state to conscientiously manage these lands for the designated beneficiaries of the land grant. 
To fulfill this duty, states historically have managed state trust lands to generate revenue, 
valuing their holdings primarily in terms of economic potential. Traditional trust land uses 
include grazing, timber, agriculture and oil, gas and other mineral mining. Recently, states 
have begun considering other “nontraditional” uses like conservation and recreation, as they 
have found that managing trust lands for these other purposes can benefit the trust and thus is 
consistent with their legal responsibility.  
 
In recent years, state trust land management has garnered increasing attention as a growing 
number of western communities urbanize and their economies shift away from natural 
resource extraction. These changes have directly affected state trust lands, especially because 
a significant percentage of these lands are located on the edge of growing urban areas, thus 
making them valuable for future real estate development and annexation into rapidly growing 
cities. As a result of these changes, trust land management is affecting more and more 
parties, including municipalities, developers, industry, conservationists and neighboring 
communities. 
 
In response to this growing development pressure, as well as rising public interest in the 
recreation and open space values of these lands, some states have begun to explore new ways 
to plan and manage state trust lands. Collaborative planning has been one way that states 
have tried to balance their fiduciary duty with community interests and needs.  
 
For the purposes of this report, “collaboration” is defined as a transparent process where 
multiple stakeholders who represent various interests have an opportunity to influence or 
affect decision making. This definition highlights three key elements of collaboration: (1) 
transparency of meetings, agreements and decisions, (2) meaningful involvement of a 




influence in decision making for all stakeholders. Collaborative planning has proven 
effective in public land contexts, including contentious cases involving land use planning, 
community planning, forest management and mineral and oil extraction. Studies show that 
collaboration can reduce conflict, create win-win situations, minimize poorly-planned 
development, create flexible strategies that meet the needs of all parties involved and produce 
durable solutions. However, little research has been conducted on the use of collaborative 
planning on state trust lands. 
 
To address this and other state trust land issues, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the 
Sonoran Institute Joint Venture convened a State Trust Lands Research and Policy Analysis 
Roundtable on October 21 and 22, 2004. Roundtable participants included five current or 
former state land commissioners and experts in state trust land management, economics, 
urban planning and institutional and program evaluation and assessment. Together, the group 
defined a proposed research agenda for state trust lands in the West. The Roundtable 
discussed the growing use of collaborative planning on state trust lands, and found that states 
have experienced mixed results with this land management approach. While some 
collaborative processes have led to favorable trust land outcomes, others have not. Moreover, 
they found that little research has been conducted on collaboration within the unique 
framework of state trust lands. The Roundtable consequently called for a region-wide survey 
and analysis of cases where collaboration was used to manage state trust lands. This study 
would identify the lessons learned from past experiences and develop a set of best 
management practices to guide future collaborative efforts. 
 
The purpose of this Master’s Project is to fill the research void identified by the State Trust 
Lands Research and Policy Analysis Roundtable. The goals of this report are to:  
 
• Capture on-the-ground experiences of collaborative planning on state trust lands 
• Analyze the advantages and disadvantages of this trust land management approach 
• Distill a set of best management practices 
• Provide broader recommendations for overcoming barriers to collaborative planning 
on state trust lands 
 
To accomplish these goals, the rest of Section I provides a brief history of state trust lands, 
explores how trust land management has evolved over the years and outlines the methods 
used to conduct this research. Section II of this report then examines eight cases in which 
state trust land managers collaborated with stakeholder groups in the planning and 
management of specific trust land parcels. These cases span seven western states – Arizona, 
Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah and Washington – and address such themes 
as land use planning in both urban and small-town settings, land management for oil, gas and 
ranching practices, open space conservation and forestry and watershed management (Figure 
1-1). The cases also vary in the impetus for collaboration, size of trust land parcel(s) 
examined, level of completion of the process and scope of the outcome. In addition to 
detailing the story of the collaborative process, each case study identifies the benefits, costs, 





Section III of this report provides a cross-case analysis to answer a series of questions about 
collaborative planning on state trust lands. Specifically, the report addresses the following 
questions: 
 
• What makes a process collaborative? 
• What motivates and sustains collaborative planning processes? 
• What are the benefits and costs of collaborative planning? 
• How do internal and external legal constraints influence collaboration? 
• How do agency structure and culture and politics influence collaboration? 
• How were collaborative processes structured to be effective? 
• What is the role of leadership and facilitation in a collaborative planning process? 
• How do interpersonal dynamics influence a collaborative planning process? 
• How do collaborative planning participants obtain, incorporate and process scientific 
information? 
 
Section IV of this report draws from the cases and cross-case analysis to outline a set of best 
management practices (BMPs) for collaborative planning on state trust lands. The BMPs 
provide guidance to state trust land managers and other stakeholders interested in creating 
and/or guiding a collaborative process within the unique context of trust land management. 
The report concludes with a collection of bigger-picture recommendations that address the 





























Figure 1-1: Distribution of State Trust Lands in the American West and Location of Case Studies 
Source: Adapted from “Map of Trust Lands in the 11 Western States,” Trust Land: A Land Legacy for the American 
West, The Sonoran Institute & Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, available at http://www.trustland.org. 
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STATE TRUST LANDS OVERVIEW 
 
tate trust land is a somewhat obscure classification of lands that exists in a “quiet corner 
of public land management.”1 The designation of state trust lands is woven into the 
history of how the United States developed as a nation. State trust lands are different from 
and more deeply rooted in the history and political traditions of the nation than federal lands 
and resources management.2 While federally owned public land is meant to be managed for 
the use and enjoyment of the general public, the purpose of state trust land management is to 
generate revenue for the trust beneficiaries, which include common schools and other public 
institutions. 
 
This report examines several cases of collaborative planning on state trust lands. However, 
the unique nature of these lands, with their constitutional mandate to produce revenue for 
schools and other public institutions, has often served as a perceived barrier for trust land 
agencies to engage in collaborative planning. In addition, because the public is typically not 
familiar with the history, purpose and location of the trust lands, it is difficult for trust land 
agencies to engage others in collaborative planning processes.  
 
This section provides background information on state trust lands, their management and 
history through a discussion of the following topics: 
 
• The placement of state trust lands in the context of public land management 
• A history of state trust lands and how they were created 
• The trust system 
• Trust resources 
• Emerging issues in state trust land management 
 
 
STATE TRUST LANDS IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT 
 
The majority of state trust lands were granted by the federal government to the newly-created 
states to be held in a “perpetual, intergenerational trust to support a variety of beneficiaries 
including public schools, universities, penitentiaries, and hospitals.”3 Public schools were 
designated as the principal beneficiary of most of these grants. From the early 20th Century 
through the present, the primary source of revenue from state trust lands has reflected the 
focus of Western economies on natural resource extraction. These traditional trust land uses 
include, but are not limited to, oil and gas leasing, hard rock mining, grazing, agriculture, 
timber and land sales. 
 
Although the purpose and designation of state trust lands are not as widely known by the 
general public, they are comparable to federal lands and make up a significant portion of 
public land in the Western U.S. In total, state trust lands comprise 46 million acres of land in 








(millions of dollars) 
Net Returns to 
Treasuries 
(millions of dollars) 
U.S. Forest Service 192 1,000 465  
Bureau of Land 
Management 261 187 142 
National Park 
Service 80 97 1 
U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service 90 8 5 
State Trust Lands 135 4,500 3,500  
trust lands are: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington 
and Wyoming. Collectively, these states manage more than 40 million acres of state trust 
lands.5  
 
In comparison to federal land holdings, state trust land acreage falls in the middle of the 
spectrum. However, state trust land generates signficiantly more revenue than federal land, 
which highlights how the trust land agencies’ mandate to manage these lands in trust for 
designated beneficiaries, explored further below, influences trust land management (Table 2-
1).   
 
Table 2-1: Federal Lands and State Trust Lands Compared      
Source: Jon A. Souder and Sally K. Fairfax, “The State Trust Lands,” http://www.ti.org/statetrusts.html; Bureau 
of Land Management, http://www.blm.gov. 
 
 
HISTORY OF STATE TRUST LANDS 
 
Granting land to support public education is not a new concept. Land grants for educational 
institutions date back to the Roman Empire, ancient Greece and the kingdoms of Egypt. The 
American colonies were using land grants by 1785 when Congress established the policy of 
granting schools in new states some federally-owned sections of land in each 36-square mile 
township.6 The early colonial state governments of Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina and Georgia all made substantial 
land grants in support of public education.7 
 
One of the first tasks facing the new American Continental Congress after issuing the 
Declaration of Independence was managing the rampant land speculation in the Western 
territories and the westward expansion of settlements. Without a system in place for 
regularizing the process of land claims and organizing territorial governments, each new 
Western settlement increased the possibility that some or all of the relocating populations 
would form independent states outside of the control of the Union.8 Congress grew 
increasingly concerned about how to police the newly-settled territories and finance the 
governments that would be necessary to oversee the new territories.9 Moreover, Congress 
wanted to ensure that the new territories would hold to the democratic values that were the 
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fundamental cause for waging the Revolutionary War.10 As the war drew to a close, the 
Continental Congress was further limited in its ability to provide federal monies to resolve 
these pressing issues.  
 
There was a strong sentiment among the Congressional leadership that providing for public 
education in the territories would be an essential element in ensuring a democratic future for 
the expanding nation.11 The Eastern states had established a system in which land grantts and 
property taxes could provide the revenues necessary to fund public education. The Western 
territorial areas lacked these resources, leaving it to the state governments or new federal 
government to subsidize public schooling until a sufficiently large population and economic 
base was established. Additionally, lands not settled and in the public domain were exempt 
from taxation by the new states, thereby limiting the tax base from which a state could draw 
revenue.  
 
As a solution to the problems of debt, land speculation, expansion and funding for education, 
Congress began brokering negotiated cessions of the colonies’ Western land claims to the 
federal government. The rationale behind this move was to create a system to administrate 
land and provide a solution to the organization of settlement and the formation of new states. 
This system also would provide public education and other essential services while repaying 
the burgeoning national debt.12 The Western territories also wanted to gain from their 
entrance into the Union and the administrative land system that developed into the land grant 
program filled that need. 
 
IMPORTANT FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
 
The U.S. federal government passed two important pieces of legislation to lay the 
groundwork for state trust land grants in the new territories. First, the General Land 
Ordinance of 1785 established the rectangular survey system, which created rules governing 
the sale of land by the federal government.13 The Ordinance also created a process for 
recording land patents and records necessary to create a chain of title for public domain 
lands. Finally, it provided for the first reservations of lands for new states, stating that section 
16 in every township would be reserved “for the maintenance of public schools within the 
said township.”14 A section is one square mile of land that adjoins the center of a 36-square 
mile township (Figure 2-1). The cadastral system and township measurement established by 
the General Land Ordinance was used as a basic survey system to reference all federal lands. 
The best way to conceptualize the survey system is to imagine Figure 1 as a grid on top of a 



























Second, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 created a system of territorial governments and a 
process for transitioning territories into new states. The Ordinance also propagated a vision 
of cheap land, state equality and public education that was considered essential to the success 
of the Western states.15 Article III of the Northwest Ordinance reinforced the belief among 
Congressional leaders that education was an essential element of the Union’s foundation. It 
stated that “Religion, Morality and Knowledge being necessary to good government and the 
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of Education shall forever be encouraged.” 
Article V, in turn, provided that Congress should admit every new state on an “equal footing” 
with the existing states.16 The concept of equal footing was included to ensure that all states 
ceding to the Union were given similar acreages of land grants, thus limiting political 
influence in issues such as slavery on state accession processes. In addition, the Western 
territories expected some return for their cession and the federal government intended to 
make the distribution and administration of land grants a self-supporting, even lucrative 
project.17 Many of the ideals espoused in the Northwest Ordinance were derived from 
Thomas Jefferson’s vision of an agrarian democracy where the township was the most basic 
unit of government, with populations oriented around agrarian communities that would 
provide for the democratic education of their citizens.18  
 
The state admission process established by the Northwest Ordinance was never strictly 
followed by Congress, particularly in the years leading up to and continuing through the 
Civil War. During this time, the admission of new states was a process that was politically 
charged with conflicts over slavery and the desire of Northern and Southern states to 
maintain an equal balance between free and slave states.19 Ohio was the first public domain 
state admitted into the Union in 1803 and the first to receive a land grant to support schools. 
Public domain states were created from land gained by the Union as a result of land 
purchases or wars. The area currently known as Ohio was originally a British territory that 
the American government gained after the Revolutionary War. After Ohio, nearly every state 
admitted to the Union received substantial land grants at admission.20 However, there were 
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Source: Souder and Fairfax, State Trust Lands: History, 




exceptions in so far as the amount of land granted (namely, Maine, Texas and West 
Virginia). 
 
Land grants to new states were an important component of Congress’s effort to control the 
accession process while balancing the Northwest Ordinance principle that new states should 
join the Union on an equal footing.21  
 
THE STATE ACCESSION PROCESS AND THE ENABLING ACT 
 
The accession process was complex and often characterized by prolonged negotiations 
between the territory and Congress. The Northwest Ordinance laid out the steps for a state-
in-the-making. After a region had been organized into a territory, the Territorial Legislature 
or its delegate in Congress, or both, could request admission. If the petition was favorably 
received, Congress would pass an “enabling act” authorizing a constitutional convention for 
the state-to-be.22 The state constitutional convention would then meet and draft a governing 
document, which would be subjected to a referendum in the Territory. In short, the enabling 
act is an act to enable the people in a territory to form a constitution and a state government. 
 
Upon admission into the Union, new states typically received sections 16 and 36 in each 
township. The amount of land granted was detailed in the enabling act. While the rectangular 
survey system established in the General Land Ordinance of 1735 had mathematical appeal, 
population centers in the West tended to develop around natural, economic and military 
features without regard for the artificial township boundaries. Thus, there were not always 
local governments associated with each township to manage the granted lands.23 Many lands 
in these cases were granted to teachers in lieu of a salary, for example, until sufficient tax 
revenues could be gathered to pay them.24 
 
The size of land grants increased significantly as the state accession process moved west of 
the 100th Meridian. With this move west came a marked change in landscape from the rich 
farmlands that predominated in the east to the steeper and more arid lands of the West.25 It 
was therefore necessary for these Western states to receive a larger quantity of land to 
generate the necessary revenues to support schools and other public institutions.26 For 
example, four of the seven states examined in this report – Oregon, Colorado, Montana and 
Washington – were granted the traditional 16th and 36th sections, while the other three states 
studied – Utah, New Mexico and Arizona – received the 2nd, 16th, 32nd and 36th sections. 
Later in the accession process, Congress took up the practice of allowing states to select “in 
lieu” lands from elsewhere in the public domain when private landowners or various federal 
reservations already occupied their reserved lands in a given township.27 Some states also 
received the beds and banks of navigable waterways as part of their land grants. 
 
The progressive increase in the size of land grants was also a reflection of the growing 
political power of the West. Initially, Congress provided little guidance to states on how they 
should manage their trust lands; the lands were granted directly to the township for the use of 
schools specific to that township.28 As a result of this lack of management guidance, many 
states sold all or most of their lands for profit soon after entering the Union. To halt the rapid 
sale of lands, Congress designated the state as trust land manager and placed increasingly 
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stringent requirements on new states to regulate the use of state trust lands. Since most 
Western states entered the Union in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, including the ones 
studied in this report, they had to comply with these stricter requirements, and, as a result, 
today retain most of their original state trust lands.29 
 
Of the seven Western states studied in this report, six joined the Union between 1876 and 
1912. The exception is Oregon, which was made a state in 1859. Montana, North Dakota, 
South Dakota and Washington were all admitted under a single omnibus enabling act. 
However, New Mexico, Arizona and Utah struggled with Congress for decades to find a 
balancing point that ensured “equal footing” for both sides (Table 2-2). 
 
 
Table 2-2: Trust Land Acres Granted at State Accession 
 








Percent of Original 
Arizona 1912 8,093 9,271 115% 
Colorado 1876 3,685 2,858 78% 
Montana 1889 5,198 5,156 99% 
New Mexico 1912 8,711 9,217 106% 
Oregon 1859 3,399 773 23% 
Utah 1896 5,844 3,5 60% 
Washington 1889 2,376 2,9 122% 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE TRUST SYSTEM 
 
The granting of state trust lands occurred during a time in U.S. history characterized by 
conflict, political upheaval and economic growth. The conditions of state accession and the 
language of the enabling acts frequently influenced the granting of trust lands, as seen in 
New Mexico, Arizona and Utah. As such, the size of the land grant and the laws governing 
state trust land administration vary substantially from state to state. The trust land 
management system currently in place has evolved from the original system. For example, 
the term “trust” was not explicitly mentioned in state enabling acts until late in the accession 
process. The differences in trust land management programs make it difficult to generalize 
across the Western states. However, the history of land grants demonstrates that state trust 
lands, regardless of location, share a common origin and a common trust responsibility.33  
 
There are three themes regarding the trust responsibility that apply to most Western states 
still in possession of trust lands: (1) these lands are held in trust by the state; (2) the state, 
acting as trustee, has a fiduciary responsibility to manage the lands for the benefit of 
designated “beneficiaries”; and (3) this fiduciary responsibility constrains the discretion of 





It also should be noted that the present-day state trust land doctrine has been shaped by 
judicial decisions at the state and federal level. Modern jurisprudence in this area of land 
management did not emerge until the early 20th Century, starting with the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision, Ervien v. United States in 1919.35 As a result, it was not until the latter half of 
the 20th Century that states began managing state trust lands with their fiduciary duty in 
mind.  
A litany of terms defines the basic legal elements of trust lands and the states’ consequent 
fiduciary responsibility. Understanding the legal terminology and lexicon of trust land 
management elucidates the rationale behind the initial granting and current management 
practices. The key legal definitions associated with trust land management include: 
 
• Trust: A legal relationship in which one party holds and manages property for the 
benefit of another. 
• Trustee: The person or party who is charged with the responsibility of managing the 
trust. In the context of state trust land management, the trustee usually is the state. 
• Fiduciary Duty: A legal obligation imposed on the trustee to act with strict honesty 
and candor and solely in the interest of the beneficiary.  
• Beneficiary: The person or party for whose benefit the property is held in trust. In the 
context of state trust land management, the beneficiaries are the designated public 
institutions for which the lands were granted (e.g., common schools and state 
universities).36 
 
To understand the mechanics of trust lands and their management, one must not only 
understand these legal definitions, but also examine the elements that comprise the “trust 
system.” The trust system includes the permanent school fund, the trust mandate, trust 
properties and the revenue distribution system. Because trust lands were granted to states to 
support public institutions, the trust system is focused on fulfilling this duty (Figure 2-2).  
State land offices receive revenues from three basic sources: (1) the sale of nonrenewable 
resources, usually oil, gas, coal and minerals; (2) the sale of granted trust lands; and (3) the 
use of use of renewable resources, which usually come in the form of agriculture and grazing 
fees, timber sales, commercial or special purpose leases and the surface rentals and bonus 
bids received for oil, gas, coal and mineral leases.37 These revenues are further classified into 
rents, royalties and dividends that are derived from different parts of the trust and, depending 
on the classification, are diverted to the permanent fund, the beneficiary or the management 































The permanent fund is essentially a bank account into which all revenues from trust land 
sales and management flows. The advent of permanent funds in state trust land management 
corresponded with the shift to state-level management in the mid 19th Century. Michigan was 
the first state to set up a permanent fund in its 1835 Enabling Act. The Act states that the 
proceeds of all lands that have been granted to Michigan by Congress for the support of 
schools “shall be and remain a perpetual fund, the interest of which, together with the rents of 
all such unsold lands, shall be inviolably appropriated to the support of common schools 
throughout the State.”38 In most states, neither the state land office nor the beneficiaries have 
direct control over management of the fund. The revenue distribution varies from state to 
state, as does the size of the permanent fund. The states with the largest permanent funds tend 
to be those with significant mineral values or an ability to sell trust land at relatively high 
prices. For example, oil, gas and coal royalties in New Mexico have produced a permanent 
fund worth billions of dollars. Arizona and Oregon, on the other hand, are not as rich in 
mineral resources, but have other profitable sources of revenue, namely real estate 
development and timber extraction, respectively, and manage funds worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars.39 Some states have smaller permanent funds due to outside interventions. 
For example, Utah’s permanent fund is one of the smallest because in the 1980s the 
legislature allowed beneficiaries access to the principal, or the capital of the permanent fund, 




























Source: Souder and Fairfax, State Trust Lands: History, Management, & 
Sustainable Use, 39. 
Figure 2-2: Trust Production System 
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TRUST LANDS AND THEIR USES  
  
Outside of Alaska, the lower 48 states 
have retained approximately 50 
million acres of trust land out of the 
approximately 1 billion granted.41 
Because public or “common” schools 
are the primary beneficiary of state 
trust lands, close to 80 percent of the 
50 million acres is dedicated to their 
support. The remaining 20 percent of 
land is managed for such beneficiaries 
as public universities, counties, public 
buildings, prisons, hospitals and other 
schools and institutions.42 Recall that 
trust lands were granted using the 
Northwest Ordinance’s rectangular 
grid system. Despite the mathematical 
appeal of dividing states into 
townships to facilitate designating trust 
parcels, the system created a 
checkerboard pattern of land that has 
proved challenging to manage. Many 
of the sections of trust land are 
“locked” within other types of land, 
making them difficult to access. An 
examination of a public land 
ownership map in any Western state 
shows this challenge. State trust lands 
traditionally are designated by light 
blue on these maps and can be seen in 
some states that do not have significant consolidated holdings as sprinkled among other land 
ownership categories. Utah’s public land ownership map illustrates this phenomenon (Figure 
2-3).  
 
The system of land granting also has resulted in a diverse spectrum of land holdings that are 
valuable for a variety of uses. Trust land uses fall primarily into four main resource 
extraction categories: minerals, timber, crops and grazing. Sales of trust lands also have been 
an important component of revenue generation for the permanent fund. Moreover, recently 








Source: “Utah Trust Lands,” Trust Land: A Land Legacy for the 
American West, The Sonoran Institute & Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy, available at http://www.trustland.org. 
Figure 2-3: Public Land Ownership in Utah 
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Table 2-3: State Trust Land Resources (in thousands of acres) 
Source: Jon A. Souder and Sally K. Fairfax, “The State Trust Lands,” www.ti.org/statetrusts.html. 
 
EMERGING ISSUES IN TRUST LAND MANAGEMENT 
 
State trust land management has been in a state of flux in recent years as Western 
communities begin to shift away from natural resource extraction to more diversified, 
knowledge-based economies.  
 
CHANGES IN THE WEST 
 
Observers of the economic and sociological shifts in the West have stated that key Western 
natural resource industries are in permanent decline – particularly agriculture, ranching and 
timber production. The engine of the West’s new economy increasingly is being driven by 
location and lifestyle choices, a rapid rise in retirement and investment income and the 
growing attractiveness of communities surrounded by protected public lands to an 
increasingly-mobile and professional population.43 Many Western communities also are 
being rapidly transformed by urbanization.44 Furthermore, the decline in natural resource 
industries and the explosive growth in many Western communities is leading some trust land 
managers to explore lucrative residential and commercial development opportunities on trust 
lands. States are attempting to balance their fiduciary responsibilities as trust managers with 
the public values associated with the preservation of landscapes, open spaces and planning 
for urban growth.45 
 
NEW MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
 
In addition to the economic and mindset shifts occurring in the West, a number of state court 
decisions and a more business-minded attitude toward trust land management has 
“reinvigorated” trust principles and shifted management toward a more “beneficiary-
oriented” approach.46 Many states reevaluated trust management as a result of state 
legislation, court rulings and more contemporary interpretations of the trust mandate. For 
Trust Lands 














Arizona 35 8,457 161 61 0 21 
Colorado 71 2,539 127 1,518 40 91 
Montana 727 4,3 350 6,3 6,189 5,848 
New Mexico 0 8,700 0 4,875 4,875 0 
Oregon 754 620 0 30 0 0 
Utah 0 3,561 12 1,777 72 245 
Washington 2,078 1,044 164 241 1 69 
*The numbers reflected in this table are circa 1996 and are not necessarily representative of current land uses.  The 
table is meant to be illustrative of the diversity of trust lands management in the seven states examined in this report. 
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example, in Oregon a state Attorney General Opinion issued in 1992 resulted in a major 
reassessment of the state’s trust obligations, offering further clarification of the trust mandate 
language. The original language states that common school lands should be managed with 
intent of obtaining the “greatest benefit for the people of this state” using sound techniques of 
land management.47 The Attorney General Opinion interpreted this language to signify that 
the state land agency was to maximize revenue in the management of its resources for the 
state’s permanent fund (known as the Common School Fund). Management of the permanent 
fund also has become more aggressive with some states experimenting with investing 
portions of the fund in equities, or stocks. In Oregon, equities investments have become the 
primary source of revenue for the trust, outshining rents and royalties from resource-based 
activities. State trust land agencies also have begun to hire staff specifically devoted to 




State trust land agencies have begun to explore new resources to expand the amount and 
diversity of revenue sources to the permanent fund. In some cases, this has meant becoming 
increasingly sensitive to the economic value of products that were historically not worth 
attention.48 For example, coastal states like Oregon have begun to respond to the growing 
market for kelp and oysters. However, the most significant of the new resources in trust land 
management has been commercial development. Commercial development of state trust 
lands is one of a few sources of rapidly escalating values for states, especially if they are not 
endowed with many natural resources.49 Development will likely be one of the most lucrative 
endeavors of trust management as Western urban areas, and by proxy land values, continue 
to increase exponentially. Indeed, several of the collaborative planning processes examined 
in Section II of this report, like the Houghton Area Master Plan Process in Arizona and the 
Mesa del Sol Planning Process in New Mexico, deal specifically with urban development of 
trust land. 
 
Land exchanges are another new avenue trust land agencies are exploring to consolidate land 
and potentially increase the value of the trust. Typically, land exchanges occur between the 
state trust land agency and either the federal government or private entities. They can provide 
benefits for both parties, including adding more land to a national park or monument, which 
benefits the federal government, and consolidating the trust lands into more contiguous 
parcels which are often more efficient to manage. Land exchanges can occur in two ways; via 
an administrative exchange or a legislative exchange. Administrative land exchanges are 
negotiated by the parties whose land is involved in the exchange. Legislative exchanges are 
initiated after Congress passes a bill containing the details of the exchange.  The case studies 




Along with the new resources that have come into play in trust land management and its 
increasing visibility, new controversies associated with that management also have emerged. 
These controversies largely revolve around the public misunderstanding that undeveloped 
state trust lands are purely open space and the changing public amenity value of trust lands.50 
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The controversies and federal legislation relevant to this report that affect trust land 
management include the pressure to conserve trust lands and the Endangered Species Act of 
1973 (ESA). 
 
The ESA is one of many laws that influence how trust lands are managed, especially in 
regards to the wildlife that inhabit those lands. The primary section of the law that affects the 
trust land management decisions, section 9, requires a permit from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (USFWS) if a proposed action has the potential to “take” a listed threatened or 
endangered species. “Take” is defined as harming, harassing or killing a species.51 To obtain 
a permit to take a threatened or endangered species, an applicant must prepare a Habitat 
Conservation Plan that must meet the specifications of the USFWS. State level judicial 
opinions have held that the trust agencies are not exempt from complying with the ESA. 
 
It remains to be seen how far the issue of preservation for aesthetic reasons, and thereby non-
monetary benefits, can be pushed in the context of the trust responsibility. Two court cases in 
Colorado and Utah suggest that under growing pressure from environmentalists and 
communities, open space preservation will continue to be part of the state trust land agenda.52 
In 1991, the Colorado Supreme Court took an aggressive approach to aesthetic preservation, 
halting a mining operation on state trust land in the picturesque Flat Iron Mountains, visible 
from the city of Boulder.53 In 1993, the Utah Supreme Court took a somewhat less aggressive 
approach, but suggested that it may be possible for the trust land division to protect and 
preserve aesthetic values without diminishing the economic value of the land.54  
 
In addition to the growing pressure for aesthetic trust land preservation, environmental 
advocates, the courts and the states are beginning to explore ways to compensate the trust 
from parcels specifically managed for preservation. Both the ESA and trust land preservation 
will continue to be important issues in trust land management as states establish new ways to 
take into account these considerations while upholding their commitment to the trust 
responsibility. 
 
The context in which state trust lands are managed has changed considerably since the lands 
were granted. Recent development and growth of communities surrounding state trust land 
has increased the public’s interest in state trust land management and has increased scrutiny 
of this management. Typically, the trust land issues and decisions that are under the most 
scrutiny deal with controversial issues, include oil and gas leasing, urban development 
projects, endangered species protection, watershed and forest management and open space 
preservation. Despite the conflict that accompanies many of these issues, they also offer new 
opportunities for partnerships and strategies for resource management. The seemingly-
competing interests underlying these issues in addition to new resources under exploration by 
agencies and the greater visibility of state trust land management offer opportunities to 
explore new and interesting answers to fundamental questions about public resource 
management. Collaborative planning is a land management tool that can assist trust land 








his project employed a case study based research approach. The research team 
determined that because of the level of in-depth research needed to understand the 
complex dynamics of collaborative planning on state trust land, a case study approach was 
the most effective mechanism to meet this need. The objectives of the research were to 
identify examples of collaborative planning on state trust land in the American West and to 
investigate the benefits, costs, challenges, facilitating factors and lessons learned from those 
examples of collaborative planning. 
 
To achieve the research objectives, the research team conducted nine phases of research. 
Early in the planning process, the team developed a set of research questions. The team then 
created an analytic framework through which to interpret relevant literature on collaborative 
planning and state trust land issues. The team also conducted preliminary investigation to 
identify as many examples as possible of collaborative planning on state trust land and then 
used a set of case selection criteria to decide on the final eight cases and three alternates. In 
addition, the team developed interview questions based on the basic research questions.   
 
At the same time, the team prepared for an initial presentation of research concepts to an 
audience of state trust land commissioners and managers at the Western States Land 
Commissioners Association Conference, where the research team solicited feedback from the 
conference participants on their research approach and research questions. Individual case 
research teams then conducted on-site interviews with participants of the eight cases and 
wrote in-depth case studies. Finally, the research team developed a cross-case analysis 
framework to guide the cross-case analysis and the development of best management 
practices, recommendations and additional research products. 
 
The project incorporated the following research phases: 
 
1. Development of research questions 
2. Creation of an analysis framework and completion of background literature review 
3. Preliminary case investigation and case selection 
4. Development of interview questions 
5. Development of Western States Land Commissioners Association Conference 
presentation and information gathering 
6. Completion of case research and case study writing 
7. Development of cross-case analysis framework 
8. Cross-case analysis of case studies 






1) DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The first step in the research process was the development of a set of research questions to 
guide the project in its focus. The research team created these research questions through an 
initial review of the literature on collaborative processes and state trust land management in 
conjunction with the advice of the project advisor and client. The final set of research 
questions were: 
 
1. What makes collaborative planning on state trust land unique and different from other 
land management collaborative efforts? 
 
2. Why did the state trust land stakeholders in the selected case studies engage in 
collaborative planning? Why was collaborative planning not used in some cases? 
 
3. What benefits were derived from engaging in collaborative planning? For example:  
• More informed decision-making 
• More effective and stable outcomes 
• Common ownership and shared understanding of the issue(s) 
• Improved conservation/environmental outcomes 
 
4. What costs were associated with engaging in collaborative planning? For example:  
• Increased demand on resources, time and/or staff 
• Undesirable outcome(s) 
 
5. What are the challenges associated with engaging in a collaborative planning process 
on these lands (recognized at the time of collaboration, as well as in hindsight)? How 
did participants deal with these challenges? 
 
6. What are the measures of success for collaborative planning on state trust land? 
• How did the participants measure “success” within these collaborative efforts? 
• What are objective measures of “success” for these collaborative efforts? 
• How do the objective measures of “success” compare within the selected 
collaborative efforts and what common themes are illuminated in a cross-case 
analysis? 
 
7. How do the collaborative efforts compare within the context of the participants' 
measures of success, as well as within the context of the objective measures of 
success? What common themes can be illuminated in cross-case analysis? 
 
These research questions guided the literature review and formation of interview questions 








2) CREATION OF AN ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK AND COMPLETION OF 
     BACKGROUND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In order to effectively analyze the literature on collaborative planning and state trust land 
management, the research team created an analysis framework through which to interpret the 
literature. This framework was used to categorize the information gathered in the background 
literature review. The framework was based on the team’s research questions and helped 
formulate the interview questions in a later phase of the research. The research team divided 
the relevant literature into several categories and assigned team members to research sources 
for each of the categories. These categories included literature on state trust lands, general 
collaboration and collaborative planning, collaboration on public lands, case study research 
methods and relevant articles from the project client’s websites. From this list, the research 
team isolated key resources and then completed the framework for each key resource. The 




3) PRELIMINARY CASE INVESTIGATION AND CASE SELECTION 
 
Case selection involved three steps.  
 
1. To identify all relevant instances of collaborative planning on state trust land from 
states west of the Mississippi that still held substantial amounts of state trust land. 
 
2. To identify case selection criteria from which the total number of identified cases 
would be narrowed down to eight, apply those criteria to the cases and select an initial 
19 possible cases.  
 
3. To narrow down the cases to a final eight based on the case selection criteria, create 




The first step in case selection was to research state trust land planning processes in 18 of the 
states west of the Mississippi, including Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
South Dakota, Texas, Washington, Wyoming and Utah. California was excluded since it no 
longer has a significant amount of state trust land. Each team member researched potential 
collaborative cases within two of these states. In identifying all possible cases, the 
researchers used the following definition of collaborative planning: 
 
A transparent process where multiple stakeholders who represent various 
interests have an opportunity to influence or affect decision making. 
 
The research team formulated this definition using the following three dimensions: (1) the 
breadth of stakeholders involved, (2) the degree of transparency of the decision-making 
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process and (3) the degree of influence the stakeholders had on the decision. The team used these 
dimensions and the definition of collaboration to guide the identification of potential cases. 
Methods of investigation included internet research, examining the states’ annual reports and 
phone calls and emails to state land departments to gather additional information.  
 
Basic talking points for phone interviews were as follows: 
 
1. I’m just in the beginning stages of my research and am trying to learn more about state 
trust land management in the west. Could you tell me a little more about how your state 
approaches trust land management? 
2. Are there examples of state trust land planning efforts in your state that have included 
participants from outside the agency or where managers used a collaborative approach to 
decision making? 
3. Do you have any suggestions for other people I should talk to or reports or websites I 
should research? 
 




The second phase of case selection was to develop case selection criteria. These case selection 
criteria included: 
 
• Geographic representation 
• Level of completion 
• Range of size 
• Issue range 
• Level of information available 
• Impetus for collaboration  
• Scope of the plan 
 
The research team determined a desired distribution for cases within these criteria (Table 3-2). 
 
Nineteen of the 42 identified cases that fit the definition of collaboration most closely were 




The third and final step of case selection was to assess the 19 cases and narrow the selection 
down to eight, develop research teams and assign research teams to cases. The goal of the final 
narrowing down was to compile a set of cases that exemplified the breadth of geography, land 
use, parcel sizes and types of collaborative planning found in Western state trust land. The 
research design allowed for eight total case studies, with a pair of researchers working on each 
case, and each team member working on a total of two cases. Thus, the research team selected 
eight cases that best fit the selection criteria, with the addition of three alternates to choose 
from if one of the original eight cases was later found to be unsuitable.  
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Table 3-1: Cases Identified from Step One 
State Case Name 
Altar Valley Conservation Alliance* 
Desert Hills Conceptual Planning Process 
Empire Ranch – Biological Planning Team* 
Houghton Area Master Plan Process* 
Arizona 
Sonoran Desert Invasive Species Council* 
Baca Ranch./Great Sand Dunes National Park* 
Emerald Mountain Planning Process* 
Kremmling* Colorado 
Lowry Air Force Base* 




Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process* Montana Strategic Plan for Trust Land Management 
Nebraska --- 
Nevada --- 
Mesa del Sol Planning Process* 
Southeast New Mexico Working Group* New Mexico 
Vecinos del Rio* 
North Dakota Coordinated Resource Management Plan 
Oklahoma Lake Texoma Lodge and Park* 
Elliott State Forest Planning Process* Oregon Public Land Management Plan Working Group 
South Dakota State Trust Land Advisory Council 
Texas Padre Island National Seashore Oil Drilling 
Castle Valley Planning Process* 
Coral Canyon, St. George 
Desert Tortoise, St. George 
Dwarf Bear Claw Poppy 
Eagle Mountain, Utah County 
Fort Pierce Industrial Park, St. George 
Hidden Valley and Fossil Hills, St. George 
Nine Mile Canyon 
Onion Hill, near Moab 
Orgill Distribution Site, near Hurricane 
Prairie Dogs, Wayne County 
South Block, St. George* 
Stephen’s Canyon, Cedar City* 
Utah 
Stream Restoration, Cache County 
Conservation Assessment  
Cooperative Planning Efforts with San Juan County  
Conservation of 237 Acres of Open Space 
Lake Whatcom Landscape Management Planning Process* 
Washington 
Wildfire Protection Plans 
Policy Decision with Public Comment Wyoming State-Wide Strategic Planning Process 




Table 3-2: Case Selection Criteria Requirements 
Criteria Category Desired Distribution 
Geographic Representation Represent a minimum of 6 states 
Level of Completion At least 50-75% completed 
Range of Sizes Wide range of sizes represented 
Issue Range 6 land use, 2 natural resource based 
Level of Information Available Maximum amount of information available 
Impetus for Collaboration Mandated v. voluntary (both represented) 
Scope of the Plan Both short-term and long-term plans included 
 
The final eight cases included: 
 
• Castle Valley Planning Process (Utah) 
• Elliott State Forest Planning Process (Oregon) 
• Emerald Mountain Planning Process (Colorado) 
• Houghton Area Master Plan Process (Arizona) 
• Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process (Washington) 
• Mesa del Sol Planning Process (New Mexico) 
• Southeast New Mexico Working Group (New Mexico) 
• Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process (Montana) 
 
These final eight cases fit the selection criteria because (Table 3-3): 
 
• The cases represented seven different states (Arizona, Colorado, Montana, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Utah and Washington); 
• Greater than 60 percent of the cases’ processes were completed; 
• The cases represented a wide range of land parcel sizes; 
• Six cases dealt with land use issues while two dealt with natural resource issues; 
• All cases had sufficient information available; 
• The cases involved both mandatory and voluntary processes; 
• Two cases related to short-term planning and six related to long-term planning.  
 
In response to a request from the team, the research team advisor helped designate eight total 
case research teams by matching the team members’ individual case preferences, schedules 
and skill sets. The research design matched each individual researcher with two different 
researchers in order to ensure adequate mixing of skills and experience. Each case research 
team prioritized its preferences for specific cases, and all researchers participated in 
assigning the teams to cases according to these preferences. Each team then assumed the 
responsibility for researching the background of its assigned case and conducting on-site 
interviews at the case location. 
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Table 3-3: How the Final Eight Cases Fit the Selection Criteria 
Selection Criteria 
Desired Distribution Selected Cases’ Distribution 
Represent minimum 6 states (Include UT, NM, 
AZ, CO) 7 States (AZ,NM,OR,WA, CO, UT, MT) 
50-75% Completed, fewer current or ongoing  5/8 completed >60% 
Wide range of sizes 3,000 (Mesa Del Sol) to 109,000 (Southeast New Mexico Working Group) 
6 land use, 2 natural resource 6 land use, 2 natural resource 
Include those with most information available for 
a richer analysis Sufficient 
Mandated vs. Voluntary (include both) 1 Mandated, 7 Voluntary 
Short term planning verses long-term planning 2 ST, 6 LT 
 
 
4) DEVELOPMENT OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
The research team developed interview questions that served to address the research 
questions to be used in the on-site case interviews. The research team based the interview 
questions on additional information gathered from the background literature review, from 
input from the project advisor and client and from the stated objectives of the project (to 
assess the benefits, costs, challenges, facilitating factors and lessons learned from 
collaborative planning on state trust land). The research team reviewed the initial set of 
interview questions multiple times and made changes to the content and form of the 
questions throughout the first three phases of the research process (see Appendix, Exhibit 1). 
 
 
5) DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN STATES LAND COMMISSIONERS 
    ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE PRESENTATION AND INFORMATION 
    GATHERING 
  
During the first four phases of research, the research team worked on developing a 
presentation and panel discussion session for the Western States Land Commissioners 
Association (WSLCA) conference held in July 2005 in Breckenridge, Colorado. The purpose 
of presenting at this conference was twofold: (1) to propose the research concept to an 
audience of state trust land commissioners and other conference participants and (2) to solicit 
feedback on the research concept and methods in order to refine the interview questions and 




The team created the following products for this Conference: (1) a color executive summary 
brochure of the project’s goals and selected cases, (2) a presentation to WSLCA conference 
attendees and (3) a facilitated panel discussion about the project’s research design, methods 
and desired products. Panel members included Mark Winkleman, Commissioner of the 
Arizona State Land Department; Tom Schultz, Trust Land Administrator of the Montana 
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation; and Ric McBrier, Assistant Director of 
Planning and Development of Utah’s School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration. 
Feedback and comments from WSLCA participants provided guidance on the specific 
research questions and helpful products that could be developed to communicate the results 
of the study. 
 
 
6) COMPLETION OF CASE RESEARCH AND CASE STUDY WRITING 
 
The eight case research teams conducted background research on their cases, identified 
potential participants to interview, conducted informal initial phone interviews with potential 
interviewees and scheduled the in-person interviews during May through July 2005. Prior to 
conducting the interviews, case research teams sent follow-up letters to interviewees 
confirming the date and time of scheduled interviews and providing additional details about 
the project (see Appendix, Exhibit 2). The case research teams also provided an informed 
consent document to each interviewee and obtained verbal consent prior to conducting all 
interviews (see Appendix, Exhibit 3).   
 
The case research teams conducted on-site case research in August 2005. Each case research 
team conducted between 11 and 17 interviews per case, each lasting approximately one to 
two hours. The teams attempted to garner the broadest possible base of stakeholder 
representation in their interviews, in order to get as full a picture of the case details as 
possible. The number of interviews conducted varied from team to team based on the types 
and numbers of stakeholders involved in that case. When permission was granted by the 
interviewee, interviews were digitally recorded and then later transcribed and/or summarized 
by the case research teams.  
 
Interview transcriptions and summaries; notes taken during the interviews; supplemental 
materials; and information from archival research, internet sources and interviewees served 
as the data for each case. Several case research teams conducted follow up phone interviews 
with participants who they had interviewed in person in order to ask follow-up questions or 
to obtain clarification. In addition, some of the case research teams conducted phone 
interviews with other case participants who could not be interviewed in person.   
 
After the research was completed, the research teams wrote in-depth case studies during the 
fall 2005. Each case study had one lead author who was one of the primary researchers for 
that case. Each lead case study author wrote a summary of the state trust land background for 
the state in which the case took place; a synopsis of the events of the planning process in the 
case; and an analysis of the benefits, costs, challenges, facilitating factors and lessons learned 
about collaborative planning from the case. Each author based his or her analysis on themes 
that emerged from interview transcriptions and notes and other supplemental materials used 
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in the case research. The case research partner then edited their partner’s draft case study for 
content, interpretation and grammar. The research team then peer-reviewed cases in which 
they were not involved for both content and grammar. The project advisor and clients also 
were provided opportunity to comment on the draft case studies, which were edited 
accordingly. 
 
After lead authors made all relevant changes to their case studies, they sent them to all 
interviewees who were directly quoted in the document to get approval to use the quotes and 
to check for errors in fact or representation. Case study authors then made the appropriate 
changes to the cases. 
 
 
7) DEVELOPMENT OF CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
 
The research team developed a framework for cross-case analysis through a brainstorming 
session during which all of the case research teams shared their initial perceptions of the 
major benefits, costs, challenges, facilitating factors and lessons learned from their cases. The 
area of overlap between the cases served as the beginning of a matrix that served as the basic 
framework for cross-case analysis. The information in the matrix was augmented by adding 
in cross-case comparisons by the team advisor and individual team members. 
 
Additionally, the research team held a cross-case analysis charrette, where all team members 
and the project advisor contributed ideas to creating the outline and substance for the cross-
case analysis section. After the charrette, team members, the project advisor and the project 
clients helped continue to shape the cross-case analysis outline. After the cross-case analysis 
outline was completed, the research team assigned individual section writers to each section, 
and those section writers were responsible for researching and drawing the key lessons from 
all of the case studies that were relevant for their section(s). 
 
 
8) CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
 
Each cross-case analysis section writer analyzed and wrote about a specific theme of the 
cross-case analysis such as legal issues, motivating factors or leadership. To do so, each 
writer read and analyzed all eight completed case studies and looked for common themes, 
similarities and differences regarding the theme in question. The author also based his or her 
writing on the content that emerged during the cross-case analysis charrette. The cross-case 
analysis sections also included discussion of relevant lessons from the collaborative planning 
literature where relevant. 
 
 
9) DEVELOPMENT OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND 
    RECOMMENDATIONS 
After having written the case studies and cross-case analysis sections, the research team 
brainstormed a set of best management practices and recommendations based on the full set 
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of lessons learned and cross-case analysis from the eight cases. To do so, the research team 
held a charrette to jointly develop best management practices and recommendations for 
overcoming the barriers to successful collaborative planning involving state trust land. 
During this charrette, the research team developed the basic categorization and substance for 
the list of best management practices and recommendations. The best management practices 
focused on providing on-the-ground guidance for collaborative planning processes on state 
trust land that are getting started or currently ongoing. The recommendations addressed the 
broader context of challenges that impede collaboration on state trust land, providing a 
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THE CASTLE VALLEY PLANNING PROCESS: 







Case Study by Stephanie Bertaina 









he small, rural community of Castle Valley is located in the beautiful red rock desert of 
southeastern Utah and is surrounded by 4,500 acres of trust lands. The town is comprised 
of only 350 residents, many of whom describe themselves as “urban runaways” or 
“renegades” attempting to escape the hustle and bustle of life in the city or suburbs.1 Despite 
its size, Castle Valley is a diverse community, representing a wide array of ages, religious 
faiths, political beliefs and economic backgrounds. However, all of the residents of Castle 
Valley share the fact that they have chosen to live in the southeastern Utah desert, more than 




acres of school trust 
land in Castle Valley 




extending toward the 
southeast portion of 
the Valley into the 
undeveloped sections 
(Figure 4-1).  
 
Before the Castle 
Valley Planning 
Process, which began 
in 2000, many 
community members 
were unaware of the 
differences between 
trust lands and other 
types of state or 
federal land in the 
Valley, and most residents of Castle Valley never expected that the land surrounding them 
could be sold and developed.2 Rather, they thought that the undeveloped land in the Valley, 
complete with its red rock formations and untamed wildness, would remain as open space. 
However, in the fall of 1998, Utah’s School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration 
(SITLA), the trustee and manager of the land, decided to auction land at the base of Parriott 
Mesa, one of the prominent red rock geological features in Castle Valley, to raise money in 
support of public schools (Figure 4-2). As a result, the community realized that additional 






Figure 4-1: Trust Land in Castle Valley, Utah 




The sale of the land at the base 
of Parriott Mesa was truly a 
wake-up call for the 
community. Shortly after the 
land sale, a group of concerned 
residents formed a citizens’ 
action committee, the Castle 
Rock Collaboration (CRC), to 
represent the conservation 
interests of the town. A multi-
year process ensued in which 
SITLA and the Castle Valley 
community, represented by 
CRC and the town government, 
engaged in efforts to plan for 
appropriate development, and 
potentially allow for 
conservation options, on the trust land. The process brought together stakeholders with 
seemingly contradictory goals of generating revenue from the land and maintaining open 
space in perpetuity and achieved an outcome that none originally thought possible. 
 
This collaborative process highlights the importance of defining the roles and responsibilities 
of all participants in the process from the outset, particularly when legal restrictions are at 
play. In addition, the Castle Valley Planning Process emphasizes the importance of having 
dedicated leadership involved in the process, especially when dealing with the reality of 
unequal power relationships among participants. The challenge of navigating conflict in the 
collaborative process also is seen in this case, as relationships between individuals and 
organizations both motivated and hindered the collaborative process along the way. 
 
 
CONTEXT FOR COLLABORATION 
 
Assessing the Castle Valley Planning Process as a collaborative planning effort on trust lands 
requires an understanding of the context in which this process occurred. This section 
discusses the historical, legal and political events and issues that influenced the process. 
 
UTAH’S LAND GRANT AND ENABLING ACT 
 
The Enabling Act of 1894 granted Utah designated sections of land in each township to 
support the common schools and 11 other public institutions, encompassing approximately 
7.5 million acres of land in a checkerboard pattern around the state.3 Utah retained about 44 
percent of this original 7.5 million acres, and sold the remaining land, primarily during the 
first 35 years after statehood.4 In fact, about 30 percent of what is now private land in Utah 
came from the sale of trust lands.5 The state now owns 3.5 million surface acres and 4.5 
million subsurface acres of trust land, which comprise roughly seven percent of the land area 
Figure 4-2: Parriott Mesa 
 
Source: Photograph by Stephanie Bertaina 
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in Utah (Figure 4-3). Approximately 70 percent of Utah’s land is in federal ownership, and 
only 21 percent is privately owned.6 The large percentage of federally-owned land makes 
private land a valuable commodity in Utah. 
 
TRUST LAND BENEFICIARIES AND THE PERMANENT STATE SCHOOL FUND 
 
Although the common schools are 
Utah’s largest trust beneficiary 
group, holding 95 percent of 
Utah’s trust lands, 11 other public 
institutions are designated 
beneficiaries.7 These other 
beneficiary groups receive funding 
in the form of interest and dividend 
payments from separately managed 
grant land funds, plus all net 
revenue except land sale revenue.8 
State law mandates that all net 
revenue generated from the lease, 
sale, rental or use of common 
school lands and all gross revenue 
from sales be placed in the 
permanent State School Fund, 
which was designated by Utah’s 
Constitution to support public 
schools. Interest and dividends 
generated from the fund are 
distributed directly to schools by 
school districts on a per pupil 
basis. Each school has a School 
Community Council comprised of 
parents, teachers and the principal. 
With their school’s trust allocation, 
this Council develops and 
implements a plan to improve 
student academic performance that 
has been approved by their local 
school board.9 
 
LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS OF UTAH’S TRUST RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Utah’s Enabling Act places few restrictions on the minimum sale or lease price of trust lands, 
as compared to those of several other Western states. This flexibility enables the state to 
engage in negotiated trust land sales, as well as public auctions, which was important in the 
Castle Valley Planning Process. Despite this flexibility, the legislature mandated that the 
state obtain fair market value for trust land and that it fulfill its fiduciary responsibility to its 
Figure 4-3: Trust Lands in Utah 
Source: “Utah Trust Lands,” Trust Land: A Land Legacy for the 
American West, The Sonoran Institute & Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy, available at http://www.trustland.org. 
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beneficiaries.10 According to the legislation, Utah also must be concerned with both the short 
term concerns of current beneficiaries, as well as the long-term interests of future 
beneficiaries. Because of this requirement, the state must balance these competing interests in 
a way that enables both short-term and long-term goals to be met for the trust’s beneficiaries. 
The debate surrounding the trust’s responsibility to balance short and long-term goals 
emerged during the Castle Valley Planning Process and became both a challenge and 
motivating factor. 
 
Prior to 1994, Utah’s Division of State Lands and Forestry managed the state’s trust lands. 
This Division was housed within the Department of Natural Resources, which also managed 
a number of other activities – a fact that precluded trust land management from being an 
agency priority. Because the Division of State Lands and Forestry was not able to prioritize 
trust land management activities, their effectiveness in managing the trust portfolio was 
limited and revenue generation suffered as a result. The agency received criticism because of 
their failure to generate adequate revenues for the trust and specifically their inability to 
manage land with real estate development potential, which had become important given the 
skyrocketing value of real estate in Utah.11 In response, the State Legislature created the State 
of Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA) in 1994 as an 
independent state agency.12 SITLA was tasked with “administer[ing] the trust lands prudently 
and profitably for Utah’s schoolchildren.”13 SITLA was required to manage the lands for 
both the short-term and long-term financial support of the trust beneficiaries. In addition, the 
legislation required SITLA to make clear that trust lands are not intended to benefit ”other 
governmental institutions or agencies, the public at large, or the general welfare of the 
state.”14  
 
Although the legislation does not explicitly require SITLA to ameliorate conflicts of interest 
between trust land management and adjacent land managed by other agencies with different 
mandates, the state often tries to balance community desires with the beneficiaries’ interests 
out of good citizenship and to avoid unnecessary conflict.15 The balance between reducing 
conflict with existing land users and ensuring that the trust beneficiaries’ interests were 
represented became difficult for SITLA at points during the Castle Valley Planning Process. 
 
TRUST LAND MANAGEMENT IN UTAH 
 
The legislation that created SITLA sets forth how the organization is directed and managed. 
By legislative mandate, SITLA manages all of Utah’s school and institutional trust lands and 
assets. The agency is guided by a Director, who is appointed by the agency’s Board of 
Trustees. The Utah Governor appoints the seven-member Board of Trustees with the consent 
of the Senate. The Board is composed of individuals who are qualified in the areas of real 
estate, renewable resources and non-renewable resources management or development. 
Prospective members of the Board are nominated by an 11-member committee, including a 
variety of stakeholders recommended by the State Board of Education, the Governor and the 
president of the Utah Association of Counties.16  
 
SITLA is organized into three Groups: Surface, Minerals and Planning and Development. 
The Surface Group primarily works on leasing and sales of trust land surface uses, such as 
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grazing, forestry, hunting access and development.17 The Minerals Group manages the 
leasing and sales of mineral and subsurface uses of trust lands.18 The Planning and 
Development Group, which manages approximately one percent of all trust lands in Utah, 
works primarily on tracts of land that have higher potential surface values in the form of real 
estate, land planning and conservation. This Group works with the private sector, 
government representatives and other parties to plan and create value through creative 
transactions.19  
 
Although subsurface uses, including oil, gas and mineral extraction, comprise the majority of 
Utah’s trust land revenues, surface uses such as real estate development sales have become 
increasingly important. SITLA’s interest in planning and development is evidenced by the 
Planning and Development Group’s activities. This Group has worked on planning, zoning 
and developing infrastructure on select parcels of land rather than selling unplanned, raw 
land. Since SITLA’s formation, the Planning and Development Group’s activities have 
resulted in the sale of more than 5,300 acres of trust lands, bringing in more than $42 million, 
with expectations of privatizing land in the future for a total expected value of $1 billion.20 
The Planning and Development Group played a significant role in the Castle Valley Planning 
Process, as SITLA’s interests were represented by the Assistant Director of the Planning and 
Development Group throughout. 
 
UTAH AND SITLA POLITICS 
 
Ric McBrier, Assistant Director of Planning and Development at SITLA, described his 
agency as a “quasi-private” agency that is much less governmental than similar organizations 
in the West.21 SITLA funds all of its activities from revenue generated from the trust land 
management activities, as opposed to relying on state taxes for its budget; although the 
Governor and the State Legislature oversee expenditures.22 Even though SITLA’s 7-member 
Board of Trustees is appointed by governmental officials, the agency has been perceived to 
be more similar to a private agency than a governmental one.23 SITLA Director Kevin Carter 
echoed the level of political independence and power of the organization, “We have a pretty 
unique and powerful situation.” Carter explained this situation by describing that the 
conservative nature of the Utah State Legislature and the clarity of SITLA’s statutory 
mandate result in the legislature being very supportive of the agency’s decisions in general. 
These factors also explain some of the difficulties entities attempting to challenge SITLA’s 
decisions in court have faced in the past.24 Because of SITLA’s clear mandate, it is a very 
powerful agency by reputation and in reality. SITLA’s level of power, both perceived and 
real, was important in shaping the discussions in the Castle Valley Planning Process, 
particularly from the Castle Valley community’s perspective. 
 
An important political factor that historically has influenced the management of trust lands in 
Utah is the role of beneficiary representatives. These representatives, who primarily represent 
Utah school children, have pushed for greater revenue generation from the trust land 
holdings. Margaret Bird is a Beneficiary Representative for the Utah State Office of 
Education and one of the directors of the Children’s Land Alliance Supporting Schools 
(CLASS) who is particularly active in interacting with SITLA.25 CLASS is a non-profit 
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organization focused on educating the beneficiaries of trust land in 24 states; its mission 
includes improving education through achieving: 
 
… increased funding from school trusts, support by education communities 
for congressional actions that benefit school lands and schools, increased 
revenue from permanent school funds through investment strategies, provision 
of information to support the land managers and assistance in the development 
of public information about the trust lands and their purpose for the children.26 
 
The Utah State Board of Education and CLASS both have been instrumental in influencing 
the management of Utah’s trust lands. Margaret Bird indicated that as a Beneficiary 
Representative, she meets regularly with the SITLA Director and staff members, as well as 
members of the Utah State Legislature to ensure that the beneficiaries’ interests are honored 
in all transactions on trust land. The reorganization of Utah’s trust land management in 1994 
to form SITLA was due in part to the education community’s lobbying for change.27 The 
beneficiary representatives, although not directly part of the Castle Valley Planning Process 
group, were nonetheless important in the outcome of the process through their influence on 
SITLA’s decisions. 
 
THE STORY: THE CASTLE VALLEY PLANNING PROCESS 
 
In the fall of 1998, the Surface Group at 
the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration (SITLA) decided to sell at 
auction an 80-acre and 40-acre piece of 
trust land at the base of Parriott Mesa, a 
majestic and well-known red rock 
formation in Castle Valley.28 This tract of 
land was purchased quickly and sold to a 
developer and his business partner, who 
subdivided it and subsequently sold three 
lots to private buyers.29 This sale upset 
many of the citizens of Castle Valley not 
only because it resulted in the subdivision 
of previously-undeveloped land, but also 
because citizens believed that there was 
little, if any, community input in SITLA’s 
decision to sell the land.30 Rumors that the 
trust land at the base of Castleton Tower, 
another spectacular red rock formation and 
a famous climbing venue, was intended to 
be auctioned next further upset the 
community (Figure 4-4).31 
 
In response, a grassroots citizens’ group, 
the Castle Rock Collaboration (CRC), was 
Figure 4-4: Castleton Tower 
 
Source: Photograph by Stephanie Bertaina 
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formed in early 1999. Comprised of residents of Castle Valley and the surrounding area, the 
group formed literally overnight in response to the sense of urgency and perceived need to 
act quickly.32 Interested community members aware of the sale called their neighbors and 
friends to gather and form a cohesive group to address the issue.33 Cris Coffey, one of CRC’s 
founding members, recalled how and why the group emerged: 
 
We got together and voiced our fears, disbelief and unwillingness to have [the 
land sales] happen … It was like a groundswell – something that’s meant to 
happen. Everyone was giving their best ideas, what was in their hearts and 
minds. We knew that we would meet again and try to do something, a group 
of friends and interested parties coming together. We all went down our phone 
lists and tried to circulate the word, so that all interested people could 
participate.34 
 
CRC’s founding members included steering committee members Brooke Williams, Terry 
Tempest Williams, Cris Coffey, Karen Nelson, Bill Hedden, Eddie Morandi, Paula Martin, 
Alice Drogin, Susan Ulery, Laura Kamala and Dave Erley. Kamala and Erley led the group’s 
activities, with Kamala as Chair of the CRC Board. 
 
Even though CRC developed in response to the sale of Parriott Mesa trust land, several 
members of the community had become aware of SITLA and the presence of trust land in 
Castle Valley much earlier. Dave Erley, one of CRC’s founding members, noted that trust 
land issues became prominent locally with the creation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante 
National Monument in 1996 that resulted in the exchange of 200,000 acres of trust lands with 
federal lands to complete the monument.35 In addition, Erley had discussed the extent of trust 
lands with several neighbors prior to the Parriott Mesa sale, including author Terry Tempest 
Williams and her husband Brooke Williams, who were influential in CRC’s formation. 
Grand Canyon Trust Director Bill Hedden, also a resident of Castle Valley, had been 
involved in Utah conservation and was knowledgeable about the nature of Utah’s trust lands, 
having authored a position paper on the topic.  
 
Despite some residents’ early awareness of trust land in the Valley, many residents were 
unaware of the scope of the issue. It took the sale of the Parriott Mesa trust land to catalyze 
CRC’s formation.36 Brooke Williams and Terry Tempest Williams were instrumental in 
suggesting that a collaborative, community-based approach could work to address the issue. 
Brooke Williams also had connections with SITLA Assistant Director of Planning and 
Development Ric McBrier, and conversations between the two fostered the belief that SITLA 
and the community might be able to work together on trust land issues in the Valley.37 
 
At the same time that CRC was organizing, the town of Castle Valley responded to the sale 
of the Parriott Mesa trust land. Although the trust land that had been sold was outside the 
town’s boundaries, elected officials were concerned that trust land within the town would 
subsequently be sold. In response to this concern, the town Planning and Zoning Commission 
considered rezoning SITLA’s unsubdivided trust land within municipal boundaries from one 
unit per five acres to one unit per 40 acres in August 1999.38 The rezone would decrease the 
allowable development density to stymie additional development.39 When SITLA Associate 
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Director of Administration John Andrews received a copy of the agenda for the Planning and 
Zoning Commission’s meeting to discuss the rezoning proposal, he was concerned because 
he believed that SITLA had not received adequate notice of the proposed zoning change and 
that the town lacked legal authority to rezone the trust lands. In response, he wrote a letter 
requesting that the Commission table the proposal pending the master planning effort that 
SITLA and the community of Castle Valley had begun the week prior.40  
 
The town and SITLA subsequently agreed that working together to solve the differences 
jointly through a master planning process would be more efficient than going through a 
contentious rezone. John Andrews recalled, “It made more sense to talk than fight.”41 Castle 
Valley Mayor Bruce Keeler, who was involved in the formation of CRC, continued a 
conversation with SITLA Assistant Director Ric McBrier about the possibility of working 
collaboratively on the problem rather than pursuing litigation and further land sales. CRC 
member Cris Coffey remembered that CRC “decided that one of the things we needed to do 
was to contact [SITLA] and find out if there was a way we could work together for a win-win 
situation.”42 As a result of this conversation and earlier discussions between Brooke Williams 
and McBrier about the possibility of SITLA working with the community, the town tabled 
their efforts to rezone and SITLA agreed to place a voluntary moratorium on all land sales 
for an indefinite period of time while the community and SITLA jointly worked on a 
planning effort for trust land in Castle Valley.43 
 
As discussions about joint planning began, CRC continued working to address the land that 
had been sold at the base of Parriott Mesa. The CRC steering committee contacted Wendy 
Fisher, the Executive Director of Utah Open Lands, a Utah-wide land trust based out of Salt 
Lake City, to see if there was an opportunity for CRC to partner with the organization to 
pursue purchasing the land back from the developers. In the early spring of 2000, roughly six 
months after its formation, CRC became a branch of Utah Open Lands, which enabled a 
partnership with a well-established land trust that could engage in tax-deductible fundraising 
efforts.44 Laura Kamala and Dave Erley were hired by Utah Open Lands part-time to 
coordinate CRC’s activities. 
 
While CRC was organizing, time was of the essence as developers intended to quickly begin 
developing the trust land at the base of Parriott Mesa. Utah Open Lands Executive Director 
Wendy Fisher remembered that the organization wired $28,000 to the developers the day the 
bulldozers arrived to start flattening the house sites in order to stop development.45 On April 
1, 2000, Utah Open Lands signed an option agreement with the developers, providing six 
months to raise the rest of the funds to purchase 60 acres of the Parriott Mesa land back from 
the developers.46 After engaging in fundraising efforts, Utah Open Lands purchased the 
Parriott Mesa property from the developers for $196,000 on October 6, 2000, an event that 
the community perceived as a stunning conservation success.47 
 
A PLANNING PROCESS EMERGES 
 
The planning process officially began in January 2000.48 As part of the planning effort, three 
stakeholder groups were originally identified to participate in the process: (1) SITLA, (2) the 
community as represented by CRC and (3) the town of Castle Valley as represented by its 
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elected officials. SITLA was represented by Assistant Director of Planning and Development 
Ric McBrier, CRC was represented by its members and the town was represented primarily 
by Mayor Bruce Keeler, Town Council member Karen Nelson and Planning and Zoning 
Commission members Richard Schwartz and Brooke Williams. However, the distinction 
between CRC and the town was sometimes unclear.  
 
At the beginning of the process in the late spring of 2000, the group decided that they needed 
an outside, neutral facilitator and planner who could help with the negotiation and planning 
efforts. Jointly, the parties submitted Requests for Proposal to various facilitators and 
planners, conducted interviews of applicants and ultimately hired Marty Zeller and his 
colleagues from the Denver-based firm Conservation Partners, Inc. SITLA and the 
community evenly split the $72,000 cost for hiring Conservation Partners. The community’s 
portion was covered by grants and a donation from the Castle Valley River Ranchos Property 
Owners Association.49 
 
The planning process began as a series of meetings during which the parties discussed their 
positions, interests and goals and explored alternative uses of the land, including 
conservation and development options. With a facilitator on board, one of the group’s first 
activities was to acknowledge that the community and SITLA had very different interests and 
objectives. The community, particularly as represented by CRC, was clear that their ultimate 
goal was 100 percent conservation of trust land in the Valley. Likewise, SITLA Assistant 
Director Ric McBrier openly indicated that SITLA’s concern was to ensure that they 
achieved their fiduciary responsibility.50 
 
At the beginning of the process, the community expressed some mistrust towards SITLA. 
CRC leader Laura Kamala remembered, “There was a basic distrust of SITLA. That was a 
big problem and a baseline that we started from.”51 She added that despite this fact, “We all 
had our doubts, our fears, our distrust, but we were willing to go forward and to try 
something new and different.”52 The mistrust stemmed from the community’s perception that 
SITLA had failed to work effectively with local communities in the past and their fear that 
SITLA would not hear their interests. Mayor Keeler reflected on what he had heard from 
other communities who had worked with SITLA in the past.  
 
All through this process, I was in communication with communities all over 
the state. Basically, they kept telling me, “What are you dealing with these 
people for? You can’t trust them. You can’t do business with them. They’re 
going to screw you in the end.” That’s what every Mayor, every Planning 
Commissioner, every Board of Supervisors said, whether from counties or 
cities. They all told us we were crazy to even enter into this. They told us 
we’d never pull it off. Basically, we were told by just about everyone we 
talked to, that no matter what SITLA told us would happen, don’t expect that 
by the time it gets through the [SITLA] Board, it will look anything like what 
you agreed to … I went to conferences and would spend all my free time 
talking to communities who had trust lands in their towns and counties and 
felt that they were being nailed to the wall, that they were having things 




CRC leader Dave Erley explained that in the past, the common perception was that there was 
“a lot of blustering and bullying on SITLA’s part. We were concerned because we had seen 
what SITLA has done with their prize developments.”54 Because of the community’s 
perceptions of SITLA’s reputation prior to the planning process, mistrust existed from the 
outset.55 
 
In order to address the participants’ varying interests and the issue of mistrust, the group 
developed a set of principles and criteria for success (Table 4-1). The principles guided the 
process, set forth standards for group members’ interactions with one another and established 
measurable goals, objectives and outcomes by which success in the process could be 
determined, with the help of the facilitator Marty Zeller.56 The principles acknowledged the 
participants’ opposing viewpoints, but established that they were not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. As described by Zeller: 
 
The principles basically were an exercise at the beginning of the process to get 
[the participants] to start talking to each other, to define some areas of 
common ground and to create an initial focus for the planning effort. [The 
principles] got them engaged constructively as opposed to destructively in the 
process.57 
 
The principles also encouraged the participants to drop preconceived notions and be willing 
to explore a variety of alternatives for the land. Zeller explained that the principles enabled 
the participants to espouse openness to new ideas, “The Town said they’d consider 
development as one of those alternatives and [SITLA] said they would consider non-
development as one of those alternatives.”58 
 
Table 4-1: Castle Valley Planning Process Principles for Success 
Castle Valley Planning Process  
Principles for Success 
1. Open and Collaborative Process. The aim of this planning process is to define both a conservation and real 
estate product for the parcel of Utah School Trust Lands (the “Trust”) identified on the attached map. This 
process should meet the primary objectives of the Town, the Trust and the Castle Rock Collaboration (CRC). 
All parties recognize that they are starting with very different objectives but that the risks of not exploring 
creative alternatives in a collaborative fashion far outweigh the consequences of typical disposition and 
conventional development of these properties. In order to arrive at an acceptable plan, all parties must be 
willing to openly explore alternatives without commitment to preconceived solutions. There is mutual risk 
taking. All parties desire to maximize benefits and minimize potential losses through this joint planning 
process. All parties enter this process with constructive, open and flexible attitudes. 
2. State Trust Objectives. The primary objective of the Trust is to realize an economic return from the 
disposition/use of these lands for the benefit of the state school trust, which is comparable to the fair value of 
these lands at the time of disposition. In addition, the Trust desires to explore strategies that add value to its 
properties, including timing or phasing approaches and to work cooperatively with the Town of Castle Valley 
and CRC so that the conservation and real estate products produce public benefits far greater than simple 






Castle Valley Planning Process  
Principles for Success Continued 
3. Castle Valley Community Objectives. The primary objective of the Town of Castle Valley and CRC is to see 
that the lands that have important conservation values on the Trust properties are protected to retain those 
characteristics for the benefit of the Town and County residents, the State of Utah and the national and 
international visitors who annually experience the valley. When the Town, CRC and their partners acquire 
lands, or interests in lands, in order to protect conservation values, they expect to pay fair value for these 
interests. In the event that neither the Town, CRC or their partners are able to acquire lands for conservation 
purposes, and to the extent that real estate development is indicated on theses properties in order to generate 
economic value for the Trust, new development should respond to the preferences and interests of the Town 
and CRC so that the development both fits in the landscape and responds to input from the local community. 
4. Conservation and Development Opportunities, Constraints and Strategies. All of the Trust parcels should 
be analyzed for their conservation and development potential and value. The objective of this exercise is to 
define those parcels that have high conservation values, high opportunities for development or a mix of 
conservation and development products that are appropriate for these areas but also strategies to achieve the 
Trust’s financial objectives and the Town’s and CRC’s community objectives. A full range of creative 
conservation and development options should be considered. 
5. Real Estate Products. In defining the types of potential real estate products, preferences shall be given to those 
kinds of development which fit in and blend with the natural landscape, which meet the Town identified needs, 
which meet economic objectives and which minimize the amount and area of disturbance. The Town, CRC and 
the Trust desire that the development product be accessible to a diverse range of potential buyers. In exploring 
alternative real estate products, a diversity of locations and product types should be considered. The Town 
expects that new development will pay its own way, that the Town will not be subsidizing the costs of new 
development and that the pace of development will occur at a rate that does not overwhelm Town services. The 
Town, CRC and the Trust will have to identify the types of development which are desirable from their 
different perspectives. 
6. Conservation and Development Plan and Time Table. The ultimate plan should identify the conservation 
and development program for each of the Trust parcels. In this fashion, the parties will have the assurance that 
the maximum allowable level of development for each of the parcels has been defined. In addition, the planning 
process should explore the concept of developing a time frame for disposition of the parcels. This time frame 
would identify the minimum amount of time prior to the development or marketing of each of the parcels. No 
parcel would be disposed of prior to the date identified in the proposed timetable. The objective of this time 
table concept is twofold: (i) to give the Town of Castle Valley, CRC and their partners reasonable time to 
develop alternative acquisition or protection strategies which might lessen the impact of development or lead to 
greater conservation benefit, and; (ii) to identify a set time frame for the Trust which would allow reasonable 
disposal of the individual parcels, with the assurance that the Town will support such development. In 
conjunction with the time table, the planning process should explore the strategies and structures for granting 
the Town, CRC and their conservation partners, the opportunity to acquire certain lands or interests in lands. 
7. Valuation. The Trust will ascertain through analysis or appraisal that the plan developed through this process 
has comparable value to open market disposition, minus any retained interests. This valuation should occur 
throughout the planning process so that they process may respond creatively to information generated through 
these analyses. The valuation process should be done in a manner that enhances the credibility of the 
conservation and development products. 
8. Implementation. The Town, CRC and the Trust understand that various agreements will need to be approved 
by the governing boards of the implementing parties. All parties agree to a good faith commitment to seek any 
reasonable means to achieve the stated objectives of the parties. 
 
Source: “Castle Valley Planning Study: Principles or Criteria for Success,” Castle Rock Collaboration, 
http://www.castlerockcollaboration.org/initiative.html (website not currently available). 
 
 
Another way that the community began to overcome their mistrust of SITLA was through 
developing relationships. Mayor Keeler recalled, “[The community] built our trust with Ric 




CRC FOCUSES ON COMMUNITY OUTREACH 
 
As the process continued, CRC worked on reaching out to the Castle Valley community and 
other stakeholders who would be interested in the plan. They identified and engaged several 
groups including: recreational interests, the Seventh Day Adventist community, the Church 
of Latter Day Saints community, Castle Valley Ranching Operation, Grand County, state and 
federal land management agencies including the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the 
United States Forest Service (USFS) and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources (DWR), 
the Castle Valley River Ranchos Property Owners Association and other conservation 
groups, who participated to varying degrees during the process.60 CRC leader Laura Kamala 
recognized that reaching out to these interest groups was important, but that reaching out to 
individuals in the community was essential, as well: 
 
We tried to identify the interest groups that we should engage in our 
collaborative process … but what it boiled down to was that there were 
individuals we had to approach as well … We had a lot of public meetings 
with the planners at every step along the way when we were going through the 
[planning process]. We invited the community in, and some meetings were 
more well-attended than others.61 
 
Kamala also acknowledged that outreach to Castle Valley community members was 
challenging: 
 
There are people in the community who are really engaged and are very 
concerned about what the future holds for our watershed and who are 
committed to that. This was the core group of Castle Rock Collaboration. 
Then there were the people outside who we also approached. We tried to 
engage those who were outside the process who were maybe skeptical or 
judgmental of those of us who were involved. [We would] tell them what we 
were doing, give them an opportunity to say what their concerns were and try 
to draw them in. It was successful only to the extent that it could be. This 
place is inhabited by strong individualists.62 
 
SITLA Assistant Director Ric McBrier remembered that because “the community’s 
perspective was that they didn’t want any development, for some of [the community 
members] even working on a plan was to acknowledge defeat. There was a split in the 
community on whether they should work on the planning or not.”63 Laura Kamala and other 
CRC members experienced difficulty encouraging members of the community to fully 
engage in the process because of their concern that development would be the unavoidable 
outcome. While Kamala reminded the community that SITLA was partnering with them in 
efforts to find options that would suit all stakeholders’ interests, including the community’s 
desire for conservation, some residents remained skeptical.64 
 
Another challenge for CRC was overcoming the perception that they were just another 
environmental group, which made the more conservative members of the community 
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suspicious. CRC and Town Council member Karen Nelson recalled the difficulty CRC had in 
overcoming the environmental group label: 
 
It was difficult for [CRC members] who started working on this project to 
encourage the more conservative members of the community to not label 
[CRC] some environmental group. And it’s really not. There is that aspect of 
it. But if you realize all of the other economic ties, and you are open to 
communicating the economic and quality of life issues, it’s their quality of life 
and our quality of life. A lot of effort was made to try to bridge that, and it 
was not always successful.65 
 
In addition to the individualist nature of community members and misperceptions regarding 
the nature of CRC as an organization, the group struggled because Castle Valley had few 
effective methods for communication among its residents. Castle Valley does not have a 
community phone book, and the town typically communicates with residents by posting 
notices on a bulletin board at the mailboxes at the edge town.66 Ron Drake’s column “The 
Castle Valley Comments” in the Moab Times-Independent was another venue for 
communication, although not everyone in the Valley consistently read the newspaper.67 The 
lack of efficient methods of communication hampered attempts at community outreach and 
limited community involvement to some extent (see Appendix, Exhibit 4 for images of the 
Castle Valley area that illustrate its rural and unique nature). Despite the many challenges 
CRC faced in its outreach efforts, the planning process continued. 
 
THE PLANNING PROCESS CONTINUES 
 
One of the group’s first formal activities after developing the principles for success was to 
develop a shared understanding of the resources of the Valley by developing and analyzing a 
set of maps. Since SITLA’s 4,500 acres of trust land represented a substantial percentage of 
land in the Valley, the group needed a common understanding of the types of land in the area 
suitable for development and natural resource protection. Conservation Partners, with help 
from Studio 2 Designs and Computer Terrain Mapping, carried out mapping analysis of the 
trust lands’ geologic hazards, vegetation, wildlife migration patterns, viewshed patterns, 
skyline, drainage patterns and other features. The group used the mapping as a starting point 
to analyze the development potential of the land and identify particularly important lands for 
natural resource protection.68 The town also contracted a hydrological study to assess the 
aquifer’s quality and capacity to accommodate development.69 
 
Initial mapping indicated that a little more than 60 percent of the land was unsuitable for 
development because of geological or natural resource restrictions.70 This constraint reduced 
SITLA’s potential development density from 884 units (based on one unit per five acre lot 
size over the total 4,500 acres) to approximately 400 units.71 With an understanding of the 
land’s restrictions, the group engaged in a series of activities to explore potential 
development and conservation options. The land was divided into 10 parcels and 
development and conservation plans were created for each of these parcels.72 Throughout the 
process, facilitator Marty Zeller reminded the group that the effort needed to reflect the 
interests of both SITLA and the community. According to Zeller, “The plan had to address 
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both the community’s desire to see as minimal amount of development as possible and 
[SITLA’s] objectives of getting fair value for the interest that they own in Castle Valley.”73 
 
The existing community of Castle Valley was developed in the 1970s as a five-acre 
subdivision in a somewhat haphazard way without much consideration of geological hazards, 
environmental constraints or design criteria.74 For example, many of the dirt roads stemming 
from the central, paved Castle Valley Drive are oriented in such a way that they climb 
directly up the steep slopes of the surrounding Valley walls, leading to problems with erosion 
after storm events. Additionally, the original layout of infrastructure and lot density did not 
take into consideration the potential effects on the watershed. In describing the problems of 
infrastructure layout and lot density, CRC leader Laura Kamala stated, “I believe this 
community would be a lot better off if it had a better, more sensible plan from the outset, but 
that’s not how it evolved.”75 Moreover, there is no consistency with building design 
requirements. As a result, the existing structures in the Valley range from teepees and log 
cabins, to Sante Fe-style adobe structures, to large, sweeping ranchettes.76  
 
Since Castle Valley residents unanimously indicated that they did not want new development 
to occur in the same unplanned manner as the existing community, Zeller helped orchestrate 
development options that were environmentally-sensitive and purposeful. The plans included 
a “cluster subdivision” option as a means of creating denser development in some areas to 
conserve open space in other, more valuable areas for natural resource protection. In 
addition, the new plans included design requirements, including limits on fencing, use of 
earth tones on exteriors to blend in with the surrounding area and other criteria to ensure 
development compatibility with the landscape. 
 
During the planning process, a tentative agreement was made whereby SITLA agreed to offer 
the parcels to the community for purchase so that the land would not be developed but would 
remain as open space, while still generating income for SITLA. This discussion was 
important because it provided potential conservation options for the land and showed 
SITLA’s openness to engaging in conservation transactions with the community. According 
to the plan, if the community was unable to raise the needed funds, SITLA would have the 
right to put that piece of land up for public auction, sell it and have it developed according to 
the agreed upon development scenario. In essence, the plan was a three-tiered approach, 
where the community would first have the option to purchase the land for 100 percent open 
space conservation. If they were not able to raise the funds to purchase the land outright, they 
would have the opportunity to find a conservation buyer who would buy the land and 
primarily keep it for conservation purposes. If the community was unable to find a 
conservation buyer, SITLA would then have the right to sell to any interested developer 
according to the plan.77  
 
A great deal of time during the process was spent determining how to divide the parcels of 
trust land, in what order they would be offered to the community and then put on the market 
and how much time would lapse between each parcel being offered. The group decided on an 
order of parcel release and a roughly 20-year timeframe for disposition of the 10 parcels, 
which included approximately 207 possible development units spread across the parcels, 
reduced by 75 percent from the original 884 possible units.78 Because trust land in Castle 
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Valley was approximately evenly split between the jurisdiction of the town and Grand 
County, an additional element of the plan included the annexation of the County’s trust land 
into the town, so that the planning document and agreement with the town would apply to all 
the SITLA land.79 The final goal of the planning process was to create a contract between the 
town and SITLA that specified the agreements made throughout the process regarding the 
development densities on the land, the timing, order and geographical location of the parcels, 
and the process of the community’s option to purchase a parcel through a negotiated deal 
prior to its release on the open market. The contract, once finalized, would be signed by 
SITLA and the town. 
 
THE FIRST CONSERVATION TRANSACTION 
 
In May 2001, although the plan was 
not yet completed, Ric McBrier and 
SITLA agreed to make the Castleton 
Tower property available to the 
community for purchase, if they 
could raise the necessary funds. This 
offer was made to create trust 
between the groups. Thus the 
Castleton Tower Preservation 
Initiative served as the first unofficial 
test case of the planning process 
implementation. It also served as 
Utah Open Lands and CRC’s first 
effort to acquire a piece of the trust 
land from SITLA. In August 2001, 
Utah Open Lands and CRC began to 
gauge support for raising funds to 
purchase 217.3 acres at the base of 
Castleton Tower.80 On December 14, 
2001, after determining that 
fundraising would be possible, Utah 
Open Lands and CRC (as a branch of 
the organization) entered into a 
purchase agreement with SITLA, 
providing 18 months to raise the 
purchase price of $640,000. 
Utah Open Lands spearheaded the 
Castleton Tower Preservation 
Initiative, securing a lead grant of 
$100,000 from the George S. and 
Dolores Doré Eccles Foundation.81 
CRC leader Laura Kamala described 
the Initiative as “an incredible 
collaborative process.”82 Because of 
Figure 4-5: Watercolor Book by Cris Coffey, Front and Back 
Cover 
 
Source: Photograph by Eirin Krane 
Figure 4-6: Watercolor Book by Cris Coffey, Pages 11 and 12 
 
Source: Photograph by Eirin Krane 
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Castleton Tower’s prominence as a top climbing venue, Utah Open Lands employee Dave 
Erley focused on obtaining support from the Outdoor Industry Association, a trade 
association representing the outdoor industry, and climbers who had a stake in maintaining 
climbing access to Castleton Tower. Castle Valley and nearby Moab are home to several 
well-known climbers, including Kitty Calhoun, Greg Child, Jay Smith and Jack Tackle, all of 
whom assisted Erley with raising awareness of the issue in the larger climbing community. 
Erley and other Utah Open Lands representatives attended outdoor industry trade shows, 
advertised in climbing magazines such as Rock and Ice and partnered with organizations 
such as the Access Fund, a non-profit group focused on maintaining open access to climbing 
areas, to raise awareness and funds for the Initiative.83  
 
At the same time, other CRC members participated in fundraising efforts aimed at those 
interested in maintaining trust land as open space for its recreational, environmental and 
scenic value. They did so by creating a website for the organization to disseminate 
information (www.castlerockcollaboration.org, which is not currently available), using the 
Utah Open Lands website (www.utahopenlands.org) and conducting outreach through 
informational brochures. CRC member Cris Coffey also made a book of watercolor images 
of favorite Castle Valley locations, combined with quotes borrowed from Chief Seattle in 
Washington about his feelings towards selling land (Figures 4-5 and 4-6). Coffey 
remembered how the book was used in the campaign, “[CRC] ended up collating more than 
400 copies of the book and sending them out to Castle Valley property owners and other 
interested parties in order to marshal support and get people thinking about how they felt 
about the land.”84 
 
In June 2003, after the massive fundraising effort was completed, Utah Open Lands and CRC 
raised the needed funds to purchase the 217.3-acre piece of land at the base of Castleton 
Tower.85 Donors who contributed to the land purchase fees or administrative costs included 
many representatives from the outdoor industry, such as PETZL America, Black Diamond 
Equipment LTD and Patagonia, as well as foundations, non-profits and private individuals.86 
The State of Utah also provided a grant from Utah’s LeRay McAllister Critical Lands Fund 
that covered approximately 15 percent of the cost of the land.87 Although the Castleton 
Tower land was no longer officially part of the planning process, CRC saw this conservation 
transaction as the first success of the process, since without the initiation of the planning 
process and the relationships that were being developed, the option would not have existed. 
CRC leader Laura Kamala emphasized the importance of conservation transactions to the 
planning process: 
 
I see all the conservation initiatives we did with SITLA as part of the process, 
because it was key in our growing relationship with them, in proving that 
there was a conservation market here for SITLA, and it’s viable. We could 
show up with the money and do what we said we were going to do, even with 







THE TOWN TAKES ANOTHER PATH 
 
As the planning process continued, the town government realized it was ill-prepared to deal 
with potential development in the Valley. In particular, Mayor Bruce Keeler, Castle Valley 
Town Council members and Castle Valley Planning and Zoning Commission members 
realized that the town’s general plan and zoning ordinance were outdated.89 The general plan 
and zoning ordinance, to which the subdivision ordinance was appended, were borrowed 
from Grand County in the 1980s when the original town formed, and had been in place ever 
since.90 Out-of-date ordinances were a symptom of a larger problem in Castle Valley town 
government – they simply were not ready for the situation that faced them. 
 
The town’s lack of preparedness stemmed from its spotty history. Originally a ranch site, 
Castle Valley was developed into 448 five-acre plots in the 1970s and was part of Grand 
County’s jurisdiction, governed informally by a loose group of property owners via the 
Castle Valley River Ranchos Property Owners Association.91 In an effort to increase the 
community’s political clout over decisions affecting land use near the residential 
development, Castle Valley incorporated as a town in 1985, with mixed support from 
community members.92 Since that time, there have been multiple attempts to undo the town’s 
incorporation most recently in 1998, illustrating the community’s contrasting feelings about a 
governmental entity guiding the community.93 The town had not faced development pressure 
since the original community was formed in the 1970s, and the potential sale of large blocks 
of trust land was problematic for a relatively-inexperienced government system. 
 
Since approximately half of the 4,500 acres of trust land fell within the boundaries of the 
town, Mayor Keeler, the Town Council and the Planning and Zoning Commission realized 
that it was imperative that the ordinances be revised. As a separate but concurrent effort from 
the planning process, the town officials began the challenging task of revising the general 
plan and local ordinances in May 2000. The town hoped to rewrite the ordinances to create a 
new general plan, a master development plan ordinance and a subdivision ordinance.94 As 
described by Mayor Keeler, “It was made very clear to SITLA at the beginning of the 
process that the town would be developing on a separate track along with this [planning] 
process, a subdivision master development ordinance.”95 In addition to Mayor Keeler, the 
main town officials involved in the ordinance revision included Planning and Zoning 
Commission Chair Catherine Howells, Brooke Williams and Richard Schwartz from the 
Planning and Zoning Commission and Jerry Bidinger and Karen Nelson from the Town 
Council.  
 
The town hired an attorney, Jerry Kinghorn, to advise them in revising the outdated 
ordinances. Kinghorn discovered that Utah statute requires that all towns have updated 
ordinances, and that a developer submit a plan to the town government for approval prior to 
initiating development on the land. Because of this legal discovery, and due to the fact that 
the town did not want to have a conflict of interest by collaborating in the development of a 
plan with a landowner and potential developer (i.e. SITLA), the town’s interactions in the 
planning process became much less formal and removed.96 Furthermore, the town worried 
about potentially binding future town government entities to provide infrastructure, water and 
sewer or septic services to future development, which the town and its residents might not be 
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able to afford.97 Although several individual members of the town government continued to 
be involved in planning with SITLA, including Brooke Williams, Richard Schwartz, Karen 
Nelson and to some extent Mayor Keeler, their involvement became a personal, separate 




Despite the progress that had been made in the planning process and the success of the 
Castleton Tower Preservation Initiative, challenges emerged that threatened implementation 
of the group’s planning. It was understood from early in the planning process that the end 
product would be a signed contract specifying the agreements reached during the process. 
The parties to the contract would be the town of Castle Valley and SITLA, since CRC was 
not an entity with authority to make a legally-binding decision for the town. As articulated by 
CRC and Town Council member Karen Nelson, “A group of citizens [such as CRC] cannot 
represent the town unless the town appoints them.”98 It was understood, however, that CRC 
would still be instrumental in implementing the agreements made in the contract, particularly 
in regards to coordinating land purchases. However, due in part to the town’s hesitance in 
signing a document that was not perceived to be part of the town’s normal development 
process and that would legally bind future town government to approving development that 
stemmed from the plan, the contract never reached its final form, and the town expressed 
reluctance in signing any documents.99 In fact, both SITLA and the town perceived elements 
of the process to be unsuccessful, which caused the planning process to flounder. 
 
The challenges faced towards the end of the process stemmed from the town’s development 
of land use ordinances, the results of the hydrological study and questions surrounding the 
town’s water rights. In addition, personality conflicts and miscommunication added to the 
difficulty of completing and implementing the group’s planning efforts. 
 
The foremost challenge to the process involved the town’s process of revising its land use 
ordinances, which was orchestrated primarily by the Planning and Zoning Commission. The 
ordinance revisions seemed to complicate the planning group’s ability to finalize and sign the 
planning contract. The contract’s viability depended on the town giving legislative authority 
to it, since the town was legally responsible for overseeing planning activities within the 
town’s boundaries and because the plan included an agreement whereby the town would 
annex the trust land outside its boundaries into the town. SITLA Associate Director of 
Administration John Andrews described it this way, “Ultimately that plan [contract] would 
have to be legally implemented through the town passing an ordinance that vested that right 
to develop in the landowner.”100 Thus, without the town’s approval, the planning contract 
could not be implemented. According to CRC and Planning and Zoning Commission 
member Richard Schwartz, there was concern among the town’s representatives that 
problems might emerge by engaging in the planning process with SITLA: 
 
There was concern that the town was committing itself to a course of action 
and implicitly binding future leaders of the town to this course of action 
without having been through [the town’s] due process. There was some 
concern that if some of the development proved to be more dense than could 
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be supported by the aquifer and there became groundwater problems, that 
people might sue the town for having entered into this development that 
subsequently led to problems.101 
 
It was this concern that further spurred the town’s desire to update the land use ordinances. 
Through the process of updating the ordinances and in consultation with the town’s attorney 
Jerry Kinghorn, the town subsequently determined that it could not explicitly acknowledge 
the work that was being done in the planning process, since colluding with a potential 
developer would be considered a conflict of interest. Planning and Zoning Commission 
member Richard Schwartz described the situation: 
 
The crux of the matter was a feeling on the part of some people that [the 
Planning and Zoning Commission] simply cannot acknowledge in any way 
the work that had been done [in the planning process]. And the feeling on the 
part of a lot of other people that it would be foolish, as well as somewhat both 
disingenuous and somewhat in bad faith, to not explicitly acknowledge what 
had been going on. That was the major unraveling.102 
 
Because of the legal advice that restricted the town’s interactions with the process, the 
dynamics of the process changed. CRC leader Dave Erley described how in writing the 
ordinances: 
 
The negotiations changed from the Castle Rock Collaboration which was very 
flexible to the town and the town’s Planning Commission, which by state 
statute was forced into some rigid things regarding timing, requirements and 
how things had to be written. That certainly changed the dynamic in the 
negotiation. It became much more tense and sometimes adversarial.103 
 
There was also concern from the other members of the planning process that the ordinances 
would provide the town with too much discretion in the development process, and questions 
emerged about whether the town was adhering to its commitment to the planning process. 
Facilitator Marty Zeller described the controversy that arose when the ordinances came out, 
“When the ordinances were put out, the discretion was so thoroughly with the town as to 
what could happen, it raised the question as to whether the town was acting in good faith and 
whether SITLA would have any development rights at all ... That’s where it really broke 
down.”104  
 
Some members of the planning process also felt that the town’s process of revising the 
ordinances was not within the spirit of the collaborative planning process. Town Council 
member Karen Nelson remembered that there were some individuals who thought the 
planning process was a stalling tactic, buying time so that the town could create and pass 
ordinance revisions that were needed and legally necessary. However, some participants felt 
that using the process as a stalling tactic was not necessarily consistent with the agreements 




Because we were still in the planning process and it was still taking a lot of 
time, there were members of the governmental body who felt that it was going 
to be advantageous to use [the planning process] to slow down any other 
actions so we could get the zoning ordinance written and have it very 
restrictive so that it would take care of most of our issues and circumvent the 
need to solve the problem through negotiation. The document would be 
restrictive enough and would make development so expensive that we 
wouldn’t have to worry about it.105 
 
Some participants also perceived the ordinances as one-sided, unfair and imbalanced, 
particularly against SITLA’s interests. Some also thought the ordinances were a smoke 
screen attempting to cover efforts to derail the planning process. Participants attributed the 
motivations behind enacting such strict ordinances to a failure of mutual risk-taking on the 
part of the town and asserted that although SITLA had agreed to reduce development density 
on the land, the town was less willing to assume risk in accommodating any development. 
 
Despite some planning participants’ feelings that the ordinance revisions were not within the 
spirit of the planning effort, town attorney Jerry Kinghorn and several town representatives, 
particularly Planning and Zoning Commission Chair Catherine Howells and Mayor Bruce 
Keeler, acknowledged that they were legally required.106 Kinghorn advised Mayor Keeler not 
to sign the planning contract and to focus instead on revising the ordinances.107 CRC leader 
Laura Kamala described how the process started to break down when the town expressed 
concerns about signing the contract: 
 
In good faith, we were all going forward for a long time. Then things fell apart 
really towards the end when it got closer to the time when the town needed to 
make a commitment to signing some of the documentation. That was when it 
really fell apart … Part of [the fear of signing paperwork] was because there 
was a lack of belief that [the community] could go forward with our original 
vision which was to continue to do conservation initiatives.108 
 
So, instead of working to complete and sign the contract, the planning process slowed and 
the town focused on revising their general plan, master development plan ordinance and 
subdivision ordinance. The Planning and Zoning Commission completed the new general 
plan and ordinances and posted them for public comment in December 2003, giving 
community members and SITLA the opportunity to comment.109 The Commission then 
revised the ordinances according to public feedback and sent them to the Town Council for 
approval. The Town Council passed the ordinances September 2004.110 
 
According to Kinghorn, to adhere to Utah state statute, the planning process contract would 
have to be submitted to the Planning and Zoning Commission for review as specified in the 
ordinances. However, the contract never was introduced through the town’s process. Mayor 
Keeler explained what needed to happen to move forward with the planning process, since 





What needed to happen was that SITLA at that point needed to come to the 
town with their application to the Planning Commission and plug it in, and 
Ric [McBrier] didn’t want to do that. He said in an open meeting that the town 
broke its commitment to the process by making SITLA go through the 
subdivision process.111 
 
Because the ordinances laid out very specific requirements to which a potential developer 
would have to adhere, they served as an obstacle from SITLA’s perspective. CRC leader 
Dave Erley recalled that once the town began to revise its ordinances, “It was clear that 
SITLA wasn’t going to like things that the town was going to do.”112 Town Council member 
Jerry Bidinger described the problems that SITLA faced in the planning process: 
  
SITLA saw a series of ordinances put in place that said if you’re going to go 
forward with this planned development, you’re going to have to do a series of 
studies, [provide] a lot of environmental impact information and the developer 
would be responsible for a series of costs that the town isn’t going to bear on 
its own.113 
 
Mayor Keeler acknowledged that SITLA was concerned that developing ordinances might 
undo the progress made through the planning effort: 
 
Ric [McBrier] was always very concerned that if [the town representatives] 
didn’t like what was coming out of the plan, we would write an ordinance to 
prevent it, so that we would actually short circuit anything we weren’t 
comfortable with. Which we didn’t do … we did do a state of the art, very 
contemporary master development subdivision ordinance.114 
 
Despite varying perspectives about the legitimacy of the town’s ordinance revision process, it 
certainly changed the direction of the planning process significantly. 
 
THE PROCESS REACHES A STALEMATE 
 
As the ordinances were being revised, personality conflicts and miscommunication further 
complicated the process. Mayor Keeler recognized, “There were people [in the community] 
who had disagreements with some people working on the planning process,” and these 
conflicts became aggravated by the issues raised surrounding the land use ordinances, water 
quality and water rights, which were emotionally charged.115  
 
Issues surrounding the town’s land use ordinances seemed to elicit personality conflicts. 
CRC and Planning and Zoning Commission member Richard Schwartz remembered that 
once the Commission started revising the land use ordinances, “There was a lot of personal 
animosity generated by the interaction of the Planning and Zoning Commission with the 
whole process, but maybe that was necessary and inevitable.”116 Despite the fact that the 
ordinances were required by Utah law, some members of the planning group felt that the 
manner in which they were created was problematic because it resulted in “defensive 
posturing and a lost spirit of cooperation.”117 According to CRC leader Laura Kamala, the 
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manner in which the town representatives created such strict ordinances “seemed personal to 
me. It seemed like it was some kind of personal vendetta, a personal mission they were going 
to at the last minute, after everything.”118 Schwartz indicated that once the town’s 
involvement focused on creating the ordinances, the planning process “became less 
collaborative and more contentious as it went along. In some senses, CRC and SITLA were 
less contentious towards each other than either was toward the town. If things were going to 
fracture, I wouldn’t have expected it to be that way.”119 Indeed, several community members 
felt this way. Some felt that the sense of contention between the town and CRC and SITLA 
resulted from the perception that “CRC stayed committed to the vision of the planning 
process while the town seemed to abandon that.”120 
 
The hydrological study results damaged the process further. The results, which came in 
during March 2004, indicated that a density of one unit per 15 acres was the maximum 
allowable development density to maintain the quality of the water in the aquifer.121 The 
Castle Valley aquifer, from which all Castle Valley residents draw their water, was 
designated as a pristine, sole-source aquifer by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
in 2001, thus increasing the importance of preserving it in an undisturbed state. Although the 
average density in the plan was one unit per 20 acres, some areas of the plan were as dense as 
one unit per five acres, which was denser than the hydrological study recommended. As a 
result, some participants suggested that parts of the development plan would have to be 
revised according to the hydrological study results.122  
 
In addition to the hydrological study results, the town of Castle Valley began to realize that it 
had been negligent in proving its water rights over the last few years, adding an additional 
complication to the process. In Utah, any entity with water rights must illustrate once every 
five years that it has used the amount it has been designated. Under this “use-it-or-lose-it” 
approach, the state can decrease or rescind a town’s water rights if they have not been fully 
utilized.123 Around September 2004, Castle Valley town representatives began to realize that 
the town’s records for proving its water rights were deficient.124 Towards the end of the 
planning process, the town entered into discussions with Grand County and the state of Utah 
about the legitimacy of its water rights. This uncertainty surrounding the town’s water rights 
complicated the planning process toward the end because the planning contract assumed that 
a developer would be entitled to use the town’s water.125 Dave Erley described the problems 
that water rights issues brought to the surface, “It was clear that there was starting to be 
questions about the amount of water rights that the town of Castle Valley really has, and part 
of these negotiations was about SITLA getting water rights.”126 
The fractures in the planning process manifested themselves through difficult community 
interaction. Laura Kamala remembered, “There were a couple of meetings where the town 
got together … and it turned into a shouting match and fell apart. It wasn’t working, wasn’t 
going anywhere, wasn’t happening.”127 She continued: 
 
There was a lot of hurt, anger and betrayal with Ric [McBrier] and Marty 
[Zeller]. They were trashed [by other members of the planning group]. There 
were some public meetings that I witnessed where I was shocked at the kind 
of interactions it deteriorated into, the way that people were so disrespectful to 




Other members of the planning process and town government similarly felt that personality 
conflicts were challenging for the process. Dave Erley remembered: “[The planning process] 
cost me some sleepless nights. It’s not like it’s just people you work with, it’s people you live 
with, and these people don’t go away. You need to be able to face them.”129 Planning and 
Zoning Commission Chair Catherine Howells felt that because the Commission was heading 
up the ordinance revisions and because she had always asked questions about the town’s role 
in addressing land use issues throughout the process, she was pinpointed as the one to blame 
for the process’ failure:  
 
The town can’t get involved in land purchase issues; they have to get involved 
in land use issues. The plan looked more at the land purchase issues and didn’t 
really deal with land use issues. When [the planning group] was forced to look 
at the land use issues, it literally exploded, and I was the target.130 
 
However, some members of the planning group felt that the plan did address land use issues 
in addition to land purchase issues.131 
 
In addition to problems with personality conflicts, some community members began to 
question Marty Zeller’s knowledge base and neutrality as a facilitator. Some members of the 
town government wondered if Zeller was aware of the state legal requirements concerning 
town ordinances. Catherine Howells remarked, “As a planner, Marty [Zeller] should have 
known that [the planning process] had to hit the Planning Commission, and if he didn’t 
know, what kind of planner is that?”132 Because SITLA hired Zeller to work on other 
projects, some Castle Valley community members also became concerned that Zeller had a 
conflict of interest. Town Council member Karen Nelson articulated the challenge this 
created for the process, “By taking on more jobs through SITLA, and I can understand why 
he did, the appearance of favoritism emerged, which was detrimental. There was the 
appearance of taking a side.”133 Furthermore, by the end of the process the costs for 
Conservation Partners exceeded the original bid amount, and SITLA covered this amount of 
approximately $6,000.134 Some community members expressed concern about this fact, 
given that the original concept was that the community and SITLA would divide the 
facilitation costs evenly. 
 
As a result of the challenges faced by the planning process, a stalemate occurred. The last 
planning process meeting occurred in the spring of 2004, after which no major actions were 
taken regarding the planning process. The town was reluctant to sign the contract because of 
their legal obligations and the Planning and Zoning Commission’s belief that SITLA should 
submit the planning process contract to the Commission’s process for review. SITLA was 
hesitant to sign the contract in response to the town’s reluctance and the feeling that the town 
was not fulfilling its commitments to the planning process. SITLA was also less likely to 
continue with the process due to a negative response from school trust beneficiaries about the 
situation, who felt that the town was not acting in good faith. As recalled by Beneficiary 
Representative Margaret Bird, “Ultimately, as beneficiaries we went to the [SITLA] Board 
and said, ‘We don’t intend to collaborate with [the community of Castle Valley] any longer 
unless they will come to the table in good faith and sign their half of the document.’”135 CRC 
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members, frustrated by the events that occurred at the end of the process, were not able to 
influence the town or SITLA to reconsider their positions. Thus, the planning process slowly 
stalled and some members of the group began to explore the possibility of a land exchange 
that could serve as an alternative to the planning process. 
 
Despite the fact that the planning process did not result 
in a signed contract, another conservation transaction 
was conducted. In January 2003, with Laura Kamala 
and Wendy Fisher’s leadership, Utah Open Lands and 
the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources combined 
resources and entered into a purchase agreement with 
SITLA to purchase 530 acres of trust land in the Valley 
that included critical habitat for a population of La Sal 
Mule Deer that uses the land for its winter range 
(Figure 4-7).136 The purchase agreement provides five 
years for Utah Open Lands to purchase the land, which 
will be paid for by funds from the Utah Division of 
Wildlife Resources and by funds still being raised by 
Utah Open Lands. A conservation easement will be 
placed on this wildlife habitat once purchase is 
secured.137 
 
A LAND EXCHANGE OPTION 
 
During the process, the group discussed the option of a land exchange whereby trust land 
would be traded for public land managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Since 
land exchanges were typically lengthy and difficult to achieve, however, the group preferred 
the planning process contract.138 But, given the difficulties that arose from trying to work out 
the details and signing of the contract, a land exchange option became more attractive to the 
group. SITLA had engaged in two successful land exchanges in the past.139 Starting in 2003, 
SITLA began to seriously consider including the Castle Valley trust lands in a land 
exchange, with encouragement from Castle Valley Planning Process participants, including 
Grand Canyon Trust Executive Director Bill Hedden and Laura Kamala, who had become 
Grand Canyon Trust’s Director of Utah Programs. Kamala described the importance of 
pursuing the land exchange once the planning process contract failed to come to fruition, “I 
wasn’t willing to let the whole thing fall apart and have no other options for addressing the 
ultimate outcome that we desired. There had to be a way, there had to be another way. And 
fortunately, there was.”140 
 
Because of the groundwork that had been laid and the relationships that had been developed 
through the planning process, SITLA included all the trust lands in Castle Valley in a 
proposed legislative land exchange with the BLM.141 This land exchange would trade up to 
40,000 acres of environmentally-sensitive trust land in Grand County with up to 48,000 acres 
of BLM land in Uintah County that could be used for oil and gas development.142 The Utah 
Recreational Land Exchange Act of 2005 was introduced in May 2005, and is still awaiting 
action in Congress.143 The land exchange proposal has received a great deal of support from 
Figure 4-7: La Sal Mule Deer 
 
Source: Photograph by Eirin Krane
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the Utah State Legislature, Utah Governor, Grand and Uintah Counties, city of Moab, town 
of Castle Valley, Utah Guides and Outfitters, the Grand Canyon Trust, the Outdoor Industry 
Association and the Nature Conservancy, among others.144 Many of the participants in the 
process believed that the inclusion of Castle Valley lands in this proposed legislative land 
exchange was a direct result of the work that went on in the planning process.145 
 
The overall consensus of the participants in the process is that if the land exchange is enacted 
and implemented, the overall objectives of all groups involved will be reached – the 
community will have the land preserved and SITLA will obtain valuable lands in another 
county that can be used for lucrative oil and gas development. Although the path that the 
process eventually took was different than expected, members of the group still considered it 
fruitful. Dave Erley described the unexpected outcome of the land exchange, “At the 
beginning, we had a blueprint of how we were going to be successful, and it didn’t turn out 
according to the blueprint, but we might have actually been more successful. I’m not sure 
everyone’s come around to realizing that.”146 Likewise, Laura Kamala spoke positively about 
the land exchange option, “I’m very grateful that everything we did evolved into this 
wonderful opportunity for the land exchange, that it went in that direction. No one could 
have imagined that would have happened when we started out six or seven years ago.”147 
 
Many involved in the process also have thought about what potentially might happen if the 
land exchange does not go through. SITLA Associate Director of Administration John 
Andrews indicated that due to the “complex legal background surrounding the interpretation 
of the uniform appraisal standards for federal land acquisition,” appraisal of the trust lands 
included in the proposed land exchange will likely be difficult and controversial.148 Because 
of the importance of having the land’s value represented in the appraisals, SITLA Director 
Kevin Carter indicated, “If [SITLA is] going to pull lands out [of the proposed land exchange 
agreement], the Castle Valley lands will be some of the first we would pull out. They’re good 
leverage.” Planning and Zoning Commission and CRC member Richard Schwartz discussed 
his concerns, “If the land swap doesn’t happen, then we have to start thinking about what 
happens now. What, if any, of this work can be applied? Will [SITLA] still be amenable to 
picking up where we left off a year and a half or two years ago?”149 Many feel optimistic that 
the work that was done through the planning process could still serve as a basis for future 
discussions, even if the land exchange does not proceed. Laura Kamala expressed her 
positive feelings, “I think [the planning process] is something that could be revisited in the 
event that this land exchange option for some reason falls apart.”150 By no means is the land 
exchange guaranteed, and until it is finalized, the future of trust land in Castle Valley remains 
undecided. 
 
UPDATE ON LAND EXCHANGE PROCEEDINGS 
 
At the end of September 2005, Laura Kamala testified before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Resources Subcommittee that is reviewing the land exchange legislation. 
She also attended many Congressional Committee meetings in which the legislation was 
discussed, and to date the bill has gone through numerous rewrites. The full House Resources 





STATUS OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UTAH OPEN LANDS AND CRC 
 
After the planning process ended, the relationship between Utah Open Lands and CRC was 
dissolved and CRC is not currently active, due in part to the fact that the trust lands in Castle 
Valley are now included in the pending land exchange.152 
 
 
THE ANALYSIS: THE CASTLE VALLEY PLANNING PROCESS 
 
Analysis of the Castle Valley Planning Process reveals benefits, costs, challenges, facilitating 
factors and lessons learned, which will be identified and discussed in this section. This 
analysis is based on stakeholder observations and reflections, as well as the researchers’ 
external evaluation. 
 
Benefits of the Castle Valley Planning Process include improved understanding among 
stakeholders, development of a sense of ownership in the issue, provision of time for 
thoughtful decision making, increased trust land value, positive conservation outcomes, 
increased town government capacity to manage growth and the formation of effective 
professional and personal relationships. The planning process also imposed substantial time, 
financial, opportunity and emotional costs for those involved.  
 
In addition, planning process members encountered significant challenges during the 
planning effort, which include mutually exclusive objectives, the newness of the process, the 
unique nature of school trust land, mixed success with community outreach, confusion about 
the role of the town in the collaborative process, water quality and quantity issues, 
personality conflicts and maintaining momentum in times of impasse.  
 
Facilitating factors that helped the Castle Valley Planning Process continue include 
partnerships, establishing common ground and shared goals, shared experiences and joint 
fact-finding. 
 
Finally, lessons learned from the Castle Valley Planning Process include the importance of 
clearly defining participants’ roles and responsibilities, ensuring that legally appropriate 
stakeholders are represented and legal sideboards and requirements are understood, engaging 
in joint risk taking and compromise, having professional, neutral and knowledgeable 
facilitation, utilizing formal and informal leadership opportunities and recognizing the effect 
of unequal power relationships in motivating and hindering the process. 
 
WAS THE CASTLE VALLEY PLANNING PROCESS COLLABORATIVE? 
 
Participants in the Castle Valley Planning Process expressed mixed feelings regarding the 
collaborative nature of the process. Most participants felt that though the process was 
collaborative overall, there were elements and periods of time when the collaborative effort 
broke down. SITLA Assistant Director Ric McBrier remembered, “We collaborated; there is 
no question about that.”153 Utah Open Lands Executive Director Wendy Fisher added, “It 
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depends on how you define collaboration … There were definitely parts where I felt it was a 
complete collaboration. Then there were times when it seemed like it wasn’t about protecting 
the land, it wasn’t about planning, we weren’t sure what it really was about.”154  
 
While the planning process began as a collaborative effort, it reached a stalemate toward the 
end when the planning contract was not completed. As a result, many participants felt that 
the process became less collaborative. CRC and Town Council member Karen Nelson 
recalled, “[The planning process] was collaborative for the vast majority of the time. At the 
end, it broke down because a few people pulled a power move within the community.”155 
CRC and Planning and Zoning Commission member Richard Schwartz echoed the sentiment 
that the planning process “became less collaborative and more contentious as it went 
along.”156 Some Castle Valley residents believed the origins of the process were 
collaborative but that the town’s legal responsibilities were not considered, making the entire 
process less collaborative. Planning and Zoning Commission Chair Catherine Howells 
recalled, “The discussion of the plan was collaborative, but the end result, since it so 
thoroughly fell apart, was not collaborative. The process didn’t include the reality of town 
government.” 
 
Breadth of Stakeholders: A wide range of stakeholders was represented in the Castle 
Valley Planning Process, although there were some groups and individuals whose added 
involvement could have increased the success of the process. In particular, the process could 
have benefited if the Town Council and Planning and Zoning Commission had been involved 
more directly and clearly from the outset and if a broader range of community members had 
been represented in CRC. 
 
The town government’s limited and sometimes unclear involvement caused some challenges 
to the process. According to some town government representatives, the planning group 
occasionally made decisions without the town’s full input, which resulted in overlooking the 
town’s legal perspective. Town Council member Jerry Bidinger noted that, “The town 
needed to have a more robust role from the very beginning to try to publicize what’s going 
on by having a community meeting.”157 Although facilitator Marty Zeller felt that the Mayor 
and other town representatives were involved to some degree throughout the process, he 
agreed that “the town, through its elected representatives could have been more forcefully 
represented in the process.”158 SITLA Director Kevin Carter also acknowledged that the 
breadth of stakeholders represented may have been deficient when it came to the local 
government: 
 
Although [SITLA representatives] felt like we were working with a 
representative sampling of the community there, it turned out that the local 
planning and the local leaders were not affiliated with the collaboration … and 
did not feel that they were committed to any of the agreements that the 
collaboration had made with us regarding our land in Castle Valley.159 
 
Attempts to include all the governing bodies in the collaborative process may not have been 




The Planning Commission was not included in the collaborative process, and 
could not have been … The Planning Commission’s charter is to look at the 
well-being of the whole town and to take requests from developers, so that it 
would be a conflict of interest for the Planning Commission to help with the 
development plan.160 
 
While some participants disagree about how involved the Planning and Zoning Commission 
could have been, the fact that there was a lack of consensus about the town’s role 
underscores the importance of understanding the legal restrictions under which each of the 
affected stakeholders must operate. Mayor Bruce Keeler noted, “You’ve got to know that 
your collaborative group is representative of the overall community, because you could go 
through all the collaborative efforts you want, but if the group representing the community is 
not accepted, then it’s all for nothing.”161 In general, having broader representation of some 
of the residents of Castle Valley, such as members from the Seventh Day Adventist 
community and the Church of Latter Day Saints community, could have added to the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the planning group.162 However, some planning group 
participants felt that community members who chose not to be involved in the process did so 
consciously – a fact that may have precluded broader representation from the community.163 
 
Despite some of the real or perceived deficiencies in achieving a complete range of 
stakeholder representation, overall many of the interested parties were involved, and the 
process benefited from their range of experiences and perspectives. 
 
Degree of Transparency: The level of transparency in the process varied over time. 
Participants shared information freely in general, but sometimes the inner workings of each 
individual entity (SITLA, town of Castle Valley, CRC) were such that they conducted their 
own decision-making processes that were not always clear to members of the other groups. 
For example, Town Council member Jerry Bidinger recognized that the town often made its 
own decisions: 
 
Once I was involved, most of the decisions the town made it made on its own. 
[The town] gave SITLA the opportunity to comment on the kinds of 
ordinances we wanted and on the positions we were taking, but at the end of 
the day, it was our obligation to make a decision as an incorporated 
municipality.164 
 
However, CRC often had difficulties making its actions visible to the general community of 
Castle Valley, as well. Bidinger remembered his experiences with CRC meetings:  
 
One of the problems with having a number of citizens get together and pursue 
issues on their own is that their activities can be unknown to a substantial 
body of the community. It’s hard enough for a town, or any government to 
communicate to all its citizens and tell them what’s going on, let alone 
convince them you’re doing the right thing. When you’re a private group of 
individuals, the opportunities for a broad range of communication is even less. 
It was a little bit difficult to figure out what was going on. I went to meetings 
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and I’d see some people and get a sense of what was happening, and when I 
got invited to [another] meeting, then I could see who the core people were.165 
 
Members of the planning process sometimes felt that the Planning and Zoning Commission 
was not always forthright with their activities as well. CRC leader Laura Kamala recalled her 
frustration with not knowing exactly what was going on when the Planning and Zoning 
Commission was working on the ordinances: 
 
As much as possible, to the best of our ability, [the planning group] kept 
hanging in there as the town went through its motions with the town attorney 
… they really went off and tried to do a separate thing from my perspective 
when that started to happen. I kept waiting for feedback from them. “What are 
you doing? Could I see what you’re doing with the town attorney? How will it 
all fit with what we’re trying to do here?” There were schisms happening.166 
 
The lack of transparency perhaps contributed to the disintegration of the planning process as 
it continued. CRC member Cris Coffey recognized that while CRC worked to communicate 
with the broader community, sometimes they were not totally successful, “We tried hard to 
keep the community abreast of what was going on. And some people had a vast interest in 
what we were doing, and others, I don’t know that they really realized what was going on. I 
think that’s often the case in communities like this.”167 
 
Degree of Influence on Decision Making: The stakeholders involved in the process had a 
fairly high degree of influence over the decision-making process, since the planning process 
and contract were based on the input of all the parties, through a long and detailed effort. 
Even though the contract was never signed, three important conservation transactions 
occurred on trust land in the Valley, which illustrates the influence the planning process has 
had on the future of at least some of the Castle Valley trust land. Furthermore, a land 
exchange involving the remainder of Castle Valley trust land is pending because of the 
groundwork that was laid through the process. Jerry Bidinger articulated what could have 
occurred if the process had not taken place: 
 
The outcome could have been that without community involvement at all and 
any give and take, that SITLA not knowing what the community’s interests 
are could have pursued a course of action that would have been inconsistent 
with community’s interests and would have created ill will and bad feeling 
between SITLA and the town.168 
 
Had the planning process not occurred, trust land in the Valley could have been auctioned by 
SITLA piece by piece over time, upsetting the community and leading to political unrest and 
potentially jeopardizing SITLA’s reputation. If all trust land in the Valley were developed in 
the same fashion as the existing development, the population of the town could have nearly 
doubled, placing a strain on the environment and town infrastructure. Laura Kamala 
recognized what might have occurred without the planning process, “If those 4,000 acres [of 
trust land] you see out there were developed into a town the size of the already existing town, 
the effect of what could happen to this community would be tremendous.”169 Because the 
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collaborative planning process occurred in Castle Valley, up to this point the decisions made 
by SITLA have been influenced by community input, increasing the chance that these 
decisions will be supported in the future. 
 
BENEFITS OF THE PROCESS 
 
Although the planning contract was never signed, the planning process resulted in several 
benefits and positive outcomes that were identified by various stakeholders in the process. 
These benefits included improved understanding, an increased sense of ownership, time for 




The planning process created an opportunity to build understanding among participants, 
particularly about SITLA’s mandate and the nature of trust lands in Utah. A well-known 
problem is that the general public rarely understands the intricacies of school trust lands. 
According to Laura Kamala, “Most people don’t realize that when they look out, they’re 
looking at state trust lands scattered all over the federal lands. They don’t get it.”170 Through 
this process, however, an education process occurred. According to SITLA Director Kevin 
Carter: 
 
Some of the people that were involved in the collaboration certainly 
understand who we [SITLA] are better, they understand what our respective 
mandates, tasks and obligations are, and as a result of that, some of those 
individuals have been very helpful in unrelated activities that we’ve done. 
There was certainly an education process and some bridge-building that went 
on there.171 
 
In addition to increasing the community’s understanding of SITLA’s mandate, the planning 
process enabled all participants to openly express their ideas and learn from each other. Jerry 
Bidinger recalled: 
 
A lot of different viewpoints were aired openly with a full presentation of 
emotion and passion and commitment to a lifestyle, of the state’s needs and of 
the obligations from both sides. I think there was a pretty frank, free and open 
exchange of attitudes and opinions, which is really healthy and important. 
That interchange went on for a substantial period of time. It wasn’t just one 
afternoon on a phone call. It stretched out for a couple of years.172 
 
Because of these interactions, planning process participants from CRC, the town and SITLA 
understood each other in a more meaningful way than before. 
 
Increased Sense of Ownership among Participants 
 
By engaging in the Castle Valley Planning Process, the participants developed a sense of 
ownership of the issue. The joint decision-making process enabled meaningful participation 
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of all involved and allowed everyone to play a key role. In considering her involvement in 
the CRC after learning of the sale of the Parriott Mesa parcel, Cris Coffey noted the 
empowerment she experienced through being involved in the process, “I gained a sense that 
there was something I could do rather than just waiting for what seemed like a very bad thing 
to happen.”173 The planning process also allowed the community and SITLA to be proactive 
about problems facing the community.  
 
The sense of ownership was particularly evident among community members involved in the 
process and those who observed it as it progressed, who had previously thought that issues 
involving state agencies could not involve small communities such as Castle Valley. Laura 
Kamala recalled discussing the process with Ron Drake, a leader in the local Church of the 
Latter Day Saints and the author of “The Castle Valley Comments,” a column in the Moab 
Times-Independent newspaper. Although Drake was not a direct participant in the process, he 
often observed the events as they unfolded. 
 
I had this conversation with [Ron Drake] one day, and he thanked [the 
planning group]. He said, “I knew about the state lands situation. I worried 
about it, but I didn’t think there was anything we could do. You’ve shown me 
that as a community we can engage with State Trust Lands; we can relate with 
them; we can say what we want.” He had no idea that was even possible. He 
was really very happy and was very supportive of the process when we were 
in it.174 
 
Provided Time for Thoughtful and Creative Decision Making 
 
The planning process also allowed time for the community and SITLA to make well-
informed, thoughtful decisions that addressed the concerns of everyone involved. During the 
four-year process, the participants were able to take the time to conduct extensive mapping of 
the Valley’s resources and development potential, which would not have occurred had the 
planning process not been initiated.175 The mapping information helped the group make 
informed decisions about what type of development would be appropriate for the trust land in 
the Valley by taking into consideration environmental constraints and coming up with 
creative development schemes that minimized the impact on the landscape.176 The time spent 
in the planning process also resulted in reducing the number of potential development units 
on the trust land from 884 to 207 without decreasing the value of the land.177  
 
From the community’s perspective, the planning process also slowed the development 
process and bought time for fundraising, enabling them to successfully purchase trust land 
for conservation purposes. Karen Nelson agreed that “The process was a success because it 
slowed everything down” and enabled the community to take the time to raise funds to 
purchase trust land around Parriott Mesa, Castleton Tower and critical wildlife habitat. From 
the town’s perspective, the process provided time to revise the land use ordinances, which 
were very out of date. Catherine Howells articulated the importance of having time to update 
the ordinances, “Part of me looks at [the process] and says thank you so much for doing this 




Increased Value and a Financial Return from the Trust Land 
 
From SITLA’s perspective, one of the primary benefits of the collaborative planning process 
was the increase in trust land value that resulted from an investment in planning and creating 
development options for the land.179 By creating a development plan for the area rather than 
selling the land in its raw form, future developers would have preapproved development 
rights and limited community opposition, and the value of trust land in the Valley would be 
increased substantially. In addition, the money made from the three conservation transactions 
(Parriott Mesa, Castleton Tower and the critical wildlife habitat) all contributed to SITLA’s 
financial portfolio that provides funding to the beneficiaries.180 
 
The conservation transactions had the added benefit of possibly serving as the baseline for 
comparable sales that could be used in future appraisal of trust lands, including appraisals for 
the land exchange. SITLA Assistant Director Ric McBrier indicated that “even though the 
planning contract may not have been formally adopted by the town, the plan will probably 
still create value for the trust in the exchange with the federal government because there has 
been planning done for the property.”181 Moreover, the value of trust land surrounding 
conserved parcels is increased by simply being adjacent to conserved land.182 John Andrews, 
the Associate Director for SITLA’s Administration, underscored the importance of realizing 
the revenue-generation potential of the land, “We can collaboratively plan, but at the end of 
the day, we have to be looking at revenue generating potential. Money is it.”183 Facilitator 
Marty Zeller remembered that the process allowed SITLA to generate revenue through non-
development options, something that had not been attempted in the past. “What we 
demonstrated in this whole process was that non-development can produce an economic 
return that may be as great or greater than you can [produce] from a development 
solution.”184 
 
Positive Conservation Outcomes 
 
Three successful conservation initiatives resulted from the planning process including the 
protection of 60 acres at the base of Parriott Mesa that were purchased from the developers 
and 217.3 acres at base of Castleton Tower and 530 acres of critical wildlife habitat that were 
purchased directly from SITLA. The purchased land is valuable from a conservation 
perspective because it provides crucial wildlife habitat for La Sal Mule Deer and other 
species, recreation opportunities for hikers, climbers and mountain bikers, areas for aquifer 
recharge and open space and scenic views, all of which are highly valued by the community. 
In discussing the land at the base of Parriott Mesa and Castleton Tower, Jerry Bidinger noted, 
“If CRC and Utah Open Lands didn’t get involved, I don’t know what would have happened 
to those two pieces of land.”185 Wendy Fisher emphasized the centrality of the planning 
process in the conservation outcomes. “The planning process served to put these lands on the 
radar screen for the community, for the state, for the [SITLA] Administration, for Utah Open 
Lands and for the conservation community at large.”186 CRC leader Dave Erley articulated 
the importance of the Castleton Tower Preservation Initiative in particular: 
 
This purchase at Castleton Tower was the first time that [SITLA] had sold 
“developable lands” for conservation, so they weren’t in the habit of doing 
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this kind of deal. We had to break a lot of inertia within the organization, and 
having the collaboration certainly was highly advantageous to being able to do 
that.187 
 
The Castleton Tower Preservation Initiative was a conservation success because of the 
amount and quality of land it protected, the collaborative efforts it initiated by involving 
people all around the world who contributed to fundraising efforts and the symbolic 
precedent it set by illustrating that highly-valued trust land can be conserved. 
 
In addition to setting aside valuable land for conservation, the planning process had the 
added effect of changing communities’ perceptions of what is possible in the realm of 
community-based conservation efforts. Fisher recalled: 
 
A lot of people know about what happened in Castle Valley, and I think a lot 
of people see it as a template for guiding their own destiny. That just because 
something happens, it doesn’t mean it has to be that way. I think that is a 
benefit for all conservation, quite frankly. That is a benefit for all communities 
who want to strive to have uniqueness, to continue to have vitality and 
economic sustainability in the future and to not just become Anytown, 
U.S.A.188 
 
Increased Town Government Capacity to Manage Growth 
 
The Castle Valley Planning Process served to increase the town’s understanding of 
development and their ability to address growth issues in their community. As a fairly young, 
small town that had never faced development pressure before, the town of Castle Valley was 
fairly informal in its land use regulations and governmental structure prior to the planning 
process. This informality is not unusual for smaller, rural communities in the West. 
According to Karen Nelson, “That’s one of the issues when you have an established rural 
community. Sometimes there’s not the understanding of what growth is and what it does to 
your life.”189 Nelson added that “because of the urgency of getting involved in the process 
because they were talking about auctioning off these lands, we just jumped in, but we 
weren’t really prepared. I think a lot of rural communities aren’t prepared in their zoning.”190  
 
Both the town’s zoning ordinances and its general plan needed to be updated in the face of 
increasing growth pressures and to comply with Utah law. Mayor Bruce Keeler remarked, 
“This was the first time we were coming up against [development pressure]. For the 
community, it was a big learning curve. It helped bring us up in the way we deal with 
things.”191 Catherine Howells was primarily responsible for researching and working on the 
new ordinances. She noted that through the process of revising these ordinances, “We 
learned … a whole lot. As a town we became more sophisticated in land use and asking the 
questions we’re asking. This is a very positive outcome.”192 If it had not been for the external 
impetus of the planning process, the town would not have felt the need to increase the 
sophistication of their land use ordinances or their general procedure for dealing with 




Established Relationships that Laid the Groundwork for Future Activities 
 
One of the most important and beneficial outcomes was establishment of effective 
professional and personal relationships. Laura Kamala noted that, “In any collaborative 
process, the single most important thing is the relationships between the people involved.”193 
Cris Coffey echoed Kamala’s sentiment, “[The planning process] was a chance to spend 
really productive time with lots of people I love, my very close friends, and to do something 
important.”194  
 
The relationships that developed through the process included those among planning process 
participants and those with outside organizations. One of the most important relationships 
was between the community and SITLA. Kamala recalled, “Relationship building [between 
SITLA and the community] was a big part of doing this whole process, so that [the 
community] could do business with [SITLA] so we could have our ultimate conservation 
goal and also honor their mandate which is to raise money for the school trust.”195  
 
According to Mayor Keeler, working relationships between members of the community also 
developed that had not previously existed. “[The planning process] really opened the 
community up to each other. We had people working together who would hardly sit at the 
same table before that. It really helped to unite the community quite a bit.”196 For facilitator 
Marty Zeller, the planning process helped him develop an effective working relationship with 
SITLA that led to being hired to work on additional projects for the agency.197 SITLA 
Assistant Director Ric McBrier said that being able to work with local communities is 
extremely important to his work: “The opportunity to get to know communities, to engage 
the communities and to make a difference in the communities is a large part of what has kept 
me working [at SITLA].”198 Planning participants also developed working relationships with 
outside organizations, particularly during the Castleton Tower Preservation Initiative in 
which several organizations such as the Outdoor Industry Association and the Access Fund 
partnered with CRC and Utah Open Lands to raise funds to purchase the land at the base of 
Castleton Tower.199 
 
The relationships formed through the planning process, both between individual members of 
the group and with outside institutions, were instrumental in reaching creative solutions 
throughout the process. Zeller commented that the process “has produced a lot of 
relationships that led to some creative deals that made things happen that wouldn’t have 
happened otherwise.”200 In particular, Zeller noted that “the process identified a range of 
tools and techniques to conserve land that neither the town nor SITLA knew about.”201 The 
most important groundwork that was laid through the process was the relationship building, 
which enhanced the community’s knowledge about the trust lands mandate, provided the 
opportunity to conduct conservation transactions on trust land and encouraged SITLA’s 








COSTS OF THE PROCESS 
 
Although there were several benefits resulting from the planning process, many stakeholders 
acknowledged that they incurred significant costs, as well. These costs include time, financial 
resources, lost opportunities and emotional energy and strained relationships. 
 
Volunteer and Staff Time 
 
Given the length of the process, time was a major cost for all involved. The process began 
around 2000 after the community and SITLA agreed to jointly work on a planning process 
following the sale of the Parriott Mesa parcel. While the planning process ended in 2004, 
some of the participants continue to work on the land exchange today. 
 
The planning process involved a series of meetings, many of which required a great deal of 
time, including preparation time, travel time and time spent during the actual meetings. 
Meetings throughout the process were held in Castle Valley, Salt Lake City, Boulder and 
Denver, and many participants traveled to meeting locations throughout the process. The 
process began with an initial charrette, led by Conservation Partners facilitators who gathered 
community input about a range of issues.203 In addition to the initial charrette, the project 
team and CRC held a series of meetings with specific stakeholder groups within the 
community, including the Property Owners Association, the Seventh Day Adventist 
Academy, the Church of the Latter Day Saints community, climbers and recreationists.204 
Zeller led meetings throughout the planning process in which CRC members, Utah Open 
Lands representatives, town officials and SITLA discussed the goals, direction and progress 
of the planning process.205  
 
The planning group also held two open houses in Castle Valley, in which any interested party 
could attend.206 During the first open house, Conservation Partners presented a series of maps 
and overlay data illustrating the various issues. They also presented their preliminary 
development options based on the data and sought community input and reactions to the 
recommendations.207 Following a series of negotiations with the planning group and 
incorporation of the feedback received from the first open house, Conservation Partners led a 
second open house in which a more final plan was presented to the community for 
comment.208 Zeller emphasized the amount of time needed to successfully complete a 
process of this scope. He stated, “Don’t underestimate the amount of community interaction 
time that will be necessary to get to a constructive solution and the amount of time that it’s 
going to take getting the parties in front of each other so that they can build trust and 
communicate effectively.”209  
 
Most of those involved from the community of Castle Valley, particularly those involved in 
CRC, volunteered their time and were not compensated. Utah Open Lands Executive 
Director Wendy Fisher estimated, “for community members engaged in the process … they 
probably spent 75 to 80 percent of their time, and I could not tell you how much of their time 
is spent today, though I know many of the individuals in the Valley are very engaged in 
ongoing land issues.”210 CRC board members met once or twice a month for a period of two 
or three years during the planning process, during which board members opened their houses 
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to hold the meetings.211 Laura Kamala and Dave Erley, the organizers of the community’s 
involvement in the process, worked at least 20 hours per week throughout the process and 
often much more.212 They were compensated for part of the time they spent working on the 
process, after they were hired by Utah Open Lands.213 
 
Members of the local government, including those on the Planning and Zoning Commission 
and the Town Council, volunteered their time as well, or were paid only part time. During the 
planning process, town representatives’ typical time commitments increased. CRC and 
Planning and Zoning Commission member Richard Schwartz recalled, “There were times 
when the Planning and Zoning Commission met two or three times a month, as opposed to 
once a month.”214 
 
Similarly, many of the other organizations involved dedicated a significant number of staff 
hours to the process. Ric McBrier, the key representative from SITLA, spent a great deal of 
time working on the process and frequently presented material to SITLA’s Board of Trustees, 
who consequently also spent time on the process.215 Utah Open Lands also spent a significant 
amount time on the process. Executive Director Wendy Fisher estimated the organization’s 
contribution: 
 
From a Utah Open Lands perspective, a tremendous amount of organizational 
time was spent on the planning process, fundraising for individual pieces [of 
land] and the negotiation of those properties. From 2000 when we worked on 
the first piece to 2003 when we entered into a contract for the critical winter 
range piece, an average of 60 to 70 percent of the organization’s time was 
spent in Castle Valley. Today, Utah Open Lands employs one individual who 





Those involved in the process invested a great deal of financial resources in the planning 
process, as well as the conservation initiatives and transactions that resulted. These costs 
were shared among process participants. Prior to the planning process’ formal beginning, 
several community members from Castle Valley paid for much of the pre-planning activities 
themselves, such as initial maps, without being reimbursed.217 Multiple stakeholders 
contributed to the various planning process expenses once it began, including paying the 
planners, engaging in the mapping activities, conducting the hydrological study, funding land 
appraisals and paying for staff time. As a rough estimate, Mayor Keeler guessed that overall, 
“there was probably a quarter of a million dollars spent on the planning process.”218  
 
The costs of hiring Conservation Partners were shared among the town of Castle Valley, 
SITLA and CRC as a branch of Utah Open Lands. The town obtained a state planning grant 
to assist in their portion of the payment, and CRC and Utah Open Lands received a grant 
from the Sonoran Institute.219 SITLA Assistant Director Ric McBrier estimated that the 
organization “spent in excess of $100,000” on the planning process itself.220 Utah Open 
Lands’ costs included CRC expenses and payroll, project and fundraising management costs 
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and appraisal and negotiating costs which amounted to approximately $50,000 per year 
during the process.221 Funds for these expenses came from grants from a variety of 
organizations, including the Sonoran Institute, Patagonia and Tides Foundation.222 
 
In addition to the direct expenses of the planning process, a great deal of fundraising 
occurred to purchase the three conservation areas. The land at the base of Parriott Mesa was 
purchased by Utah Open Lands for $192,000, the Castleton Tower parcel was purchased by 
Utah Open Lands with CRC as a branch organization for $640,000, and the critical wildlife 
habitat was purchased by Utah Open Lands and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources for 
$954,000.223 All of the funds for these properties were raised through extensive fundraising 





Several of the participating organizations had to weigh their involvement in the Castle Valley 
Planning Process against many other activities in which they could engage. Jason Keith, 
Policy Director for the Access Fund which was one of the contributors to the Castleton 
Tower Preservation Initiative, stated, “There are always opportunity costs when you focus on 
one issue and you can’t focus on another.”225 For the Access Fund, whose mission is to keep 
access to climbing areas open and to conserve those areas, maintaining access to Castleton 
Tower clearly fit within the scope of the organization’s work. However, as an organization 
participating in the Castleton Tower Preservation Initiative, Keith recognized that the Access 
Fund had to ensure that this task would not take resources away from other programs. He 
also needed to reassure the organization’s board that it was not setting a precedent for 
preserving viewsheds, which would be outside the realm of the organization’s mission. 
 
Utah Open Lands Executive Director Wendy Fisher echoed Keith’s sentiment, noting that 
when an organization focuses most of its time and energy on one issue, it has to ensure that 
the activity fits the mission of the organization and does not take away from energies that 
should be directed towards other areas. For Utah Open Lands, the Castleton Tower 
Preservation Initiative was only one issue related to the organization’s mission of conserving 
land and open space in the state of Utah. Being involved in Castle Valley limited the amount 
of energy and resources that the organization could spend on other projects across the state. 
Fisher commented, “The Castleton Tower Preservation Initiative was the sole land 
preservation project for the organization for two years. Land preservation and the 
stewardship of the three parcels Utah Open Lands owns will continue forever.”226 
 
Emotional Energy Spent and Strained Relationships 
 
Many involved in the process also viewed the process as imposing less tangible costs, 
including emotional energy and strained interpersonal relationships. Richard Schwartz 
described these costs. “There were some friendships at least strained and maybe in some 
instances ruined or severely stressed … and that’s not a success.”227 Wendy Fisher echoed 
this saying, “You get personally involved. It can be emotional, and it can be draining, and 




The delicacy of interpersonal relationships and the strain on emotional energy was 
particularly salient for those participants who lived in the community of Castle Valley, since 
they had to face their neighbors every day.229 Indeed, toward the end of the process, it 
seemed that relationships among some of the town members and members of the planning 
process became strained to the point of interference with the process. Margaret Bird, a 
Beneficiary Representative at the State of Utah Office of Education, noted that sometimes the 
emotional strain of these issues stems from the fact that they are about larger issues relating 
to land and people’s experiences with it. “It disturbs people because it disturbs how they 
view life. It’s about a bigger, global issue. It’s about land and people’s strong personal ties to 
that land.”230 In the Castle Valley Planning Process, people’s ties to the land were clearly 
very strong, and oftentimes this feeling manifested itself in difficult interpersonal 
relationships. 
 
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 
 
Participants also faced challenges in the process of collaborating, including having mutually 
exclusive objectives, achieving mixed success with community outreach and trying to 
understand the role of the town in the collaborative process. 
 
Mutually Exclusive Objectives and the Challenge of Finding Common Ground 
 
One of the most challenging elements of the process was the perception, and at times the 
reality, that the stakeholders possessed diametrically-opposed perspectives. In essence, 
SITLA’s goal was to maintain the value of their lands and obtain revenue from them through 
development or another revenue-generating activity. The community’s goal, on the other 
hand, was to maintain open space and prevent development from occurring. While SITLA 
wanted to increase the value of trust land in the Valley, the community did not want the land 
to increase in value, because they were concerned that they would then be unable to afford to 
purchase the land according to the plan. Marty Zeller articulated this well: “I don’t know if 
[Conservation Partners] had worked anywhere else where the two sides came at this from 
more diametrically-opposed viewpoints.”231 The participants’ opposing viewpoints often 
stalled the process and led to mistrust. 
 
Throughout the process, however, the group discovered that their positions might not be 
mutually exclusive. They made a breakthrough early in the process when they discovered 
that SITLA’s mandate was not necessarily to develop the land but to generate revenue from 
the land, and that generating revenue does not necessitate development. This discovery was 
key to overcoming the perception that the stakeholders had mutually exclusive positions and 
enabled the conservation initiatives to serve both the revenue needs of SITLA and the open 
space interests of the community. Furthermore, although the community’s stated goals were 
to totally prevent development, Laura Kamala noted that the community discussed some 
flexibility there as well. She stated, “Aside from having the ultimate goal of finding a 100 
percent conservation solution … if that wasn’t possible, then we wanted to have the best 
possible development scenario on the lands.”232 The goal of developing a plan that was 
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acceptable for all involved was critical to establishing common ground. This goal was 
achievable because of the willingness of participants to compromise. 
 
Once common ground was established, participants faced the challenge of developing a 
shared commitment to finding a solution. Marty Zeller emphasized the need for people who 
were engaged in the process and mentioned the difficulty of having some who were not 
committed: 
 
You need to have constructive, engaged people as part of these processes. 
This process if anything showed that if you have individuals involved who 
want to derail the process and are not committed to a constructive solution, 
they can be very detrimental to positive outcomes. Having constructive 
attitudes and believing in the process are important.233 
 
Many of the process participants were constructive and engaged, but some however, seemed 
to obstruct the process at points. This fact was particularly evident when the role of the town 
was unclear and members of the town government and members of CRC and SITLA became 
adversarial. 
 
The Newness of the Process 
 
The Castle Valley Planning Process was a new experience for most individuals and 
organizations involved. It was also precedent-setting because it was not only the first time 
SITLA had engaged with a community in a joint planning effort but also the first time 
developable trust lands had been sold for conservation purposes in Utah. SITLA Associate 
Director John Andrews noted that collaborative planning was new to SITLA at the time of 
the Castle Valley Planning Process, though the agency has been involved in similar 
collaborative processes since that time.234 Mayor Keeler also recognized that the process was 
new for Castle Valley: 
 
We’re going to have our 20th anniversary as a town in November [2005]. 
Besides the planning process, we’re learning each year how government 
functions. We don’t have a long history of how you deal with things. In most 
cases, you make just small changes. We don’t have any details or parameters 
upon which to base our decisions.235 
 
According to Wendy Fisher, Utah Open Lands had been involved in collaborative processes 
before, but this process was different: 
 
This [planning process] was really different because of the starting point. 
There were a lot of things that hadn’t been done before. I don’t know that the 
community had a master plan prior to the process, and there hadn’t been a 
need to look at what would happen if we had large-scale onslaught 
development in this community … SITLA also hadn’t negotiated a 
developable piece of property with a conservation organization before. It was 
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also the first time Utah Open Lands bought a property back from the brink of 
development.236 
 
Because the collaborative effort was a fairly new endeavor on SITLA’s part and because the 
town of Castle Valley was also inexperienced in collaborative planning, the process required 
communication regarding the various limitations and abilities of the stakeholders to 
participate in the process. 
 
The Unique Nature of School Trust Lands 
 
Because of SITLA’s mandate to manage trust lands for the financial benefit of the public 
schools and other beneficiaries, the financial outcome of the process was a necessity. Unlike 
other federal or state land management agencies whose lands are designated for multiple 
uses, trust land management is designated for the sole financial support of its beneficiaries. 
While this mandate posed some restrictions on SITLA’s ability to consider conservation 
options in the process, it also allowed for some flexibility in entering into collaborative 
agreements – a flexibility that is not enjoyed by other federal or state agencies that are bound 
by a set of strict procedures and rules. SITLA Assistant Director Ric McBrier stated that 
SITLA is “absolutely” more flexible and able to collaborate with local communities than 
federal government agencies.237 According to McBrier, “If a professional manager [at 
SITLA] can see that [a collaborative approach] is in the beneficiaries’ best interest, and how 
do you figure that out without probing into it, then theoretically we should be free to do 
it.”238 In discussing the difficulties the federal government faces in making land use decisions 
that involve local communities, Beneficiary Representative Margaret Bird contrasted the 
ability of federal government agencies and SITLA to collaborate: 
 
We’ve created a situation where things are frozen in the current [with federal 
agencies]. We’ve made it impossible for them to do administrative land 
exchanges and impossible for federal officials to come in and collaborate. 
However, Trust Lands can collaborate because [the legislature has] set their 
rules up pretty liberally.239 
 
However, not all participants in the planning process felt that SITLA’s mandate encouraged 
collaboration. Mayor Keeler recalled some of the challenges the mandate posed for the 
process: 
 
I think the mandate’s kind of a hindrance. It does not allow for looking at the 
highest and best use very readily. I think that’s why Ric [McBrier] had to fight 
with the [SITLA] Board. I will say that Ric really worked this process. He 
tried very hard to make this thing work, and I think he was very invested in it. 
Unfortunately, in the world that Ric functions in, by not having the deal done 
at the end, was a hard thing to accept and for the Board to accept. I think that 
their mandate makes it very hard to do this.240 
 
SITLA’s mandate both allowed for collaboration and posed some restrictions over it. 
However, in contrast to federal agencies governed by a more cumbersome set of restrictions, 
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SITLA had a unique ability to consider and engage in a collaborative effort with the 
community. 
 
The Challenge of Community Outreach 
 
The lack of full involvement from the community was perhaps due to the urgency from 
which the process originated, the lack of effective mechanisms for communication in the 
Valley and the deeply individualistic nature of many members of the community.241 Because 
residents involved in the process were not totally effective at reaching out to the greater 
Castle Valley community, the process suffered. 
 
Urgency of the Process 
The urgency from which the process emerged contributed to the difficulty in community 
outreach. The process was a reaction to the perceived crisis of the sale of land at the base of 
Parriott Mesa. The community quickly formed CRC as a result, which may have precluded 
full involvement from all members of the community who may not have been notified from 
the outset. Many CRC members remembered that when the group initially formed, each 
member called his or her friends and neighbors to alert them to the issue.242 However, this 
informal phone tree method of reaching out to the community may not have been the most 
effective way to reach out to all members of the community.  
 
Lack of Effective Communications Mechanisms 
The lack of efficient methods of communications in the Valley also may have contributed to 
the challenge of community outreach. Castle Valley is a remote and quiet town with few 
mechanisms for effective communication among its 350 residents. For example, there is no 
phone book designated for Castle Valley.243 Internet access is available in the Valley, but 
residents’ email addresses are not posted. The town and CRC post notices about planning 
process meetings and other information at the entrance to town on a bulletin board where the 
mailboxes are located, but this method has its limitations as community members often do 
not read the notices. In addition, information presented in Ron Drake’s column in the Times-
Independent was not always read by all interested parties.244 Cris Coffey reflected on Castle 
Valley’s communication methods and how they affected community outreach, “Although the 
first [CRC] meetings were quite large, it was hard to know if everyone was represented … 
[CRC] just tried to put the word out. We put a note at the front gate, sometimes that’s a good 
place. We don’t have a really good communication system in the Valley.”245 
 
The fact that communications mechanisms are limited in Castle Valley created a challenge in 
accomplishing community outreach. Coffey described the difficulty that having limited 
communications caused, “It’s always important to involve and include everyone. Sometimes 
it seems like the same people are the ones who are involved in everything … Some people 
never seem to get involved, and some seem to get over involved in everything.”246 
 
Individualistic Nature of Castle Valley 
The lack of effective outreach also may have stemmed from the nature of the community 
itself, which is comprised of a diverse group of individuals with varying backgrounds and 
perspectives. Laura Kamala articulated this challenge, “Every door you knock on you’d find 
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a strong opinion that’s different from the next. Trying to pull that together was a bit of a 
challenge.”247 Kamala continued in saying that even though she would bake pies to take to 
individuals in the community and try to engage them in the process, some people were still 
reticent to becoming involved. Mayor Keeler recalled that one of the reasons conducting 
effective outreach to the community was so difficult was because, “there are a number of 
people in this community who like to exclude themselves, who won’t work with so-and-
so.”248 The fact that many Castle Valley residents moved to the Valley to “get away from it 
all” may have also limited the full involvement from the community, particularly those who 
wished to remain uninvolved in seemingly political or environmental issues.  
 
Because of the urgency of the process, the lack of effective communications mechanisms and 
the individualistic nature of the community, many participants noted that outreach to the 
community was successful only to a point. Several participants noted that they wished the 
Church of the Latter Day Saints community and Seventh Day Adventist community members 
had participated to a greater extent, in addition to a more diverse representation from the 
community as a whole. Jerry Bidinger commented, “I would have liked to see more of the 
articulate, honest, decent, hardworking people in the Valley come out, but they didn’t. Some 
did, but a lot did not. You almost have to pry them out with a crowbar to get them to 
come.”249 
 
Some community members felt that communication and outreach were ineffective during the 
process. Planning and Zoning Commission Chair Catherine Howells was among those who 
did not feel particularly included in the process. “There wasn’t the real inclusion of the whole 
community, and that’s hard. It’s hard to get them engaged and it’s hard to listen to things you 
don’t want to hear. The propensity is always to not listen.”250 In describing her personal 
feelings about the process, Howells stated, “I wasn’t heard. If you weren’t part of the [CRC] 
group, you weren’t heard. They may have held meetings and presentations, but that wasn’t 
the level of involvement you need.”251 Despite the fact that not every member of the 
community participated in the process in an equal fashion, the leaders of the process felt that 
overall there was ample opportunity to participate and most of those who desired to 
participate were able to do so. 
 
The Appropriate Role of the Town 
 
Determining the town of Castle Valley’s legally appropriate role in the process was an 
obstacle. From the outset, the distinction between CRC’s role in the process and the town’s 
role as a governmental entity was not well established. At the beginning of the process, 
Mayor Keeler participated through CRC. But as the process continued, he was advised to 
separate himself from CRC and the planning process, and thus he and the town’s 
governmental representatives (including the Town Council and Planning and Zoning 
Commission) became more focused on the legal role of the town itself.252  
 
The town’s main objective during the planning process was to update its general plan and 
zoning ordinances. While this was separate from the planning process, SITLA and CRC were 
aware of the town’s efforts. Mayor Keeler noted, “It was made very clear to SITLA at the 
beginning of the process that the town would be developing on a separate track along with 
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this process, a subdivision master development ordinance.”253 In addition, several of the 
members of the Town Council and the Planning and Zoning Commission also were involved 
in the planning process as individuals, including Karen Nelson, Richard Schwartz and 
Brooke Williams. Because the town engaged in zoning and subdivision ordinance revisions 
separately from the planning process, a tenuous balance between commitment to the 
collaborative process and to the legal requirements to update zoning ordinances was present. 
According to CRC and Town Council member Karen Nelson, “It was very difficult to 
balance the community’s right and our obligation to take care of and protect our citizens … 
and our obligation to the collaborative process.”254 This balance was difficult to achieve 
because on the one hand, the town felt that it should recognize the work that was being done 
in the planning process, but on the other hand it had a legal requirement to govern future 
planning in the town.  
 
In the end, the town’s process precluded local officials from being able to forthrightly 
acknowledge the work that was being done in the planning process, and communications 
between the town and CRC and SITLA broke down as a result. Furthermore, the zoning 
ordinances included some elements of the plan developed through the planning process, but 
they included a greater level of detail and more requirements than were in the planning 
process document. This created additional tensions between those who thought that the town 
was correct in creating more stringent ordinances and those who thought that the town was 
not acting in good faith given the collaborative agreement.255 
 
The timing of the ordinance revisions upset some of the people involved in the collaborative 
planning process who felt it was unfair that the town engaged in this action. Some perceived 
the town’s actions as failing to comply with the agreements of the planning process. 
Facilitator Marty Zeller was among those who felt that the town government acted contrary 
to the planning agreements. He recalled: 
 
My read on it was that the town basically wasn’t willing to take the risk and 
they weren’t living up to the principles … When the town said, “Well, this is 
the way we’re going to play the game,” the game was rigged. It wasn’t a fair 
game anymore. That’s when the process really broke down … it really divided 
the town, and it was very challenging for everybody.256 
 
Jerry Bidinger was involved in the redrafting of the ordinances and felt that the process 
engaged by the town was quite fair. He discussed the importance of the ordinances to SITLA 
and the planning process in saying: 
 
Those ordinances were of substantial interest to SITLA. They created a 
planning process so that if one wants to develop land inside the town of Castle 
Valley, one has to go through a process of planning that lays forth a master 
development plan that has to be ultimately approved by the Town Council, 
and then after you go through that, go through the process of actually 
developing a project. This places a planning obligation on a developer and it 
creates obligations for a developer to ensure that the developer carries the 
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burden of water, sewer, streets, and that there be a certain amount of open 
space.257 
 
These changes were seen as important to protect the town’s citizens from bearing the burden 
of development. In a small community of only 350 residents, it was important to the town to 
ensure that the cost of infrastructure from any future development would be paid for by 
SITLA or the developer, rather than the residents of the town who might not be able to afford 
increased taxes or other fees. 
 
The Role of Water in the West 
 
Complications with water rights, quality and quantity also posed challenges to the planning 
process. As in most Western states, water in Utah is the limiting factor for development. The 
Castle Valley Planning Process addressed the issue of water from the outset. The 
understanding was that through the planning process, the town would provide the 
development, if it occurred, with access to its water rights. However, towards the end of the 
planning process, the town’s water rights were called into question because the records on 
water use were not up to date. In Utah, water rights are governed by a “use-it-or-lose-it” 
principle, whereby an entity owning water rights must prove every five years that it will use 
that amount annually.258  
 
The uncertainty surrounding the water rights, in addition to the town’s hesitance in 
committing itself to providing water for future development, caused a significant challenge to 
the process. Laura Kamala described the results of the hydrological study that examined the 
quality and quantity of Castle Valley’s aquifer, “The hydrological study showed that it would 
have been far wiser for the development … to be 15-acre, rather than five-acre lots.”259 
Because parts of the plan had assumed a minimum five acre lot size, some participants were 
concerned that portions of the planning would have to be redone. However, since financial 
resources were gone by the time the study results were reported, the plan was not revamped 
accordingly. Because Castle Valley’s aquifer was designated as a sole source aquifer by the 
EPA, the town had no choice but to ensure that its water be protected or else risk the 
contamination of the only source of water for its residents’ use.260 Catherine Howells 
expressed concern with the way that water issues were dealt with in the group’s plan, “If we 
had just accepted SITLA’s plan and not used our land use ordinances, we would have given 




Throughout the process, but particularly towards its end, personality differences were 
challenging. Many of the stakeholders in the process mentioned the difficulty of conflicts 
between individuals. Marty Zeller remembered that “there were personalities involved that 
were very difficult to work through.” These personality conflicts were often addressed 
through talking things out. CRC member Cris Coffey mentioned that conflicts were often 
addressed through thinking things through and by talking things out with one another, which 




Sometimes it is important to talk about something before you act. Because, a 
few times someone would get hot under the collar and say something just for 
the release of doing that. Then there was a lot of fence-mending to do. But 
that’s just because the process was so important to everyone.262 
 
Catherine Howells indicated that using facts to overcome the challenges of emotional 
reactions can be helpful: 
 
In true collaboration, you have to be willing to do a whole lot of talking and a 
whole lot of listening and try to get past the emotional stuff. I’m a great 
believer in presenting facts, thinking through the process, and always coming 
back to the scientific/legal facts … It cuts through a whole lot of the emotional 
stuff when you do that.263 
 
In the Castle Valley Planning Process, using shared mapping information to make decisions 
helped the group overcome emotional reactions in some cases. Facilitator Marty Zeller 
remembered: 
 
The biggest challenge was just getting people to sit down and interact and 
trust each other so they could discuss some options … I think that having 
people sitting down and interacting in an organized fashion, having everyone 
sitting at a table looking at maps together with the same information, helped 
build a level of trust about what was really going on with the land and what 
the options really were. That was probably the first key thing. The inventory 
and analysis of the site conditions helped both parties realize what you could 
do and what was probably not desirable to do.264 
 
Despite the fact that the group was able to overcome some emotional reactions about the trust 
land, the group still faced the challenge of overcoming personality differences, particularly 
those related to the town’s involvement in the process and its ordinance revisions. 
 
Maintaining Momentum and Overcoming Impasse 
 
Another challenge to the process was maintaining momentum when faced with hurdles that 
threatened to slow or stall the process. Many of these hurdles stemmed from the fact that the 
process was prolonged and required more work than originally expected. Although the group 
knew the effort would take a significant amount of time, a limited budget and unclear roles 
challenged the completion of the process.  
 
Marty Zeller voiced his concerns with limited funding sources, “The limitations are a result 
of the fact that there haven’t been enough resources dedicated to allow the process to work 
effectively. These things just take time to work through and be efficient. That’s certainly 
probably the key lesson.”265 In this case, most of the financial resources for the planners were 
gone by the time the hydrological results came in. As a result, resources were not available to 
address some of the challenges that were faced at the end of the process, including the need 




Maintaining momentum was particularly problematic at the end of the process, when it came 
to signing the planning contract. Because of confusion surrounding the role of the town’s 
zoning ordinances in the planning process, the process eventually lost momentum and 
participants were not able to regain forward motion. As a result, some members of the 




Several factors facilitated the collaborative planning process in Castle Valley. These included 





Partnerships were central to the planning process success, particularly in achieving 
conservation goals. The key partnership in this case was between CRC and Utah Open 
Lands, without which the process and the conservation initiatives would not have been as 
successful.267 Utah Open Lands provided an avenue for collecting donations for the 
conservation initiatives, helped spearhead a good deal of fundraising efforts, provided 
legitimacy for the new branch organization (CRC) and provided resources and networking 
during all three conservation transactions. CRC member Cris Coffey agreed that Utah Open 
Lands’ involvement was important, particularly in purchasing the Parriott Mesa parcel. 
“Once we joined forces with Utah Open Lands, their financial backing and contributions 
were absolutely essential. We wouldn’t have been able to buy back the Parriott piece if they 
hadn’t advanced the money to do that … Having that kind of support and trust was very 
important to us.”268 Dave Erley also recognized Utah Open Land’s key role in the process: 
 
At the end of the day, the community would have experienced a far different, 
and much less satisfactory, result without the involvement of Utah Open 
Lands … Without Utah Open Lands and their leadership, resources and 
fundraising ability we would not have been nearly as successful … In fact, 
after the process got going I believe Utah Open Land’s involvement was the 
biggest single factor in the community's success.269 
 
However, CRC’s relationship with Utah Open Lands was not without its complexities. The 
two entities struggled to make sure their respective missions were compatible. CRC had to 
determine if it wanted to be a branch organization, and Utah Open Lands had to assess 
whether CRC would consume too many resources or too much time. In the end, CRC and 
Utah Open Lands crafted a very successful relationship by determining the roles and 
responsibilities of each entity. This partnership also was fostered through the leadership of 
Dave Erley and Laura Kamala who were hired part-time by Utah Open Lands in order to 
facilitate the process. Erley and Kamala worked to ensure that the goals of both Utah Open 




In the Castleton Tower Preservation Initiative, several other organizations were essential, 
including the outdoor industry, the climbing community and the Access Fund, all of which 
assisted with fundraising for obtaining the Castleton Tower trust land. The Access Fund 
provides a good example of an organization with which CRC collaborated to achieve the 
goals of the Castleton Tower Preservation Initiative. In addition to a $20,000 grant, Jason 
Keith, Policy Director at the Access Fund, indicated that his organization, “provided a direct 
connection to the climbers themselves through our membership, e-news alerts, hard copies 
that go out. We provided that and public relations for [the Castleton Tower Preservation 
Initiative].”271 
 
Establishing Common Ground and Shared Goals 
 
Although the participants in the process often emphasized their seemingly contradictory 
goals, the process did work to establish common ground. Even though SITLA needed to 
generate revenue in some way, perhaps through development, and the community wanted the 
land to remain in its same undisturbed state, everyone could agree on the need to create a 
quality plan. This common goal helped to guide the process despite the seemingly opposing 
individual objectives. Wendy Fisher attributed the development of common ground to the 
group’s recognition that all participants could benefit from the process. “Everybody 
involved, whether it was said specifically, knew that the reason we were all coming together 
was that there was something about the land, there was something about the community, 
there was something about the idea of working together towards a common resolution that 
was mutually beneficial for everybody.”272 In addition to this recognition, the group 
developed common ground by understanding that everyone involved was committed to 
having an outcome that would be positive for as many of the participants as possible. As 





The role of shared experiences was key in the Castle Valley Planning Process. Often, 
participants in the planning process would go for hikes, share potluck dinners or engage in 
other activities that encouraged building personal relationships and shared understanding that 
was crucial to the progression of the process.274 For example, Dave Erley remembered hiking 
in the Valley with CRC member Eddie Morandi, SITLA Assistant Director Ric McBrier, and 
McBrier’s wife and dog. On the strenuous hike, Erley recalled offering to carry McBrier’s 
dog down the steep trail, so it would not get injured.275 According to McBrier, hiking trips 
and other shared activities throughout the planning process fostered the development of 
friendships that have continued past the conclusion of the process.276 
 
Wendy Fisher remembered that celebrating shared successes throughout the process was 
essential, “We celebrated different milestones along the way, and that was key. You’ve got to 
focus on the quality of the experiences that everybody has, and one of the ways to do that is 
to celebrate little milestones, little successes, in an inclusive, not exclusive way.”277 One of 
the major successes that the group celebrated was the milestone of purchasing the trust land 




Technical Information and Mapping 
 
Discussions over technical data and mapping helped to facilitate the Castle Valley Planning 
Process. One of the first activities in which the group engaged was detailed mapping of the 
environmental constraints and development potential of the trust lands. Copies of maps made 
during the process were made available to community members attending public meetings.279 
The mapping process and distribution facilitated the sharing of information, which, in turn, 
helped foster a common understanding of how the land could and could not be used and 
allowed for trust to be built among the participants.280 Marty Zeller articulated the 
importance of the mapping: 
 
The first key thing was that the inventory and analysis of the site conditions 
helped both parties to realize what you could do and what was probably not 
desirable to do. It dispelled a lot of preconceptions about how valuable the 
land was from a natural resources standpoint and an economic standpoint.281 
 
Richard Schwartz agreed with Zeller that the scientific information was important. He also 
emphasized that the information be shared with as many people as possible. “Base whatever 
development strategies you’re going to use on as good a science base as you can. And make 
that as widely available as you can online, on websites, on CDs, whatever.”282 Likewise, 
Mayor Keeler concurred that the science was central to the process, but emphasized that 
sometimes waiting for the appropriate scientific data takes time, “If you’re doing a process 
like this, you have to be able to sit with it until the technical science parts are finished that 
give you your underlying data that show you how far you can go.”283 In this case, the science 




Several overarching lessons can be taken from the Castle Valley Planning Process. 
 
1. Effective collaboration requires clearly defined roles and responsibilities for all 
stakeholders involved in the process. 
 
One of the primary challenges in the Castle Valley Planning Process was the lack of clarity 
about the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders. In particular, the process 
would have benefited from having the roles of CRC and the town more clearly defined. Even 
though the two entities were separate, it was not clear from the beginning who was 
representing which party. Facilitator Marty Zeller described the perceptions of the two 
groups, “The Castle Rock Collaboration was definitely not the town, and the town felt that it 
was very different from the Castle Rock Collaboration.”284 However, SITLA Director Kevin 
Carter indicated that little attempt was made to distinguish the town from the community as 
represented by CRC, “I don’t know that there was any effort to collaborate with the town 
separately at all. We were under the impression that the Castle Rock Collaboration coalition 
group was taking care of that end of the process.”285 This highlights the importance of 
 
 78
ensuring that all parties define their responsibilities and relationships to other parties within 
the collaborative effort at the outset. According to Richard Schwartz: 
 
Make sure the parties involved, especially if one of them is a jurisdiction, a town or 
county or something, has early on defined its relations with the unofficial participants, 
and that any participation of the town from the beginning is clearly understood and 
done under whatever due process has to be done in that state for the town.286 
 
2. Prior to engaging in collaborative planning process, the group should ensure that all 
legally appropriate stakeholders are represented and that legal sideboards are 
understood. 
 
Another lesson learned from the process was that the legal sideboards of the process should 
be identified as early as possible and all legally appropriate stakeholders should be included 
from the outset. The town’s involvement was particularly important, and its interests were 
not always separated from those of CRC and the community in general. Because of the lack 
of understanding of the town’s legal responsibilities and restrictions, the town might not have 
been represented in an effective manner. SITLA Director Kevin Carter acknowledged this in 
saying, “Certainly a shortcoming in the process was that it didn’t include the people who 
were ultimately going to be making the decisions.”287 In this case, it was the town 
government that represented the decision-making agent. Planning and Zoning Commission 
Chair Catherine Howells reemphasized the need for the legal requirements to be met in a 
collaborative process, “You can’t have a collaborative process and not follow due process of 
law as part of that process.”288 Town Council member Jerry Bidinger noted: 
 
A collaborative process is one that requires that the town, county, city pass 
those legitimate ordinances that are recognized as legal and proper and not 
overbearing, that have been recognized in your state or in the surrounding 
states, that you put those in place, just as the state agency has an obligation to 
pursue the broad interests of all the citizens of the state.289 
 
Had the town’s legal requirements been fully understood and explored from the outset of the 
process, the planning efforts may have been more successful. Carter summarized SITLA’s 
major lesson learned through the Castle Valley Planning Process, “The take-home lesson is 
that in the future, we need to make sure that the people we’re collaborating with represent the 
entities that can make the final decision.”290 
 
3. Effective collaboration is facilitated by joint risk taking and compromise. 
 
Another lesson from the planning process is the need for mutual risk taking and compromise 
from all sides. Karen Nelson discussed the importance of risk taking, “Without risk on both 
sides, you’re not going to ever succeed. You have to assume some risk.”291 The stakeholders 
in the process all assumed the risk that they might not achieve their ultimate goal. For the 
community, the goal was 100 percent conservation of trust land. For SITLA, the objective 
was to achieve the mandated revenue generation from the trust land. Ric McBrier articulated 




There was a risk to us from not engaging, what I call the political risk, the risk 
of developing a reputation of being big brother and not caring about the 
community’s interests and perspectives. When you own 7,500 pieces of land, 
that would be a heavy burden to carry around with you every day, and word 
travels fast … There was a risk on the other side that by engaging [the 
community] we would compromise our responsibilities to the beneficiaries.292 
 
The different goals required stakeholders to be flexible and to be willing to compromise on 
their objectives. McBrier emphasized the importance of compromise in the process: “This is 
about compromise at some level. Collaboration makes it sound like no one compromises, 
that’s not what it’s about. People are compromising. Maybe they are learning areas in which 
the compromises are easier to make, but there is compromise inherent in this thing.”293 He 
also emphasized the importance of sticking with the process in the face of compromise, “You 
can’t know the outcome without walking through it … I think that it is about having some 
faith and some trust in good possibilities.”294 
  
4. Collaborative processes benefit from professional, neutral and knowledgeable 
facilitation. 
 
Facilitation was key to the planning effort in Castle Valley. The planners and facilitators 
provided ground rules, mapping and technical information and general guidance to the group 
throughout the process. Marty Zeller, as the lead facilitator, directed participants through 
meetings, took group comments and feedback and came back with revised work products.295  
 
Overall, the consensus in the group was that Marty Zeller was effective in balancing the 
needs of the community with SITLA’s needs. Mayor Bruce Keeler recalled that Zeller was 
good at helping the group to overcome distrust, “In the beginning, we were all very skeptical 
of working with each other. Marty Zeller did a great job in bringing everyone together.”296 
He added, “Marty was very good at keeping the two sides moving and finding ways to move 
through times when we were butting heads. He brought us together, and his facilitating skills 
were good.”297 Laura Kamala added that Zeller “was very effective in the way he addressed 
the layers of the community.”298 Many participants viewed the fact that the community and 
SITLA jointly funded Conservation Partners as a positive factor, in that it established that the 
facilitator was a client of both sides.299 Furthermore, participants mentioned that the mapping 
provided by Conservation Partners was essential to the group’s progress. Mayor Keeler 
indicated that Zeller “also did a good job with the on-the-ground mapping.”300 
 
Towards the end of the process, however, some began to question Marty Zeller’s neutrality, 
when SITLA hired Zeller to work on other projects not related to the Castle Valley Planning 
Process. Regardless of the accuracy of speculations surrounding Zeller’s neutrality, they 
played an important role in how several of the participants, particularly from the community, 
evaluated Zeller’s role as a facilitator. 
 
In addition, many of those involved would have liked to have seen Marty Zeller take a more 
proactive position at the beginning of the process when the issue of the ordinances and the 
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legality of the contract between SITLA and the town arose. Some suggested that perhaps 
since Zeller was from Colorado, and since Utah laws are different regarding the jurisdiction 
of towns, he might not have had an appropriate knowledge base about the specific 
circumstances governing the process in Castle Valley.  
 
Overall, though, facilitation was clearly a key factor in much of the progress the planning 
group made throughout. For instance, CRC member Cris Coffey said that she was pleased 
with Zeller’s participation. “The planner, Marty Zeller, is a wonderful person. [He] had all 
the technical training and a philosophical attitude that was very helpful to us. We were very 
lucky.”301 
 
5. Formal and informal leadership can enhance collaborative efforts. 
 
Leadership was another key component to the collaborative process. Ric McBrier, as a 
representative of SITLA, built relationships and trust with CRC members and planning group 
participants because of his attitude and his willingness to engage in the process. Many of the 
residents of Castle Valley felt that McBrier was essential in providing the motivation to 
engage the community. Regarding this, Cris Coffey stated that “I’ve always felt that we were 
very fortunate that Ric McBrier was the one in that office when we started the project.”302 
Many process participants felt that not many in McBrier’s position would have engaged the 
community in the same way. McBrier also played a key role in representing the community 
and the planning process to the SITLA Board of Trustees, who ultimately were the decision 
makers for the agency. For an agency that had not attempted to collaborate in this way with a 
community before, having a champion for the collaborative process on its staff was key. 
 
Process participants also recognized Wendy Fisher, Laura Kamala and Dave Erley as 
essential leaders in the process. Dave Erley remembered that without Wendy Fisher’s 
leadership in the process, it would not have been as successful. “Wendy Fisher and Utah 
Open Lands were the glue that held the community together and got us through some very 
difficult times with SITLA and the town of Castle Valley for that matter.”303 Cris Coffey 
mentioned that “Laura [Kamala] and Dave [Erley] were hugely important. Although their 
working styles were very different, they had totally complementary skills.”304 Division of 
labor between Kamala and Erley was also very effective, with Kamala primarily taking the 
role of communicating with the various stakeholders and particularly interfacing with 
SITLA, and Erley taking the chief responsibility for spearheading some of the fundraising 
efforts for the various conservation initiatives and engaging the outdoor industry and 
climbing community. Kamala, in conjunction with Fisher, also took on the main fundraising 
role for the wildlife habitat initiative. Kamala mentioned some of the qualities that any leader 
of a collaborative process should have: 
 
You have to have some leaders that really care, to the point where they’re 
willing to go through hell and keep showing up. That’s the only way you can 
have success ultimately … You have to have stamina, you have to believe in 
your ultimate outcome whatever that is. You have to have enough passionate 




6. Unequal power relationships can both motivate and hinder collaborative planning, 
particularly with relationships between trust land agencies and local communities. 
 
As a state agency that is not technically required to adhere to local planning and zoning, 
SITLA did not have to engage the community in a collaborative process. Director Kevin 
Carter described the unilateral power held by SITLA: “If it’s too much hassle to deal with the 
local community, I’ll just sell the land and walk away from it. It’s always a valid question, ‘Is 
what I could potentially get out of a collaborative process worth the effort?’”306 Although 
McBrier, as a SITLA representative, tried not to wield this power over the community, the 
inequality of power between SITLA and the community was palpable. McBrier discussed the 
agency’s power, “We had power, but I think the showing of the power after it was initially 
understood would have been really destructive.”307 He also described the importance SITLA 
considers in making long-term decisions and how working with communities rather than 
grandstanding about power relationships often is more effective: 
 
We practice a philosophy here in Utah, at least in my department, that we try 
to hit doubles and triples. We don’t swing for home runs. That means that 
there’s room … to pay attention to community interests. When you have 7,500 
pieces of land, you’re not just doing one transaction; you have a legacy and a 
long-term engagement that it is very important to pay attention to beyond just 
the money. I think that gives us flexibility, but … you have to be prepared to 
answer the questions that come up about, “Couldn’t you have gotten more 
money doing it a different way?” And the answer is, and always may be, “But 
this is what we thought was in the best interest, and this is why.” We’ve 
worked very hard at articulating that idea. We have to say it over and over and 
over. We think that it’s starting to prove itself because people work with us.308 
 
Interestingly, it was probably this power that enabled the collaborative process to occur by 
motivating planning process participants from the community to stay involved. As described 
by McBrier, “It was our power to act unilaterally and change the status quo that created the 
foundation from which the collaboration developed. Absent that power [the community] 
never would have engaged [with] us.”309 He also described how SITLA’s involvement may 
have been contingent on having more power: “I was collaborating from a position of power. 
Collaboration from a position of no power might be an entirely different experience … If we 
hadn’t had that power then we might not have been as willing to walk into the 
engagement.”310 Unfortunately, the community’s perception that SITLA could stop the 
process and just sell the land led to some misperceptions and mistrust at the beginning of the 
process, but the relationships built between McBrier and the community helped to ameliorate 
some of this concern. Thus the inequality in power between the community and SITLA was 
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ucked away in southwest Oregon’s Coast Range, the relatively unknown Elliott State 
Forest, cut by knife-edged ridges and a myriad of streams, contains trees ranging from 
100 to 150 years old (Figure 5-1). The forest is a contiguous block of land approximately 18 
miles long (north to south), and 16 miles wide (east to west) covering a total of 93,282 acres. 
The Umpqua River is located due north of the forest and to the west, the Elliott extends 
within six miles of the Pacific Ocean.1 More than 90 percent, or 87,934 acres, of the Elliott 
State Forest is Common School Forest Land. The remaining 9,088 acres are owned by the 
Board of Forestry (BOF), 2 the governing body of the Oregon Department of Forestry 
(ODF).3 
 
Named for Oregon’s first State Forester, Francis Elliott, the forest is prime habitat for the 
northern spotted owl, marbled murrelet and coho salmon,4 all federally listed threatened 
species. The Elliott is the state’s largest block of Common School Forest Land5 and while it 
is owned by the Oregon State Land Board, the ODF handles its day-to-day management. 
Oregon’s constitutional mandate to produce revenue for the Common School Fund requires 
that the Elliott be managed as a working, timber-producing forest. However, the Elliott also 
provides important wildlife habitat, and management policies now recognize this additional 
responsibility. One such policy was the decision to apply for a Habitat Conservation Plan 
(HCP) in response to the federal listing of the spotted owl and the marbled murrelet. In 1994 
and 1995 as part of the HCP, a 60-year Incidental Take Permit (ITP) was issued for the 
spotted owl and a six-year ITP was issued for the marbled murrelet.  
 
In 2000 with the marbled murrelet ITP due to expire, the State Land Board, the Department 
of State Lands (DSL) and the ODF decided to forgo a quick revision of the 1995 HCP and 
instead created a bi-level committee to spearhead the planning process to draft a multi-
species HCP. Both the State Land Board and the BOF felt that a more comprehensive HCP 
that included species that might become listed in addition to the owl, murrelet and recently-
listed coho salmon, was prudent to ensure more management certainty in the long run.  
 
The Elliott State Forest Planning Process is bound by the regulations and requirements of the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) HCP process and the state trust constitutional 
mandate. The Planning Process members included staff from the DSL, ODF, Oregon 
Department of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW), a local elected official and eventually a 
beneficiary representative. In addition to revising the HCP, the Steering Committee and Core 
Planning Team also were charged with revising the Forest Management Plan (FMP), the 
overarching, broad document that will ensure long-term management of the forest using a 
landscape approach.6 The goal of the HCP and FMP drafting processes is to find a middle 
ground between wildlife conservation and revenue generation for the state’s education 
coffers. Pending initial approval from the State Land Board and the BOF, the HCP will be 
submitted for approval to the USFWS and NMFS in 2007. The FMP will likely be approved 
at the time both plans go before the respective boards.  
 
The Elliott State Forest Planning Process highlights the complexities of initiating a 




process is unique because never before have the agencies traditionally responsible for 
overseeing the forest been engaged in a process with such a diverse array of agency and 
beneficiary stakeholders at the table. The Planning Process is best conceptualized as an 
internal, highly collaborative process that created a well-defined, bi-level structure to best 
utilize the time and expertise of the participants. In addition, the process highlights the 
challenges and complexities of interpreting scientific data into policy. Finally, the Planning 
Process exemplifies that compatible personalities, the inclusion of the beneficiaries on the 
Steering Committee and relationship building has made it in most estimations successful.  
 
Figure 5-1: Map of the Elliott State Forest 
 
     Source: Oregon Department of Forestry, http://egov.oregon.gov/ODF. 
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CONTEXT FOR COLLABORATION 
 
A complete understanding of the elements at play and the intricacies of Common School 
Forest Land management in Oregon requires a careful examination of the context in which 
this process has developed. A brief review of the legal and policy framework currently in 
place, the history of the Elliott State Forest and common school land management and finally 
the political climate surrounding timber and endangered species in southwest Oregon 
follows. 
 
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR OREGON STATE FORESTS 
 
The primary legal framework in which the Elliott State Forest is managed is the land grant 
mandate set forth in the Oregon Constitution. Article VIII, Section 5 of the Oregon 
Constitution authorizes the State Land Board to manage the Common School Forest Lands, 
“with the object of obtaining the greatest benefit for the people of this state, consistent with 
conservation of this resource under sound techniques of land management.”7  
 
The State Forester is authorized to manage the Elliott for the DSL under Oregon Revised 
Statute 530.500. According to the agreement: 
The overriding objective for Common School Forest Lands shall be 
maximizing revenue to the Common School Fund over the long-term, as 
determined by the Land Board. In addition, the plans shall also maximize (to 
the extent consistent with the primary revenue objective) other public values 
which the Land Board determines will obtain the greatest benefit for the 
people consistent with conservation of the resource under sound techniques of 
land management.8  
After legal concerns were raised over threatened species protection and meeting the fiduciary 
responsibility of “obtaining the greatest benefit” outlined in the state Constitution, former 
State Attorney General Charles S. Crookham issued a formal opinion on July 24, 1992, 
addressing the lawful uses of the Common School Lands and the effect of federal or state 
regulations on such uses.9 Crookham’s opinion was issued in response to these concerns and 
discussed whether the State Land Board’s compliance with the federal and state Endangered 
Species Act (ESA) conflicted with their fiduciary responsibility. By this time, both the 
northern spotted owl and marbled murrelet had been listed on the federal register of 
threatened species and the Land Board was trying to determine their legal obligation to 
obtain HCPs on the Elliott and other Common School Forest Lands. 
 
The former Attorney General also found that the State Land Board was not exempt from 
complying with the ESA. Crookham stated that neither the Oregon Admission Act nor the 
Oregon Constitution were cause for exemption.10 He went on to state that: 
 
The state ESA does not restrict the State Land Board’s exercise of its 
constitutional powers over the disposition and the management of the 
Admission Acts lands … the Board must comply with the state ESA unless 
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the ESA “unduly burdens” the Board’s constitutional responsibilities to 
manage the Admission Act lands.11  
 
He also stated that it was unlikely that the courts would exempt the Board from the federal 
law.12  
 
Crookham’s opinion also lent further interpretation and clarification of Article VIII, Section 
5 of the Oregon Constitution. He interpreted the trust mandate to strengthen the term 
“greatest benefit” into the maximization of revenue. For example, if the DSL sells timber or 
land, the agency is required to maximize the revenue from the sale. However, the DSL has 
broad discretion over what lands are sold so long as the agency can foresee an economic 
return to the Common School Fund either in the short term or in the future.13  
 
This opinion had the potential to dramatically change the way in which state forests were 
managed. According to Crookham, in addition to the Land Board’s responsibility to manage 
these lands in trust for the benefit of the schools, the board has a constitutional obligation that 
extends to the protection of natural resources.14 The constitutional obligation implied in 
Article VIII, Section 5 was further defined by Crookham’s opinion, stating that the “greatest 
benefit” standard requires the Land Board to use the lands for the schools and the production 
of income for the Common School Fund.15 Crookham defined “resources” to include other 
values besides timber. He stated that the term resources “include[s] all of the features of the 
land that may be of use to the schools … the Board should consider uses of other resources, 
such as minerals, water, yew bark16, etc., that may offer revenue for the fund.”17 This was the 
most controversial part of his opinion because it assigned value to non-revenue producing 
resources such as water and natural chemicals found in plants. Though his opinion has not 
been challenged in courts or in the media, it does loosen the constitutional mandate to 
consider other values besides extractive, potentially making it less ironclad insofar as the 
manner in which the state manages land and revenue in the long-term compared to other 
states’ mandates.  
 
Other than Crookham’s opinion and the constitutional mandate of the trust, there are several 
pieces of legislation that affect the management and the scope of the planning process on the 
Elliott. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is one of the regulatory frameworks 
that affect the Elliott planning process. NEPA establishes environmental policy for the 
nation, provides an interdisciplinary framework for federal services to prevent environmental 
damage and contains enforcement procedures to ensure that federal agency decision makers 
take environmental factors into account.18 The NEPA process includes public scoping, as 
well as potentially the development of a draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).19 The 
USFWS or NMFS must comply with NEPA when evaluating potential impacts related to the 
issuance of an incidental take permit through the Habitat Conservation Plan process.20 
  
The federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) was enacted “to provide a means whereby the 
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved 
to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered and threatened species.”21 The 
ESA allows the “taking” of a “threatened” or “endangered” species if the purpose is to carry 
out an otherwise lawful activity, so long as the applicant submits an HCP, which must 
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include measures to minimize and mitigate such impacts.22 While the primary objective of an 
HCP is not the recovery of a listed species, it is an important consideration in the HCP’s 
development.23 Another crucial aspect of the HCP is the issuance of an ITP. Based on the 
ecology of the specific species, a certain number are allowed to be taken in accordance with 
typical uses of the land, so long as measures are taken to mitigate habitat in other areas. 
 
The Board of Forestry (BOF) is the governing body of the ODF, directing all state forest 
planning and management. The BOF has a legal mandate to manage state forest lands, 
including an obligation to share income with the counties in which the forest lie and protect 
and use a variety of natural resources.24 Because a portion of the lands that lie with the 
boundaries of the Elliott State Forest are BOF lands, those lands must be managed in 
accordance with ODF forest policies. The legal mandate for managing BOF lands is similar 
to the trust mandate in that the BOF lands are to be managed so as “to serve the greatest 
permanent value of such lands to the state.”25 The BOF is required to manage with the dual 
obligation of sharing revenue with local counties and conserving, protecting and using a 
variety of natural resources.26 The main difference between BOF lands and Common School 
Forest Lands, such as the Elliott State Forest, is that the BOF and the State Forester are not 
required to manage their forestlands to maximize revenues. 
 
The Oregon Forest Practices Act declares it public policy to encourage economically 
efficient forest practices that assure the “continuous growth and harvesting of forest tree 
species and the maintenance of forest land for such purposes as the leading use on privately 
owned land, consistent with sound management of soil, air, water, fish and wildlife resources 
and scenic resources in visually sensitive corridors.”27 The Act establishes the standards for 
reforestation, road construction, timber harvesting and application of chemicals and disposal 
of slash.2829 It is a statewide guide that establishes a framework for proper forest 
management. The standards set forth in the Forest Practices Act govern the management of 
the Elliott, as well. 
 
 COUNTY POLITICS, THE TIMBER ECONOMY AND THE SPOTTED OWL 
 
The nationwide debate on the protection of endangered species and resulting timber industry 
job losses heavily influenced the political climate in Oregon in the early 1990s and was a 
likely contributor to Crookham’s opinion. In the 1980s, concern over the habitat of the 
spotted owl instituted a change in public forest management practices to protect the owl’s 
habitat.30 In 1989, the timber industry and timber dependent communities were up in arms 
about potential court injunctions imposed on the timber harvest to protect owl habitat. The 
decision whether or not to list the owl was hugely controversial. If the owl was listed as a 
federally endangered species, it would become a crime to disturb owl habitat, threatening to 
bring the logging industry to a standstill.31 By some estimates, court injunctions would have 
put 40 percent of forest lands off limits to logging.32 In Oregon at that time, timber was a $7 
billion-a-year industry employing 150,000 people.33 But environmentalists saw timber’s 
destruction of old growth forest – with an estimated 15 percent left and rapid disappearance – 
as unacceptable.34 Mainstream media published scenes of extreme environmental group 
members chaining themselves to trees and machinery to disrupt timber harvests.35 Thus, the 
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spotted owl became the lightning rod for the ideological war between the timber industry and 
environmental groups in Oregon. 
 
Roseburg, Oregon located just miles from the Elliott State Forest, was ground zero for this 
divisive debate. Due to the injunctions that halted logging in certain areas, the local economy 
stood to lose $13 million a year in timber revenue, not to mention a significant loss of jobs.36 
In Douglas County those supporting the timber industry were often seen wearing t-shirts or 
hats with such colorful phrases as, “Save a logger – eat an owl” and “I like my spotted owl 
… fried.”37 The sentiment about the owl and the reduced timber cuts was also carried over 
into losses for local schools that received income from federal and state timber sales. One 
banner headline in a Roseburg newspaper stated, “Saving spotted owl seen as threat to 
schools”.38 The national spotted owl controversy died down when then-President Clinton 
signed the Northwest Forest Plan into law. Soon after, a slump in domestic timber and an 
increase in the use of mechanized harvesting made the economic argument for continued 
logging less compelling.  
 
In the end, Oregon lost fewer jobs than were originally predicted. Early estimates of timber-
related job losses were about 67,000 jobs; however, due to the increased logging on private 
lands and a healthy regional economy, job losses totaled around 13,800.39 Nevertheless, the 
timber industry continues to be an important source of income in southwest Oregon. A large 
pecentage of the workforce in southwest Oregon is employed in wood processing, much 
larger compared to the state as a whole. Both Douglas and Coos Counties have strong timber 
industry roots. Douglas County, in which Roseburg is located, employs 17 percent of its 
workers in the lumber and wood products industry. The county processes almost half of the 
timber harvested from the Elliott State Forest. The Elliott accounts for ten percent of the 
timber harvested in Coos County.40  
 
FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP IN OREGON 
 
The Elliott is an island of state forest surrounded by national forests and a small acreage of 
industrial forest. The federal government owns approximately 50 percent of the land in the 
State of Oregon. Though it is not unusual in the West for the federal government to own such 
a significant percentage of land, the State of Oregon owns relatively small amounts of forest 
land in comparison to other states. Possibly due to the symbolic and economic importance of 
forests in Oregon, the State Land Board has retained ownership of the Elliott despite pressure 
to sell.  
 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE LAND 
 
Established in 1859, the State Land Board is the oldest board in the state of Oregon. Article 
VIII, Section 5 of the Oregon Constitution created it as, “the Board of Commissioners for the 
sale of school, and University lands, and for the investment of the funds arising therefrom.” 41 
Since its inception, the State Land Board has been comprised of the governor, secretary of 




Oregon was granted common school land in its 1859 Admission Act. The act ceded the 16th 
and 36th section of every township for public school use and, in cases where these sections 
fell upon land that was already deeded, the state was allowed to choose other public lands in 
lieu of the constitutionally-designated lands.42 The income generated from the sale and 
management of these properties forms the basis of the Common School Fund. The Common 
School Fund also was established by the Oregon Admission Act to support and maintain 
schools.  
 
Between 1859 and 1912, Oregon attempted to liquidate its school lands as quickly as 
possible. State officials felt that the development of those lands by private citizens would 
yield more for schools via property taxes and other economic benefits. 43 Thus, many of the 
Common School Lands were sold to the settlers and entrepreneurs. However, a large portion 
of the land was fraudulently obtained, given away or sold for next to nothing. In some cases 
government officials gave away land as repayment for political favors. From the 1850s to the 
early 1900s, swindlers and land speculators discovered ways to defraud the state of its land. 44 
As an example, swamplands thought to have no value were sold at the price of $1 per acre 
during that time, while school trust land, much of it highly valuable, was sold for only $1.25 
to $2.50 an acre. 45 At this time, surveying, land records and security measures were 
incomplete and corruption was extensive. State investigations were conducted in 1872, 1878 
and 1896, and the resulting land fraud trials continued until 1913, concluding with 21 
convictions of high-level state and federal officials. 46 By 1912, only about 130,000 acres of 
Common School forest land was left in the state’s hands with about 70,000 of those acres 
“locked” within National Forest boundaries.47 This historical loss of land has colored the 
current relationship between the DSL and the beneficiaries of the trust. 
 
Despite this land scandal, much of the Land Board’s early history was spent defining its 
powers and procedures. 48 Until 1864 there was no formal procedure for selling land to 
settlers. The first formal sale of land occurred in 1871. 49 Subsequently, laws were passed 
differentiating the sales of various types of land, from university and college land to swamp 
and tidal lands.  
 
The board’s early leasing programs emphasized the most important factors in Oregon’s 
economy: mining, timber and agriculture. In the 1960s, many changes in board policy and 
structure occurred. In 1967, the Legislative Assembly elevated the Office of the Clerk to 
agency status and renamed it the Division of State Lands. The new law transferred all of the 
responsibilities and management duties of the board to the Division. The Division took on 
the day-to-day management of the common school lands as it was becoming increasingly 
challenging for the Land Board to manage the lands in addition to their other responsibilities. 
The Board maintained its role in general policy making and review of agency decisions. At 
the same time, all state forest lands were placed under the administration of the Oregon 
Department of Forestry (ODF).  
 
In 1968, due to voter responses, the mission of the Land Board was modified to stress 
environmental management of lands as long-term investments, rather than selling them for 
short-term revenues. The constitution was amended to include long-term resource 




In 1995, the DSL produced an Asset Management Plan designed to be a comprehensive tool 
for land and resource management. It includes a land classification program and strategies for 
management, conservation, revenue, enhancement, investment and disposal. In the plan, 
forest lands are to be managed to provide the greatest revenue for the Common School Fund 
over the long-term.51 
 
The 2003 Legislature changed the name of the Division of State Lands to the Department of 
State Lands (DSL52) to be consistent with the names of other state agencies. The DSL serves 
as the administrative arm of the State Land Board. The DSL operates in accordance with 
general policies formulated by the board and through the laws prescribing its own duties and 
powers. The DSL’s mission is, “To ensure a legacy for Oregonians and their public schools 
through sound stewardship of lands, wetlands, waterways, unclaimed property, estates and 
the Common School Fund.”53 For a current map of state trust lands in Oregon, see Figure 5-
2. The trust lands are shown in blue. 
 
Source: “Oregon Trust Lands,” Trust Land: A Land Legacy for the American West, The Sonoran Institute & 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, available at http://www.trustland.org. 





COMMON SCHOOL FUND 
 
The Common School Fund is a constitutional trust created to manage assets derived from 
common school land. The state treasurer and the Oregon Investment Council manage and 
invest the fund. Aside from the revenue gained from land and natural resource management, 
the original Common School Fund assets included money paid for exemptions from military 
service, money accrued to the state from escheats and forfeitures, grants, gifts, bequests, 
500,000 acres of land that were given to Oregon by an 1841 act of Congress, and five percent 
of all proceeds from the sale of federal land within the state.54 Amendments passed in 1968 
and 1980 have added other revenue sources (See Article VIII, Section 2). As of February 14, 
2006, the fund was worth $1 billion.55 
 
Resources dedicated to the Common School Fund include: nearly 644,000 acres of range 
land and agricultural lands, beds and banks of all navigable rivers (including half of the 
Columbia and all of the Willamette) and lakes, tidal and submerged offshore land and more 
than 133,000 acres of forest land. Interest from the fund is paid biannually to public schools 
in all 36 counties, on the basis of school-age population. 
 
In the early 1990s, the financial managers of the trust began investing a part of the trust into 
equities. This was a fortunate move as the stock market took off shortly thereafter. Since 
then, equities have been the major source of revenue for the Common School Fund, far 
overshadowing the revenue produced from resource extraction and leasing.56 Annual 
distributions to the schools have fluctuated from $9 million to $40 million depending on 
Land Board policies and market conditions.57 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS OF COMMON SCHOOL LAND  
 
The agency’s holdings include nearly 644,000 acres of rangeland and agricultural land, 
located primarily in the eastern side of the state.58 These lands contribute approximately 
$400,000 of annual revenue.59 Approximately 500 acres are classified for industrial and other 
purposes.60 The Land Board owns approximately 131,000 acres of forest land, 85,000 of 
which are located in the Elliott State Forest. The 6,403-acre Sun Pass State Forest, located in 
Klamath County, is the next largest parcel of common school forest land. The remaining 
forest land is found is small tracts scattered throughout the state of Oregon. In the 2004 
Fiscal Year, the Common School Fund received $14,310,341 in revenue from timber sales. 
In the same year, the DSL had $4,714,830 in expenditures related to forest lands, 
representing the cost of contracting the ODF to manage the forestlands. 61  
 
The Elliott is a large asset and a substantial value for the trust. It produces the highest amount 
of revenue of all the State Land Board’s landholdings.62 The majority of annual income to the 
Common School Fund, as stated before is equity investments. While these monies are 
substantial the Elliott still maintains a very high “book value”; meaning that the revenue the 
DSL expects to earn from timber sales in the future is considered when analyzing the overall 
value of the forest. Current harvests on the Elliott average about 25 to 28 million board feet 
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of timber annually, producing average revenues of $16 million per year.63 On average, timber 
sales constitute approximately 26 percent of the revenues earned by the Common School 
Fund.64  
 
HISTORY OF THE ELLIOTT STATE FOREST 
 
The history of the Elliott State Forest has played a significant role in shaping the 
environment of the planning process. In 1869, the Coos Bay Fire burned approximately 
300,000 acres, including close to 90 percent of the present day Elliott State Forest, and 
killing trees estimated to be 300 years old. After the fire the forest regenerated naturally as a 
Douglas-fir dominated forest. The area now known as the Elliott State Forest was created via 
land exchanges of scattered trust land inholdings locked within national forests and lands in 
Eastern Oregon with the federal government. The Elliott State Forest is the largest 
contiguous block of forest land owned by the DSL (Figure 5-3).65  
 
The state began locating property boundaries and 
developing roads in the 1930s with intensive forest 
management beginning in the 1950s. The 1950s and 
1960s saw a tremendous housing boom and many of 
Oregon’s forests were logged to meet the demand. The 
Elliott was less intensively logged during that time 
compared to other forests in the Coast Range because it 
was a relatively young forest.66  
 
Today, the Elliott contains trees ranging in age from 100 
to 150 years old, while the surrounding forests are 45 to 
55 years old. Spotted owls and marbled murrelets 
typically favor older growth trees, thus many of the 
birds prefer the trees in the Elliott over the younger 
forest that surrounds it. 
 
The ODF states that the Elliott is currently managed to 
produce revenue for the Common School Fund and 
conserve important fish and wildlife habitat. Another 
goal is to provide opportunities for dispersed recreation, 
such as hunting, fishing, picnicking and camping in 




THE STORY: THE ELLIOTT STATE FOREST PLANNING PROCESS 
 
The Elliott State Forest Planning Process originated in the changing context of forest 
management in Oregon in the 1980s and 1990s. The national attention on the spotted owl and 
other threatened species created a political spotlight on forest management in the Northwest. 
Timber extraction has been the historical mainstay of the Oregon economy, providing 
Figure 5-3: Elliott State Forest, Southwest 
Oregon 
Source: Photograph by the Sonoran Institute 
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revenue for counties primarily in the southwest region of the state. This coupled with the fact 
that the Elliott is “rich” in endangered species had made managing it to produce the “greatest 
revenue” for the Common School Fund challenging. The expiration of the 1994-1995 
marbled murrelet HCP initiated a new round of forest planning and a multi-species HCP 
process spearheaded by the ODF and DSL. A unique factor of this particular process was the 
inclusion of non-traditional stakeholders, an emphasis on an ecosystem-based management 
approach and the desire to increase the harvest yields on the forest. Thus the Elliott State 
Forest Planning Process was created to develop the plans and inform the policies necessary 
for such an endeavor. 
  
1994-1995 HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS 
 
The Elliott straddles Coos and Douglas counties, both heavily steeped in the wood products 
industry and one of the last outposts of the “logging wars” of the 1980s and 1990s. The owl 
and its seabird counterpart became famous in the early 1990s when they were listed as 
federally threatened species and became figureheads of the ideological war between the 
timber industry and environmentalists. The comparatively “older” trees in the Elliott make 
them prime habitat for the northern spotted owl and marbled murrelet.67 The Elliott is both 
“owl and murrelet rich,” which forced the ODF to reduce timber harvest on the forest to 
provide additional habitat protection in compliance with the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 
As a result, the timber sold on the Elliott dropped substantially from 50 million board feet68 a 
year in the 1980s to 10 to 12 million board feet, and back up to 28 million board feet a year 
under the 1995 HCP.  
 
In the mid-1990s, in an attempt to mitigate the drastically reduced timber sales, the State 
Land Board, the Division of State Lands (DSL)69 and the ODF decided to develop a HCP. 
Separate HCPs were drafted for both species. In 1994-1995, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (USFWS) approved a 60-year ITP for the spotted owl and 6-year HCP for the 
marbled murrelet. The HCP was the first ever completed on state forest land. 
 
KEY PLANNING DOCUMENTS: THE FOREST MANAGEMENT PLAN AND THE HABITAT 
CONSERVATION PLAN 
 
At the core of the Elliott State Forest Planning Process are two separate documents, the 
Forest Management Plan (FMP) and the Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP). The 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is completed under the umbrella of the HCP process 
and Implementation Plan (IP) is the document that outlines how the FMP will be 
implemented. The FMP is the comprehensive, overarching plan for the management of the 
forest. It takes a landscape approach to management, using a set of pre-defined strategies for 
integrating the management of timber, fish, wildlife and forest health.70 The purpose of going 
through the HCP process is to obtain an ITP. The ITP would allow harvesting to continue in 
designated portions of the forest in exchange for creating nesting, roosting and foraging 
habitat elsewhere in the forest. This is done by leaving certain stands in either reserve status 
or placing them in hundred year rotations or growing stands that produce habitat. Thus, while 
both plans are inherently separate they are developed in tandem with the wildlife habitat 
needs in the HCP informing the broader management approach in the FMP. Another key 
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document in this planning process is an EIS. The USFWS and NMFS must comply with 
NEPA when issuing and ITP, thus an EIS is necessary. In addition, per ODF policy, an 
Implementation Plan (IP) will be created for the revised FMP/HCP. The IP is a ten-year plan 
that allows foresters to locate harvests for the first 20 years and “look ahead” to the next 
decade to make sure planned harvest levels are available.71 The final piece of the HCP and 
FMP is the development of an implementing agreement between the State and federal 
agencies. The Department of Justice will work with the Core Planning Team and federal 
solicitors to complete the agreement prior to the ITP issuance.72 
 
PRECURSORS TO THE PLANNING PROCESS 
 
Under ODF management since 1950, the Elliott State Forest has been managed to produce a 
sustainable timber supply while providing revenue for the Common School Fund. From 1950 
through 1990, management of the forest was based on silvicultural objectives, with the 
primary focus on timber harvesting and maintaining the sustained yield of timber coming off 
the Elliott.73 According to Dan Shults, ODF Southern Oregon Area Director, from 1950 
through 1990, “management progressed pretty well based on silvicultural and harvest 
objectives for the Department of Forestry working through the DSL and the Land Board.”74 
 
Forest management in the Pacific Northwest came under scrutiny during the 1980s, at a time 
when concern was growing about endangered species, such as the northern spotted owl and 
the marbled murrelet. The northern spotted owl, Strix occidentalis caurina, was listed as a 
federal threatened species in 1990 followed by the listing of the marbled murrelet, 
Brachyramphus marmoratus marmoratus, in 1992. 75 At this time long-range plans for the 
Elliott were primarily timber-based management plans. After the spotted owl was listed in 
1990, ODF surveys found a substantial number of owls in the Elliott, requiring the agency to 
reduce timber harvest dramatically. The harvest levels in the forest dropped from 50 million 
board feet to 12 million board feet a year. Shults stated that the modus operandi for the ODF 
was “a take avoidance policy where we protect the owls to the extent we feel is biologically 
acceptable for the owl population and will maintain the populations.”76 The take avoidance 
policy was developed by ODF using the USFWS rescinded guidelines for spotted owls. 
According to Shults, the objective was to avoid damage to owl habitat or the owls 
themselves.77 
 
Given the large population of spotted owls and murrelets found in the Elliott, the Land Board 
and the BOF were faced with two management options. According to Shults: 
 
There’s two ways you can deal with endangered species legally. One is to 
avoid take – you have policies in place to adequately protect the species. 
Another is to develop an HCP where you work with the services, in this case 
[U.S.] Fish and Wildlife, to come up with a method on the ground that will 
both protect the owls and improve your ability to continue your activities 
there. A major benefit of this is management certainty. 78 
 
In order to ensure stable timber harvests and habitat protection for the owl and murrelet, the 
Land Board and the BOF found it necessary to complete an HCP and revised FMP for the 
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Elliott.79 Given the high amount of media attention being paid to the threatened and 
endangered species in Oregon at the time, the decision was likely political as well. The Land 
Board is composed of the three highest elected officials in the state, the governor, secretary 
of state and the treasurer. In this situation the decision to move forward with the HCPs was 
probably the safest move in balancing their fiduciary responsibility and habitat conservation 
and balancing the interests of environmentalists and the timber industry. 
 
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN PROCESS 
 
The purpose of an HCP is to identify potential impacts to species listed under the ESA and 
describe the planned measures that will minimize and mitigate those impacts and other to the 
maximum extent practical those impacts if necessary.80 The applicant also can request an 
incidental take permit, which is required by the USFWS whenever non-federal activities 
result in the “take” of a threatened or endangered wildlife. An HCP must accompany an 
application for an incidental take permit.81 “Take,” as defined in the ESA, is to “harass, harm, 
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect any threatened or endangered 
species.”82 The HCP must also include a description of alternatives to the proposed takings 
and why those alternatives are not considered feasible.83 According to the USFWS, an HCP 
allows a landowner to legally proceed with an activity that would otherwise result in the 
illegal take of a listed species.84 As required under NEPA regulations, a 30-day public 
comment period is required for all completed HCP applications.85  
 
In the case of the Elliott, the HCP was used to obtain an Incidental Take Permit (ITP) that 
allowed timber harvesting to continue conditionally as long as certain measures were taken to 
protect habitat for the owl and murrelet. The HCP was developed within the context of the 
broader FMP, which requires the completion of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 
The EIS was developed in collaboration with a private contractor and the federal services to 
provide an in-depth analysis of the effects of the proposed HCP. 86 Due to the presence of 
threatened fish species on the Elliott, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) also has 
been consulted in the process. 
 
In 1991, the State Land Board directed the ODF to work with ODFW, DSL and other state 
agencies to develop a new long-range management plan to address the Elliott forest 
ecosystem consistent with the management contract between the Land Board and ODF.87 The 
ODF and DSL convened a group of ODF staff including foresters and wildlife biologists to 
complete both plans in tandem.  
 
The endeavor came to fruition in 1995 when the USFWS approved two separate HCPs for 
the spotted owl and the marbled murrelet. At the time, strategies for protecting the murrelets 
were seen as short term solutions because little was known about their habitat needs. As a 
result only a six-year incidental take permit (ITP) was granted. Research on the northern 
spotted owl was more advanced and thus the ODF was able to get a 60-year incidental take 
permit for the owl. During the six-year murrelet ITP period, the HCP required the ODF to 
fund research to gather additional data on murrelet habitat requirements to inform future 
strategies to support a longer term ITP for the murrelet. Also conditional with both ITPs was 




MARBLED MURRELET INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT DUE TO EXPIRE 
 
In early 2000, in anticipation the expiration of the marbled murrelet ITP on October 3, 2001, 
the ODF initiated an FMP and HCP revision process.89 In March of that year, ODF staff met 
with USFWS and NMFS representatives to determine the best way to go forward with the 
revision process. NMFS was consulted for the second HCP because the Coho salmon, 
Oncorhynchus kisutch, was listed as threatened in 1997.90 At this point there were two 
options under consideration; one was a quick revision of the 1995 murrelet HCP and the 
second was a longer, more involved HCP process that included the collection and 
dissemination of information on the forest ecosystems and species habitat requirements. 
According to Jim Young, ODF Coos District Forester, the USFWS and NMFS felt that a 
quick revision would not be adequate to ensure final approval of the HCP. They felt that 
there would be wildlife management certainty in the long run if a more careful re-evaluation 
of the forest and wildlife was conducted.91  
 
Following the meeting with USFWS and NMFS, the ODF met with the Land Board in 
August 2000 to report the HCP revision options.92 According to ODF Southern Oregon Area 
Director Dan Shults: 
 
Clearly the main driver for the HCPs was mitigating the harvest restrictions 
they placed on the forest. When you have that kind of revenue loss on a key 
fund that helps fund schools it is a huge impact to the state and gets the 
governor’s and Land Board’s attention as well as the DSL.93 
 
It also became clear at the time that other species, either now or in the near future would need 
to be included in the HCP. Rather than go through another planning process in the future if 
an additional species became listed, the decision was made to create a multi-species HCP.94 
Federal regulation establishes that: 
  
In the event an unlisted species addressed in the approved conservation plan in 
subsequently listed pursuant to the Act, no further mitigation requirements 
should be imposed if the conservation plan addressed the conservation of the 
species and its habitat as if the species were listed pursuant to the Endangered 
Species Act.95  
 
However, this was not a free ticket for any potentially threatened species to become part of 
the HCP. The Land Board and the BOF determined that, at a minimum, the revised HCP was 
intended to include the spotted owl, marbled murrelet and coastal Coho salmon. Other 
species considered at risk for listing known to live in the Elliott also were up for 
consideration, provided there was suitable scientific knowledge.96 Based on the advice of the 
ODF, the federal agencies and the desire to obtain further management certainty, the Land 
Board and BOF opted to take the longer, albeit safer route to obtain a new HCP and revise 
the current FMP. According to ODF Coos District Forester Jim Young, the benefits of a 
multi-species HCP included “management certainty while at the same time meeting the 
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mandates for different types of land ownership and complying with the Endangered Species 
Act.”97  
 
Given that the planning process for completing the HCP and FMP would exceed the October 
2000 expiration date for the murrelet HCP, the ODF is allowed to continue managing the 
forest under the provisions of the 1995 ITP.98  
 
THE STEERING COMMITTEE AND CORE PLANNING TEAM ARE FORMED 
 
In response to the 2000 decision by the Land Board and the BOF, Ray Craig, then-Assistant 
State Forester, in consultation with the DSL, created a preliminary Steering Committee made 
up of ODF field and program staff to oversee and provide direction for the FMP and HCP 
drafting processes. Jim Young, the Coos District Forester and Dan Shults, ODF Southern 
Area Director assisted Craig in putting together the Steering Committee. All three men felt 
that given the gravity of the situation – operating at drastically reduced harvest levels and the 
potential for further species listings – called for a more inclusive planning process that 
represented the interests and viewpoints of all who had a stake in the forest. From the 
beginning, it was recognized that interests outside the realm of the status quo should be 
included in the Steering Committee, as ten percent of the Elliott is BOF land and Douglas 
and Coos Counties have a financial interest in how both the BOF and Common School Forest 
Lands are managed. To facilitate a broader set of interests, a bi-level committee structure was 
developed, comprised of a Steering Committee and a Core Planning Team. The Steering 
Committee was designated to deal with the overarching policy issues concerning the Elliott 
and involve stakeholders, namely the DSL and county officials, at that level. 99 Beneath the 
Steering Committee was the Core Planning Team. It was characterized as the “technical 
planning group” and its members were responsible for assembling the science information 
and drafting both the FMP and HCP.100  
 
In early 2000, Craig, Young and Shults brainstormed the interests they felt should be 
represented on the Steering Committee. According to Shults, “we made an effort to try and 
stick with those who had a key interest in the financial outcome of what was coming off the 
Elliott.”101 A number of the state agencies invited to join the Steering Committee were 
natural choices and well-prepared to engage in this endeavor. These agencies included the 
ODF, Oregon Department of Justice (ODOJ) and the Oregon Department of Fish and 
Wildlife (ODFW). These agencies were sought out to contribute their expertise in forestry, 
legal matters and wildlife, respectively, to the process. 
 
The inclusion of ODF staff at various levels within the agency was an obvious choice. The 
ODF characterizes itself as a “can do” agency that is comfortable collaborating with other 
agencies and the public. It is a standard operating procedure for the ODF to seek public 
comment on all of its FMPs in state forests. In developing FMPs and HCPs, the ODF is 
charged with the “nuts and bolts” aspects of the process – coordinating logistics, drawing on 
agency expertise and authoring the requisite planning documents. The ODF has been the 
contracted manager of DSL Common School Forest Lands for 70 plus years; thus the agency 
is comfortable operating within the confines of the trust mandate. ODF staff from the Salem 
headquarters also was included to provide their perspective on the on the documents 
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produced by the Steering Committee and the Core Planning Team to make sure they were 
consistent with state wide forest policies. Additionally, as stated by Steve Thomas, Assistant 
State Forester and member of the Steering Committee, his role as part of the ODF Salem 
contingent was to “try to provide any assistance I can to the core group and their effort to 
make sure agency processes are being taken care of as smooth as possible; to make sure 
everyone who needs to be informed about the process; to make sure the Board of Forestry 
can get the approvals [for the HCP and FMP].”102  
 
The inclusion of ODF Salem and DSL staff members was also a key element of the process 
because they had more direct access to the BOF and State Land Board and thus could better 
facilitate the flow of information to and from the respective Boards. Prior to being submitted 
to the USFWS and NMFS, both plans must be approved by the BOF and the State Land 
Board. The ODF and DSL are structured such that all policy decisions, like the approval of 
both plans, must go through ODF and DSL Executive Staff. The ODF Executive Staff 
representative on the Steering Committee was the Assistant State Forester for Forest 
Management Division who acted as a liaison between the Committee and State Forester 
Marvin Brown – the highest executive at the ODF.103 Information and policy guidance would 
then filter up the BOF via the State Forester. The Assistant Director for Policy and Planning 
at the DSL, John Lilly, acted in a similar role. He provided information to the DSL Director, 
Ann Hanus, who would then pass that information along to the State Land Board. The 
majority of the members of the Steering Committee were chosen based on their existing job 
duties and affiliations with the Elliott State Forest. 
 
Though they had not been included in the 1995 HCP process, ODFW staff was invited to 
participate on the Steering Committee to provide their expertise. The ODFW is considered 
the “sister agency” to the ODF and has the necessary experience in managing and knowledge 
of Oregon fish and wildlife. ODFW oversees the state fish and wildlife programs, including 
everything from budget and personnel to legislative and programmatic issues.104 Many of the 
ODFW biologists also had previous experience with HCPs and the NEPA process. 
 
It was recognized early on that legal issues would likely arise during the Planning Process, 
thus a representative from the Oregon Department of Justice (ODOJ) was invited to 
participate on the Steering Committee. Though not as active as the other members, the ODOJ 
representative was at the table to provide legal counsel and serve primarily in an advisory 
role. 
 
Once the agency representation at the table had been solidified, the anticipated role of the 
Steering Committee was fleshed out further to assist in determining what other stakeholders 
would be offered a seat at the table. The Steering Committee’s role was to provide policy 
direction to the Core Planning Team as issues arose and to periodically review and provide 
input on planning issues and guide the planning process.105 The Steering Committee 
members would also have to keep other stakeholders, political leaders, and others informed 
of planning issues and both plans’ progress.106 In addition, they were responsible for 
maintaining contacts with opinion leaders and constituents to promote understanding and 
acceptance of the plan.107 The early-defined role of the Steering Committee served to inform 




Other stakeholders were discussed as being potential members of the Steering Committee, 
including timber and environmental interests and adjacent land owners. However, the 
decision was made by the preliminary members of the Steering Committee to limit direct 
involvement on the Committee to those with key interests in the forest’s management. 
According to Shults, they “tried to include all those who primarily had some fiduciary 
interest as stakeholders, rather than include hunters, recreators and environmental groups on 
the Steering Committee itself.”108 This sentiment was later echoed by Rick Howell, when 
questioned about the diversity of representation among the Steering Committee. He iterated: 
 
Everyone that deserves a seat at the steering committee has one. This is not a 
community project. It’s a forest plan … There’s a lot of opportunity for people 
to comment on the development of the plan. It would be very hard for 
somebody who is interested in what’s happening on the Elliott to say that they 
didn’t have a lot of opportunity for input into it.109  
 
While they could not include everyone who had a potential interest in the forest on the 
committee, the Steering Committee members felt that the public input opportunities would 
allow representatives of those interests to submit feedback and opinions on both plans.  
 
It also was decided that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the U.S. Forest Service 
(USFS) and Weyerhaeuser, both managing forest land adjacent to the Elliott, would not be 
Steering Committee members, despite the overlaps in owl and murrelet habitat ranges. This 
decision was largely attributed to the difference in management mandates. Said Shults: 
 
We consciously did not include the federal land management agencies. The 
constitutional mandate for the Elliott State Forest is far different from the 
mission on federal lands in Oregon. We felt that there would be little value 
added to the process and likely an increase in the time it would take to 
develop the plan; likewise with adjacent landowners. The private lands 
approach to compliance with the Endangered Species Act, generally speaking, 
is different from public lands.110  
 
Added Young, “We thought if they were interested, they would chime in during the public 
process either at the meetings or via the public comment period.”111 Regardless of the 
decision not to include adjacent landowners on the Steering Committee, information about 
location of threatened species was shared among the land managers. Because ODF 
implements the Oregon Forest Practices Act, they are aware of the location of spotted owls, 
marbled murrelets and salmon habitat on all lands in the area.112 The Forest Practices Act 
encourages the economically efficient forest practices consistent with sound management of 
soil, air, water, fish and wildlife resources.113 The Forest Practices Research and Monitoring 
Program conducts surveys and studies on all forests to monitor conditions and expand the 






THE STEERING COMMITTEE 
 
The complete Steering Committee, with the exception of the beneficiary representative, was 
in place by May of 2000. At that time the Steering Committee was composed of managers 
from the ODF Salem headquarters, Division of State Lands, Oregon Department of Justice, 
ODFW SW Region, and the Coos County Board of Commissioners. The roles of the Steering 
Committee members are as follows: 
 
• Chair: ODF Southern Area Director Dan Shults was chosen as chair of the Steering 
Committee because he has overall responsibility for supervising and managing field 
programs in the ODF region in which the Elliott is located. As chair of the Steering 
Committee, Shults, was the final arbiter of decisions when consensus could not be 
reached. 
• Project Leader: As the on-the-ground manager of the Elliott, Jim Young was 
selected as project leader and functioned as the link between the Steering Committee 
and the Core Planning Team. 115 Part of his job was to raise policy issues raised 
during Core Team meetings to the Steering Committee for resolution.116  
• ODF: As the link to the Executive Staff at the agency, Assistant State Forester Steve 
Thomas’ role on the committee was to ensure that the agency processes are followed 
and that all relevant ODF officials are informed about the process. He also made sure 
documents created by the committee aligned and were consistent with state wide 
forest policy.117 Other ODF Salem staff were added to the Steering Committee 
including, Lisa DeBruyckere, State Forests Program Director, and Mike Schnee. 
Schnee, State Forests Planning and Policy Manager, was also a member of the Core 
Planning Team, providing a policy perspective to the technical aspects of both plans. 
He recently retired and has been replaced by Barbara Lee. 
• DSL: As the Assistant Director for Policy and Planning at the DSL, John Lilly’s role 
on the Steering Committee was to serve as the representative for the Director and the 
Land Board.118 He also made sure that both plans were developed within the confines 
of the school land mandate. Now that John Lilly has transitioned into another area of 
the DSL, Steve Purchase has taken over his seat at the table. 
• ODFW: Regional Assistant Supervisor Steve Denney has oversight of all fish and 
wildlife programs in southwest Oregon. He was selected because the ODFW has 
more experience with Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) projects and the NEPA 
process and could provide technical expertise in both wildlife and fish habitat 
needs.119  
• Department of Justice: Jas Adams served as the representative for the Attorney 
General’s office and provided legal advice to the committee.  
• Local Area County Commissioner: The desire to involve a local elected official led 
to a seat being offered to a member of the Coos County Board of Commissioners. 
John Griffith was elected to the Coos County Board of Commissioners in 2000. When 
his term began in 2001 he replaced his predecessor on the Steering Committee and 
subsequently became much more involved in the process.  
• Beneficiary Representative: Rick Howell, Superintendent of the South Coast 
Education Service District (SCESD) located in Coos Bay, Oregon, was chosen to 
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represent the beneficiaries on the Steering Committee. He was chosen to provide a 
locally-based beneficiary perspective. Howell joined the Steering Committee in 2003. 
 
As of 2006, the Steering Committee has been meeting for nearly six years and due to the length 
of the process, it has experienced minor attrition. Some of the original members are no longer on 
the committee due to retirement, change in career, promotion and other factors. Typically, each 
agency’s representative(s) are on the Steering Committee based on their job position. Both 
leadership positions, Chair and Project Leader, have remained with the same individuals since 
the Steering Committee’s inception. The most current roster of the Steering Committee is: 
 
• Chair – Dan Shults, Southern Oregon Area Director, ODF 
• Project Leader – Jim Young, Coos District Forester, ODF 
• Steve Purchase – Assistant Director, DSL 
• John Lilly – Assistant Director for Policy and Planning, DSL (currently in the process of 
transitioning out of this role to Assistant Director of Wetlands and Waterways) 
• Steve Denney – Southwest Region Assistant Supervisor, ODFW 
• John Griffith – Coos County Commissioner 
• Jas Adams – Attorney General’s Office, ODOJ 
• Mike Schnee - State Forests Planning and Policy Manager, ODF 
• Steve Thomas – Assistant State Forester for the Forest Management Division, ODF 
• Lisa DeBruyckere – State Forests Program Director, ODF 
• Barbara Lee – State Forests Planning and Policy Manager, ODF 
• Dan Postrel – Public Affairs Director, ODF 
• Rick Howell – Superintendent, South Coast Education Service District 
 
For a complete diagram of the Steering Committee and Core Planning Team, see Figure 5-4. 
 
In the initial stages of the planning process, the Steering Committee typically met once a month. 
Often the meetings would be held in the ODF Western Lane District Office in Veneta, Oregon. 
Located 15 miles outside Eugene, it is roughly the same amount of traveling time for Steering 
Committee members coming from Salem, Coquille, Coos Bay and Roseburg; ranging from 1.5 
to 2.5 hours by car. Because of the distance traveled to attend the meetings, they typically last for 
a full day. While at meetings, the Steering Committee members would schedule the next meeting 
two months ahead of time to ensure that everyone could make it to as many meetings as their 
other job duties would allow. Now that the process is nearing completion, the Steering 
Committee meets approximately once every other month. 
 
THE CORE PLANNING TEAM 
 
The Core Planning Team was developed to work on the technical aspects of the process 
including gathering data and researching and writing both the FMP and HCP. The team members 
did not start meeting regularly until October 2000. Led by Jim Young, the team was responsible 
for developing the overall resource management strategies for the forest and synthesizing those 
elements in both the FMP and HCP. The species’ habitat requirements outlined in the HCP has 





































The Team was made up primarily of ODF biologists and foresters and ODFW wildlife 
biologists. The USFWS and NMFS were approached in late 2000 and invited to join the Core 
Planning Team. Jim Young recalls the rationale for including USFWS and NMFS, “we 
wanted to get them involved so they could provide input, have a better sense of it and more 
knowledge of it when it comes to the HCP negotiation process.”120 Early on, when the basic 
strategies for the process were being laid out, the federal agencies were less involved. 
However, as surveys were conducted and data gathered, USFWS and NMS staff provided 
their own data for comparison and acted as a sounding board. According to Young, the 
USFWS and NMFS staff participated in Core Planning Team discussions, but not as actively 
as the other members: “the team members would ask [the USFWS and NMFS] questions, 
Source: Elliott State Forest Management Plan, Oregon Department of Forestry, available at 
http://egov.oregon.gov/ODF/. 
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such as whether or not they were on the right track. They gave feedback and tried to be 




• Jim Young, Coos District Forester and Project Leader, ODF 
• Larry Sprouse, Project Coordinator, ODF 
• Marcia Humes, Wildlife Biologist, ODF 
• Logan Jones, Planning Coordinator, ODF 
• Jeff Brandt, Resource Monitoring Coordinator, ODF 
• Jane Hope, Planning Specialist, ODF 
• Mike Schnee, State Forests Planning and Policy Manager, ODF 
• Jeff Foreman, Public Information Officer, ODF  
• Marnie Allbritten, Wildlife Biologist, ODFW 
• Howard Crombie, Fisheries Biologist, ODFW 
• Greg Kreimeyer, Assistant District Forester, ODFW.122 
 
The Core Planning Team met until September 2004, when the committee was dissolved.  
 
CREATING THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
 
The September 2000 Steering Committee meeting laid the foundation for the Planning 
Process (At this point the committee was not completely formed). In an effort to figure out 
the direction of the process, the committee members brainstormed 12 ground rules they 
agreed to follow. These rules included, for example, keeping in mind the mandate to produce 
revenue for the Common School Fund. The ground rules were originally deemed “planning 
principals.”123 Jim Young described how the content of the planning principles evolved over 
time: 
 
Over the next year [the planning principals] were discussed at meetings in 
which we wordsmithed them and made changes. This was done through an 
open discussion in which we sought consensus. There was not much 
disagreement; it was mostly over the use of certain words. Occasionally there 
were instances where wording was left in even if everyone did not agree.124  
 
The Guiding Principals were finalized from the original planning principles in early 2001. 
They took into consideration the forest vision, management goals and monitoring 
assumptions and were designed to set the direction for the management plan. The Guiding 





• The plan will recognize that the goal for the Common School Forest Lands is the 
maximization of revenue to the Common School Fund over the long-term. The goal 
for the BOF lands is to secure the greatest permanent value to the citizens of Oregon 
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by providing healthy, productive, and sustainable forest ecosystems, that over time 
and across the landscape provide a full range of social, economic, and environmental 
benefits to the people of Oregon. 
• The plan will be developed within the context of the Elliott State Forest as a managed 
forest. 
• The plan will recognize that the forest is intended to be an important contributor to 
timber supply for present and future generations. 
• The plan will be a comprehensive, integrated forest management plan taking into 
account a wide range of forest values. 
• Lands will be identified and managed for long-term revenue production while 
providing for a sustained contribution to biological capability and social values. The 
plan will recognize that there will be trade-offs between revenue producing activities 
and non-revenue producing activities. 
• The plan will examine opportunities to achieve goals through cooperative efforts with 
other agencies, user groups or organizations. 
• The plan will be developed through a collaborative and cooperative process involving 
the State Land Board, the BOF, the public, local and tribal governments, and other 
resource management agencies including the federal services. 
• The plan will be goal-driven. 
• The plan will view the Elliott State Forest in both a local and regional context. 
• The plan will consider the overall biological diversity of state forest lands, including 
the variety of life and accompanying ecological processes. 
• The forest will be managed to meet the state and federal Endangered Species Acts 
(ESA) while fulfilling the State Land Board’s responsibilities under the Oregon 
Constitution and the BOF’s statutory responsibilities.126 
 
DEVELOPING MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
 
Once the direction of the planning process had been determined, the Core Planning Team 
began the process of gathering and analyzing the data to inform both plans. During Core 
Planning Team meetings, there was a lot of discussion about the scientific points of the 
process, focused primarily on trying to balance wildlife habitat needs with the DSL’s 
constitutional mandate. Finding the appropriate balancing point was often a point of 
contention among the scientists, as explained by Jim Young, Project Leader of the Core 
Planning Team: “Overall the team functioned pretty smoothly, although there is always some 
disagreement. I would make the decisions if there was a stalemate. To make my decision, I 
usually referred back to the Guiding Principles.”127 
 
In the initial meetings, the biologists inventoried the data they already possessed on the owl, 
murrelet, salmon and other potentially-threatened species and determined what information 
they were lacking. Numerous studies already had been conducted on the owls and murrelets, 
but little was known about the potentially-threatened species and salmon. One of the 
decisions that came out of the meetings was the need to conduct a watershed analysis of the 
forest to acquire more data on the state of the salmon fisheries. The Planning Team decided 
that they also needed a survey of speices for which they had little information (e.g., song 
birds, bats and amphibians). An independent firm was hired to conduct the bulk of the 
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surveys while the ODFW biologists completed the rest. The biological surveys were 
underway from January through November 2001 and included: 
 
• Surveys on winter and summer aquatic habitat on streams in the Elliott that had not 
been previously surveyed conducted by the ODFW 
• Amphibian surveys were conducted to determine species presence and abundance to 
assist in determining how manage actions might affect their habitat 
• Songbird, pilated woodpecker, and bats were surveyed to determine presence in the 
forest 
• Pilot radar surveys for marbled murrelets were conducted to determine flyways and 
high use areas in the forest128 
 
In 2001, the planning team organized the array of possible management scenarios under 
consideration into eight conceptual management plans. These conceptual management 
approaches were devised to capture the variety of possible management scenarios envisioned 
by the Steering Committee. The eight models are as follows: 
 
• Model 1: Continue managing in accordance with the 1995 FMP/HCP 
• Model 2: No HCP – manage under take avoidance for owls, murrelets, and fish 
• Model 3: Continue managing under the 1995 FMP/HCP with revised riparian 
strategies 
• Model 4: Manage forest to create an array of forest structure conditions 
• Model 5: 50 percent of forest allocated to conservation areas 
• Model 6: HCP for owl only and managed with a take avoidance strategy for murrelets 
and Coho salmon. 
• Model 7: 25 percent of forest allocated to conservation areas 
• Model 8: 100 percent conservation129 
 
The Core Planning Team then approached Dr. John Sessions, Professor Forestry and Forest 
Engineering at Oregon State University, to model the eight scenarios. The modeling system 
was designed to display the impacts and outputs of each strategy on the forest ecosystem 
throughout 30 consecutive five-year periods.130 Dr. Sessions also produced a Conceptual 
Management Approaches Summary as a supplement to the modeling. It explained each 
model with specific references to the affect of timber production, conservation areas, and 
riparian strategies on the forest. Three key concepts emerged from the modeling. These were 
used as a benchmark for narrowing the options for potential management models and 
included:  
 
1. Reserves for the protection of important habitat. 
2. Revised aquatic/riparian strategies 




The modeling described what would happen to conservation reserves, marbled murrelet 
habitat areas, owl areas, aquatic habitat, scenic corridors, etc. over a 100-year period. The 
output from the modeling allowed the Steering Committee to compare the net present value 
of the forest under each strategy. This 
information aided them in determining the 
best course of action for Elliott 
management. John Lilly, then-Assistant 
Director for Policy and Planning at the 
DSL, identified the utility of the modeling 
in providing output on what each strategy 
could produce in timber harvests: “What 
the difference is between one model and 
another could be the cost of meeting the 
federal ESA requirements.”131 
 
Once the initial modeling was completed, 
the Core Planning Team devised a 
preliminary matrix as a means to select the 
best model or combination of models 
(Figure 5-5). In 2002, during a Core 
Planning Team meeting each member 
individually ranked the eight models on a 
scale from one to five. The rankings were 
averaged and presented to the Steering 
Committee. The Steering Committee 
directed the Planning Team to incorporate 
the three key concepts identified from the 
modeling into the development of the draft 
landscape strategy. Using the revised 
decision matrix, the Core Planning Team reexamined each model and rated it on a scale of 0 
to 5 (5 being the highest score) as to the political viability of each management scenario, and 
how it met the three main goals and objectives of the planning process: maximization of 
revenues to the Common School Fund in the long run, contribution to the survival and 
recovery of threatened and endangered species, and prevention of future listings.132 
 
DRAFTING OF KEY PLANNING DOCUMENTS 
 
While the modeling was underway, the Core Planning Team also began drafting the FMP, 
HCP and other key planning documents. In September 2001, the ODF, Oregon State 
University, and economic consultants conducted a socio-economic study to asses the 
economic and social effects both locally and regionally of the management of the Elliott 
State Forest.133 The report provided information on the value of timber harvest sold on the 
Elliott to the local and regional economies, and on the value and frequency of recreational 
use on the forest.134 The key findings of the study were as follows: 
 
Figure 5-5: Decision Matrix 




• Southwest Oregon has a larger percentage (17 percent) of its workforce in the wood 
processing industry than the state as a whole. 
• Timber industries account for 10% of personal income in Coos County. 
• Tourism to the Oregon Coast is significant to Coos County’s economy. 
• Hunting is an important recreational activity on the Elliott. 
• Every one million board feet of timber harvested from the Elliott State Forest 
generates between 11 and 13 jobs in southwest Oregon with an average annual wage 
of approximately $32,000. 
• 37 percent of Elliott harvests are processed in mills in Coos County.135 
 
The findings of the socioeconomic study were another element that served to balance the 
economics and science at play in the planning process. These findings were especially 
poignant for Coos County Commissioner John Griffith:  
 
A million board feet here and a million there might be what some people 
would want for owls and murrelets but I am the one that has to face those 11 
to 13 guys for every million feet and explain that I blinked or was asleep at the 
switch and now they don’t have a job. I have to let the guys on the Committee 
know this. I am never going to be able to not see the faces of those men and 
families who lost their jobs because I didn’t hold out for everything I could 
get.136 
 
During 2003, using the three concepts identified by the Steering Committee, the Core 
Planning Team developed and wrote the first draft of an Integrated Landscape Strategy. The 
Integrated Landscape Strategy was the foundation from which the HCP and the FMP were 
built. It was designed to meet the legal mandates for revenue production while providing 
what the team determined was an adequate level of habitat for threatened species that will 
comply with the Federal ESA.137  
 
The team also continued to work with Dr. Sessions on modeling variations of the draft 
management scenarios and updating inventory data on the model. Initial model runs of the 
draft Landscape Strategies were done in early 2004. Since then, other management scenarios 
ranging from an emphasis on conservation to an emphasis on timber production have been 
run. The outputs were analyzed and resulted in minor adjustments of the Landscape 
Strategies until the first half of 2005.138 A scientific peer review of the draft Strategies and 
draft FMP was conducted at the end of 2003 and early 2004.139 
 
THE BENEFICIARIES JOIN THE STEERING COMMITTEE 
 
In October 2003, the make-up of the Steering Committee was broadened to include Rick 
Howell. At that time, the DSL decided the constitutional interest of the beneficiary warranted 
involvement in the Steering Committee. Chuck Bennett, an education interest group lobbyist 
and member of the Beneficiary Advisory Council, was consulted on whom should be 
selected to represent the beneficiary interest in the planning process. He suggested Rick 
Howell, the Superintendent of the South Coast Education Service District (SCESD) located 
in Coos Bay, Oregon. 140 Howell was a logical choice because he has close ties with local 
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area schools and education interests and is familiar with the Elliott State Forest. Howell had 
some reservations about joining the Steering Committee:  
 
One of my concerns going into the process was who am I talking to? I know 
my attitude going into this was getting the maximum sustainable production 
… I didn’t know if I was going into a room full of environmentalists, of which 
in some circumstances I consider myself one, but not to the same extent in this 
circumstance because my mandate is different.141 
 
The beneficiaries of the Common School Fund and the education interest groups are 
organized into what could be best described as a very loose coalition. In many ways the 
beneficiary interest group is in its infancy of organizing itself. According to Bennett:  
 
We have had really good access to the DSL and State Land Board. They have 
taken us into pretty strong consideration but we are still the new kids on the 
block. Ranchers, retailers and other interest groups have been there for years 
pushing back on Common School Fund claims. We are really new. We have 
allowed this thing to go on for 150 years without getting involved so we are 
trying to be pretty reasonable as we move ahead.142  
 
The overarching beneficiary organization is the Confederation of Oregon School 
Administrators (COSA). Founded in 1974, its primary goal is to give Oregon’s educators a 
voice in public policy, encourage professional development, and play a more active role in 
shaping the public school system. It represents more than 2,000 school administrators 
throughout Oregon.143 Recently, COSA has become a powerful lobbying organization. 
COSA, in addition to other Oregon education interest groups has become involved with 
Children’s Land Alliance Supporting Schools (CLASS), a westwide beneficiary 
organization. Director of State Lands Ann Hanus also has been active in getting beneficiaries 
more involved in DSL activities. She organized a large group of representatives from the 
Oregon teacher’s union, classified employee union, school administrators and Parent Teacher 
Associations involved in CLASS. SCESD serving Coos, Curry and Western Douglas 
counties, is a member of COSA. SCESD provides schools high-cost services that would be 
difficult for them to provide on their own, such as special education teachers, technology 
services and consultation services.144  
 
At the same time, Director Hanus has encouraged the involvement of beneficiary groups like 
COSA to become part of the advisory and other Steering Committees managing common 
school land. Hanus was also instrumental in getting members of these groups on the 
Beneficiary Advisory Council, Asset Management Plan Committee and Rangeland Advisory 
Committees.145 This has occurred over the last five to six years. One of the main goals of the 
beneficiary groups, outside of being more involved in the management of the school land 
portfolio, is to maximize income and assets to the state.146 They hope to maximize the 
income to the Common School Fund is by increasing the harvest yield sold in the Elliott. 
According to Bennett, the beneficiaries in general “tend to advocate cutting more than 
environmental groups. More cutting equals more money. ‘Stumps on the hill, money in the 




BALANCING REVENUE AND THREATENED SPECIES PROTECTION 
 
The issue of balancing the increase of timber harvest sales and providing adequate protection 
for the threatened species in the Elliott State Forest came to a head during a series of Steering 
Committee meetings in 2003. Commissioner John Griffith has been characterized by the 
other committee members as pushing the hardest to increase harvest levels. As a former 
logger, reporter for the Oregonian and member of the State Ocean Policy Advisory Council, 
Commissioner Griffith has been at the center of numerous controversies on resource 
management. On January 16, 2002, the Coos County Board of Commissioners, led by 
Commissioner Griffith, voted to sue the USFWS over critical habitat violations for the 
western snowy plover.148 Griffith and the Board felt that the USFWS only considered the 
biology of birds when designating critical habitat and did not take the economic impact of 
beach closures into consideration. The snowy plover breeds primarily on coastal beaches 
from southern Washington to southern Baja California and is vulnerable to disturbance by 
humans, pets and nest scavengers, such as crows and ravens.149 Protecting the plover 
breeding sites necessitated the closure of many beaches and limited access to certain area by 
off-road vehicles (ORVs). The Oregon Dunes draw many tourists to Coos County and ORVs 
are a main source of recreation for tourists and locals. The lawsuit was decided in May 2003 
in Coos County’s favor.150 
 
Prior to the lawsuit when Griffith was working as a reporter, he covered the Advisory 
Council appointed by then-Governor Kitzhaber to implement the Coastal Zone Management 
Act (CZMA) and other ocean-related policies. The Advisory Council put the state agencies in 
the position of either adopting their recommendations or vetoing them, but not allowing them 
to make changes. The change in management of the coastal zone also took away authority 
from coastal counties. Griffith states that he became, “such a pain in the neck that in 1998 
they put me on the council.”151 He was subsequently fired from the council. The media “went 
nuts” on the story. In 2003, after being approached by the State Legislature, Griffith re-
drafted a section of a bill to make it more responsive to the coastal communities. The bill was 
revised and passed into state law.  
  
Commissioner Griffith’s reputation and his somewhat acrimonious feelings towards some 
state officials and the USFWS have made him somewhat of a maverick on the Steering 
Committee and averse to taking what others consider the safer route. He also has taken the 
revenue maximization mandate of the DSL to heart. He laminated Article VIII, Section 5 of 
the Oregon Constitution – the actual text of the mandate – to the binder he takes to Steering 
Committee meetings. According to Griffith, “By and large they want to get out as much 
timber as [the other Steering Committee members] can. The difference is that I think they can 
get out more and they don’t think they can get out as much as I think they can.”152 Steve 
Thomas, Assistant State Forester, expressd his view of Commissioner Griffith’s opinions in 
relation to the rest of the Steering Committee: 
 
If John had his way, he would want to go closer to the Forest Practices Act 
and give the [USFWS and NMFS] the old ‘one two’ and give them only what 
he absolutely had to give them … he takes a slightly different view of our 
 
 111
negotiations with them. John would lean more towards an industrial [forest 
management] model. The rest of us are pretty well aligned.153 
 
The other Steering Committee members did not want to have the HCP rejected by USFWS 
and NMFS because it was overzealous in the amount of harvesting allowed and not stringent 
enough in its provisions for species protection. The underlying goal of revising the HCP was 
to increase harvest levels while at the same time putting in place the necessary measures to 
mitigate threatened species habitat loss. Moreover, there was a general understanding that the 
levels would not return to pre- 1995 HCP conditions. 
 
The discrepancy in viewpoints between Commissioner Griffith and the rest of the committee 
became heated in one of the meetings. Griffith states: 
 
I thought that we weren’t really making headway towards meeting our 
constitutional obligations. We had one meeting where it was pretty face-to-
face. I told them where I thought the shortcomings where and they told me 
where they thought their constraints were. We got that all aired out and it has 
been better since.154  
 
When it comes to resolving conflicts and making everyday decisions, both the Steering 
Committee and the Core Planning Team attempted to reach consensus on each decision 
point. According to Griffith, “usually we work things out and there is no major heartburn 
about anything … you just try to get it to where for the most part it is just text changes to a 
draft.”155 However, when it was clear that consensus could not be reached, the chairman had 
the authority to make the decision. As chair of the process, Shults saw himself as more of a 
facilitator to make sure that the committee got through the process. Of his duties, Shults 
stated, “It’s a little bit of a balancing act. I try not to direct the process but facilitate it so we 
get the right amount of folks inputting and we get all of their thoughts on the table and 
include them in the process.”156 
 
Though the issue of balancing the fiduciary responsibility of the DSL with the habitat 
conservation of the owl, murrelet, salmon and other species was resolved within the Steering 
Committee, both the Committee and the Core Planning Team have struggled with the issue in 
drafting both the FMP and HCP. Even though staff from USFWS and NMFS has been 
involved, there remains uncertainty about whether or not their participation will directly 
result in an approved HCP. Commissioner Griffith gave his opinion of the situation:  
 
I don’t know if those guys have the experience I do or believe as firmly as I 
do that the federal agencies, particularly NMFS, are of the tendency of saying 
“Your plan is not good enough,” but they do not tell you specifically what 
they want. They just hang it out there and it is like they have one hand behind 







DRAFTING OF KEY PLANNING DOCUMENTS CONTINUES 
 
In April 2004, the peer reviews of the FMP strategies were reconciled and revisions were 
completed. By May, the first draft of the FMP was available for public comment and work on 
a draft Implementation Plan began. 158 The Core Planning Team hired Jones & Stokes 
Associates to write the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and to assist them in going 
through the NEPA process.  
 
In the midst of the process, the beneficiaries and state legislators considered selling the 
Elliott and investing the money to increase revenue for the trust. They feared that the HCP 
would not allow enough timber sales making it a resource sink instead of an income-
producing forest. A budget note from the Oregon State Legislature allowed the Land Board 
to hire Mason, Bruce and Girard Associates to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the forest. 
The cost-benefit analysis was designed to provide information important in determining a 
benchmark to meet the Land Board’s fiduciary responsibility and to guide the Board’s long-
term plans for the Elliott State Forest. It estimated the forest’s income value under two 
alternatives: continued state ownership of the Elliott (net present value of Common School 
Fund income) and sale of the Elliott and investment of proceeds (Common School Fund 
income from sale).159 The conclusion reached by the authors of the report determined that 
selling the forest, depending on economic conditions at the time, would be more or less 
equivalent to keeping the forest and continuing its long-term management.160 Once the 
results of the analysis were complete, the Land Board issued a statement saying they had no 
intension of selling the Elliott State Forest because of its importance to the Common School 
Fund portfolio. 
 
Once it was determined that selling the Elliott State Forest was not a viable option, work on 
the draft FMP and HCP continued. In February through June of 2005, the draft 
Implementation Plan was written. By September 2005, the final draft of the FMP for public 
review was completed and the initial draft of the HCP was developed. The most current 
iteration of the FMP was published on the ODF website on January 2006.  
 
Though the Planning Process still has a few more hurdles to pass, the Steering Committee is 
optimistic that the outcome will be positive – meaning HCP approval and an increase in 
timber sold in the Elliott. According to Shults, “At the end of the process the Steering 
Committee and the core team will go away and hopefully we’ll get Jim Young and the local 
managers managing under that plan.”161 
 
PUBLIC INPUT PROCESS  
 
From the outset, avenues for public input were built into the FMP/HCP process; some, like 
the public meetings were held at specific times while others such as comments submitted via 
the ODF’s webpage were available at all times. The public involvement process consisted of 
newsletters, public meetings and forest tours, information posted on the ODF website and 




The first public meetings were held in January through February 2001 in Coos Bay, North 
Bend, Roseburg and Salem. Prior to the meetings, the ODF had purchased newspaper 
advertisements in the Coos Bay World, Eugene Register-Guard, Portland Oregonian, 
Roseburg News-Review and Salem Statesman-Journal to announce the first public meeting 
and invite public participation. The focus of this meeting was to provide background on the 
reasons for revising the FMP and HCP, and to seek public input on the management of the 
forest.163 The second round of public meetings was held in Salem, Coos Bay and Roseburg 
during June 2004 to discuss strategies for the FMP. In May 2005, public meetings were held 
for the EIS scoping process. The last public meeting occurred in September 2005 in Coos 
Bay and Roseburg to discuss the final draft of the FMP.164 
 
Another means by which the Steering Committee kept the public apprised on the status of the 
Planning Process was via a newsletter, Expectations: A Newsletter about Elliott State Forest 
Planning. The newsletter contained information about Elliott State Forest management and 
habitat conservation and was published in May 2001, January 2002, September 2002 and 
May 2004 by the ODF. The newsletter was available online and by post. The first issue states 
its intended purpose: 
 
The ODF will use this newsletter to communicate with interested persons 
during the planning process, which is expected to take three years. The 
newsletter will be published on an as-needed basis to note progress in the 
planning process and to announce upcoming opportunities for public 
involvement. 165  
 
Expectations included information on: (1) history of Elliott State Forest, (2) natural resources 
found in the Elliott, (3) information and updates about the FMP and HCP processes, (4) 
summaries of comments from public meetings, (5) other sources of information on the Elliott 
and ODF, (6) an explanation of the different harvest models under consideration, (7) the 
Guiding Principals, (8) specific questions for the public to address in their comments, (9) 
actions the ODF and ODFW were undertaking to improve habitat on the Elliott (counting 
salmon, placing large pieces of wood in the streams for better spawning grounds), (10) 
species information and (11) information on common school lands mandate. Expectations 
also contained pictures, graphs and maps complementing the written material. In some 
issues, the project timelines of both the FMP and HCP were included on the back page. 
 
Another venue for public comment was made available through the ODF’s website. Through 
this medium, the public was free to submit comments anytime. Typically people were asked 
to respond to focused questions regarding the direction of the plan and management 
techniques, such as the Integrated Resource Management Strategies. Opportunities for these 
types of comments and comment periods were advertised in Expectations and more recently 
on the ODF website.  
 
When public comments were submitted on-line or via another written format, they were 
filtered and condensed by ODF staff, specifically dedicated to reading and processing the 
volumes of comments. The Steering Committee responded only to comments that were 
relevant to the subject of the comment period; superfluous comments or ones not based in 
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reality were not given responses. Responses are typically a sentence or two and at most a 
paragraph. Many comments addressed why the Steering Committee had chosen a certain path 
with their management strategies. The written responses were then posted on the ODF 
website so the public could view them. 
 
The comments also were condensed into an internal document that was passed along from 
the Steering Committee members to their supervisors. Comments also are seen by the State 
Land Board albeit after much censoring and condensing. State Land Board assistants had the 
opportunity to review them and pass along information at their discretion. It is not clear 
whether the Governor, Secretary of State and Treasurer actually saw the public comments in 
their entirety. 
 
The Steering Committee and Core Planning Team also held public meetings to inform the 
public on the progress of the FMP and HCP and to allow them to provide verbal feedback. 
Expectations described the public meetings as “listening posts” where opinions are sought 
from participants in a formal setting.166 Core team members typically ran the meetings. 
Sometimes the Steering Committee members attend to listen to the comments, but they did 
not necessarily participate in the discussions. Often, the specialists that worked on the plan 
were available for discussions at walk-up stations. The ODF staff attempted to answer all of 
the questions and addressed comments during the meeting. The meetings have been held in 
Salem, Coos Bay, North Bend and Roseburg. Since the process began there have been four, 
all of which have been advertised on the ODF’s website and in Expectations, when it was 
still in publication. The attendance of the meetings is usually low with a turnout of 
approximately 25 to 30 people. 167 Steve Thomas described his feelings of frustration with 
some of the initial public meetings:  
 
We put the dog and pony show together. We had twelve resource analysts 
come to Roseburg, Coos Bay and Salem. We set it up so that there would be a 
brief introduction and have all these resource tables – one about habitat, one 
about trees, one about water … all these [staff] are lined up and only ten 
people showed up. We outnumbered the number of people.168  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, attendance at meetings closer in proximity to the Elliott was higher 
than the meetings held in Salem.  
 
In 2005, newspaper inserts were used to reach more of the “general public” and attract a 
broader audience to public meetings. The inserts were placed in Roseburg and Coos Bay 
papers and provided an overview of the Elliott process in addition to advertising meeting 
times and locations. They were published before the most recent public meeting in 
September 2005. Steve Denney originally suggested the idea because it had worked well for 
the ODFW’s Diamond Lake Restoration Process. According to Jim Young, the Core 
Planning Team was satisfied with the insert’s effectiveness, as different people showed up 




However, despite the small success of the newspaper inserts, the Steering Committee 
struggled in coming up with effective means in which to actively involve the public. Roger 
Welty, a Planning Specialist at ODF, gave his opinion on the public comment process:  
 
When talking about “the public,” it is a very diverse public. There are some 
people that are very involved with the Elliott FMP and HCP. We’re not sure 
how many people they represent. Some people read and spend enough time 
checking the plans, that it makes you wonder how they have time for a job and 
other responsibilities and interests in their life. The other part of the public is 
working all day, have family and other responsibilities and find it difficult to 
get to public meetings. They don’t have time to read the whole Forest 
Management Plan draft or HCP.170 
 
In addition to public comment periods, meetings and written publications, ODF planners also 
met with interested individuals and groups over the course of the planning process. These 
contacts included informal meetings and tours of the Elliott, telephone conversations, 
distribution of informational materials and outreach to local media outlets.171 The ODF also 
gave presentations to local timber operators including Douglas Timber Operators and Friends 
of New and Sustainable Industries. 
 
INTEREST GROUPS OUTSIDE OF THE PROCESS 
 
The perspectives of stakeholders outside of the Elliott State Forest Planning Process, while 
not affecting the process directly, can further elucidate the context in which the process 
operated in and offer a more complete picture of the process from an outside vantage point. 
While it is challenging to categorize the spectrum of the public that participated in some form 
during the meetings and public comment periods, two distinctive groups were perceived as 
representing of the “extreme” views on how the Elliott State Forest should be managed – the 
environmentalists and the timber industry. 
 
Francis Eatherington, Forest Monitor for the Roseburg-based Umpqua Watersheds, Inc 
(UW), a local environmental non-governmental organization, was one of the more vocal of 
the environmental groups interested in the Elliott. UW is a 501(c)(3) organization dedicated 
to the protection and restoration of the watersheds in the Umpqua River Basin. UW does this 
by monitoring the activities of federal, state and local agencies that manage public land and 
forests within the watershed. Eatherington expressed her concerns about the way the Elliott is 
currently managed: “In the [Elliott State] Forest the ODF is selling and logging the biggest 
and oldest trees in any of Oregon’s state forests. The Elliott has different logging practices 
than federal agencies. It’s more backward and less progressive. There are bigger clear cuts, 
more herbicide use and smaller stream buffers.  The state uses prison labor paying about $2 a 
day.”172 She went on to describe her perception as to how the Steering Committee has 
misinterpreted the DSL’s mandate: 
 
The mandate the state has to manage common school fund land doesn’t 
necessarily mean that they have to liquidate the oldest forests as fast as they 
can; that is not the mandate. Instead the mandate requires ODF to return 
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revenues of a sustainable logging program into the Common School Fund. 
They have interpreted this as being we have to make as much money as 
possible now.173  
 
During the process, Eatherington inquired if she could be on the Steering Committee or sit in 
on the meetings so she could better direct her comments on the FMP and HCP. She was 
denied both requests.  
 
Bob Ragon, the Executive Director of Douglas Timber Operators (DTO), a regional trade 
association representing the wood products industry in southwest Oregon, represented the 
timber industry interests in the Elliott. The members of DTO, ranging from Weyerhaeuser to 
individuals, are the principal buyers of the timber sales the Elliott produces. Ragon offered 
his perspective on the Planning Process: 
 
My line of comment has been along the edges of “you have a fiduciary 
responsibility to schools in the state of Oregon to provide revenue and that 
ought to be your prime function.” With respect to the other things they get 
involved in I have questions about how valid they are, so I provide my 
comments. Much of that revolves around the ESA and the wide reach it has on 
resource management. I know there are other groups are out there that 
advocate that we shouldn’t be harvesting any trees on the Elliott because it’s a 
unique ecosystem … my comments are totally on the other side of the 
equation. I believe very strongly in managing forests. There too many 
examples, particularly on federal lands in the west, where the US Forest 
Service has walked away from management and now they are burning up. I 
don’t think that benefits anybody.174 
 
Ragon added his opinion about the restrictions imposed the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
and job loss in Southwest Oregon: “Before taking this job I was the CEO of a local mill and 
watched thousands of jobs disappear in Oregon because of endangered species. What did 
succession of harvests in public lands do for endangered species? Nothing. They are no better 
off today than they were before.”175 
 
 
THE ANALYSIS: ELLIOTT STATE FOREST PLANNING PROCESS 
 
The following analysis identifies and discusses benefits, costs, challenges, facilitating factors 
and lessons learned from the Elliott State Forest Planning Process. This analysis is based on 
the observations, reflections and perceptions of Steering Committee members, in addition to 
environmental and timber representatives. The analysis also reflects the researchers’ external 
assessment of the process. 
 
Benefits of the Planning Process include the increased involvement of beneficiary groups, 




Facilitating factors that enabled the Steering Committee to persevere and develop what most 
consider a successful plan were the personalities and relationships of the Steering Committee 
members, a commitment to the process, the Planning Process structure and, finally, the forest 
modeling. 
 
In sum, the lessons learned and advice from the Elliott State Forest Planning Process include 
using technology to capture the values of land, recognizing the challenges of grabbing the 
attention of the public, ensuring that participants have adequate time to commit to a 
collaborative effort, using collaboration in situations that warrant its added time and energy 
and understanding that stacking the representation towards one interest can lead to an uneven 
process. 
 
WAS THE ELLIOTT STATE FOREST PLANNING PROCESS COLLABORATIVE? 
 
Compared to traditional management processes, the Planning Process used to complete the 
FMP and HCP for the Elliott State Forest was collaborative. While all state forests including 
Common School Forestlands are managed via forest management plans, the process used to 
devise them is not considered collaborative. For example, the 1994-1995 Elliott FMP and 
HCP was an internal process between DSL and ODF.176  
 
However, while many members of the Steering Committee stated that the process was 
collaborative, there was a general acknowledgement that it was not a traditional collaborative 
process and that the collaboration varied at different levels of the process. John Lilly, 
Assistant Director of Policy and Planning for the DSL, explained that, “it’s collaborative in 
the sense that those sitting around the table feel equally involved but not all have the same 
stake in the outcome” and that, “[the process is] a collaborative effort but not traditional.”177 
Dan Shults further elucidated the different levels of collaboration, adding that the Core 
Planning Team is “a very collaborative effort too with ODFW, USFWS, NMFS and a lot of 
the technical folks from the Elliott State Forest itself. So there are two levels of collaboration 
there. There is the working group actually forging the plan and the [Steering Committee].”178 
Though many felt that the Steering Committee and Core Planning Team were collaborative, 
there was a general sentiment that outside of these two structures the process was less 
collaborative. Steve Thomas agreed that the Steering Committee was “collaborative,” but the 
public outreach was not collaborative: “I would say that the whole issue of public 
involvement is not collaborative. It’s more of a give us your input and we respond kind of 
thing.”179 Steve Denney of the ODFW iterated a similar thought, stating that the process is 
“collaborative with the people involved.”180 Added Commissioner Griffith, “I’d say it’s more 
collaborative than most.”181 Rick Howell stated that he thought the Planning Process was 
“very collaborative.” 
 
The Elliott State Forest Planning Process was collaborative within the sphere of the Steering 
Committee and Core Planning Team; however, outside of the scope of the planning structure 
the process was less collaborative. Bob Ragon, Executive Director of Douglas Timber 
Operators, explained how he felt about the level of collaboration: “They are trying to reach 
out to all different interest groups, but the decision can’t be a collaborative decision in my 
view. We don’t all get a seat at the table and we don’t get to vote.”182 Francis Eatherington, 
 
 118
Forest Monitor at Umpqua Watersheds, Inc., cited numerous frustrations with the public 
meetings, comment process and the lack of response by the ODF and said that she feels as 
though the decision on how to manage the forest has already been made.183  
 
The reflections on the level of collaboration and the experiences of participants in this 
process can be further examined via three lenses used to measure collaboration in this report: 
(1) breadth of stakeholders, (2) degree of transparency and (3) degree of influence on 
decision making. 
 
Breadth of Stakeholders: In so far as striving to create a Planning Process with a diverse 
breadth of stakeholders with an economic interest in the Elliott State Forest, this process was 
successful. Former Assistant State Forester Ray Craig, Jim Young and Dan Shults 
orchestrated an inclusive Steering Committee and Core Planning Team to develop an FMP 
and HCP for Common School Forest Lands in Oregon that met the “economic stake in the 
management of the forest” criteria set forth in the beginning of the process.  
 
From the beneficiary perspective, involvement in the Steering Committee was demonstrative 
of the more active role they are taking in all aspects of DSL management and the broader 
influence of CLASS. John Lilly stated that in the last five years there has been more 
emphasis on school financing and that:  
 
Organizations like CLASS helped too because there has been an outreach 
from grassroots people to their interests … they have a story to tell and it is 
somebody else telling the story not just the department. When the department 
talks about trust land and the trust responsibility it sounds a little self-serving, 
like “you guys are just trying to protect your jobs.”184  
 
The involvement of the beneficiaries has served deepened the broader understanding of the 
trust mandate and fiduciary responsibility for beneficiary and education interest groups in 
Oregon. 
 
However, if other interests in the Elliott are considered outside of those who stood a chance 
to experience monetary gains from their interests, the breadth on the Steering Committee and 
Core Planning Team was shallow. The Steering Committee actively acknowledged that not 
all stakeholders or interested parties were invited to participate in the Planning Process 
outside the realm of public comment opportunities. Those not invited to participate included 
adjacent landowners (BLM, USFS and Weyerhaeuser), timber interest group and 
environmentalists. Recall, that the reason for not including the adjacent landowners was 
because of the difference in operational mandates. John Lilly, Assistant Director for Policy 
and Planning at DSL, went on to further acknowledge the interests lacking representation on 
the Steering Committee:  
 
There is an environmental interest in the Coos Bay and Roseburg areas that 
watch over our activities on forest lands that aren’t on the Steering 
Committee. There are people who buy the timber, there are the loggers, and 
folks who purchase the timber that aren’t represented. There are local people 
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who use the forest for all sorts of things, recreation purposes or what have 
you; those folks aren’t on the Steering Committee even though they have an 
interest in the outcome. They are the ones that might thwart the outcome 
through legal or political efforts. There are no legislators and there isn’t a 
County Commissioner from Douglas County.185  
 
Recall that it was decided early on that the Steering Committee would be made up of those 
with an economic interest in the forest. While some of the interests listed by Lilly could fall 
into that category, there was also the feeling that it would be too complicated to determine 
which individuals would serve as representatives for the timber interests, environmentalists 
or the public at large. According to Dan Shults: 
 
We manage the land with the permission of the public and the public has to be 
involved and understand what we’re all about. It’s always a challenge because 
you never know whether the person at the table really represents the “public.” 
The “public” consists of a lot of different perspectives.186  
 
Interests outside of the Steering Committee had access to the process primarily via public 
meetings and written comments and were not allowed to attend meetings. Eatherington 
recalled one such incident when she inquired if she could come to a Steering Committee 
meeting as an observer: “I was told I could not come, that the meetings were closed. Only 
those that have an economic interest in the Elliott can be on the committee.”187 She added, 
“We do talk to timber industry folks and in the past we have collaborated with Roseburg 
Forest Products. We are used to sitting at the table with them. We can work with the timber 
industry but not with ODF. There is no table for us to come sit at.”188 Jim Young felt slightly 
differently than the other committee members, and stated the he felt that, “the environmental 
perspective may not have been adequately represented on the committee.”189 Young’s belief 
is noteworthy because both outside interest groups interviewed – pro-timber and pro-
environment – agreed that their participation on the Steering Committee would not have 
aided the process.  
 
Degree of Transparency: This process was highly transparent within the scope of the 
Steering Committee and Core Planning Team. However, outside of the process the visibility 
of the process, rationale for decision making and access to information was less transparent. 
Francis Eatherington shared her thoughts on the transparency of the process:  
 
I actually don’t really have much of an idea how the [Steering] Committee 
works or what the process is or who comes to meetings other than what I see. 
From what I understand the [Core] Planning Team hasn’t met in 2005. I asked 
for meeting minutes and they said there aren’t any.190  
 
Eatherington also cited the poor accessibility of information on the DSL and ODF webpages 
as an impediment to her participation in the Planning Process. Eatherington explained:  
 
They [ODF] need to have a link on their website for the Elliott under “State 
Forests.” When they post something on the site they should have a list of 
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recipients that are notified that something has been posted, otherwise we never 
know it’s there unless we go to the site on a regular basis.191  
 
In contrast, Bob Ragon, Executive Director of Douglas Timber Operators stated that there 
was, “no concern on my part that I do not have access to enough information.”192 While it 
appears that the inability or difficulty in accessing information was unintentional, much of 
this depends on the perspective through which the process is viewed. The Steering 
Committee clearly felt that they had made numerous efforts to reach out to the public and 
inform them of the proposed management plans for the Elliott. They published the 
newsletter, Expectations, for four years, put all announcements and draft FMPs and HCPs on 
the ODF website and held numerous public meetings. Ragon felt comfortable with his access 
to information; however if one person found it difficult to find the relevant information on 
the Planning Process then it is likely that others did, as well. 
 
While the degree of transparency associated with information related to the process varied 
depending on perception, the Steering Committee was arguably less transparent about the 
manner in which decisions were made. The Steering Committee made a sincere effort to 
make all of the written products of process available to the public. The drafts of the FMP and 
HCP were posted to the ODF website, making them accessible to all who wanted to read 
them. However, the perception in the environmental community in Roseburg was that the 
decision to increase harvest levels, thus putting the threatened species in further danger, had 
already been made. Eatherington stated her frustrations with the Steering Committees lack of 
transparency about the management decisions, “I feel like it’s a done deal. I feel like it 
doesn’t matter what we say, that they have already decided what they are going to do.”193 
 
Arguably, the HCP and FMP process were as transparent to the public as other ODF forest 
management processes. Collaboration with the public is becoming a part of the culture of the 
ODF, and more recently, part of the DSL as well. According to Dan Shults, the agency “is 
using more collaboration in recent years in all elements of the organization. There are a 
diverse array of stakeholders with different viewpoints and interests and, being a public 
agency, we value their input.”194 Steve Denney iterated a similar statement, “We could have 
sat in a smoke-filled room and done all of this. We chose to make it a more open process. 
That is the strength of it.”195 Because collaboration and transparency are amorphous terms 
that can be interpreted in numerous ways, it is challenging to gauge the differences between 
internal perspectives of the process and external perceptions. Moreover, since the 
transparency of the Elliott State Forest Planning Process was determined by a combination of 
NEPA process requirements and ODF standard operating procedures there is the possibility 
that this sent mixed messages about the transparency of the process to the public and interest 
groups. 
 
Degree of Influence on Decision Making: The Elliott FMP/HCP Planning Process did not 
afford Steering Committee and Core Planning Team members a high level of influence in the 
decision-making process. This was largely due to the bureaucratic environment in which the 
Planning Process had to occur. Both plans had to be approved by separate Boards 
representing congruent, but not necessarily identical, interests in forest management. 
Additionally, once approval was granted from the Land Board and BOF, the USFWS and 
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NMFS had to sign off on HCP as well. While the Steering Committee attempted to work 
with in the confines of what they thought the federal agencies would deem acceptable, each 
stage of approval further confined their ability to influence the process outside of the 
committee except on a small scale.  
 
While the public at large had numerous opportunities to submit written or oral feedback on 
the Elliott FMP, HCP and EIS, their input had a very little influence on the decisions made 
by the Steering Committee over the course of the process. The lack of power in this capacity 
can be linked to a few factors. First and foremost, it was time consuming for the ODF staff to 
collect, sort, process and respond to written comments. The volume of comments received 
and their pertinence to the process also had to be assessed and condensed before being 
reviewed by the Steering Committee. Second, based on the comments of the Steering 
Committee member interviewed, they often looked to the public comments to affirm the 
course of action they were taking to manage the forest because many of the comments 
desired uses of the Elliott that were considered against the spirit of the trust mandate. 
Commissioner Griffith explained: 
 
How do you deal with those general public comments that can’t allow the 
outcome that the commenters desired? You have to go back to the laws and 
constitutional obligations that are associated with the [Elliott State] Forest. 
But how do you be firm and compassionate at the same time? How do you tell 
them this is the purpose for these lands, this is the constitutional mandate for 
these lands and not have them take the perception, “then why did I comment if 
you were going to do that anyway?”196  
 
Additionally, there was no ground rule or standard operating procedure set forth in the 
Steering Committee to actively consider public input in the decisions made. The Steering 
Committee had the choice of incorporating feedback or not; thus the public had a relatively 
low level of influence on the decision making process. 
 
BENEFITS OF THE PROCESS 
 
Although the Elliott State Forest Planning Process is not yet complete, members of the 
Steering Committee cited numerous benefits of engaging in a collaborative process. These 
benefits include increased involvement of beneficiaries in DSL management, increased 
stakeholder buy-in and the relationships built among the participants. Though these benefits 
seem small in number it is likely that more will be realized upon the completion of the 
process. Many Steering Committee members felt the benefits of the process were contingent 
on the approval of the HCP and FMP.  
 
Increased Involvement of Beneficiaries  
 
One of the hallmarks of this process, and what sets it apart from traditional management 
processes, has been the inclusion of the beneficiaries on the Steering Committee and in the 
management of the DSL’s portfolio. As mentioned earlier, beneficiary involvement in DSL 
management activities has been slowly evolving in the last five to six years. Chuck Bennett, 
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lobbyist and Director of Government Relations for the COSA, explained Director Hanus’ 
motivation for including the beneficiaries in management committees similar to the Steering 
Committee: “For her it has been an assistance in terms of educating our constituency (the 
education community), education public interest groups and also the legislature.”197 In 
Oregon, the education interest is considered a very aggressive advocacy group. At the same 
time, CLASS has brought beneficiary involvement and trust management accountability 
much higher on the radar throughout the entire Western U.S. According to Bennett, “they get 
virtually every western state involved with CLASS and creating awareness regionally.”198 
Thus the decision to make sure beneficiary groups are more involved in getting their input in 
on trust management is both a political and progressive move by Director Hanus. 
 
The more active role of beneficiaries in Oregon was evident in the makeup of the Elliott State 
Forest Steering Committee. Rick Howell, a later addition to the Committee, was chosen 
because of his position as Superintendent of the SCESD located in Coos Bay. 199 Bennett’s 
rationale for selecting Rick Howell was that, “the more involved local school districts get in 
the Common School Fund lands, the better.”200 In this capacity Rick Howell serves as the 
beneficiaries’ “man on the ground” who could share their perspective on the Steering 
Committee.201 According to Bennett, the beneficiaries perceive that the Elliott State Forest 
has evolved in way it is viewed by locals and statewide interest groups and that 
environmental issues, water quality issues, and recreation, among others, are values that have 
begun to supersede the true value of the forest – which is to produce revenue for the 
Common School Fund.202 Bennett surmised, “We are showing up and saying, ‘wait a minute 
those are the kid’s logs.’ We are a newcomer but the fundamental reason the Elliott 
exists.”203 The greater involvement of the beneficiaries via Rick Howell on the Elliott 
Steering Committee is part of a state-wide movement in which the beneficiaries are 
becoming increasingly active in common school land management.  
 
Increased Stakeholder Buy-In  
 
An additional benefit of having more stakeholders represented in the Steering Committee and 
Core Planning Team has been an increased level of buy-in to the process from all 
stakeholders involved. Dan Shults iterated the benefits of a stakeholder buy-in in 
collaborative process, “Collaborative processes take an awful lot longer time initially than 
directed processes. However over the long-term I think you save a lot of time, arguments, 
and future controversies by having the right folks involved from the get go.”204 John Lilly, 
Assistant Director for Policy and Planning at the DSL had a similar take on the process:  
 
The benefits are that in any team exercise the collaborative efforts of the 
people around the table are always better then the efforts of just one party 
alone. Though there isn’t always 100 percent agreement on the direction to go, 
at least there are opposing or different points of view expressed and the final 
decision at least gets weighed out against those points of view.205  
 
In addition to their more active role on the Steering Committee, the beneficiary advocacy 
groups have seen a direct connection between buy-in and an increase in revenue for the 
common school fund. According to Chuck Bennett, one of the most effective tools to making 
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his voice heard has been, “literally showing up at the meeting where the discussion is 
occurring … we have gotten more money because we have gotten more involved.”206 Time 
will tell if this is the case with the Elliott, though at this point in the Planning Process it 
appears that the harvest level increases outlined in the FMP will cause the Common School 
Fund to experience greater revenues. 
 
All Steering Committee members interviewed felt that the collaboration within the 
committee was value added to the process and allowed them to better work within the 
constraints of the trust mandate, the HCP process, and the need to increase harvest levels. 
Shults gave his opinion of the value of collaboration:  
 
The value of the collaborative process is that folks are brought along, along 
the way. They see the stumbling blocks, they see the problems the issues 
they’re aware of, the negotiation issues with the [USFWS and NMFS] to get 
things accomplished rather than at the end game laying something out for 
them and saying, “Hey, this is the best we could do. Sign off on it.” They’re 
aware of the challenges along the way and involved in solving them so there is 
more buy-in to what we are trying to do.207  
 
The inclusion of the USFWS and NMFS in the Core Planning Team and, to a lesser extent, 
on the Steering Committee was strategic move to develop federal buy-in to the process and to 
mitigate the constraints of the planning process. The federal biologists that participated on 
the Core Planning Team will not decide whether or not to approve the HCP. They too must 
report to their superiors who will ultimately make the final decision. The decision whether or 
not to approve the HCP are often both politically and scientifically based, leaving space for a 
rather high degree of uncertainty. However the Steering Committee hopes that inviting the 
federal biologists to participate in the process will give the HCP a better chance of being 
approved. According to Shults, “As we get closer to the end game, we will be able to go to 
their on-the-ground folks and supervisors and they will have buy-in. Hopefully they will be 
able to support what we are proposing together and I think that will help but it’s a challenge, 
too.”208 
 
Although according to Jim Young, “it is likely that we would have ended up with a similar 
plan if it had been the status quo. The only difference would be in the wording and emphasis 
on particular parts.”209 Dan Shults iterated a similar thought, “I don’t know whether or not 
the new plan increase in harvest and dollar return is a direct result of their involvement. We 
aren’t to the end of the process yet.”210 While substantive differences in the FMP and HCP as 
a result of a more inclusive Steering Committee are not apparent, Shults commented that 
“there is more buy-in from stakeholders. This is particularly true, I believe, of Coos County 
and the SCESD Superintendent … we have their support in a ‘bottom line’ in our 
negotiations.”211 Shults and Young were optimistic that the involvement of the USFWS, 
NMFS, Commissioner Griffith and Rick Howell will play an important role in the final HCP 








Another benefit of the process cited by Steering Committee members were the relationships 
built between the participants during the process. Many participants commented that the 
Steering Committee gives them the opportunity to work with people they would normally not 
converse with outside of the traditional agency interactions. Steve Denney, ODFW 
Southwest Regional Assistant Supervisor, summed up what he saw as beneficial about 
having contact with non-agency participants within the Planning Process: “Participating on 
the Steering Committee allows me to interact with other players like the SCESD and local 
County Commissioners. Sometimes we [ODFW] only deal with them in confrontational roles 
so it’s better to interact in a collaborative process and that’s a benefit to me in the long 
run.”212 Added Denney about building relationships with other state agency staff within the 
process: “[ODFW] come[s] at it from a wildlife perspective. [Other agency staff] understand 
the issues we deal with and we understand their political process and statutes and that has 
been really positive. It has set the stage for future efforts, not just on the Elliott.”213  
  
Measuring the Success of the Process  
 
According to those interviewed, much of the process’ success is contingent on the outcome, 
namely getting the approval of the State Land Board, the BOF and the federal agencies on 
the HCP. However, many members of the Steering Committee have found successful 
elements of process despite the fact that the process is not yet complete. A clear majority of 
the Steering Committee also stated that the process itself has been successful in what it has 
accomplished thus far. Shults gave his opinion on the process as a whole:  
 
It’s taken a lot longer that I ever thought it would at the beginning, but I 
would characterize it as successful in that we have good collaboration, we 
have a solid plan, and it looks like we will be able to increase harvest levels – 
big dollars – and at the same time protect the species as well as, and maybe 
better than, under the first plan. 214  
 
When questioned about the success of the process and what elements would deem it 
successful Steve Denney offered what he considered to be the ideal finale of the process: “I 
think it’s going to be [successful]. I say the ultimate success is that they [the ODF and DSL] 
get the incidental take permits and the FMP is approved with minimal protest and no court 
involvement. It’s a very tricky tightrope we’re walking on now.”215 Added John Lilly, “I 





While it is evident that there are conservation outcomes that have been produced as result of 
the HCP, since that was its intended purpose, there is some level of uncertainty as to how 
effective the HCP is in protecting endangered species that reside in the Elliott. The decrease 
in spotted owl population on the Elliott State Forest begs the question as to whether HCPs are 
effective at protecting species. A survey was conducted a survey in 1993 to inform the 1994-
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1995 HCP process that counted 69 owls on or partially on the Elliott. The resulting Incidental 
Take Permit allowed the ODF to “take” 43 of the owls over a 60-year period. The ODF was 
also expected to protect 26 owls over a 60-year period.217 In 1998, five years after the initial 
survey, another survey was conducted of owls on state lands. The survey found that the owl 
population had plummeted to 23 owls.218 Though the decline in number of spotted owls can 
arguably be attributed to other factors including habitat invasion by bard owls, loss of owls is 
nonetheless concerning. Additionally for those individuals and groups concerned about the 
loss of old growth forest in Oregon, the Elliott FMP and HCP will not explicitly conserve 
those trees; however, to be fair, that was not the goal of either plan.  
 
What can the Elliott State Forest Planning Process tell us about HCPs on Common School 
Land? There are a number of lessons questions about the effectiveness of HCPs that can be 
gleaned from the Planning Process. Many of the challenges faced by the Steering Committee 
and Core Planning Team highlights some of the faults of HCP process including a lack of 
direction from the USFWS and NMFS on what they would consider an acceptable plan. The 
decline of the spotted owl population under the 1994-95 HCP raises some concern about the 
ability of the plan to maintain a viable owl population. In addition, with the likelihood that 
the new FMP and HCP will raise harvest levels on the forest there is the potential that more 
losses on the forest could occur. However, while it can be perceived that the Steering 
Committee tends to prioritize the economic value of the forest more than the environmental 
value, the Committee is meeting federal ESA requirements. Perhaps a revision of the federal 
HCP process would reduce the frustrations experienced by applicants and implement more 
effective wildlife conservation measures. Time will tell if this new HCP will be effective in 
protecting the spotted owl, marbled murrelet, coho salmon and other species in the Elliott 
State Forest. 
 
COSTS OF THE PROCESS  
 
The costs associated with the Elliott State Forest Planning Process are best conceptualized 




The monetary costs associated with the Elliott State Forest Planning Process included both 
agency costs and personal costs. The bulk of the expenses associated with Planning Process 
were shouldered by the DSL. Most of it can be considered part of the cost the agency 
experiences as a result of contracting the management of the forest out to the ODF. That said, 
the process bore significant costs largely due to the length of the process. The Elliott State 
Forest Planning Process has taken more than five years to complete and is still not finished. 
The DSL spends approximately $4.7 million annually for forestland management of 
Common School Forest Lands. The management of the Elliott makes up a large portion of 
the annual expenditures. Despite the high cost of managing the forest, the Elliott also 
produces a significant amount of revenue. Dan Shults provided an estimate on the costs and 




In the millions of dollars when you add in all the time it takes for meetings 
and the district people to develop new strategies, watershed analysis work, 
and paying contractors for the EIS. But when you look at the revenue that 
comes off the Elliott annually, it pales by comparison. The timber sells for 
approximately $500 per 1,000 board feel and the potential for 40 million 
board feet a year; that is a lot of money [$20,000,000].219  
 
The Mason Bruce & Girard Cost-Benefit Analysis was a useful tool to determine the best 
course of action for the Steering Committee when it came to finding the least-cost option. 
The cost-benefit analysis measured the cost of an outright sale or continued management of 
the forest. According to the findings of the report, under continued state ownership at its 
current harvest level, the forest is worth $282 million to the Common School Fund. At the 
expected harvest level under the revised FMP and HCPs, the value of the forest would 
increase to between $318-381 million.220 However, if the forest was sold the range of net 
income from the sale would only be worth between $245-488 million to the Common School 
Fund.221 The Cost-Benefit Analysis made it clear that it was in the best interest of the Land 
Board to continue managing the Elliott for timber production even with the constraints of an 
HCP in place. It should also be noted that none of the Steering Committee members 
interviewed associated collaboration with incurring higher costs to the DSL. Thus the dollar 
amount the collaborative process has “cost,” or rather taken out of the Common School Fund, 
can be considered in the realm of the usual management costs. 
 
There were additional monetary costs associated Core Planning Team. To defray the costs of 
the ODFW staff on the Core Planning Team, the ODF paid some of the participating their 
salary, allowing the ODFW to become more involved in the process. 
 
Personal expenses borne by the Steering Committee members were also a cost of the process. 
These expenses included travel for meetings, meals and occasionally overnight stays. Steve 
Denney described the costs he incurred as a result of being on the Steering Committee, “My 
expense has been running to meetings and meals. There weren’t too many overnight stays. 
My personal expenses were pretty minimal.”222 Commissioner Griffith also had to bear some 
of the cost of traveling to Committee meetings. Because Coos County Commissioners are not 
provided county cars or compensation for mileage, Commissioner Griffith has incurred 
personal costs to be a part of this process. However, some of his mileage is covered via the 




Costs in the form of work and personal time vary between members of the Steering 
Committee. Some of Steering Committee members approximated the percentage of time they 
dedicate to the process compared with previous job time allocation. As Chair of the Steering 
Committee and ODF Southern Area Director, Dan Shults stated that he prior to the Planning 
Process he spent 20 to 30 percent of his time working on Elliott-related issues. His duties on 
the Steering Committee have caused him to devote more hours than normal to the Elliott. 224 
Similarly, Jim Young said that he spends 50 to 75 percent of his time on Elliott-related work, 
both related to the Planning Process and his day-to-day management duties. Even if the 
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Planning Process was not going on, he stated that he would still be spending about 50 percent 
of his time on state forest issues. Steve Denney spends two to three days a month working on 
Elliott planning process accounting for three to five percent of his work time.225 
Commissioner Griffith added that he devotes five to ten percent of his work time to the 




The participants of the Steering Committee also incurred opportunity costs as a result of their 
participation in the Planning Process. Many stated that the additional time spent working on 
the Planning Process took away time typically devoted to their other job responsibilities. Jim 
Young mentioned that if he were not acting as Project Leader, more of his time would be 
spent on other responsibilities, such as administering the Forest Practices Act, providing 
assistance to family forest owners, and participating in the fire protection program.227 Dan 
Shults explained in more detail how opportunity costs have impacted the ODF: 
 
[The Planning Process] certainly takes more field time, staff time and 
involvement of our people. When you engaged in process like this, you’re not 
as able to keep up on the day-to-day stuff. The district people are suddenly 
thrust into doing a lot of other things in addition to their regular duties. I 
would say the same is true for a lot of the other [participants] dealing with 
their normal jobs … It’s expensive and organizationally it has impacted what 
we’ve been able to do in our day-to-day work. It takes a lot of my time away 
from other things.228  
 
Opportunity costs were clearly significant when compared to the other costs of the Elliott 
State Forest Planning Process. 
 
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES  
 
The Elliott State Forest Planning Process encountered significant challenges during the five 
plus-year planning process. Many of these challenges were unique to the fact that this 
process addressed trust land management within the context of a federal HCP process. 
 
Lack of Public Interest and Participation  
 
Challenges stemming from lack of public interest and involvement have plagued the FMP 
and HCP processes. One of the main challenges cited by Steering Committee members was 
getting comments from a diverse array of interests from the local communities. According to 
Jim Young, ODF Coos District Forester, the reason for limited interest may be that, “It is not 
controversial how the forest is being managed. Most people feel okay or are not that 
concerned. It isn’t really big on their radar screen; they have other things to worry about.”229 
Steve Thomas, ODF Assistant State Forester, indicated that he felt that the Steering 
Committee is constantly grappling with the question of what they are trying to achieve via 
public comment, how to make it meaningful for the public and the agencies, and if they were 
doing enough to involve them. “We kept getting the feeling that the same people that talk to 
 
 128
you at board meetings, show up at public meetings. The mantra doesn’t change. We wonder 
if there is somebody else out there with additional insight. How do you grab them?”230 Said 
Rick Howell, Superintendent of the SCESD, of public interest in management of the Elliott:  
 
Unless it affects them personally they aren’t going to be interested in it. Their 
interest in the Elliott planning is not going to be because how it affects the 
Common School Fund it’s going to be in how it affects their ability to go into 
the Elliott and do what they want to do. Our plan allows that … Hopefully 
we’re going to bump it up to about 40 million, in a five billion dollar budget 
not a huge impact. Even money not going to make them be as aware of or care 
unless it’s 40 million transferred into their bank account. That doesn’t mean 
we don’t ask them.231 
 
A number of factors could explain the poor turnout at meetings. First and foremost, the 
Elliott is a long way from Portland. According to Steve Thomas, Assistant State Forester, if 
there is a meeting for a plan on the nearby Tillamook and Clatsop forests, 100 people show 
with lots of questions.232 According to Francis Eatherington, Forest Monitor at Umpqua 
Watersheds, Inc, there are significant differences between the attentions paid to the Elliott 
compared to other more well-known forests:  
 
It is very difficult for us in Roseburg because we don’t get the same input as 
the Salem/Portland folks. They get to go to more meetings and participate in 
public comment. The Board of Forestry knows who they are. The Elliott 
doesn’t get the same advocacy as the Tillamook does. The Tillamook is right 
outside of Portland and there are a lot of people loving it. The Elliott is sort of 
this lost forest out here that only the murrelets love.233  
 
The Tillamook has a significantly higher amount of recreational use compared to the Elliott. 
The Elliott does not have any hiking trails, only logging roads and a few scattered campsites 
leaving few opportunities for recreational use. Eatherington added that the sign at the 
entrance to the Elliott is also misleading in what it purports (Figure 5-6):  
 
I think the spirit of the sign is good but camping, fishing, and hiking? There is 
none of that there … there are zero miles of hiking trails on the Elliott. Want 
to know why? There is no good reason why. [The ODF and DSL] say that it’s 
illegal to have them on Common School Land but I have yet to come across a 
CFRI that says that … they could advertise it as a bicycle trip. You can see the 











Figure 5-6: Sign at Entrance to the Elliott State Forest 
Source: Photograph by Eirin Krane
 
Secondly, many of the Steering Committee members interviewed conceded that the times of 
the public meetings, typically in the evenings when people were at home with their families, 
made it challenging for local people to attend unless they had a high degree of interest. Stated 
Bob Ragon of Douglas Timber Operators:  
 
The problem with most of these processes is that the average public tunes out. 
Who is going to read an [Environmental Impact Statement] that is two inches 
thick? … Part of the reason [for the lack of public involvement] is that the 
issues are so complex and the detail is so great that the average citizen won’t 
bother to read or understand it.235 
 
Thirdly, as Ragon mentioned, the complex nature of the FMP and HCP and the huge volume 
of material to read, it would be nearly impossible for anyone to read two reports, each 
hundreds of pages long in their spare time. Also, most people are not familiar with the legal 
requirements and policy frameworks that come into play on Common School Forest Lands, 
like the Elliott, making it more difficult for them to give substantive comments. 
 
Online Comment Process  
 
While the online comment period proved useful for those who could not attend the public 
meetings, there were mixed feelings as to the success of this input venue. Bob Ragon, 
Executive Director of Douglas Timber Operators, a regional trade association representing 
the woods products industry in southwest Oregon, stated that he feels the process is very 
open: “[The Steering Committee is] interested in comments. I could send them a letter 
tomorrow and they would say ‘thank you very much.’”236 Francis Eatherington had different 
feelings about the comment process: 
 
Last year we kept waiting for an announcement that the Annual Operations 
Plan was up for comment. There was no email or written announcement. I 
went to the website and found it was over in a day … They extended the 
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comment period for me a couple of weeks because I wasn’t notified. This year 
I kept checking. A simple email list or a post on the website would work but 
they don’t do that. The BLM does that. From the BLM we get notifications all 
the time that the websites has been updated.237  
 
Eatherington also mentioned that the ODF website is difficult to navigate, with no direct link 
to the Elliott State Forest. She goes further to express her frustration at the lack of response to 
her comments by the ODF:  
 
Traditionally, I do not get any response from the [ODF]. One of my biggest 
beefs is that they don’t write us a letter back. They put the response to 
everyone’s comment on all operations for the state of Oregon in one document 
on the website. I might have an issue that I wrote in about and I might find a 
reference to it in one line. Then they put it on their website and don’t notify 
anyone when it goes up.238 
 
While the online comment periods had mixed reviews by those who utilized them, the parties 
that were more critical of the FMP and HCP were clearly frustrated by the lack of response to 
their concerns. 
 
Lack of Public Understanding of Trust Mandate  
 
Though the Steering Committee actively sought public involvement, its ability to incorporate 
suggestions into the final plans has been hampered by the regulations of the HCP and the 
constitutional mandate of the trust. The fiduciary responsibility constrains the Committee 
from considering the Elliott as a reserve-based forest with no cutting, a common suggestion 
from the public. According to Steve Thomas, with the substantial owl and marbled murrelet 
populations, it would be better to move towards a multi-value forest and at the same time 
gain the needed stability with the HCP to serve the dual purpose of protecting the species and 
increasing timber harvests.239 John Lilly stated that the public’s misunderstanding concerning 
the trust mandate has been a challenge: “Getting credibility about it is a challenge, in other 
words some people might say, ‘well that’s just a lot of legal mumbo jumbo that you guys are 
just trying to hide behind to keep you from doing the right thing on the ground.”240  
 
While this appeared to be the perception from inside of the process, the two interest group 
representatives outside of the process stated that they had knowledge of and understood the 
trust mandate. In this case it is difficult to draw a conclusion about whether or not knowledge 
of the trust mandate is widespread in Oregon; however, it is clear from the comments made 
by the Steering Committee members and the groups outside of the process that perhaps the 
values associated with Common School Lands are not well understood. 
  
Creating an Us-versus-Them Dynamic with Polarized Interests  
 
When questioned about the public comment process, Steering Committee members noted 
that comments largely came from environmentalists and the timber industry, two groups with 
opposing views on management of the Elliott. Though not explicitly stated, many of the 
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comments made by those interviewed indicated that the perceptions and input of these 
groups, particularly “environmentalists,” were sometimes discounted because they were 
perceived as extreme and conservation beyond the HCP could not be accommodated given 
the trust mandate. This could have to do with the fact that the “environmentalists” were being 
critical of the process while the timber interests tended to be more supportive, with only 
minor criticisms. As a result, the perception of an “us-versus-them” dynamic arose between 
the Steering Committee and the environmental groups. 
  
Problems Inherent in the HCP Process  
 
Challenges have also arisen in adapting to the HCP process timeline and its restraints. The 
HCP document is not as straightforward as the FMP, and control of the cadence of both 
processes is not up to the state agencies. The HCP must provide extensive data on owl, 
murrelet, salmon and other potentially-threatened species. The Core Planning had a lot of 
ground to cover to make sure the science was in place to inform the policies to manage the 
Elliott. The surveys, watershed analysis and dissemination took years to complete, often 
putting both the team and the Steering Committee behind in their work plan. John Lilly 
describes the complexity of the issues inherent in the Planning Process:  
 
The Elliott is a different creature because you are trying to get a federal permit 
at the same time so you have to sequence all this stuff out. How do you leave 
decision space for the policymaker - that is the Land Board – in a way that 
doesn’t lock them down before the USFWS has tipped their hand as to what 
they will accept as an HCP? You’ve got to leave all that decision space mushy 
so that you’re not taking away your policymaker’s prerogatives. We’ve 
always said that if the price of the HCP is too high, we won’t get one. How do 
you know if it’s too high, until you walk that road with the scoping, the draft 
EIS, the plan to present on the HCP to find out whether or not it’s going to be 
something that is acceptable to USFWS and NMFS and we can decided to go 
back to the board and say, “Board, we think this is worth the effort. We think 
this is going to be okay.”241 
 
When the subject of working with the federal services was broached, all of those interviewed 
felt that this represented one of the largest impediments to the process. Dan Shults summed 
up his frustrations, “The goalposts seem to move. You think you have a pretty good 
agreement on a set of principles or set of objectives or management you’re going to employ 
and somewhere down the line, someone higher up in the organization can say, ‘nope, that’s 
not going to work.’”242 The general consensus was that the federal services were not very 
forthcoming about what is acceptable. Lilly summed up his impression of the situation: “The 
federal services want to be outside the process because they have veto authority. They tell 
you whether or not. They are not negotiating. They are above the process.”243  
 
The Steering Committee attempted to overcome this challenge by including staff from the 
USFWS and NMFS on the Core Planning Team. The Team worked jointly with the federal 
agencies’ staff to conduct wildlife, hydrology and aquatic species surveys on the Elliott. This 




A key value of this collaborative process is including the services along the 
way and getting them out on the ground and looking at some of the stuff on 
the ground … they are part of the process in developing solutions … as we get 
closer to the end game we’ll be able to go to their supervisors and they will 
have buy-in. Hopefully they will be able to support what we are proposing 
together and I think that will help.244  
 
The decision on whether or not to approve the HCP is not made by the “on-the-ground” staff, 
but rather their superiors at USFWS and NMFS. The real determinant as to whether the 
Steering Committee’s efforts at including the federal services has been an aide in overcoming 
the challenges inherent in the HCP process is yet to be seen because the plan has not been 
submitted for approval. However, if the Incidental Take Permit (ITP) is issued, the inclusion 
of USFWS and NMFS staff in the Planning Process will likely be seen as a large part of its 
success.  
 
Technical Uncertainty and Interpreting Scientific Data  
 
The Steering Committee has also grappled with the issue of science and how to interpret the 
findings of the studies conducted by the ODF in cooperation with USFWS and NMFS. 
Throughout the HCP process there have been issues concerning the validity of scientific 
information collected by the USFWS and NMFS versus the data collected by the state 
agencies. Said Dan Shults: “You’d think good science is something everyone agrees on, but 
there’s a very fine line between what is scientifically proven and what scientific opinion 
is.”245 Additionally, many of the threatened species that inhabit the Elliott State Forest have 
only recently been under observation by scientists. The examination of habitat requirements 
for the marbled murrelet intensified when the 1995 HCP was approved per one of the 
contingencies of the ITP. Data on the spotted owl has been produced since the early 1990s 
and some would argue that their remains to be a complete understanding of the species 
habitat requirements.  
 
Members of the Steering Committee felt at times that the HCP process was unduly 
burdensome. Some felt that they were being penalized by being forced to mitigate threatened 
species habitat in the Elliott when there were other factors affecting the wildlife outside the 
forest that they had no control over. According to Shults, “Salmon are hugely impacted by 
ocean conditions that we have no control over. That said, it’s also important to have good 
habitat on the inland side … but the degree to which you maintain it, what is actually 
required versus someone’s opinion of what is required is arguable.”246 Though no simple 
solutions could resolve the interpretation of science, the Steering Committee members opted 
to be conservative in balancing the trust mandate and threatened species protection by 
increasing the amount of timber harvested in the HCP by a moderate amount. They also 
included potential, but non-listed species in the HCP to ensure they would not have to go 






Dealing with the State Agencies and State Politics 
 
The number of state agencies involved in the Steering Committee and the management of the 
Elliott was challenging in so far as each agency has its own hierarchical structure that could 
impede the forward movement of the HCP/FMP process. The DSL is a small agency with 
many management responsibilities. Thus, the DSL staff had to be strategic about allocating 
their time and attention to each area of concern. Steve Thomas, ODF Assistant State Forester 
offered his perspective of this issue: “Another tough area for us resource wise for us 
[Steering Committee] with the DSL … it is not a big agency and they have a lot of things 
going on. The Planning Process has strapped them to be at our meetings.”247  
 
The hierarchical structure of the Land Board and the DSL has, at times, impeded the forward 
movement of the process. Recall that the Land Board is made up of the three highest elected 
officials in the state; the governor, secretary of state and treasurer. Because the Elliott also 
contains BOF lands, they must also be consulted on policy decisions within the HCP and 
FMP processes. Steve Thomas described some of his frustrations with the system:  
 
The Land Board is made of people you just don’t get at meetings to talk about 
things. When at official board meetings if you get an hour, it’s like manna 
from heaven, it’s like nirvana. Usually you get 10 minutes. Typically you end 
up talking to them through their assistants. When you come to the meeting 
everything is supposed to be taken care of. Whereas with the BOF there are no 
secondaries to go through there is just the Board. The BOF wants to hear 
everything; they don’t want anything filtered out. The Land Board is not the 
same case. They don’t want everything to come floating out on the table 
during the meeting because of the political situation.248 
 
Added Thomas about a situation where the Secretary of State and the Treasurer requested 
additional meetings to discuss the Planning Process, “We can’t talk to [the Secretary of State 
and State Treasurer] together because any combination of two of them together is a 
quorum.”249 
 
The state-level politics associated with the Land Board also affected the Planning Process. 
Because the Land Board is made up of elected officials, they are more vulnerable to 
endangered species politics and timber interest groups. Conversely, the Steering Committee, 
with its majority of participants being bureaucrats, is more insulated from state politics. 
Many of the committee members are also from southern Oregon, an area steeped in the 
timber industry and ground zero for the logging wars of the 1990s. While it has not created 
an overt conflict between the Land Board and the Steering Committee, there is recognition of 
the clash in values between the two within the Steering Committee. According to 
Commissioner Griffith, “[The Land Board members] are state-wide politicians and the 
majority of Oregon citizens are in the Portland area. They are not going to do anything to 






FACILITATING FACTORS  
 
Several facilitating factors were instrumental in creating a positive collaborative process for 
the members of the Steering Committee within the Elliott State Forest Planning Process. 
These include personalities and relationships, commitment to the process, the process 
structure, and forest modeling. 
 
Personalities and Relationships  
 
The personalities and the relationships developed among the Steering Committee members 
have facilitated the forward momentum of the process. Nearly all interviewees cited the 
healthy relationships between committee members as having facilitated what they see as by 
and large a successful process.  
 
One of the most colorful personalities on the committee belonged to Commissioner Griffith. 
When Commissioner Griffith joined the committee, he replaced his predecessor who had not 
taken an active role in the process. In his past positions, Commissioner Griffith has been a 
reporter, logger and member of several collaborative resource management councils. All of 
these experiences have colored his opinions on the Elliott Planning Process. Commissioner 
Griffith saw his role as pushing for as much timber extraction as was feasible with the HCP. 
He described his role in the Steering Committee:  
 
Because they are bureaucrats, permanent employees or as permanent as they 
can be of the state agency that ultimately have to answer to the Land Board, 
they’re not as situated as I am or of the same sort of view as to how far they 
can push to meet the constitutional goal. They don’t, since they are employed 
by ODF, want to risk irritating the governor too much, whereas me, I think it’s 
my job to do so when the local economy and school funding are on the line.251  
 
According to Steve Thomas, Assistant State Forester, “John caused us to sharpen our pencil a 
bit.”252 
 
The relationships between Steering Committee members also served to keep all members up 
to date on the process. As the only two on the committee that were not employed in a state 
agency, both Commissioner Griffith and Rick Howell had to become familiar with ODF 
practices and polices relatively quickly. Howell described how he felt upon joining the 
Steering Committee and how Jim Young helped him get up to speed on the process: 
 
When I came on the process I was behind by quite a bit and [Jim Young] and 
an ODF staff member came in and spent a lot of time with me. They had a 
bunch of maps and charts and gave me some visual aides … They took me on 
a trip to see all the different basins [in the Elliott] so I could get a better 
picture of what they were talking about. I got to see current cuts and how they 




The personalities of the rest of the Steering Committee also have facilitated a more open 
process. Says Dan Shults, “Everyone knows where other people are coming from and where 
the push-pull is and we end up with pretty good compromise and resolution on those 
things.”254 Steve Thomas, Assistant State Forester, felt similarly: “Getting different people’s 
perspectives; that is always useful. We are all open-minded but we all have our glasses that 
we look at the world through.”255 
 
Commitment to the Process 
 
The commitment to the Elliott State Forest Planning Process also served as a facilitating 
factor in the process. Commissioner Griffith took particular interest in researching and 
understanding all aspects and legislation guiding the Planning Process. He also employed a 
technique to keep himself and other Steering Committee members on track: 
 
I had this laminated to the front of my Elliott binder in case the guys get a 
little out of shape – Article 8, Section V256 of the state constitution. They hate 
it when I have to do that; they can tell when we are starting to get to an 
impasse. When I first got on the Steering Committee I had to do quite a bit of 
work – I thought it would be easier to photocopy it and laminate it to my 
binder. It brings them back closer to the track.257  
 
The Steering Committee members also were very committed to putting in the extra work and 
personal time to attend meetings and keep abreast of the numerous iterations of the FMP and 
HCP. This commitment was considerable given the voluminous amounts of reading that 
accompanied the process. Dan Shults described what he saw as one of the many successful 
elements of the process: “The Steering Committee folks have been really good about doing 
their homework … page by page as a group they have made a lot of fairly significant changes 
for the betterment of the plan.”258 
 
The addition the commitment of the two non-traditional stakeholders, Rick Howell and 
Commissioner Griffith, also drew praise. According to Steve Thomas, Assistant State 
Forester, “Putting education folks on there [Steering Committee] was DSL’s call. We had no 
idea what the relationship was going to be like but Rick has jumped in there like a trooper 
and has worked out just like everybody else.”259 Thomas went on to describe in more detail 
how Howell and Griffith have added to the Planning Process: 
 
I have enjoyed Rick Howell’s participation. He has come into an arena that is 
completely outside of his normal workings, has asked good questions, gotten 
involved and stayed up with the material. If I hadn’t known John Griffith 
through another forum, I would have been amazed at the due diligence he puts 
into every homework assignment. He reads everything in front of him. He’s a 
really value-added person to the group because he digs into everything.260 
 
Evidently, the involvement of these two non-traditional stakeholders has been a benefit to the 
process, facilitating positive relationships and constant reinforcement of the committee’s 




Planning Process Structure  
 
The decision to create of a bi-level planning process, with the Steering Committee focused 
on policy issues and the Core Planning Team on science, has by all accounts been successful. 
The structure of the process allowed Jim Young and Mike Schnee, State Forests Planning 
and Policy Manager, to serve as liaisons between the two groups. They facilitated the 
communication between the scientist and policy advisors. On the Steering Committee, 
Young and Schnee presented the scientific findings and data to the participants to keep them 
up to speed on the technical aspects of the plans. On the Core Planning Team, Young and 
Schnee provided the policy perspective. The well-defined structure of the Steering 
Committee has also facilitated the success of the process.  
 
The adoption of the Guiding Principles as part of the structure also facilitated a smoother 
process. The Guiding Principles gave the process direction as well as specific goals and 
objectives to work towards while developing the FMP and HCP. The regulatory frameworks 
in which both the FMP and HCP had to fit within were included either explicitly or implicitly 
in the text of the principles. The early Steering Committee spent a significant amount of time 
crafting them and often referred back to them over the course of the process. Said Jim Young 
in regards to the utility of the having the Guiding Principles, “What it did was define the 
playing field for us essentially. They made sure we were not getting off on a tangent that we 
didn’t belong on.”261 
 
Forest Modeling  
 
Many felt that the ability to display scientific data on ecosystem-wide level was an extremely 
helpful tool in the Elliott State Forest Planning Process. The forest modeling in particular 
was initiated to assist the Steering Committee in better understanding what the Elliott would 
look like under various management regimes. According to the DSL’s John Lilly modeling 
was the hallmark of the process: “Once you can present to a policy maker a chart that on one 
page they can see what the harvest levels would be under various management regimes, then 
you have a very powerful tool to help them make informed decisions.”262  
 
However, one of the Steering Committee members felt that modeling was a panacea. This 
concern was largely derived from the challenges inherent in understanding the complexities 
and outputs of the modeling program. Steve Denney, Southern Area Director for ODFW, 
identified some of the elements he found challenging about the modeling:  
 
They hired people to construct very specific timber harvest models. I think 
they are really difficult for people to understand. The outcomes of models, in 
my experience with wildlife population models, are only as good as their 
inputs. You have to build trust that the inputs are good to get people to buy in 
on the outputs and people will often question whether the information was 
good to begin with … With some of the modeling aspects, I get completely 




The two perspectives on forest modeling demonstrate that while tools such as modeling can 
be very useful, they are not error-free and can be challenging to comprehend. However, 
despite these issues, the use of forest modeling was a facilitating factor in developing the 
FMP and HCP. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED AND ADVICE FOR FUTURE PROCESSES  
 
Several lessons can be taken away from the analysis of the Elliott State Forest Planning 
Process to further inform collaborative efforts on state trust lands.  
 
1. Using technology to capture both the economic and environmental values of land 
can be beneficial. 
 
John Lilly saw the technological tools such as modeling an important part of quantifying the 
values associated with the forest. This not only allows more cogent assessment of all the 
factors involved in the HCP and FMP but in the outcomes as well. He offered this advice:  
 
You’ve got to find a way on key issues to quantify or qualify them to a point 
where you describe biological functions, populations, habitats, and the 
condition of those habitats to the point where people can then talk about how 
they value the number of critters or the quality of habitat. Say if you want 60 
percent of the forest under advanced structure then we know how to 
silviculturally get you that.264 
 
While tools such as modeling can synthesize many complex aspects of a process it is 
important to remember that the model cannot necessarily capture every element 
appropriately. Models are only as good as the input data, and while they can be useful tools 
for informing future outcomes, they cannot include all factors that exist in reality. Therefore, 
models and other technology-based tools to capture environmental and economic values 
should be considered only as tools and not as an accurate depiction of the future. 
 
2. Soliciting public input in a top-down collaborative effort can be ineffective if the 
public is not interested in the issue and serves to frustrate outside interest groups if 
they perceive that they are not being heard. 
 
Implementing an effective public input process was one of the more thorny issues of this 
planning process. Despite the valiant attempts of the Steering Committee to provide 
numerous ways for the public to give feedback on the process, it was viewed as largely 
unsuccessful. To quote Jim Young, “The public process hasn’t appeared to facilitate greater 
understanding of what the Elliott is supposed to do and be. It seems like there is not much 
interest in the forest from the public side and I am not sure how effective the public meetings 
are.”265 The Steering Committee members often mentioned that they wanted to hear from the 
“general public” in the comment period but in the same breath they stated that most of the 
general public does not have the time to attend meetings and read the planning literature. It is 
clear from the comments mentioned previously by Francis Eatherington that she was 
interested in the Planning Process and made a significant effort to voice her concerns in 
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public meetings and through written comments. However, her comments also indicate that 
she felt frustration because her comments and suggestions were not acknowledged in an 
appropriate manner. Thus, any endeavor that includes opportunities for public involvement 
should be prepared to address a lack of public interest in the issue and be sensitive to how 
those outside of the process perceive it.  
 
3. Ensure that participants have adequate time committed to the effort and be 
strategic about how time is used. 
 
Given that the Elliott State Forest Planning Process has taken place over five years and is still 
not complete, participants in a similar process must be willing to see it through to the end. 
This can be challenging when participants have other professional and personal 
responsibilities they must attend to. One of the ways that the Steering Committee and Core 
Planning Team were strategic about using their time was to outsource some of the 
information gathering. Outside contractors were hired to complete species surveys and a 
watershed analysis was also useful in expediting the process. Had the Core Planning Team 
tried to conduct the surveys in addition to their other duties, it is likely that the Planning 
Process would have lagged even further behind its projected work plan. Jim Young offered 
practical advice for engaging in another collaborative process:  
 
My suggestion for the future is make who ever are working on it their only 
project or primary project. If people devoted their time solely to this project 
then it would have gone faster. Also, consider hiring a contractor with relevant 
experience and that is familiar with these types of plans.266 
 
4. Use collaboration strategically in situations that warrants its added time and energy. 
 
All of the participants interviewed stated that the Planning Process was value-added. They 
had a lot of advice to impart to others considering a similar process, largely directed at the 
amount of time involved. Dan Shults found the process highly beneficial, but also stated that 
collaborative is not always appropriate in every circumstance:  
 
Make sure the stakeholders are engaged and involved and listen to what they 
have to say. Be prepared for a process that takes a lot more time that you think 
initially. It’s time well spent because it saves you time on the other end. We 
probably wouldn’t have needed to do a collaborative process but in cases 
where people have a lot of outside interests that are divergent and in some 
cases conflicting then you need to look hard at a collaborative process. It’s not 
a cure-all; there’s some places where it’s what you need to do and others 
where it’s probably not.267  
 
One of the key take-away lessons from an analysis of the Elliott State Forest Planning 
Process is that not all resource management issues on state trust lands can incorporate a high 
degree of collaboration with the public and interest groups outside of the process. The The 
HCP processes include public comment and review, but the public is not actively part of the 
decisions being made. The public is only being heard in a general, albeit censored way. With 
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that caveat, however, the Elliott State Forest Planning Process can be considered an effective 
collaborative process  
 
5. Stacking the representation of stakeholders towards one interest can lead to an 
uneven process. 
 
The stakeholders represented on the Steering Committee were those who had an economic 
interest in the management of the Elliott State Forest. From the outside, the representation on 
the Committee could be viewed as uneven with respect to non-economic interests. The 
assembly of representatives at the table reflected the complexity of the situation at hand; 
completing a multi-species HCP with the ultimate goal of raising harvest levels on the forest. 
Arguably with the challenges inherent in crafting an HCP and the added pressure of a 
timeline for the process made selecting those with similar interests a logical choice. Despite 
the fact that many Steering Committee members iterated that they felt the similarities in 
interests facilitated the process Young indicated that it might have been a beneficial to have a 
representative from the environmental community on the Steering Committee, though he was 
the only one interviewed who felt this way. “We didn’t have somebody that represented that 
necessarily. We did have folks interested in the revenue side of things but we didn’t have an 
environmental player.”268 While it can be viewed as inviting more conflict into a situation, 
including representatives from interest groups that have frequently voiced opposition to a 






In October 2005, the USFWS announced it was considering de-listing marbled murrelets 
from the threatened species list. It is likely that the announcement came as a response to 
arguments from the wood products industry that the murrelets found from California to 
Washington do not represent a distinct population from those found elsewhere. Hundreds of 
thousands of the marbled murrelets can be found in Canada and Alaska. Jim Young stated 
that, “the Committee isn’t quite sure what we are going to do, but it is likely that we will 
continue with the HCP as planned.”269 This is a prudent decision because when the final 
decision from USFWS comes down, either way it is highly likely that a long and drawn-out 
court battle will ensue. 
 
Both the FMP and HCP are getting closer to completion. Once complete, the revised FMP 
and HCP must be approved by the Board of Forestry, ODF’s governing body, and the State 
Land Board. The Steering Committee went before the BOF for preliminary approval of the 
FMP on January 4, 2006. According to Young: 
 
The Board had a list of questions and concerns about the HCP with regard to 
the murrelet and the Coho [salmon]. We got approval to continue developing 
the HCP and at the time both plans are ready for approval, we will ask the 




In February, the Steering Committee will go in front of the State Land Board and ask for the 
same approval. 
 
The revised plan will likely increase harvesting to about 38 to 44 million board feet per year. 
That gives the forest a net present value of approximately $370 to 389 million and a rate of 
return of barely four percent on asset value. In the cost-benefit study, the consultants felt that 
under an industrial model, the forest would be worth in the neighborhood of $600 million.271 
Even though this seems lower in comparison, since the Land Board owns the Elliott outright 
a rate of return of four percent is acceptable. The Land Board takes a very long-term 
approach to Elliott’s management and according to John Lilly:  
 
At the same time we’re going to be able to manage resources to preserve them 
for the future so that if these critters recover, and the forest can be more 
intensively managed in the future, then we have that option … If the state of 
the biology of these birds changes, if they get de-listed, if somebody discovers 
that they’re more able to cope in more habitats than we think today then that’s 
going to change the complexion of things and we can come back and revisit 
the plan.272 
 
In March 2006, the final draft of the HCP and the final draft of the EIS will be available for 
public review. The Steering Committee hopes that by November both plans will be finalized. 
April 2007 has been slated as the approximate date in which the USFWS and NMFS will 
issue their decision on whether or not they will approve the HCP and subsequently issue the 





LIST OF ACRONYMS  
 
BOF – Board of Forestry 
 
DSL – Department of State Lands 
 
DTO – Douglas Timber Operators 
 
EIS – Environmental Impact Statement 
 
ESA – Endangered Species Act 
 
FMP – Forest Management Plan 
 
HCP – Habitat Conservation Plan 
 
IP – Implementation Plan 
 
ITP – Incidental take permit 
 
NMFS – National Marine Fisheries Service 
 
NEPA – National Environmental Protection Act 
 
ODF – Oregon Department of Forestry 
 
ODFW – Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife 
 
SCESD – South Coast Education Service District 
 
USFWS – U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
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Emerald Mountain and adjacent private ranch land, Steamboat Springs, Colorado   
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s with many of Colorado’s ski towns, the landscape around Steamboat Springs has 
changed as out-of-towners moved into the area and purchased natural and agricultural 
land for residential use.1 Emerald Mountain is a scenic, 6,000-acre parcel of state trust land 
that lies west of adjacent Steamboat Springs. The parcel currently generates yearly revenue 
for the State Land Board (SLB) from agricultural leases. However, considering its 
attractiveness to developers in a vibrant Colorado ski town, it could be subdivided and sold 
for residential development to allow the Land Board to purchase higher revenue-producing 
property in its place.  
 
The increased development interest in Emerald Mountain raised public concern in Steamboat 
Springs. In an area with rapid growth and rising land values, this large tract is increasingly 
cherished by the community for its agricultural use, wildlife habitat and scenic and potential 
recreational resources. Citizens who are concerned about preserving Routt County’s 
agricultural heritage and open space, and local governments have begun stepping up their 
efforts to conserve the remaining undeveloped tracts of land.2 
 
To conserve this resource for the community as well as meet its constitutional duty of raising 
money for public schools, the SLB entered into a unique collaboration with members of the 
Steamboat Springs community. The collaboration began in 1993 with informal monthly 
meetings between the SLB and local stakeholders. In 2000, this group evolved into the 
Emerald Mountain Partnership (the Partnership), a community non-profit organization 
working to identify ways to protect the property’s agricultural, scenic, and recreational 
values. The SLB worked with this Partnership in two ways: the agency had a regional 
representative working directly with the community throughout the 12-year process and it 
eventually entered into a contractual relationship with the Partnerhip to give the group time 
to purchase the parcel at market value.  
 
To garner these funds, the Partnership explored several unsuccessful options before deciding 
to coordinate a land exchange between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the 
SLB. Through this transaction, the BLM would exchange several small, scattered and 
difficult-to-manage parcels within Routt County for the Emerald Mountain parcel. The BLM 
would then manage the property according to the agency’s multiple-use objectives. Since 
2002, the Partnership, SLB and BLM have progressed through the federal land exchange 
process. The Partnership has proposed a management plan for the parcel to the BLM, which 
the agency will consider as one of the four alternatives for the BLM’s amendment to its 
regional Resource Management Plan.3 The exchange is yet to be finalized.  
 
The story of the Emerald Mountain Partnership reveals the importance of communicating 
openly and often with the public about the collaborative group’s process and progress. This 
case also illustrates the value of including all potential stakeholders in the collaborative 
group, especially as scope of the project changes, to make sure new stakeholders are brought 
into the fold. Finally, the Emerald Mountain case demonstrates the importance of anticipating 





CONTEXT FOR COLLABORATION 
 
Appraising the collaborative planning work of the Emerald Mountain Partnership requires a 
familiarity with the context in which this project unfolded. The following is a brief overview 
of the relevant historical events and political issues that shaped the Emerald Mountain story. 
 
COLORADO’S LAND GRANT  
 
The 1875 Colorado Enabling Act, passed by the U.S. Congress, granted sections 16 and 36 in 
every township for the support of common schools, totaling 4.6 million acres.4 Once the 
lands were granted, the state followed the familiar pattern of quickly selling off trust lands to 
generate income for schools and encourage settlement in the state. As the landscape became 
more settled, the state began retaining more of their trust lands to generate income through 
grazing and farming leases (Figure 6-1).5 Today, the state owns approximately three million 
acres of surface and the three million acres of subsurface below it, as well as 1.5 million 
acres of subsurface land to which they only have subsurface rights (Figure 6-2).6  
 
TRUST LAND MANAGEMENT IN COLORADO 
 
In the early 1990s, the SLB was involved in several controversial real estate transactions that 
opened the agency up to public scrutiny and criticism.7 In response, the structure and mission 
of Colorado’s SLB was overhauled midway through the Emerald Mountain Planning 
Process. Indeed, the parcel became the “poster child” of the campaign for Amendment 16, 
the constitutional amendment to reform Colorado’s state trust land management. At the 
outset of the Emerald Mountain case, the SLB consisted of three full-time salaried 
Commissioners, who were appointed by the Governor. The SLB operated under the 
Department of Natural Resources, and had six district offices throughout the state.8 
  
Prior to Amendment 16, the SLB 
managed land for short-term financial 
benefits. While neither the state’s 
Constitution nor statutes explicitly 
required the SLB to maximize revenues, 
court rulings interpreted the Constitution 
to direct the Board to achieve the 
maximum possible value in each 
transaction.9 The “old” SLB’s 
philosophy of managing state trust lands 
was, according to Charles Bedford, “To 
respond, or react to something that 
draws their attention to a parcel. The 
‘old Board’ appeared to feel that the 
mandate to maximize revenue required 
it to consider selling land to whoever 
walked in the door at any time.”10 
 
Figure 6-1: State Trust Land Sign on Emerald Mountain
Source: Photograph by Lisa Spalding 
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This reactionary management style meant that the Board did not plan for the long-term, or 
conduct outreach or public relations work. One example of this insular approach is the 
Board’s approach to their monthly (public) meetings. On the day prior to the scheduled 
public meetings, the Board would hold a private “workshop,” which included an unrecorded 
dress rehearsal of the following day’s meeting, working through the agenda with full analysis 
of all relevant information, and open debate and discussion. At the formal meeting the next 
day, the Board’s discussion was an abbreviated, somewhat artificial version of the former 
day’s discourse, with no opportunity for interaction with the public in attendance.11 
  
 Figure 6-2: Map of State Trust Lands in Colorado 
Source: “Colorado Trust Lands,” Trust Land: A Land Legacy for the American West, The Sonoran Institute & 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, available at http://www.trustland.org. 
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Source: Photograph by Lisa Spalding 
COLORADO AND ROUTT COUNTY POLITICS 
 
The debate over Emerald Mountain was influenced by Colorado’s political dynamics. This 
politically-divided state has small, dense pockets of Democratic-leaning urban areas 
(including the ski towns like Steamboat Springs) within a broader Republican-leaning rural 
landscape. When the Emerald Mountain conflict heated up in the early 1990s Democratic 
Governor Roy Romer’s hand-picked SLB was in place. There was “constant noise” from 
communities that were displeased with SLB management in their areas.12 Romer, who was in 
his third and final term, responded by initiating the campaign for Amendment 16 to radically 
change the way the SLB approached land management. 
 
 
THE STORY: EMERALD MOUNTAIN PLANNING PROCESS 
 
RISING VALUES AND INCREASING USES CREATE LOCAL CONFLICT 
 
West of the Continental Divide near the northern edge of the state lies Routt County, which 
is traditionally home to agricultural and mining operations, and also the growing city of 
Steamboat Springs (Figure 6-3). A ski and resort town with a rich ranching heritage, 
Steamboat Springs’ population is approximately 10,000, comprising almost half of the 
county’s population.13 The main commercial ski hill opened in the mid 1960s, and since then 
the town’s reputation as both a winter and summer resort destination has grown rapidly, with 
Olympic-caliber skiing facilities, hot springs, river sports and a downtown shopping village. 
Today, the town has a strong tourism-based economy, bolstered by the pastoral landscape 
that surrounds it.  
            
 
Figure 6-3: View of Steamboat Springs, Colorado from City-Owned Property on Emerald Mountain 
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While Emerald Mountain historically had been leased by the SLB for grazing, the 
agricultural activity around Emerald Mountain had diminished over time. Before 1970, 
approximately 25 farms and ranches operated around Emerald Mountain in Steamboat 
Springs. Six of these operations held grazing leases on the state trust land on the mountain.14 
Over the last 30 years, however, most of these agricultural parcels have been subdivided into 
residential properties (Figures 6-4 and 6-5). Only five ranches still operate commercially 
around the mountain.15 Routt County’s economic boom in the 1980s and early 1990s helped 
to fuel these changes and resulted in rising land values as out-of-towners moved into the area 
and purchased properties.16  
 
As large tracks of agricultural land continued to be subdivided for residential use, the 
landscape began to visibly change. The public became increasingly concerned about how to 
preserve Routt County’s agricultural heritage and open space.17 Emerald Mountain 
Partnership Chairman Ben Beall who served as County Commissioner from 1993 to 2001 
remembered, “Everyone could see all these folks were moving in, and the land was being 
broken up. How do we preserve our 
heritage, our agricultural heritage, so we 
don’t become like every place in 
America?”  
 
The “Emerald Mountain parcel” is 
actually a general name for a piece of 
state trust land that spans a broad area 
that includes Emerald Mountain, Agate 
Peak, Quarry Mountain, Quaker 
Mountain, Cow Creek and Twenty Mile 
Park.18 The land is rugged with steep 
slopes and access is limited by private 
properties on the east and north sides. 
County roads, power line corridors, and 
service roads create access to the 
parcel.19 Most of the parcel has been 
leased for grazing since the early 1890s, 
and in the 1990s four adjacent ranchers 
held grazing leases on the Emerald 
Mountain.20 
 
Emerald Mountain was valuable not 
only for agriculture, but also for 
recreation and wildlife habitat. The 
rising population created more demand 
for convenient recreation areas for 
Steamboat’s large community of 
mountain bikers, hikers and cross-
country skiers. While public access is 
illegal on Colorado’s state trust lands, 
Figures 6-4 and 6-5: Farmland for Sale in Steamboat Springs
Source: Photograph by Lisa Spalding 
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mountain bikers, hikers and cross-country skiers often trespassed on the parcel. The robust 
elk population on Emerald Mountain dates back to a reintroduction that occurred in the early 
1900s by entrepreneurs intending to create a game park on adjacent Howelson Hill for 
wildlife viewing. Eventually, the park management stopped and the elk remained.  
 
In response to these increasing pressures in and around Steamboat Springs, the community 
took several measures to improve land use planning in the region in the early 1990s. They 
updated their subdivision and zoning regulations, developed community plans, set up a land 
trust, and passed a purchase of development rights policy. The City worked to conserve the 
land on Howelson Hill, which is part of Emerald Mountain that is visible from downtown. 
During this effort, they contacted the SLB to discuss possibilities for opening up the state 
trust land parcels on Emerald Mountain for recreational opportunities on existing trails and 
roads.21  
 
Increased recreational pressure on 
Emerald Mountain created 
conflicts between diverse user 
groups. Historically, lessees have 
controlled all access to the state 
trust land on which they hold 
leases. According to Jim Stanko, 
whose ranching family held a lease 
on Emerald Mountain from 1923 
to 2000, “If you lease it, it 
becomes like yours. You have the 
total say over access, over who 
does what, when, where, and why” 
(Figure 6-6).22 While lessees have 
provided hunting access to their 
lands, demand for access was low 
because there were a range of 
other hunting areas available.  
 
But as Steamboat Springs grew, recreational lands within the city limits were disappearing or 
becoming more crowded. All of this put added pressure on Emerald Mountain to fulfill the 
recreational needs of the growing community.23 “The problem was that if you weren’t one of 
our friends, you didn’t get to hunt. That started irritating people that didn’t fall into that 
classification,” remembered Jim Stanko.24 While some lessees charged a nominal fee in order 
to cover their cost, others made a business venture out of these leases and charged individuals 
$4,000 to $5,000 annually for hunting access. Conflicts grew among other user groups. In 
some cases, mountain bikers would ride up the county road on the mountain and turn onto 
trails on state land and trigger openly hostile responses from one particular ranch manager. 
 
In response to increased recreational interest in state trust lands statewide, the SLB developed 
a multiple-use policy to increase revenues in the early 1990s.25 This policy, which allowed 
public and private groups to apply for recreational leases, amplified the tensions between 
Emerald Mountain’s agricultural and recreational users. To no one’s surprise, the current 
Figure 6-6: The Stanko Family Ranch, with Emerald Mountain 
in the Background 
Source: Photograph by Lisa Spalding 
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agricultural lessees preferred to control access to the land they leased. After designating 
Emerald Mountain under the new policy, the SLB issued new recreational leases that allowed 
leaseholders to charge the public for activities such as hunting and horseback riding. While 
some of the grazing lessees applied for recreational leases, the city of Steamboat Springs also 
looked into purchasing a lease for trail development. Debate ensued over which uses would 
be covered by each set of leases, and who would control access to the parcels.  
  
 COMMUNITY TEAMS UP TO RESPOND TO DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
 
As real estate prices rose, the increasing attractiveness of Emerald Mountain for development 
purposes moved the SLB to consider the possibilities of developing residential home sites.26 
In the mid-1990s, the Colorado SLB began to explore ways to manage Emerald Mountain for 
increased revenue. With rising land values and high demand for developable land, land 
disposal was an important opportunity to increase revenue for public schools and other 
beneficiary institutions.27 On Emerald Mountain, agricultural leases were bringing in only 
$40,000 in annual revenue, yielding an asset value of only roughly $1 million.28 The agency 
did not know the market value of the parcel, but current real estate trends suggested it was 
rapidly increasing. 
 
The growing conflict among user groups, the City’s interest in developing recreation trails on 
the mountain and the parcel’s potential inclusion in the SLB’s urban portfolio stirred up 
concerns throughout the Steamboat Springs community about future of land use on Emerald 
Mountain. This interest led to the creation in 1993 of an ad-hoc collaborative planning group, 
which became known as the “Core Group.” While the name of the collaborative group 
changed several times over the next 12 years, most members of the original Core Group 
endured (Table 6-1). These early meetings laid the groundwork for long-term collaboration 
between the SLB and diverse user groups in Steamboat Springs. 
 
 The Core Group met monthly over 
approximately two years and 
discussed a variety of ways to balance 
competing interests and generate 
revenue for the SLB. The County 
Extension Office hosted the meetings, 
and Extension Agent C.J. Mucklow 
facilitated. Beall described the group, 
which included Beverly Rave, 
northwest representative of SLB, as 
“congenial” despite some differing 
opinions: “Sure, the State Land Board 
wanted to sell it, and we wanted to preserve it. But, there was a way to meet. There was a 
way to do both.”30 Discussions were freeform, with no formal decision rule or voting 
process. Beall explained, “We all discussed and worked things out, and got on the same page 
without any knock-down, drag-out fights.”31  
 
Core Group Membership:29  
CJ Mucklow   Agricultural Extension 
Ben Beall Routt County Commissioner 
Jim Stanko Lessee 
Ralph Painter Manager for Newel Grant, lessee 
Jim Kemry Lessee 
Jim Hicks Colorado DOW 
Chris Wilson City of Steamboat Springs 
Robert McCarty Colorado SLB 
Table 6-1: Emerald Mountain Core Group Membership 
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The SLB’s goal for participating in the Core Group was to “get the value of that parcel for 
our beneficiaries.” according to Beverly Rave.32 Having created and worked with 
collaborative processes before, Rave also saw value in the opportunity to take “the 
controversy out of what we might otherwise have done. Give the community the opportunity 
to participate, so that the end result meets with their interests as well as ours.”33 Since the 
parcel was appreciating dramatically throughout the 1990s, Rave saw little cost to investing 
many of those years into working with the community: “Regardless of the fact that we 
weren’t getting a whole lot of money out of it in terms of revenue, it was very obvious to me 
that we were still getting value from it because the price was going up, pretty quickly.”34  
 
Beall remembered how Beverly Rave represented the SLB’s perspective to the group, “She 
and I have knocked heads, but in a good way. She would come down and we would 
negotiate. That’s probably not the right word, but everybody at the table understood that it 
was their land, so they were at the table.”35 
 
The group examined a range of potential solutions, including creating grazing partnerships, 
applying for foundation grants and working with land trusts. After two years of monthly 
meetings, participants had made several compromises. They chose to draft a “consensus 
opinion” that outlined how Emerald Mountain should be managed in the future. Jim Stanko, 
a cattle rancher who leased a portion of the Emerald Mountain parcel, was satisfied with the 
members’ mutual compromises. His wife Jo remembered, “When he first went, he thought 
they were all coming from such different directions, that they thought they’d never come to a 
consensus. And Jim was so proud and excited, when this group, this diverse group began 
working together and came together with a consensus.”36 
 
The group submitted this joint opinion as a “Community Statement” to the SLB. The 
document declared that the sale or development of any or all Emerald Mountain state trust 
lands was unacceptable, and the SLB’s current policy of maximizing short-term revenues 
should be reconsidered to take into account both local needs and long-term goals. The group 
then outlined their set of goals for the parcel: 
 
• Prohibit housing development on the land 
• Retain agricultural use and maintain livestock grazing 
• Allow public hunting with controlled hunter numbers 
• Improve wildlife management and reduce wildlife conflicts with adjacent landowners 
• Allow controlled public recreation that pays its fair share and is compatible with other 
uses 
• Generate more revenue for the Colorado SLB in perpetuity than is currently generated 
today by fully utilizing the multiple-use plan 
• Develop a land use management plan to improve all the resources, both natural and 
human, of Emerald Mountain37 
 
Finally, the Core Group requested five years to develop a community plan for the parcel that 
“benefits our community and the citizens of Colorado as well as substantially increasing 
revenues to the State Land Board.” During this time, they proposed to identify potential uses 
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and stakeholders, evaluate alternatives, assemble funding sources, write a plan and create an 
organizational management structure.  
 
 The SLB felt they needed to explore a range of options to generate a reasonable rate of 
return. Around this time, the agency continued discussing moving the Emerald Mountain 
parcel into their urban portfolio, a status shift that meant it could be considered for disposal 
or residential development. This Urban Lands Account was a holding bin for lands being 
prepared for development within ten years or less.38 The community took this proposal as a 
sign that the possibility of development on the parcel was imminent. 
 
To continue to explore this option, the agency hired a contractor named Charlie Foster in 
1995 to conduct a planning study to assess the property’s development potential and outline a 
set of development scenarios to increase revenue. Beverly Rave described the report: 
“Charlie put together a basic study of the property and developed some alternatives that the 
Board might consider for what they could do with that parcel to get some additional 
revenue.”39 Foster outlined scenarios for six to 18 building sites and presented the following 
three alternatives: 
 
• Continue current uses, but develop limited large tracts or subdivisions in selected 
areas 
• Initiate a multiple use plan that involves limited development  
• Sell or exchange all significant areas of Emerald Mountain, if effective and fiscally 
responsible management is not an option40 
 
Foster recommended the second, multiple-use planning option and estimated the value of the 
parcel at between $6 million and $7 million.41 With the report completed and approved by 
the agency, the SLB held a public meeting in 1995 in Steamboat Springs to present its 
findings to the community.42 Jim Stanko remembered the community’s strong reaction to the 
presentation: “Once the word got out that it was going to be sold, the city of Steamboat got 
excited, the county got excited, you know, all kinds of people got excited. Everybody 
protested.”43 
 
To develop an alternative solution, Routt County proposed to coordinate a community-based 
planning process to work out an alternative solution.44 The Emerald Mountain Steering 
Committee was born. The County Planning Department led this continuation of the local 
planning effort, and expanded the set stakeholders and interests from those represented in the 
Core Group. The new Steering Committee included representatives from the County, City, 
adjacent property owners, lessees, recreational interests, local land conservation 
organizations, wildlife interests and community members.45 The SLB’s Beverly Rave joined 
the group meetings to offer guidance.  
 
The group initially proposed to write a land use plan for the parcel, intending for this plan to 
be adopted into the County’s Master Plan. However, the SLB was concerned that their plan 
would not incorporate development options, so it would not realistically address the Board’s 
mandate to manage the land for revenue. In response to the agency’s concerns, the Steering 
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Committee switched gears in 1995 and tried to pursue the multiple use option included in the 
Foster Report.  
 
The group’s new objective was to develop a multiple-use land management plan based on the 
Core Group’s joint set of goals. A subset of Committee members representing all the above 
interests undertook this task, and was chaired by County Commissioner Ben Beall. “So the 
Board agreed to do a planning lease to Routt County for five years to give them a chance to 
see what they could come up with,” described Beverly Rave.46 The terms of the 1995 five-
year planning lease negotiated by the SLB and the Routt County Board of County 
Commissioners were to include one rent-free year, followed by four years charged at $1 per 
acre annually, totaling $6,900 per year.47  
 
AMENDMENT 16 OVERHAULS COLORADO’S STATE LAND BOARD 
 
Emerald Mountain was not the only parcel of Colorado’s state trust land that was mired in 
conflict in the 1990s. Some other parcels being considered for sale around the state were also 
highly valuable to local communities for open space, scenery or wildlife habitat. The public 
was increasingly concerned about the impacts of sprawl development and rapid growth, and 
increasingly voiced concerns with sale proposals.48 Controversial SLB transactions fueled 
growing public scrutiny over the agency’s decision making. One controversial sale occurred 
in southern Routt County in 1995. The SLB failed to adequately consult local government 
before entering into a contract with a developer to subdivide a 640-acre parcel into 35-acre 
parcels (which, due to their size, avoid local land use regulations and oversight).49 While this 
action increased the tension between the SLB and Routt County Board of County 
Commissioners, similar SLB transactions were creating friction with many other Colorado 
communities.50 
 
The Governor’s office received a rising number of public objections to the SLB’s activities. 
Indeed, a subsection of the Emerald Mountain Core Group went to Denver to voice their 
concerns to Romer in hopes of influencing the SLB’s actions from above. Jim Stanko’s 
message to Romer on that trip was, “Governor, your land board is out of control. Do 
something about it.”51 Charles Bedford, who was Romer’s deputy legal advisor at the time, 
recalled that Emerald Mountain was prominent on the list of grievances: 
 
We started hearing about Emerald Mountain and about the Land Board’s 
desire to develop or sell, or maximize value, back in 1994. There was just 
constant noise about it. They were basically just at loggerheads. The Land 
Board would propose something ‘let’s do 800 houses on this part of it’ and the 
community would come unglued. The governor’s office would say to the 
Land Board, “what are you doing?” The Land Board would say, “we’re just 
trying to maximize value.”52 
 
In response to heated controversy around proposals for land disposition, Governor Roy 
Romer worked with his staff and environmental groups in 1995 to write Amendment 16. This 
ballot initiative would redesign both the principles and the structure of the SLB. With the 
assistance of Citizen’s to Save Colorado’s Public Trust Lands and other environmental 
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groups, Governor Romer collected sufficient signatures to get the proposal on the ballot, and 
fought hard to see it pass by a margin of 1.8 percent.53  
 
The Amendment, according to Charles Bedford, “Basically brought [the SLB] out of the 
1890s into the 1990s.”54 This revision shifted the SLB’s mission away from maximizing trust 
land revenue to “producing reasonable and consistent income over time,” and replaced the 
existing three-member salaried board with a newly appointed five-member volunteer board 
with broader geographical representation, expertise and constituencies.55 Most importantly to 
the Emerald Mountain case, the Amendment required the SLB to comply with local land use 
regulations and plans. This obligation opened the door for collaborative work with local 
communities to coordinate planning on state trust lands.56 
 
The Amendment also created a Stewardship Trust of 295,000 to 300,000 acres 
(approximately 10 percent of landholdings) determined to be valuable in the long-term, in 
order to preserve land for future benefits to the trust. Stewardship Trust land can not be sold 
unless it is first removed, which required the consenting votes of at least four of the five SLB 
Commissioners. The Trust would be established through a statewide public nomination 
process, and any land removed must be replaced with the coincident designation of other 
lands of roughly the same acreage. The Amendment also made other important changes, 
including explicitly allowing the Board to sell or lease conservation easements on state trust 
land and developing stewardship incentives for grazing lessees.57  
 
Many citizens, including some of those on the Emerald Mountain Steering Committee, 
mistakenly thought that the Stewardship Trust would protect land in perpetuity. The 
Committee had strongly advocated for the Amendment in hopes of including the Emerald 
Mountain parcel in the Stewardship Trust. The misunderstanding was perhaps a consequence 
of Emerald Mountain’s widespread use as the “poster child” in Romer’s state-wide campaign 
promoting the Amendment. This promotion occurred most notably when Governor Romer 
visited the site to launch the petition initiative, producing public relations photos of him 
literally pointing to Emerald Mountain in the background as an example of state trust land 
that should be conserved for future generations.58 Once the Amendment passed and the 
Stewardship Trust was established, the community advocated for, and successfully 
nominated the Emerald Mountain parcel for designation.  
 
However, after the parcel was designated into the Stewardship Trust in 1998, the Emerald 
Mountain Steering Committee got a rude awakening and had to work within the constraints 
of the Amendment. Only some members understood that the actual Amendment promises 
only that a certain number of acres would always be held in trust, and parcels would require 
the SLB’s four-fifths vote to be removed. Susan Otis described this widespread confusion:  
 
The citizens of the state felt the Stewardship Trust was going to set aside some 
of the State Land Board lands so they would be free from development, or 
they wouldn’t be under pressure of development. But in reality, the State Land 
Board interprets the Amendment in a way that only gives communities the 
opportunity to “buy” the time to come up with the money to resolve the 




For some participants, the realization that the Stewardship Trust was merely a temporary fix 
was frustrating. Jim Stanko recalled: 
 
We thought, that’d be it! We’d get it in the Stewardship Trust. Then, you 
know, they couldn’t sell it. Everybody could use it. It would become what 
Amendment 16 was supposed to be about. Well, we got it into the 
Stewardship Trust. And then the State Land Board said well, this is only a 
temporary thing.60  
 
A NEW EMERALD MOUNTAIN PARTNERSHIP IS BORN 
 
At the end of 1999, the County’s five-year planning lease was approaching expiration. The 
SLB conducted an appraisal of the fair market value of the parcel based on the highest and 
best use, which was one “gentleman rancher” purchasing the entire parcel. This appraisal 
came back as $17.2 million.61 The community was concerned that a land sale was imminent, 
and with the support of Routt County and the city of Steamboat Springs, the Emerald 
Mountain Partnership (the Partnership) was born in February 2000.62 The Partnership’s goals 
were the following: 
 
• The prudent management, location, protection, sale, exchange or other disposition of 
trust lands within Emerald Mountain in order to produce reasonable and consistent 
income over time for the beneficiaries of Colorado State Board of Land 
Commissioners trust lands 
• The conservation, preservation, protection and enhancement of open space and scenic 
lands for the benefit of the public and future generations 
• The maintenance, protection and enhancement of wildlife habitat and wildlife resources 
• The maintenance and preservation of agricultural lands, agricultural operations and 
activities and the agricultural heritage of Routt County 
• The creation and management of public recreational opportunities compatible with 
open space preservation, wildlife and agriculture 
• The development and implementation of educational and scientific opportunities and 
programs relating to wildlife, wildlife management, land preservation, conservation, 
and sustainable agricultural activities 
• Collaboration and communication with, and the development of cooperative programs 
with the Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners and other state and federal 
agencies, charitable organizations, citizens groups and others to promote the purposes 
and goals set forth above63 
 
The Partnership originally was designed with a seven-member Board of Directors composed 
of two City appointees, two County appointees and three additional members. Over time, 
however, the Board was expanded due to high level of interest and commitment of old and 
new members.64 Based on legal advice, the Partnership also created an Advisory Council 
comprised of individuals, organizations or agencies who either had “a land ownership 
interest [and] who would benefit from Emerald Mountain,” or possessed helpful knowledge 
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or expertise.65 Members of the latter would be included in discussions but did not have a vote 
in decision making (Table 6-2). 
 




The Partnership’s structure and meetings were highly organized. The group incorporated as a 
501(c)(3) non-profit organization, and developed bylaws, articles of incorporation and a 
strategic plan. Roles were created for chairperson, chair pro tem, secretary and treasurer, and 
numerous subcommittees were created over time to accomplish focused tasks such as writing 
a management plan for the parcel, or revising the strategic plan to allow for the group’s 
evolving vision. Semi-monthly meetings were open to the public and advertised regularly in 
the local Steamboat newspaper, The Steamboat Pilot. One member developed a website and 
posted all agendas, meeting minutes and important documents for public access and 
comment. 
 
Not surprisingly, Ben Beall immediately was elected chairman of the Partnership. Beall, a 
long-time Routt County Commissioner, had spearheaded the local Emerald Mountain 
2000 Membership  
Board of Directors Affiliation 
Ben Beall (Chair) Routt County 
Commissioner 
Ken Brenner Steamboat Springs City 
Council 
Jim Ficke Routt County appointee  
Bob Enever Steamboat Springs City 
Council appointee 
Doug Monger Rancher from Hayden, CO 
Dr. Dan Smilkstein Steamboat Springs Nordic 
Council 
Chris Young  Routt County Riders  
Advisory Council  
Jim Stanko Lessee 
Ed Trousil Lessee 
Lymon Orton Adjacent Landowner 
Susan Shoemaker Adjacent Landowner 
Scott Flower Adjancent Landowner 
Representative 
Debbie Fuller Yampatika 
John Spezia Outdoor Educator  
Wano Urbonas Bicyclist 
Jim Hicks Interested Citizen, former 
CO DOW representative 
Susan Dorsey Otis Yampa Valley Land Trust 
Linda Kakela  City of Steamboat Springs 
Libby Miller CO DOW 
Dennis Scheiwe CO State Parks  
2002-2006 Membership 
Board of Directors Affiliation 
Ben Beall (Chair) Routt County 
Commissioner 
Jim Ficke Routt County appointee  
Doug Monger66 Now a County 
Commissioner 
Dr. Dan Smilkstein67 Steamboat Springs 
Nordic Council 
Chris Young  Routt County Riders  
Ken Brenner Served as both the City 
Council appointee and 
Board appointee 
Susan Otis Formerly on Advisory 
Council 
Sally Wither68 Educator, Steamboat 
Springs City Council 
appointee  
Paul Strong Steamboat Springs City 
Council 
Advisory Council  
Jim Stanko Lessee 
Ed Trousil Lessee 
Susan Shoemaker Adjacent Landowner 
Scott Flower Adjancet Landowner 
Representative 
Alan Keefe Lawyer, interested citizen 
Libby Miller69 CO DOW 
Carol O’Hare Interested citizen 
Lynn Abbot Interested citizen 
Jim Hicks Interested citizen, former 
CO DOW representative 
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planning effort from its inception. The other three leadership positions changed hands several 
times during the Partnership’s work due to member resignations. Each time, the Board of 
Directors would hold a vote to elect a different member to fill the vacancy. 
 
Because the five-year planning lease was expiring, the first order of business for the 
Partnership was to buy more time to conduct their planning efforts. When the SLB initiated 
its sealed bidding process in August of 2000, the Partnership seized this opportunity and 
drafted a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to submit as their bid. The MOA specified that 
the Partnership would purchase the Emerald Mountain parcel at market value within five 
years, based on a current appraisal. During those five years they would lease the parcel for 
$6.50 per acre. The SLB received two other sealed bids for the property: a vague proposal 
from a Steamboat Springs realtor who intended to try to find a buyer for the parcel and a 
$17.2 million bid from Cordillera, the developers of a major resort community in Vail 
Colorado. 
 
When the sealed bids were opened in September, the Partnership’s MOA prevailed. The local 
realtor’s bid was not considered legitimate because it lacked a funding plan. While 
Cordillera’s bid was legitimate (and would have been accepted over the Partnership’s 
because it was cash), the developer elected to retract the bid upon learning of the 
Partnership’s proposal. The reason provided to the SLB, according to the agency’s northwest 
district manager Beverly Rave, was that prior to this bid process they had successfully taken 
on and mitigated controversy around other development projects in the Steamboat Springs 
area by working closely with the local community. With these successful projects now in 
progress, Cordiella preferred not to work against that same community on the Emerald 
Mountain property.70  
 
The SLB accepted the Partnership’s MOA and gave the Partnership the option to purchase 
the Emerald Mountain parcel prior to March 15, 2005.71 While the MOA essentially froze the 
parcel for five years, if the Partnership were not able to purchase that property within that 
timeframe, the SLB could consider other offers and remove the property from the 
Stewardship Trust.72 The MOA included two phases: Phase One required the purchase of a 
1,400-acre parcel on or before March 15, 2004, and Phase Two was the purchase of the rest 
of the property on or before the final deadline one year later.73 This arrangement allowed the 
SLB to obtain some early revenue and ensure that progress was being made towards the 
complete purchase.  
 
The Partnership developed a strategic plan for its five-year effort to purchase and conserve 
the Emerald Mountain parcel. During its first year, it conducted a mail survey in Steamboat 
Springs to determine the level of community support for preserving the parcel and to measure 
their willingness to commit public funds for the cause. The survey found that while 85 
percent of respondents supported preserving the parcel, only 37 to 47 percent were willing to 
accept a tax increase to purchase the parcel, depending on the amount and term.74 A 
consulting firm analyzed the data for the Partnership, which helped them determine that 
community support for public funding was inadequate to pursue a local ballot measure for a 




Next, they decided to look for conservation buyers, in hopes to find an individual buyer who 
would either preserve the entire property, or perhaps develop a home site on the parcel and 
conserve the rest as open space.75 While the Partnership received six proposals, mostly from 
adjacent landowners, only one considered purchasing the entire parcel. However, this 
proposal from Yampa Valley Community Foundation included a more significant 
development and would privatize most of the property. Chairman Ben Beall remembers, 
“some of it actually may have been preserved as open space, but it wouldn’t have been public 
open space.”76  
 
During its first two years, the Partnership was vigorously spinning its wheels, but was unable 
to make significant progress towards acquiring the funding or a buyer to purchase Emerald 
Mountain. According to City Council member Paul Strong, “Before the BLM got involved, 
we were really kind of floundering for ways to do this.” They explored other funding 
opportunities through a variety of organizations including the City, County, Sierra Club, 
Community Foundation of Northern Colorado and Great Outdoors Colorado (GoCo). They 
created a mailing list of “friends” and sent out letters of appeal for individual donations. One 
of their more creative strategies was to help a wealthy adjacent rancher throw a fundraiser on 
his property, complete with horseback and walking tours of the state trust land parcel he 
leased for grazing. However, none of the funding they received came close to the quantity of 
money necessary to acquire the parcel.77 Susan Otis remembered the group’s predicament:  
 
The question is, how do you conserve Emerald Mountain when you have 
GOGO saying we’re not giving you the money, and a community that says 
don’t tap our pockets? So how does one think outside of the box to come up 
with another way to put this land conservation transaction together?78 
 
Meanwhile in 2000, the Emerald Mountain state land parcel that land rancher Jim Stanko 
leased was exchanged and became private land. The City had been working with rancher 
Newell Grant to purchase his ranch adjacent to the Emerald Mountain parcel. Since Grant 
had already received a proposal from a developer, many were concerned that the area would 
be subdivided and developed. In an attempt to preserve the open space, several parties 
offered to purchase pieces of the ranch, including the city of Steamboat Springs, CO DOW, 
CO State Parks and Recreation, and a private individual. One portion of the ranch that was 
difficult to sell was incorporated into a deal with Byron Cressy, owner of Wolf Run Ranch, 
who would purchase the parcel and then exchange it for 840 acres of state trust land directly 
behind his own property. This trust land happened to be the land that the Stanko family had 
leased for decades.79   
 
The land swap enabled the SLB to connect their trust lands on Emerald Mountain with those 
on Saddle Mountain and create a continuous block of land. However, this deal came at a 
personal cost for the Stanko family. From then on, Jim Stanko leased the land directly from 
Byron Cressy, at the same rate as his former lease with the state. He was no longer able to 
hunt on the land, and was required to reduce the number of cattle he ran on the property. This 
swap had far-reaching economic and personal ramifications for the Stanko family and their 




THE BLM SUGGESTS A LAND EXCHANGE TO ACQUIRE EMERALD MOUNTAIN 
 
In early 2002, geologist and Steamboat Springs resident Fred Conrath of the BLM’s Little Snake 
Field Office suggested the possibility of exchanging BLM parcels in Routt County for the Emerald 
Mountain parcel. The BLM had undertaken a similar land exchange for state trust land in nearby 
Grand and Jackson Counties, and it had been a favorable transaction for both agencies involved. 
The BLM had been struggling to manage landholdings in Routt County that were small, irregularly 
shaped, scattered and landlocked (i.e. surrounded by private lands with no public access). Emerald 
Mountain, a large, contiguous block of publicly-accessible land was a desirable alternative that they 
could manage for multiple uses including wildlife, grazing and recreation. Ben Beall invited John 
Husband, manager of the Little Snake Field Office, to join a February 2002 Partnership meeting to 
discuss the BLM parcels in question, and explain the federal land exchange process. Husband 
brought Tim Wohlgenant of the Western Land Group to the following Partnership meeting to 
discuss logistics. Wohlgenant had facilitated a similar exchange in Grand and Jackson Counties, 
and was willing to broker a similar deal for Emerald Mountain. 
 
The Partnership came to a consensus that the swap was their best chance for protecting Emerald 
Mountain, and decided to approach the SLB to obtain their “blessing.”81 Six members of the 
Partnership attended the February SLB meeting in Denver to discuss the exchange. These 
individuals reported back at the Partnership’s next meeting that the SLB was positive, but would 
require the Partnership to handle the logistics. 
 
The exchange would be a three-party transaction, coordinated by the Partnership. Wohlgenant 
would seek out private buyers for certain scattered BLM parcels in Routt County, and the revenue 
from the sale would be used to purchase of the 6,345-acre Emerald Mountain parcel. The BLM 
identified 41,523 acres of difficult to manage land, spread out across 269 parcels, of which they 
were interested in disposing (Figure 6-7). The Partnership, particularly the representatives from 
DOW and the Yampa Valley Land Trust, then evaluated these parcels to determine if they had 
values such as community significance, open space, critical wildlife habitat or adjacency to already 
conserved land, any of which would deem them preferable to remain in BLM ownership. The SLB 
also identified certain preferred BLM parcels that the Board was interested in acquiring. Most of 
these properties were contiguous to existing or future SLB landholdings. The agency also withdrew 
their interest in some parcels that had public access in an attempt to avoid controversy. This process 
narrowed down the potential acreage under consideration.82 
 
The Partnership attempted to avoid conflicts between potential buyers of BLM land by constructing 
an analytical formula that would offer current BLM grazing lessees the option to purchase the land, 
and keep existing agricultural land in agriculture.83 Private landowners who owned contiguous 
property were contacted to determine their interest in participating in the Exchange. Susan Otis 
described the complex formula the group developed to determine land eligibility: “The Partnership 
developed a set of selection criteria for the Exchange to systematically determine who would have 
the first opportunity to purchase BLM lands.” Otis described the criteria as a “formula” or “a flow 
chart, for determining how properties were considered, and how decisions were made to ensure 
fairness. Decisions were made based on the surrounding properties and circumstances. Decisions 




Figure 6-7: Map of Emerald Mountain Land Exchange 
 




Tim Wohlgenant viewed his own function in the exchange as that of a “mediator” working in 
a “transparent, fishbowl atmosphere.”85 Wohlgenant’s role was to execute a scoping process 
to identify and contact all parties who might want to purchase the BLM parcels, primarily by 
contacting all contiguous landowners. He also worked closely with the SLB, BLM, and the 
Partnership. Of the 25,000-30,000 BLM acres that remained after the initial Partnership 
screening, Wohlgenant identified 59 buyers for approximately 129 parcels, totaling 15,621 
acres.86 Of these properties, 75 percent were inaccessible to the general public because all 
accesses are privately owned and 84 percent of the BLM lands currently leased for grazing 
were set up to go to the current grazing lessee.87  
 
To the Partnership’s surprise, the land exchange triggered fervent opposition. Paul Strong 
summarizes their standpoint: “There are other people outside of the Steamboat Springs area 
that don’t have any problem saving Emerald Mountain but don’t want to sacrifice any BLM 
lands to achieve that.”88 Some landowners in Routt County were unhappy when they did not 
receive the opportunity to purchase the BLM land adjacent to their property (presumably 
there was another neighbor with greater adjacency who was willing to purchase it). Others 
were frustrated that, while they were presented with the opportunity to purchase the land, 
they did not have the financial means. Some individuals had the means but did not want to 
purchase property that they had always used for free, but did not want to lose it either. In 
these cases, they simply elected not to participate. The most “intense” opposition came from 
people who owned less than 50 percent of the adjacent land and did not want to see the 
owner with the greatest adjacency acquire the property.  
 
A small group of these citizens formed a group called “Citizens to Save Our Public Lands” 
and sent representatives to most Partnership meetings that occurred after 2002. This group 
employed a range of arguments, challenging the description of the BLM parcels as 
“landlocked,” by asserting that they can still be reached by helicopter. The opposition also 
criticized the assessment process, saying that $17 million was too low a value for the 
Emerald Mountain parcel. At times, their airing of grievances in meetings escalated into 
heated arguments with Chairman Ben Beall.89 This citizens group also met with the BLM 
and the SLB several times, submitted letters to the editor of local papers, and placed ads in 
papers criticizing the exchange. 
  
By 2004, the window of opportunity was closing, because the MOA deadline was rapidly 
approaching. To provide adequate time to complete the necessary assessments for the BLM’s 
federal land exchange process, and because they viewed the exchange as a strong opportunity 
to obtain the value of the Emerald Mountain parcel, the SLB issued an amendment to the 
MOA. The amendment waived the requirement for an early, “Phase One” land purchase and 
extended the March 15, 2005 deadline to March 15, 2006. 90 
 
As of December 2005, parties to the exchange are awaiting the results of appraisals of both 
the BLM parcels and the Emerald Mountain parcel, as well as an environmental assessment. 
The appraisal is a critical determinant of how the land exchange will proceed, because the 
values of the BLM and SLB properties must be equal in order to complete the exchange. If 
the value of the BLM parcels exceeds the value of the Emerald Mountain parcel, some BLM 
lands will be taken out of the exchange. However, if the Emerald Mountain parcel is valued 
at more than the BLM sites, either the BLM would have to re-enter the scoping process to 
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identify more parcels for sale, or a portion of the Emerald Mountain acreage would be 
removed from the exchange and remain under the SLB’s ownership.91 The appraised values 
of BLM parcels will also determine if buyers are able to complete the transaction to acquire 
the land.92 Private landowners participating in the exchange are paying for the environmental 
assessment required by the federal exchange process, and will consider the impacts of both 
the exchange and the management plan, which will eventually be an amendment to the 
BLM’s Little Snake Resource Management Plan. One of the three management alternatives 
being considered in the assessment is the Partnership’s management plan.93 While the BLM 
often allows ORV use, the Partnership opposes motorized recreation on the parcel 
 
 
THE ANALYSIS: EMERALD MOUNTAIN PLANNING PROCESS 
 
The following analysis identifies and discusses the benefits, costs, challenges, facilitating 
factors and lessons learned from the Emerald Mountain Planning Process. This analysis is 
based on the observations and reflections of process participiants, as well as the researchers’ 
external assessment.  
 
Benefits of the process include reduced conflict and improved understanding and 
relationships between the SLB and community, improved personal and professional 
relationships within the community and generated a unique solution that achieved both the 
SLB’s and Partnership’s goals. The 12-year process also imposed time, financial and even 
public relations costs on participants. Individuals and orgainizations faced a range of 
challenges throughout the process, which included dealing with the SLB’s constraints, 
tensions between City and County, misperceptions of the Stewardship Trust and coping with 
federal bureaucratic delays. 
 
However, several facilitating factors helped move the planning process along and keep 
participants at the table. These beneficial activities and tools included strong leadership, 
contractual agreements between parties, the Partnership’s shared goals and vision statement, 
and shared skills and perspectives among participants. 
 
Finally, the lessons learned from the Emerald Mountain case include notions that reaching 
out to educate the public can improve a collaborative group’s effectiveness, groups should 
evaluate proposals to anticipate potential controversies and identifying and including all 
potential stakeholders is key, especially if the project’s scope changes. 
 
WAS EMERALD MOUNTAIN PROCESS COLLABORATIVE? 
 
All members of the Emerald Mountain Partnership described this process as “collaborative.” 
Chris Young described the Partnership as a “Collaboration of ranchers and recreation people, 
and normally we’re at odds with each other.”94 Susan Otis agreed that the Partnership was 
“incredibly open” to the general public.95 Charles Bedford described the SLB’s interaction 
with the Partnership as “A constant stream of communication back and forth between the 
Land Commissioners, my boss, members of the community, Beverly Rave, and others. A 
constant, iterative process.” These reflections highlight the three axes used to measure 
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collaboration in this assessment of collaborative planning on state trust lands: (1) breadth of 
stakeholders, (2) transparency and (3) level of influence on decision making. 
 
Breadth of Stakeholders: In its early stages, the Core Group included representatives from a 
wide range of interest groups on the Emerald Mountain parcel, including the grazing lessees, 
DOW, bikers, county, city, land trust and SLB. Over time, the group expanded its 
representation in some ways, such as including other types of recreation, but it eventually lost 
its formal representation from the County. When the land exchange idea broadened the 
project’s scope so that it would impact BLM lands in other towns, the group failed to actively 
seek out these broader geographic interests. The county-based opposition to the proposed 
land exchange seems to indicate that perhaps the inclusion of more county stakeholders 
might have improved the county response, modified the exchange to be more palatable to 
those interests or even developed an alternative solution. Paul Strong described the lack of 
county-based stakeholders on the Partnership:  
 
We selected the members of the board of directors to be people who were for 
this exchange, people who would work for it and be advocates for it. So you 
just end up hearing your closed circle of people who think it’s a great thing. 
I’m not saying we should have necessarily broadened the members of the 
Board, but should have somehow gotten wider representation on the Advisory 
Council.96 
 
Degree of Transparency: The Emerald Mountain Partnership planning process was highly 
transparent for both participants and the general public. The group advertised their meetings 
in the paper, posted agendas, minutes, documents and plans on their website and allowed the 
public to attend and participate in all meetings. When opposition arose to the land exchange, 
these individuals were able to come to Partnership meetings to learn more about the process 
and discuss their concerns. The Partnership also held public meetings in Steamboat Springs 
to gather input and share ideas. According to Beverly Rave, these meetings also helped 
increase local understanding of the SLB’s mandate, “[The Partnership] wanted to make sure 
people were really informed about what it was they were trying to accomplish, and at the 
same time, really make it clear to people what our mission was and our expectations had to 
be for that property.”97 The Partnership also held public meetings in several other towns in 
the county, joined by the BLM and SLB, to educate people about the land exchange and 
solicit public comment. Between the Partnership and the SLB, former Director Charles 
Bedford described the process as “a constant stream of communication.”98  
 
Degree of Influence on Decision Making: The Partnership clearly had significant impact on 
the SLB decisions, but only because they were acting within the bounds established by the 
SLB. The nature of the Partnership’s influence on SLB decision making was based upon 
offering proposals of strategies to generate revenue from the parcel. Simply put, a proposal 
would be accepted if and when it was able to achieve market value, and no less. Charles 
Bedford recalls the SLB’s regular check-ins with the Partnership to assess progress: 
 
Every six months, they would come back in and brief the Board on where they 
were, show the Board what they had and the Board would say, look, there’s 
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no revenue here. There’s no way for us to capture any value. So go back to the 
drawing board. So they’d grumble and go back to the drawing board.99  
 
The Partnership’s successful bid in 2000, which created the five-year MOA, greatly 
increased their influence in several ways. First, a significant degree of influence was exerted 
by the mere presence and persistence of such a strong local coalition. This sway inspired 
Cordillera to withdraw its bid upon learning of the local group’s proposal to have an MOA 
with the SLB, and left the agency with no option but to choose the Partnership’s proposal. 
Beverly Rave described the position the SLB was in at the time: “Without a question, we 
would have had to have taken that bid. It was the best bid we had, you know, for the 
beneficiaries. But, the fact that they withdrew it eliminated that opportunity.”100 Second, the 
MOA then provided the Partnership a five-year exclusive agreement to purchase the parcel, 
preventing the SLB from pursuing other options. But while the SLB chose to relinquish this 
right, it had no obligation to accept any of the Partnership’s proposals.  
 
Had the SLB not worked with the Partnership, some predict the stalemate over development 
could have continued indefinitely. Charles Bedford thought “it just would have sat there in 
uncertainty.” And as for the agency itself, he saw enormous risks of continuing with a status 
quo of making decisions without accounting for local appeals: 
 
There’s a set of things that can happen to you as a public agency. You can get 
overhauled, like amendment 16 did or like the Arizona initiative is. You can 
have your budget either continued in the same [meager] fashion that it did or 
even be cut – we actually experienced that – or you can just spend a lot of 
time in court. And you’ve got 29 staff, and only two people who you could 
actually send into a courtroom, for fear having a complete disaster occur. You 
have a lot of resources going towards those lawsuits. And those are the 
negatives, those are the things that you gain by ceding some control to the 
community groups that are worried about land board developments.101 
 
BENEFITS OF THE PROCESS 
 
Participants from various stages in this 13-year collaborative planning process identified 
several benefits of having used this approach. 
 
Improved Understanding and Relations between State Land Board and Community 
 
One of the major benefits the SLB observed from working with the Partnership was the 
increased visibility of both the agency and the state trust lands, themselves. Beverly Rave 
observed that the Partnership greatly improved relationships between the SLB and the 
community: “I think that whole community has a much better understanding of what state 
trust lands are, and why we have to manage those lands in the manner in which we do. There 
were more public meetings about Emerald Mountain than any other property the SLB owns 
in Colorado.”102 According to Rave, most of this public outreach was accomplished by the 
Partnership: “They wanted to make sure people were really informed about what it was they 
were trying to accomplish, and at the same time, make it clear to people what our mission 
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was. What our expectations had to be for that property.”103 Rave also observed that Emerald 
Mountain has received statewide publicity, which has provided wide-reaching education 
about Colorado’s state trust lands.  
 
From the BLM’s perspective, the collaborative group involved the public from the outset, 
which helped accomplish one of the BLM’s major responsibilities as a public agency. 
Through public meetings and surveys, the group gained tremendous knowledge of the 
interests of citizens in Steamboat Springs, particularly for the protection of wildlife as a top 
priority for Emerald Mountain.104  
 
Reduced Conflict between Community and State Land Board to Facilitate Future 
Interactions 
 
A major benefit for the SLB in engaging in this process is that it diminished the conflict 
surrounding this parcel of land to allow the agency to eventually generate more revenue 
from the parcel. Charles Bedford summarized this accomplishment as, “resolving a set 
of disputes that is impeding the value realization of a piece of state property.”105 Bedford 
compared working with the Partnership with the alternative: “This is successful because 
there is not a log jam happening in the Land Board. There’s not litigation, or angry 
letters, and the Land Board is not spending an awful lot of their own resources, which 
needs to be part of the fiduciary equation.”106 Bringing the community into their 
decision-making process enabled the SLB to be presented with an outcome that could 
satisfy both their own mandate and local needs. Beverly Rave agreed that working 
closely with the Partnership “took the controversy out of what we might otherwise have 
done, and gave the community the opportunity to participate in that so that the end result 
met with their interests as well as ours.”107  
 
This process also has a long-term benefit of preempting future conflicts, by establishing 
relationships and shared understanding between the SLB and the local community. Charles 
Bedford even recommended that if an agency has a regional representative stationed in an 
area that they embark on a similar community-based planning process early on:  
 
Because you develop these relationships early on, so that essentially you never 
have to go through these processes anymore. You do this in more of an 
informal, ongoing fashion, this sort of ongoing collaborative process. 
Sometimes you’ll still have conflicts come up. But if you have the same guy 
that lives there for 10 to 15 years, that’s passionate about this place, that has to 
go to the same supermarket as the enviro goes to, and has a personality that 
allows for kind of problem-solving, then you’ve really created an incredibly 
powerful vehicle for going forward. 
 
Improved Personal and Professional Relationships within the Community 
 
Charles Bedford’s comment also illustrates how valuable the relationships are that can 
develop out of planning processes like Emerald Mountain. Beverly Rave found that working 
with the Partnership, “went a long way towards improving the relationship with the SLB and 
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that community.”108 All participants in the Partnership report that their involvement in this 
planning fostered their relationships with individuals and organizations that they were often 
working with on other issues. According to Ben Beall: 
 
The people at the table, let’s say myself, the DOW, we’re also at the table on 
other issues. In Routt County, there are only so many people that are involved, 
and they’re all the same at all the tables. So when you go to those tables, even 
though you’re going to a meeting on Emerald Mountain to figure that one out, 
you’re also there with the same folks that are trying to do the other 
conservation projects, or they’re worried about the urban boundary, or how 
are we going to get that trail connection.109 
 
Some even reported enjoying going to Partnership meetings merely to touch base with others 
and be reenergized. Others found that serving on the Partnership helped them professionally. 
For Libbie Miller, participating in the Partnership helped improve her effectiveness and 
credibility in her work with the DOW: 
 
As an enforcement officer, I think the more interaction you are able to have 
with your community the better. People see you in a different light and they 
see the agency in a different light. When you interact on a different level 
instead of just strictly writing tickets to people or taking them to jail, you have 
a whole different kind of involvement.110  
 
Libbie Miller found the Partnership especially helpful in forging new relationships, having 
recently moved from working for the Utah Department of Wildlife Resources:  
 
It was a huge benefit for me, because I got to meet a lot of people who I 
would not necessarily. It is likely I would have gotten to meet them over time. 
However, when you work with somebody on a monthly basis, you certainly 
develop professional relationships that you wouldn’t get in any other 
scenarios.111  
 
Provided a Rewarding Experience for Participants that Fostered Creativity 
 
The earliest stage of collaborative planning on Emerald Mountain, referred to as the Core 
Group, is viewed by many as one of the most rewarding periods of the Partnership’s 12-year 
history. Chris Young remembered these early stages as being open-minded and engaging: 
“The initial core group was stimulating and thought-provoking. An experience I’d never had 
before. I really enjoyed that.”112 One element that made the Core Group stimulating was that 
it was the initial phase of working through the conflicting interests in the parcel and the 
community at large by bringing together a diverse group of stakeholders who all wanted to 
keep the land “green” for different reasons. These disparate interest groups were surprised 
and excited to discover they had mutual interests and could make compromises. Jo Stanko 
recalled her husband Jim’s rewarding experience with the Core Group: “when he first went, 
he thought they were all coming from such different directions, that they thought they’d 
never come to a consensus. And Jim was so proud and excited, when this group, this diverse 
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group began working together and came together with a consensus.”113 Charles Bedford also 
found satisfaction in the potential for this process to resolve a problematic issue, “There’s a 
satisfaction in that, in sort of disposing of a tricky issue, a sticky problem … That’s a 
personal motivation.”114 
 
Generated a Unique Solution that Achieved both the State Land Board’s Revenue 
Targets and the Partnership’s Conservation Goals 
 
One of the greatest benefits of the Emerald Mountain collaborative process is the unique 
solution developed by the group of a land exchange with the BLM. This exchange was a 
creative response to the need for a multiple-use management approach on the parcel, 
brainstormed locally between a BLM employee living in Steamboat Springs and members of 
the Partnership. The Partnership’s involvement heightened the public education and outreach 
efforts to help increase local awareness and support. 
 
Federal ownership of the land will allow grazing, hunting and wildlife management activities 
and enhance trails and recreation opportunities, all under the oversight of an experienced 
multiple-use land management agency. For the SLB, the exchange also will generate roughly 
$17.2 million, the full value of the parcel, and if it does not, the SLB will reduce the acreage 
to be included in the exchange so the values correspond. This revenue will then be invested 
into higher revenue-generating properties, which will further benefit the trust.  
 
For the community, the future availability of Emerald Mountain for grazing, recreation, and 
wildlife habitat has been ensured. This solution has greatly increased opportunities for the 
general public to access the land, which was previously prohibited. Ben Beall described his 
vision of the parcel’s potential to act as a magnet for local recreation, easing the impact of 
such uses on other undeveloped lands in the area:  
 
You’ll have a central park. Something in the midst of this urban development. 
I believe, if in the West, we could have areas inside of or adjacent to urban 
areas, where people could get out of those areas and feel like they were in the 
West, feel like they are in a rural area, feel like they’re in a park, maybe they 
won’t go out and build and ruin the whole countryside.115 
 




The primary cost cited by all participants was the extraordinary time investment the Emerald 
Mountain Partnership required. While for some, time spent volunteering with the Partnership 
could have been allocated for paid employment, most people observed that personal time was 
expended. Susan Otis, Executive Director of the Yampa Valley Land Trust observed that 
while the Partnership’s work aligned with her organization’s mission, she still had to 
accomplish all of her normal duties and volunteer time to the work of the Partnership: “Most 
individuals have a set job with certain hours, and when you voluntarily expand on that 
position it just cuts into personal time. But still, it’s worth it, this is something I’m very 
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passionate about.”116 Libbie Miller agreed, “For me personally, the biggest issue was the time 
commitment; huge. There also was mental fatigue at times.”117 Libbie Miller also 
acknowledged that some of the extra workload was voluntary.  
 
The management plan was something that I did not necessarily have to do. It 
was something that I felt needed to be done. Extra tasks like this often require 
people willing to accept additional responsibilities. I felt if we didn’t step up 
to get it done, then perhaps it may not get done.118  
 
Jim Stanko’s wife, Jo, went through their old calendars to quantify the amount of his time 
spent in or preparing for meetings on Emerald Mountain, and estimated that Jim had spent 
almost 1500 hours over 12 years. As with so many other participants in this process, the time 
costs for Jim were personal, because volunteer hours “can't come from the time needed to 
ranch, so that time came from family, recreation and relaxation time.”119  
 
For the SLB, the time commitment by Beverly Rave was an expense, but it was probably a 
small investment compared to what would have happened if the SLB had not engaged in the 
collaborative planning process. Charles Bedford outlined how he weighed his decision to 
continue working with the Partnership:  
 
The question is, is it going to be cheaper for you to send Beverly to a meeting 
once a month with community people that she’s going to have to work with 
anyways on issues, and to have that community group come in quarterly or 
every six months and report on their progress. Or is it cheaper to try to cram 
something through, give subdivisions, and try to parcel out the lands. What’s 
the downside to that? And we clearly made the judgment that it was cheaper 
to do the former rather than the latter. It was one of those things where you 
were just going to run into a brick wall a hundred times, and spend a lot of 
energy and time on a lot of these negative outcomes like lawsuits and angry 
letters.120 
 
Financial Costs  
 
Financial costs were easier for some participants to identify than others. From the SLB’s 
perspective, the Emerald Mountain Parcel may have depreciated in value over the last 10 
years, according to Beverly Rave:  
 
I definitely think this property has reached its peak and if anything is going 
down. So right now, my focus is to dispose of this property as quickly as 
possible, with the best scenario that we possibly can. Because if we’re going 
to start losing value … then we’re not doing a very good job for our 
beneficiaries.121  
 
Also, the fact that Cordillera retracted its bid for $17.2 million in 2000 has cost the 




A wide range of costs were borne by the Partnership and its members at different times 
throughout the 12-year process. The Partnership’s five-year planning lease on the Emerald 
Mountain parcel totaled $27,600.122 Other expenses paid by the Partnership included the cost 
of advertising space in The Steamboat Pilot, a consultant to analyze the survey data, the 
appraisal of Emerald Mountain, postal and office expenses and website hosting. The group 
found several creative sources for these funds, including personal donations, fundraisers, 
Routt County and a grant from the Yampa Valley Community Foundation.123  
 
The Stankos spent money working to put a conservation easement on their land, “to show our 
good faith with the SLB.” But they were not able to take full advantage of the federal tax 
credits because their taxable income was not high enough. Losing their lease to the land 
exchange between the SLB and Cressy cost them as well, since they view their investments 
in controlling “white top” (a noxious weed) on the state land as a lost investment. In terms of 
the land exchange, the BLM had no separate budget for its work with the Partnership to set 
up the exchange, and thus staff time came out of their general operating budget. Landowners 
assembled to purchase BLM parcels are paying the costs of the land exchange’s 
environmental assessments and Tim Wohlgenant’s fees. 
 
Public Relations Challenges for Some Organizations  
 
For a state agency like the DOW, appearing to support a controversial land exchange raised 
some criticism from those that opposed the deal, and also put a magnifying glass on those 
agency employees who were involved with the process. Libbie Miller remembered: 
 
We might have taken some hard knocks from the opposition, being perceived 
as a supporter. People wanted to know “How could we possibly be supporting 
this, particularly since losing these lands is going to hurt the economy of our 
local towns through the loss of hunting!” There are probably some people who 
feel a little bit negative about the Division or myself, with our position on the 
exchange.124 
 
While participants remember the DOW receiving criticism for supporting the exchange, they 
also recall DOW under fire for raising concerns about the exchange at one Partnership 
meeting. The process exposed possible conflicts of interests because the DNR houses both 
the DOW, whose mission is to protect wildlife, and the SLB, whose mission is to generate 
revenue. This conflict, along with other land use issues and controversies occurring around 
that time, prompted the DOW to redesign their inter-agency land use commenting 
procedures. 
 
Tim Wohlgenant and the Western Land Group also received public criticism stemming from 
their involvement in the exchange. A 2002 Denver Post article criticized the firm’s use of 
political connections, fees and methods.125 The reporter met with staff of the WLG to discuss 
the Emerald Mountain land exchange, as well as with opponents of the exchange, and, 
according to Wohlgenant, “completely missed the issue of Emerald Mountain and how 
interesting that process is, choosing to focus on our company instead.” Chairman Ben Beall 
also received criticism that he failed to adequately share information.126  
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CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES  
 
State Land Board’s Constraints and Goals 
 
Some of the intricacies of SLB policies were challenging for community members to work 
within. According to Beverly Rave, the SLB cannot legally provide an indirect benefit to 
parties who are not formal beneficiaries: “We can’t damage our beneficiaries by doing 
something in the collaborative process. As long as everyone understands that the solution has 
to be in the best interest of the trust, and agrees on that goal, we’re fine. There is plenty of 
flexibility within that.”127  
 
Another difficult issue to navigate was the revenue requirements for disposing of trust land. 
Beverly Rave recalled that “There were a lot of people over there that were convinced that if 
they just pushed hard enough or waited long enough that the Land Board would just give it to 
them. And we couldn’t do that. And so, changing those expectations or clarifying those 
expectations was tough.”128 However, the specific amount of revenue necessary for a plan to 
be legitimate was never made explicit, because the SLB needed to obtain market value for 
the parcel at the time of the transaction. Without a specific price identified, the Partnership 
and the SLB went back and forth several times with different proposals. Charles Bedford 
remembered: 
 
The Land Board wouldn’t say ‘this is how much we want’, and the 
community wouldn’t say “this is how much we’ve got,” so there was little bit 
of a stalemate for awhile, and they went down some wrong tracks for awhile, 
trying to develop ecotourism and grazing models of production that just 
weren’t really realistic.129  
 
The hierarchical structure of the SLB also frustrated members of the Partnership at times. For 
example, Beverly Rave had to consult the Denver office on issues such as extending the 
MOA.130 Indeed, the mere fact that the SLB owned the land and held the ultimate decision-
making authority was somewhat daunting. Chris Young reflected on this unique challenge of 
dealing with the SLB as, “Knowing that they were in charge. It was their land, and they could 
decide whether they wanted to work with us or not. I was relieved and gratified that they 
were willing, and still are, to hang in there while this thing creeps along.”131  
 
The group addressed this challenge in several ways. One strategy was to maintain a high 
degree of communication between Ben Beall and the Board, with Beall visiting Denver every 
six months or so to update them on the process. These visits helped reinforce the SLB’s 
revenue expectations, and maintained open lines of communication between the eventual 
decision-makers and the Partnership. Also, Beverly Rave made it a point to be clear and 
forthright about the SLB’s requirements. Susan Otis described Rave’s style as, “Beverly 
Rave just gets it out right front and center … She has a job, and she knows what her job 
is.”132 Even when the revenue requirements were ambiguous early on, the SLB and the 
Partnership still maintained a strong mutual respect. As Charles Bedford described, “People 




The Reluctance of Some Members of the Partnership to Consider Development Options 
 
While members of the Core Group, Steering Committee and eventual Partnership generally 
agreed on a common goal of conserving Emerald Mountain, those that were more open to 
development options tended to feel less well-received. One participant in the early-mid 1990s 
was Bob Enever, active in the local real estate scene, who proposed clustered housing on the 
northwest side of the property which was out of site from the town: “I’m not sure everyone 
understood what I was trying to do, where I was coming from. And some that did understand 
just rejected it. Just didn’t think it was a good idea. I think it is just that it smacked of what 
the SLB was trying to do.”134 Interestingly, a few years after Enever’s involvement in the 
Partnership, the group was soliciting conservation buyers similar to those which he had 
proposed. Enever suggested that his ideas perhaps were offered too early in the process and 
the Partnership needed to pursue several other strategies before realizing that conservation 
buyers might be a necessary option. Both the passage of time and failed attempts at other 
strategies seemed to have effectively broadened the range of possible solutions considered by 
the Partnership. 
 
Opposition to Land Exchange  
 
The Partnership’s decision to coordinate a land exchange to protect Emerald Mountain made 
them the target of criticism from land exchange opponents. The fact that a Steamboat 
Springs-based community group was selling off BLM land to create a “playground” in their 
backyard inspired resentment that may not have existed if the BLM had conducted the 
exchange directly with the SLB. Many of these landowners expressed a sense of unfairness 
that they were losing public land. As one BLM representative explained, supporters of the 
exchange felt differently, “The public response was that ‘hey, you’ve had this public land for 
free for a long time and no one could get to it.’”135 One particular member of the opposition 
made more personal accusations, such as calling members of the Partnership “insider traders” 
and accusing Chairman Ben Beall of not sharing information openly. Western Land Group’s 
involvement also was criticized, with accusations that they had failed to properly inform all 
neighboring landowners.136  
 
To deal with such criticisms, the group considered holding private meetings, but chose not 
to.137 Instead, members of the Partnership and Wohlgenant felt they made a good faith effort. 
According to Chris Young, “We did the best we could, but we were working with inaccurate 
or out of date information on peoples’ addresses.”138 Wohlgenant acknowledged the 
importance of the set of land exchange criteria, especially in light of the fact that the BLM is 
not able to auction off public lands: “The Emerald Mountain Partnership’s criteria was an 
important step, but very controversial. It allowed some people to participate in the trade and 
precluded others.” Interestingly, several members of the Partnership as well as 
representatives of the BLM and SLB acknowledged that if they had “free” public lands 
adjoining their own properties, they would have resisted the exchange, as well. “There were a 
lot of people who had the opportunity to get involved who chose not to. They already 
surround [the BLM land], and there’s no incentive to buy them. The only incentive is if there 




Tensions between the City and County  
 
At the heart of the controversy over the land exchange was that Steamboat Springs 
masterminded an outcome benefited the City at the cost of other areas in Routt County. 
Steamboat Springs’ residents were more likely to use Emerald Mountain than citizens of 
Hayden or Oak Creek, 20 miles away. Susan Otis recalled a conversation at a public meeting 
in the neighboring town of Oak Creek:  
 
One individual stated that she was irritated because as she stated, any time 
there’s an issue in Steamboat Springs that needs to be resolved, it’s the “brain 
trust” of Steamboat Springs that comes to the rescue and resolves it. I told her 
she needs to realize that every community has the potential of a “brain 
trust.”139  
 
The BLM’s Dwayne Johnson reports that compared to the strong support for the land 
exchange in Steamboat Springs, only about half the citizens who came to public scoping 
meetings in neighboring Oak Creek and Hayden were in favor of the swap. He summarized 
the latter sentiments as, “‘So, that just gives Steamboat Springs something else. We’re not 
going to go up there and use it anyways, so why should we be for it?’ Most of those people in 
the Oak Creek and Hayden area are snowmobilers, and use 4-wheelers. They’re not going to 
buy a mountain bike and go to Emerald Mountain and ride it.”140 While some vocal 
opposition exists, however, Johnson clarified that they do not represent the majority opinion 
in the County:  
 
A lot of them, I’ve talked to them about the exchange, they don’t have an 
opinion one way or another. They’re not being impacted because they’re not 
the one that’s losing access to BLM right in their backyard, and they’re not 
going to go to EM if it does happen, they use public lands, the large blocks, to 
hunt, or to play on, and Emerald Mountain just doesn’t interest them.141  
 
The controversy over the land exchange highlights the fact that, while the Partnership 
claimed to represent stakeholders in both the City and the County, there were no County 
Commissioners on the Partnership while the exchange was being planned. Ben Beall had not 
run for the position again, and Commissioner Doug Monger, who had been a Board member 
on the Partnership, had resigned from the group to avoid public concern that he might have a 
personal stake in the land exchange. His family owned property adjacent to BLM land that 
was listed as potential for exchange, but was not eventually included due to the high public 
value of the parcel. Ben Beall described the tensions between Steamboat Spring and the rest 
of the county:  
 
Steamboat Springs is the gorilla in Routt County, the outlying areas don’t 
necessarily appreciate everything that Steamboat Springs does, you know, 
they’re jealous, [our] school districts are better, the parks and recreation are 
better, [we’ve] got money, and that is a political problem for us [the 




Ben acknowledged that the opposition to the exchange has a “legitimate complaint,” and that 
it does not help that “if you look at the map, there aren’t many parcels that we’re taking 
around Steamboat Springs, because those parcels have been bought up, purchased, done 
something with them before.”143  
 
Misinformation and Misperceptions of Emerald Mountain and the Stewardship Trust 
 
When elements of either the Emerald Mountain parcel or the land exchange were 
misrepresented, the Partnership had to invest time into educating the public and negotiating 
misunderstandings. Some residents of smaller towns in Routt County were “concerned about 
or had been mislead that the particular parcels provide a significant amount of hunting 
revenue for their community,” Libbie Miller remembered:  
 
When in reality, having spent years on the ground checking hunters, the few 
parcels within the exchange that have public access have limited use and are 
primarily used by locals. Their economic contribution to the community is not 
changing one way or another based on where they hunt. Public access was a 
consideration from our Division perspective when we said we don’t want to 
lose these areas, and indirectly the economic aspect was part of our 
considerations.144 
 
Another example is the common misrepresentation of Emerald Mountain as the “scenic 
backdrop of Steamboat Springs” in literature about the state trust land parcel on the 
mountain. In fact, the state trust land portion of the parcel is not visible from downtown 
Steamboat Springs, or the ski hill. Susan Otis spent a lot of effort challenging this 
misconception, “The community was so confused. They thought Emerald Mountain was 
Howelson Hill. Emerald Mountain is not the scenic backdrop to Steamboat Springs.”145 To 
counter this notion, Otis took a driving tour around the mountain and took photographs from 
all sides, then placed them on a map to show what the views were from different angles, and 
how much of those views actually included state trust land. 
 
A third example of misconceptions that challenged the process was early on, over 
Amendment 16 and the definition of the Stewardship Trust. Jim Stanko recalled the 
confusion over what the Stewardship Trust would do:  
 
Our goal, and that’s what we did as a Core Group, was to get Emerald 
Mountain in the Stewardship Trust. Because we thought, that’d be it! We get 
it in the Stewardship Trust, then they couldn’t sell it, everybody could use it, it 
would become what Amendment 16 was supposed to be about.146  
 
Stanko and some others on the Core Group were disillusioned when the Amendment was not 
interpreted the way proponents had expected. Susan Otis agreed:  
 
The citizens of the state felt the Stewardship Trust was going to set aside some 
of those lands so they would be free from development, or they wouldn’t be 
under pressure of development. But in reality, the SLB interprets it that it only 
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gives communities the opportunity to buy the time to come up with the money 
to resolve potential future sale and development of SLB parcels.147  
 
The SLB’s Beverly Rave did not disagree with these observations: 
 
The general public may have been mislead to some extent about what the 
Stewardship Trust was supposed to be. And I think that had the Judge ruled 
differently on the legal challenges of Amendment 16, the result may have 
been a bit closer to what people thought they were voting for.148 
 
According to Beverly Rave, Judge Babcock's ruling indicated that the Stewardship Trust 
portion of Amendment 16 was not unconstitutional, but the lands could not be free and 
designation did not necessarily mean they were open to the public. His ruling set the stage for 
the SLB to develop their designation process, which included a mechanism to remove 
properties from the Stewardship Trust, meaning they would not be designated in 
perpetuity.149 In response to the confusion and disappointment around the Stewardship Trust, 
the Partnership returned to the drawing board to find an alternative solution. The Amendment 
had authorized the SLB to work closely with local communities, supplying the time and the 
political will for collaborative planning. 
 
Dealing with Federal Bureaucratic Delays 
 
The BLM’s land exchange process is highly complex, and requires a sign-off from the 
Washington D.C. office. When the Little Snake Office sent their draft feasibility report to 
Washington, it took a year and a half to be approved. Part of this was due to the fact that the 
Administration changed mid-way. Dwayne Johnson remembered being at a standstill during 
some of that time, “We were kind of waiting, and waiting, and waiting for Washington to say 
that they wanted us to go with the exchange ….”150 This delay was particularly frustrating for 
members of the Partnership, who were used to conducting their planning activities at a more 
local, hands-on level. Chris Young summarized the groups’ feelings during this time: “we 
were … very disappointed about the length of time that people in Washington took. That was 
unbelievable and inexcusable. But we kept saying, oh well, that’s the federal bureaucracy.”151 
It was not only the delay in Washington that was difficult. In general, Chris Young described 
the “machinations of the BLM” process as “moving, I guess, at a glacial pace. I wish the 
BLM process was less convoluted and felt more local, and less abstract and out there. These 
things are going on and decisions are being made and we’re not getting direct input.”152  
 
FACILITATING FACTORS  
 
Strong Leaders  
 
All members of the Partnership acknowledged that Ben Beall’s leadership and dedication 
helped the Emerald Mountain Partnership achieve its mission. Bob Enever, an early 
participant, summed up Ben’s 12-year persistence: “I give so much credit to Ben. He just 
doesn’t go away.”153 Throughout the planning process, Beall would visit Denver every six to 
eight months to update the SLB on the Partnership’s work, float different proposals and ideas 
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and then head back to the drawing board in Steamboat Springs.154 The DOW’s Libbie Miller 
observed, “I think he’s driven and he didn’t give up, and he’s one of the people that have 
been with this process from its inception.” Commenting on his own involvement, Ben Beall 
remained enthusiastic: “Maybe it’s because of my interest in this project, but I’ve been staff 
and everything else to keep this thing going. I’ve enjoyed it. I’ve had fun doing it, and I think 
it’s a goddamn great project.”155 Strong leadership was important not only at the local level, 
but at the state level as well. Charles Bedford observed that Governor Romer’s commitment 
to the process was a critical factor in its success: “A lot of this has to do with personalities. 
Romer was a classic collaborator personality type.”156 
 
Contractual Agreements between the County and State Land Board 
 
Both the five-year planning lease and the MOA issued by the SLB to the County gave the 
Partnership legitimacy, the incentive to commit themselves to the process and the time to 
consider a range of possible strategies. The MOA was especially powerful, because during 
that agreement the SLB could not consider any other offers for the parcel for the term of the 
agreement. While these opportunities empowered the Partnership, Charles Bedford 
acknowledged that these contractual relationships were a balancing act. “The risk was 
creating expectations that the plan, whatever the plan they came up with, was going to be 
accepted … You have to balance it, because they have to believe that something that they’re 
doing is going to be meaningful, and it’s going to impact the decision-making process.” 
Giving the community the opportunity to develop a plan for trust land also requires a certain 
amount of trust on the part of the SLB: “You have to in your heart believe that what they’re 
going to come up with is going to be something you can work with,” said Charles Bedford.157 
 
Shared Goals and a Common Vision Statement  
 
The collective desire to keep Emerald Mountain free of development and to manage it for 
multiple uses united diverse community stakeholders around a common purpose. Participants 
were proud of the fact that stakeholders who entered the process with such seemingly 
divergent goals were able to develop a mutually agreeable solution to the management of the 
parcel. One factor that seems to have helped the group progress in that direction is the 
exercise of developing a set of common goals for both the Core Group and the Partnership. 
The group determined that overall, they wanted to keep development off of the parcel, and 
allow grazing, wildlife management, hunting and other recreation, all concurrently. This 
agreement on a multiple-use outcome also illustrates that individuals recognized each others’ 
interests in the land and were willing to compromise to develop mutually agreeable goals. 
This process highlighted their mutual aspirations to conserve the land. All participants had in 
common a passion for green spaces in their community, and a powerful sense of place. It 
appears that by agreeing to the goal of multiple-use management, they recognized their 
interdependence and could move forward around a common mission. 
 
Shared Skills and Perspectives 
 
The Core Group, Partnership and Advisory Council provided the opportunity for rich 
discourse between a broad range of perspectives on the future of Emerald Mountain. Some 
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individuals particularly stand out as bringing unique and valuable information or perspectives 
to the group, which would otherwise have been lacking. All participants mentioned Jim 
Stanko, long-time grazing lessee of Emerald Mountain, as having skillfully represented the 
agricultural values of the parcel, and provided a valuable “reality check that we wouldn’t 
have had if you just had your recreationists. The reality of ‘hey, my livelihood depends on 
this property, and if I want to pass on my ranch to future generations and have it be 
economically feasible, then this is the type of stuff that needs to happen.’”158 Libbie Miller 
explained the critical role of Stanko’s perspective in the overall debate over the future 
planning of Steamboat Springs:  
 
Routt County is unique, and Steamboat Springs is unique from the standpoint 
that while we do have tourism and skiing, agriculture is still a really important 
part of the community here. We value that and want to keep that. So, it was 
good to have somebody like Jim in there saying “hey, we can’t let this type of 
stuff go.”159  
 
Other participants also were important to the effectiveness of the process. Susan Otis of the 
Yampa Valley Land Trust provided the group with expertise in land conservation strategies 
as well and networking. Libbie Miller also provided her professional skills in preparing for 
public meetings and took the lead role in writing the management plan. Chris Young’s 
training in psychology helped manage the diverse interests during the more heated meetings 
with Citizens to Save Our Public Lands. Ben Beall, through his experience as County 
Commissioner, provided contacts in city and county governments and the media, general 
expertise in policy process as well as resources such as meeting places in the county court 
house.160 Some members of the Partnership brought logistical skills that kept the day to day 
operations of the Partnership progressing. Lynn Abbot’s administrative skills, combined with 
her willingness to contribute her time, were particularly valuable. Libbie Miller recalled, 
“Lynn would always say, ‘I’m willing to do the mailings. I’m willing to write up a letter … 
you need something, let me know. You need editing, let me know.’ She was really useful.”161  
 
LESSONS LEARNED  
 
1. The Colorado State Land Board’s clear mandate, few regulatory constraints, and 
regional representatives equip them well for engaging in collaborative planning. 
 
Several aspects of the SLB make them easier to work with than many other types of 
agencies, and affords them more flexibility than one might assume. The clarity of the SLB’s 
mission makes them an easier party with whom to negotiate. Susan Otis, Director of the 
Yampa Valley Land Trust, observed this during her work with the agency: “I love the 
directness of the SLB, even though I don’t always agree with their philosophy to dispose of 
their state lands.”162  
 
Not only does the agency have an explicit mission, but they also have fewer constraints in 
engaging in collaborative planning than federal agencies. Charles Bedford observed from his 
time as Director of the SLB that he actually had much more flexibility than federal agencies 
do in choosing to collaborate with local communities: “State governments have so much 
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more flexibility and leeway, even within the fiduciary mandate. I mean, every time you 
convene a group on the federal level, you have to go through the FACA process, which … 
makes for very stiff kind of meetings.” However, Charles Bedford differentiated between the 
regulatory constraints agencies face, and the confining influence of their own cultures and 
institutional structures: “Regulatorily it’s a lot easier on the state level. Culturally and 
institutionally, it’s dependent on the personalities within the Land Boards. They have the 
flexibility, whether they want to use it or not, that’s another question.”163  
 
The SLB’s structure of six regional offices also equips them with on the ground personnel 
that can engage communities and represent the SLB in local planning processes. In the case 
of Emerald Mountain, the SLB hired Beverly Rave early on in the planning process. She had 
significant experience with collaborative planning, which was helpful in managing the 
process at the local level.164 But merely having a local office is not adequate. Local personnel 
need to actively connect with the community to foster collaborative interactions. Beverly 
Rave explained the importance of “talking to people face to face. County Commissioners, 
other people, generally in a public forum … And being visible, being out there, looking at the 
land, doing inspections, just doing my job, really. But before I was there, the State Land 
Board had very little visibility.”165 
 
2. Communicate openly and often with the public about the group’s process and 
progress. 
 
The Partnership also would have benefited from using public relations strategies to share 
even more information with the public about their process, and to generate even broader 
support for their activities. The group received some criticism for not getting Great Outdoor 
Colorado (GOCO) Trust Fund involved (a state granting program funded by the Colorado 
Lottery), however GoCo does not fund the acquisition of STL (because the money would 
merely be shifted from one state agency to another). Chris Young recalled this predicament: 
“We were criticized for not getting GoCo involved … I didn’t know that GoCo wouldn’t 
fund state trust lands, and we should have put it in the paper in big banner headline.”166 The 
group also would have benefited from publicizing the many avenues they tried, to illustrate 
that the BLM Land exchange was the best option. Chris Young thought they could have 
publicized their RFQ and RFP processes more. Wohlgenant agreed that the PR strategy could 
have been improved by generating more visible support for the land exchange early on, both 
in the community and among political leaders. 
 
3. In a long-term collaborative planning process, evaluate each new proposal to 
anticipate and mitigate potential controversies that might hinder acceptance or 
implementation. 
 
In retrospect, some members of the Partnership felt they should have spent more time 
anticipating potential controversies around their work and how to address them. Chris Young 
advised, “anticipate what the opposition will bring,” and Libbie Miller agreed:  
 
You need to do some brainstorming beforehand, particularly about what some 
of the potential pitfalls you are likely to run into. Obviously you can’t think of 
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every one, but develop a list of some things that might come up, and how you 
are going to address them if they do come up.167  
 
She used the example of parties opposed to the exchange coming to Partnership meetings. 
While they did not oppose protecting Emerald Mountain, they disagreed with selling off 
public lands in other towns to achieve this goal. Libbie Miller thought the Partnership was ill-
prepared to work with this conflicting perspective: “In my opinion, as a Partnership we didn’t 
handle that very well. When the opposition started bringing in their concerns, we might have 
done a better job handling these, if we had thought how we were going to address those 
ahead of time.”168  
 
One strategy to alleviate this conflict could have been to include and expand county 
representation on the Partnership as soon as the project broadened to include a land exchange 
with the BLM. Because this exchange process is still underway, the outcome is unknown, 
however there are many channels through which those opposed to the exchange could 
impede or prevent its final passage. Ben Beall forewarned, “Some of these guys are wealthy 
enough, there will probably be a lawsuit, because they didn’t get opportunity to buy land.”169 
McBrayer commented, “If it gets stopped in Washington, it will be political. Someone will 
tell the BLM director this is a bad idea … We have people in the area who can pick up the 
phone and talk to the Secretary of the Interior.” 
 
4. Identify and include all potential stakeholders, and reevaluate if the project scope 
changes to make sure new stakeholders are brought into the fold. 
 
One of the strongest lessons participants in the Emerald Mountain process learned is that as 
the scope of the project grew (from a city conservation effort to a county-wide land 
exchange), it would have been critically helpful to seek out and work with representatives 
from this broader community of stakeholders. Libbie Miller advised future groups to “more 
clearly identify who your stakeholders are, and make sure that you are not farther than you 
think you are in terms of who this could or could not impact. Then actively work to engage 
those people.”170 Chris Young agreed that the Partnership did an inadequate job of 
maintaining a steady representation from county-based interests:  
 
When we got into county and city appointed members, and those members 
selecting other members, the personality of the group changed, and it was very 
disappointing to me. I mean, I have nothing against the individuals, but right 
now, four of the nine members are either current or former city council 
members, and in my mind that does not adequately represent Routt County … 
We don’t have any representation from South Routt. We have no 
representation from West Routt. We’re all from Steamboat.171  
 
Beverly Rave noted that including representatives from all involved stakeholder groups 
improves communication across these groups: “Try to make sure that all the people who have 
an interest in what you’re doing are at the table, so that you’re not having to carry info out of 
that room and trying to pass it on to someone else.”172 Libbie Miller suggested that even if 
individuals are not interested in participating, “Document that you’ve attempted to engage 
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people numerous times. If you can show that they have not shown an interest, or even better, 
support what you’re going for, it may help clear things up down the road.”173 Wohlgenant 
also agreed that once the exchange was proposed, the Partnership no longer represented the 
entire county. However, he wondered if it was the Partnership or the BLM’s responsibility to 
represent those interests, citing that the federal land exchange process is intended to gather 
public input from all stakeholders involved. It is unclear whether they would have selected 
the land exchange as the best option if more groups from the county were represented in the 
Partnership, or would they have chosen a solution that was less controversial in surrounding 
communities. 
 
5. In designing the group’s structure, be aware that hierarchical membership 
categories can breed conflict and may alienate some stakeholders. 
 
One issue that has yet to be resolved within the Partnership was the decision to separate 
lessees and other parties into the Advisory Council because of a perceived conflict of 
interest. While members of both the Board of Directors and Advisory Council are welcome 
to come to meetings to discuss the issues, if the group reaches a point where they need to 
take a vote, only the Board is able to vote. Ben Beall described the two categories of 
membership in the Partnership: “We set that up just so we could have more people involved, 
so we could expand the interest groups … when we discuss around the table, they’re right 
there, saying the same thing. It’s if we ever had to vote … when I say what the yae or 
nay.”174  
 
However, not all participants felt that the distinction between the two groups is innocuous. 
This sentiment is especially true of individuals who were involved with the initial Core 
Group, and then relegated to the Advisory Council, such as Jim Stanko: “You’re told you 
can’t be part of it anymore because you’ve got a conflict of interest, and a person that’s 
trying to get a bicycle trail through the thing is appointed, and they don’t have a conflict of 
interest?” Jim Stanko was not comfortable with the fact that he did not have a vote in group 
decisions: “when it comes down to actually making the decision, or coming up with 
something, you know, I don’t have a say in it.”175 This particular division seems to have had 
somewhat serious consequences in group relationships in recent years. While Ben Beall 
claimed that “I don’t know if we’ve ever had a dissent after our discussion, as far as trying to 
work something out,” Jim Stanko felt differently: “Now it’s the Partnership off doing 
something and the rest of us may or may not know what they are doing, even though I’m 
supposed to be on the Advisory Council.”176 Perhaps the decision to distinguish between the 
two classes of stakeholders was necessary to maintain credibility, as was legally advised; 
however, it is unclear whether that benefit outweighed the cost of losing the participation and 
endorsement of such a critical stakeholder. 
  
6. Individuals with direct interests in the outcome may be more invested in the process,  
thus may endure through other personnel changes. 
 
Several participants in the process differentiated between members of the Partnership who 
directly rely in the Emerald Mountain parcel for their livelihood, and those that merely have 
an interest in using it. Libbie Miller felt directly linked to the outcome: “I was tied to it, as an 
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agency person representing wildlife values that needed to be addressed. And as a landowner 
like Jim Stanko, you’re tied to it because it’s your livelihood and your future.”177 Miller 
observed that there tended to be more turnover in representatives of recreational interests:  
 
It would really be neat to mountain bike up there. It would really be neat to 
cross country ski up there. However, when it’s all said and done, it’s likely 
going to matter less one way or the other. We had a lot of people that would 
get really involved for a year or two and drive really hard, but would end up 
getting burnt out. It’s difficult to maintain that enthusiasm through all the 
momentum plateaus in this type of process.178 
 
Implied in this statement is that those with more direct interests in the outcome are more 
likely to persevere in the process.  
 
Other participants observed a similar division within the group. Jim Stanko reflected, “To 
really make it successful, you’ve got to involve the people who really have a passion for it or 
the heart, or want to do it. And, when you started getting the people that had an agenda, 
you’re in trouble.” In his view, those with the “passion” were those that have a direct interest 
in finding an outcome that includes their own interest, but is livable for others as well. 
Unfortunately, in Jim Stanko’s opinion, such individuals: 
 
… in a lot of cases don’t have the time, they’ve got to make a living. And the 
people who have the agenda are the people who are the trust fund babies and 
the people who can sit around for four to five hours a day with nothing better 
to do than to.  
 
Stanko perceived, in particular that some of the individuals representing recreational interests 
did not seek a holistic solution to the user conflicts on Emerald Mountain:  
 
Like the bicycle people, that’s all they want. Or the recreation people … they 
don’t care how it’s managed … everything else can go to an oblivion. All they 
can see is this bicycle trail and them riding on it. And they lose all sight of, 
you know, who’s going to patrol, how are you going to miss the cattle. You 
know, even the wildlife was a main thing; you can’t get them to talk hunting 
season. What are you going to do in hunting season?179  
 
7. Using a neutral spokesperson could help mitigate controversy and divert public 
scrutiny of process leaders. 
 
Some participants thought the Partnership could have been more effective dealing with the 
controversy around the land exchange if they had chosen spokesperson who appeared more 
neutral, and who had strong mediation skills, instead of having Ben Beall act as both 
Chairman and spokesperson. This could have helped the opposition feel more listened to. 
Libbie Miller remembered, “I think sometimes that was their concern. They felt that they 
were never listened to.”180 While Beall was the fundamental driver of the collaborative 
process, that fact alone may have made him a target for those opposed to the land exchange. 
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Chris Young recalled this dynamic with some regret: “Ben has been a wonderful leader, but 
regrettably been the lightening rod. I wish some of the rest of us could have shared the grief. 
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ountain vistas and the ecologically-diverse and beautiful Sonoran Desert surround the 
City of Tucson in southeastern Arizona. Like many popular Western cities, Tucson is 
experiencing significant growth as more and more people make their home there. As 
Tucson’s pattern of growth trends from northwest to southeast, a large section of 
undeveloped land on the southeastern edge of the city known as the Houghton Road area is 
projected to become the focus of future development. The Arizona State Land Department 
(ASLD), the agency responsible for managing Arizona’s state trust land, owns the majority 
of the land in this area.  
 
Traditionally Tucson has grown by annexing small pieces of land from surrounding Pima 
County that the county already has developed or planned. This method has not allowed for 
comprehensive or planned growth in Tucson and has resulted in development that is not well-
connected. However, the Houghton Road area, which was annexed into the city between the 
1970s and the 1990s, is a large section of mostly undeveloped land. The City of Tucson 
decided to take the opportunity to develop a comprehensive growth strategy for the area as 
part of a larger sustainable growth initiative. The product of this effort was the Houghton 
Area Master Plan (HAMP), which serves as a framework to guide development in the area 
based on the Desert Village model. The Desert Village model is a style of development that 
promotes mixed-use land use patterns, a range of housing types and prices, transportation 
options that encourage walking, biking and mass transit and development that is sensitive to 
the desert’s natural features.1 
 
In 2003, the city initiated a collaborative planning process for the development of the HAMP 
by creating a Citizens Review Committee (CRC). The CRC was comprised of citizen 
representatives of neighborhood groups surrounding the Houghton Road area, as well as a 
number of local people with professional land use planning and development backgrounds. A 
planner from the ASLD attended the CRC meetings and served as a resource on ASLD-
related issues that arose during the process, although he was not an official member of the 
CRC. 
 
The HAMP was completed in 2005 and unanimously adopted by the Tucson Mayor and City 
Council the same year. Despite this citywide approval, the future of the HAMP remains 
uncertain and only time will tell how effective this planning document will be as the ASLD, 
the largest landowner in the area, begins disposing of property in the area. To achieve the 
goals of the Desert Village model put forward in the HAMP, the city has encouraged the 
ASLD to sell parcels of no less than 500 acres in the area covered by the HAMP, and to push 
the purchasers of these parcels to develop a master plan for each parcel before selling off 
smaller pieces for development.2 
 
The HAMP development process raises some interesting issues and offers some valuable 
lessons about the collaborative planning process, including the importance of having a well-
planned and prepared-for process and the important role momentum and consistency can 
play. It also reveals some of the nuances of collaborating with a state trust land management 





CONTEXT FOR COLLABORATION 
 
In assessing the development of the Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP) it is important to 
first understand the historical, political and legal context in which the process took place.   
 
ARIZONA’S LAND GRANT 
 
The federal government granted Arizona sections two, 16, 32 and 36 in every township at 
statehood to be managed “for the support of the common schools.”3 Arizona has retained a 
significant amount of the 10.8 million acres originally ceded to it and the Arizona State Land 
Department (ASLD) currently manages 9.2 million acres of trust land throughout the state.4  
 
Some of Arizona’s state trust 
land is scattered in a 
checkerboard pattern across the 
state, but the majority of it is in 
larger, contiguous parcels 
(Figure 7-1). The reason for this 
distribution is that by the time 
Arizona became a state, some 
of the sections it was granted 
already were being used by the 
federal government for other 
purposes. Arizona was allowed 
to choose other sections of land 
in lieu of the original sections to 
make up the difference.5 In 
many cases the state chose 
contiguous in lieu sections that 
helped consolidate their 
holdings and provide for more 
efficient management of the 
land.  
 
While the majority of Arizona’s 
state trust land is in rural areas 
of the state and is primarily 
leased for grazing, the ASLD’s 
most lucrative activities 
involve their urban land 
holdings.6 As a result, the 
ASLD focuses many of its 
resources on the lease and sale 
of these parcels. The state trust 
Figure 7-1: State Trust Land in Arizona 
 
Source: “Arizona Trust Lands,” Trust Land: A Land Legacy for the 
American West, The Sonoran Institute & Lincoln Institute of Land, 
available at http://www.trustlands.org. 
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land in the area addressed by the HAMP is one such large, contiguous parcel of urban land 
with high development potential. 
 
THE NEW MEXICO-ARIZONA ENABLING ACT AND ARIZONA CONSTITUTION 
 
The New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act was passed in 1910, and as the name suggests, 
contained provisions for both the territories of New Mexico and Arizona. In 1912, the two 
territories were admitted to the Union as separate states. Because the New Mexico-Arizona 
Enabling Act was the last of such legislation in the continental United States, it is the most 
restrictive with regard to the management of state trust land.7 This Enabling Act is the only 
federal legislation to specifically require that the land granted to the states at statehood be 
held “in trust,” which has heightened the Arizona State Land Department’s (ASLD) sense of 
its fiduciary duty in the management of Arizona’s state trust land.8 The stringency with 
which the ASLD approaches this responsibility was apparent during the development of the 
Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP) and is one of the elements explored later. 
 
The Act also outlines specific parameters about the disposition and management of state trust 
land, including the requirement that the land only be sold or leased “to the highest and best 
bidder at a public auction” for no less than its appraised value. 9 This requirement has a 
significant effect on current land management and transactions. While this provision ensures 
that the ASLD maximizes the revenue for the trust beneficiaries from any transaction, it also 
limits the flexibility the ASLD has to conduct these activities. For example, the ASLD is not 
allowed to act as a private landowner might and negotiate the terms of a sale or lease with a 
potential buyer privately.  
 
The Arizona Constitution contains many of the same guidelines and restrictions for the use 
and management of state trust land as the Enabling Act, including that the land be held in 
trust and that it only be sold or leased at public auction to the highest bidder.10  
 
LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ARIZONA’S TRUST RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Over the years, Arizona’s trust responsibility has been interpreted by state and federal courts 
to impose a restrictive trust responsibility.11 Through these interpretations the courts have 
confirmed that: all state trust land sales have to take place at public auction, even if the 
purchaser is a city; the Arizona State Land Department (ASLD) is prohibited from engaging 
in land exchanges; and the ASLD must be compensated for the full appraised value of any 
right-of-ways it grants on state trust land.12 Arizona’s strict trust management mandate and 
these legal interpretations of it preclude the ASLD from interacting with other state agencies 
and municipalities in the more accommodating manner that is often afforded state agencies.  
 
TRUST LAND MANAGEMENT IN ARIZONA 
 
The Arizona State Land Department (ASLD) was established in 1915 to manage Arizona’s 
state trust land and maximize revenue generation for the Trust’s beneficiaries.13 A 
gubernatorially-appointed State Land Commissioner manages the Department. The ASLD is 
divided into six divisions, which include Administration and Resource Analysis; Land 
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Information, Title, and Transfer; Real Estate; Southern Arizona Real Estate Division; Natural 
Resources; and Forestry Management.14 In addition, the department has a five-member 
Board of Appeals, which is responsible for approving land sales and commercial leases, and 
hearing appeals of the Commissioner’s classification and appraisal decisions. 15 The 
Governor appoints Board members for six-year terms. Three board members are appointed to 
represent the 15 counties in Arizona, which are divided into three districts of five counties 
each, and two members are appointed at large.16 No more than three members can be of the 
same political party and each must have a background in real estate classification and 
appraisal.17 
 
The ASLD’s current mission is: 
 
To manage State Trust lands and resources to enhance value and optimize 
economic return for the Trust beneficiaries, consistent with sound 
stewardship, conservation, and business management principles supporting 
socioeconomic goals for citizens here today and generations to come. To 
manage and provide support for resource conservation programs for the well 
being of the public and the State's natural environment.18 
 
A SHIFT IN FOCUS TO URBAN LAND USE ISSUES 
 
Most of Arizona’s state trust land is leased for grazing, but the Arizona State Land 
Department (ASLD) currently manages more than one million acres of state trust land that is 
adjacent to or within rapidly growing urban areas of the state.19 The lease and sale of the 
ASLD’s urban lands currently generates the most revenue for the trust. According to 
Commissioner Winkleman, “We don’t have oil and gas, so the revenues that we generate are 
from disposing of our real estate in these expanding urban areas that have grown out into our 
properties.”20 In the past, most of the ASLD’s urban land transactions have been focused in 
and around Phoenix. However, as that state trust land continues to be sold and leased, the 
ASLD has begun to focus some of its attention on its state trust land holdings around Tucson. 
This change was reflected in the ASLD’s involvement in the issues surrounding the 
development of the Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP).  
 
The state of Arizona has recently experienced a population increase that far exceeds the 
national growth average for the United States.21 This increase in population has meant, 
among other things, an increase in the size and number of the state’s urban areas. In many 
cases, this expansion has meant that the demand to develop state trust land in and around 
these urban areas has increased. This demand, combined with the large amounts of revenue 
the ASLD can earn from urban land transactions has helped shift the ASLD’s role and focus 
as a land management agency from one that deals primarily with traditional land use 
management issues like grazing to an agency involved in urban growth issues like real estate 
disposition and land use planning. Also instrumental are three important pieces of legislation 




• The Urban Lands Act 
The Urban Lands Act, passed in 1981, allows the Commissioner, either on his or her 
own initiative or at the request of the governing body of a city, town or county, to 
designate certain parcels of state trust land as urban lands suitable for urban planning 
or conservation purposes if the land is to be planned in conjunction with land that is 
to be developed.22 The Act is the first legislative indication of the shift of the ASLD’s 
primary focus away from natural resource management to real estate and urban 
development issues, and allows the ASLD to capitalize on the increase in revenue that 
planning adds to state trust land appropriate for development. 23 
 
• Growing Smarter and Growing Smarter Plus Legislation 
 
In 1998 and 2000, the Arizona Legislature passed the Growing Smarter and Growing 
Smarter Plus Legislation, respectively, which were intended to strengthen land use 
planning activities throughout the state. The legislation requires, among other things, 
that the ASLD prepare and periodically update conceptual plans for state trust land 
located in urban areas of the state and create five-year disposition plans. The purpose 
of the conceptual plan is to portray the ASLD’s long-term land use goals for the 
area.24 The ASLD also is required to work with local municipalities to integrate their 
conceptual plans with the general plan of the city, town or county in which the land is 
located.25 In addition, local communities are required to identify potential growth 
areas and develop strategies to ensure that the growth is planned so that it can provide 
for its share of the public facilities that will be necessary to serve it, including the 
development of master planned communities.26 The City of Tucson’s General Plan 
identifies the Houghton Road area as one of the city’s areas of potential growth.27 
 
The Urban Land Planning Oversight Committee, consisting of five members 
appointed by the Governor for staggered, four year terms, was established to make 
recommendations to the ASLD on the creation of these conceptual plans, give advice 
on the kinds of studies that are necessary to create the conceptual plans, and review 
and make recommendations for approval of the conceptual plans and five year 
disposition plans.28 
 
• The Arizona Preserve Initiative 
 
The Arizona Preserve Initiative (API), passed in 1996, and revised in 1997, 1998 and 
1999, is intended to encourage the preservation of certain parcels of state trust land as 
open space in and around urban areas.29 The API allows the Commissioner to sell, or 
lease for up to fifty years, state trust land in urban areas for conservation purposes and 
describes the processes that must be followed to do so.30 Consistent with the Enabling 
Act, these sales or leases must be done at public auction and based on a fair market 
value appraisal of their worth. The API also establishes a Conservation Advisory 
Committee whose role is to help evaluate and prioritize applications for land to be 
considered for conservation and making recommendations to the Commissioner.31 
Members of this five-member Committee, three of whom are appointed by the 
 
 189
Governor and two of whom are appointed by the Commissioner, serve staggered five-
year terms and must have a background in natural and historical conservation 
issues.32 
 
In addition, Governor Napolitano appointed Mark Winkleman to head the ASLD as 
Commissioner in January 2003. Commissioner Winkleman has applied his previous 
professional experience in real estate to his management of the agency and has been credited 
with helping increase the ASLD’s revenues to historic levels through urban land 
dispositions.33 
 
CURRENT ARIZONA POLITICS AND THE ARIZONA STATE LAND DEPARTMENT  
 
Arizona, in general, is a politically conservative state. However, although the governor 
appoints the Arizona State Land Department’s (ASLD) Commissioner and the agency relies 
on the State Legislature to appropriate its funding, the agency is less affected by the more 
direct sorts of political influence than it would be if the Commissioner were an elected 
official. This, combined with the fact that the ASLD has experienced a substantial increase in 
revenue generation under the current Commissioner, has meant that the agency has been able 
to operate relatively autonomously.  
 
As the state capital as well as the biggest urban area in the state, Phoenix is where most of the 
political power is concentrated and where the ASLD has its headquarters. Historically, the 
majority of the ASLD’s urban land development resources focused in and around Phoenix 
where development is primarily welcomed and encouraged. In contrast, Tucson is known as 
a more liberal city where there is less agreement on issues related to development and 
growth. While some in Tucson see development as a necessary element in attracting new 
residents and sustaining the city’s economic vitality, others are more resistant to the idea.34 
The city’s desire to address these kinds of questions by managing and planning for its growth 
was the main reason for creating the Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP).  
 
Historically, there has been some tension between the City of Tucson and Pima County, in 
which it is located. The reason for this tension is that Pima County is the only county in 
Arizona that has a substantial urban population living in an unincorporated area (only slightly 
more than half of the population of the Tucson metro area lives within city limits, the rest 
live in Pima County). This situation forces the county to provide urban services, a task it is 
not really equipped to do.35 This tension over provision of services has led to conflict 
between the two entities in the past. However, some of this tension was relieved as the two 
entities interacted during the development of the HAMP.  
 
After the passage of the Urban Lands Act in 1981, the ASLD’s relationship with other 
agencies and municipalities began to change. Instead of being perceived as a public land 
agency like the U.S. Forest Service or the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, the ASLD 
began to be seen as a real estate focused agency.36  
 
This new, more development-centric focus, and the enforcement of the ASLD’s specific 
mandate to generate revenue has caused and continues to cause tension between the ASLD 
 
 190
and other agencies, municipalities and in some cases organized interest groups who either do 
not understand the ASLD’s unique mandate or construe it in ways that differ from the ASLD 
interpretation.37 The different interpretations of the ASLD’s mandate are seeing it as a guide 
for what the ASLD cannot do versus exploring how new or different land management and 
development ideas might compliment the ASLD’s mandate.38 Both points of view exist to 
some extent, within and outside of the ASLD. This debate manifested itself during the 
development of the HAMP, not as differences of opinion over whether or not the area should 
be developed, but instead as the details of what form the development should take. 
 
Historically, as a state agency, the ASLD has had super zoning power over local 
municipalities and technically did not have to cooperate with them in terms of zoning. In the 
past, this authority was a point of contention between the ASLD and Arizona localities. 
However, the Growing Smarter and Growing Smarter Plus legislation requires that before 
adopting a conceptual land use plan for state trust land, the ASLD Commissioner must 
consult with the local municipality in which the land is located on integrating the conceptual 
plan into the general land use plan of the municipality.39 Likewise, the legislation directs 
municipalities to work with the ASLD in coordinating the production of their general plans 
with the creation of the ASLD’s conceptual plans.40 
 
Commissioner Winkleman has recognized that sales suffer because of the uncertainty created 
by this lack of past cooperation and has begun working with municipalities to make sure the 
ASLD and the municipality share a common vision for the property before it is put on the 
market.41 As demonstrated during the development of the HAMP, others at the ASLD also 
recognize the potential importance and attendant benefits of working together with a locality 
during the planning phase of a development endeavor.  
 
TRADITIONAL METHODS OF STATE TRUST LAND MANAGEMENT IN ARIZONA 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Arizona State Land Department (ASLD) historically has focused 
on natural resource management, although recently it has shifted its primary focus to urban 
land management and planning issues. The ASLD often works together with local 
communities and jurisdictions on state trust land management issues, by either serving as a 
resource for the community or planning group, or soliciting public comment and holding 
public hearings.42 The former role was exemplified during the Houghton Area Master Plan 
(HAMP) process; an ASLD representative attended the Citizens Review Committee, 
participating as a resource person in an advisory capacity.43 It is difficult to make a general 
statement about how the ASLD interacts with local jurisdictions because it varies across the 
state, but from the ASLD’s perspective, the more a city is interested in growth and interested 
in planning, then the more cooperative the relationship will be.44 
 
Traditionally, the City of Tucson has grown by annexing land that has already been planned 
or developed by Pima County.45 The opportunity to develop a plan for an undeveloped area 
as large as the one covered by the HAMP thus was a new experience for the city.46 While 
Tucson was inexperienced with such large-scale planning, it had been involved with citizen-
based groups in the past. However, prior to the HAMP process, the city never had initiated a 
citizens process that addressed land use planning issues for such a large area.47 This 
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Figure 7-2: Houghton Area Master Plan Boundary
 
Note:  The blue denotes the city of Tucson and the 
yellow line outlines the HAMP boundary. 
Source: Houghton Area Master Plan, Tucson  
Department of Urban Planning and Design, 
http://www.tucsonaz.gov/planning/plans/all/hamp.pdf. 
inexperience had some interesting repercussions for the development of the HAMP that are 
discussed in depth later. 
 
 
THE STORY: THE HOUGHTON AREA MASTER PLAN PROCESS 
 
Set in the ecologically unique and beautiful Sonoran desert, and surrounded by four arresting 
mountain ranges, Tucson has been inhabited for thousands of years. Traditionally a center for 
farming, mining and ranching, and now a popular location with tourists, retirees, outdoor 
enthusiasts and professionals alike, Tucson is the second largest city in Arizona.48 Drawn by 
its natural and cultural attractions and economic and academic opportunities, an increasing 
number of people are calling Tucson home.49  
 
As it grows, the City of Tucson is interested in protecting its character and expanding in a 
sustainable way. The city hopes to accomplish this goal by focusing on growing “smarter” in 
new areas of development through urban planning efforts, by taking advantage of 
opportunities to redevelop the downtown area and by improving existing services and 
infrastructure.50 The Houghton Road area is on the “evolving edge” of the southeast side of 
Tucson, an area where the majority of new growth in the city is predicted to take place.51  
 
In an effort to direct how this growth will occur 
in a way that is consistent with their 
development goals, the city decided to create a 
Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP). The 
HAMP addresses an area of approximately 
10,800 acres of land that, while within city 
limits, is still about twenty miles from 
downtown Tucson.52 The area is bounded by the 
city’s corporate boundary to the east and south, 
Irvington Road to the north and extends about 
one mile west of Houghton Road, which runs 
directly north south through the area.53 (Figure 
7-2) The Rincon Mountains rise to the east in 
the Saguaro National Park and the saguaro and 
cholla cactuses and ironwood trees of the 
Sonoran desert stretch out to the east and south 
(Figure 7-3).  
 
There are currently three subdivisions in the 
area, but the majority of the land is 
undeveloped. While two of the subdivisions 
resemble typical suburban development, one of 
them, Civano, stands out. Civano was developed in the late 1990s using the tenets of New 
Urbanism, which include creating communities that contain mixed-use areas and a range of 
housing types and prices, are walkable and denser than typical subdivisions and are 
environmentally sustainable in their use of energy.54 Civano is considered a mixed success 
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depending on from which 
perspective it is approached. 
On the one hand, it has had 
significant financial struggles 
in the past, which makes some 
developers wary of the market 
readiness of that kind of 
development in the Houghton 
Road area. On the other hand, 
however, Civano embodies the 
type of growth that many 
espouse and is home to many 
happy residents.55 Finding a 
balance between using smart 
growth development strategies 
for the area and ensuring that 
the new development is 
financially viable and lucrative 
is one of the biggest tasks 
facing those involved in the development of the Houghton Road, namely the city and the 
Arizona State Land Department (ASLD).  
 
The ASLD owns 76 percent (7,742 acres) of the area covered by the HAMP, all of which is 
undeveloped and currently not adequately served by public facilities.56 The rest of the land is 
either owned privately or by the City of Tucson or by Pima County.57 As the major 
landowner in the area, the ASLD’s land disposition decisions will have a significant effect on 
how the land will be developed, and subsequently how that part of Tucson will take shape. 
Both the ASLD and the city have an interest and a stake in how the Houghton Road area is 
developed and the HAMP planning process was one step in the process of bringing them 
together.  
 
PRECURSORS TO THE HOUGHTON AREA MASTER PLAN 
 
The passage of the Growing Smarter and Growing Smarter Plus legislation in 1998 and 2000, 
respectively, had a big effect on the planning efforts of the ASLD and Arizona towns and 
counties. The new legislation required the ASLD to develop and integrate conceptual plans 
for state trust land in and around urban areas of the state with city and county plans for the 
same areas. The ASLD uses conceptual plans to assess the allocation of land uses on a 
particular parcel and determine if it is being used in a way that is most financially beneficial 
to the trust.58 One of the requirements of the City of Tucson, like all cities, through the 
legislation was to identify potential areas of growth at its edges and ensure that development 
in these areas was planned. The purpose of requiring the ASLD and local jurisdictions to 
integrate their conceptual plans was to ensure that growth occurred in a coordinated way. 
 
 In 1999, the ASLD, as part of its compliance with the new law, awarded a land use planning 
contract to Houghton Road Plan Associates to create a conceptual plan for 7,742 acres of 
Source: Photograph by Alden Boetsch 




state trust land in the Houghton Road area of southeast Tucson.59 Houghton Road Plan 
Associates was a consortium of area planning, development, engineering and conservation 
professionals, as well as representatives from the City of Tucson.60 Within a few months, the 
group submitted a plan to the ASLD, although the plan was later modified by the ASLD to 
include higher density development and less open space. 61  
 
Using information in the conceptual plan to inform its decision, the ASLD held an auction 
for a 1,071-acre parcel of state trust land in the Houghton Road area in 2002. Vistoso 
Partners, a Phoenix-based development company, was the successful bidder and bought the 
parcel for $29.1 million.62 However, they later defaulted after failing to pay the additional 
money due within 30 days of the auction.63 Vistoso Partners sued to have the auction 
rescinded, claiming it had been misled about what lands were included in the auction.64 The 
suit was settled, with Vistoso Partners forfeiting most of the money it paid at auction.65 
Although no land ultimately was sold as a result of this auction, it still crystallized for the 
city the fact that development in the area was imminent, and helped catalyze the Houghton 
Area Master Plan (HAMP) development process.66 
 
Also, in accordance with the new law the City of Tucson in 2001 amended its General Plan 
to identify areas of potential growth and strategies to plan for that growth in ways that 
ensured that it would be able to pay for an equitable share of the additional services required. 
These amendments to the General Plan, the document at the top of the plan hierarchy, created 
some inconsistencies with the two existing area plans – documents on the next lower level in 
the plan hierarchy – for the Houghton Road area.67 Instead of amending the two area plans, 
the city began to consider developing a single new plan for the area, an idea that would later 
be manifested as the HAMP.68 
 
In addition to these activities by the city and the ASLD, city Councilperson Shirley Scott, 
who represents Ward Four where the majority of the Houghton Road area is located, also 
began to get involved in planning efforts for the area. In September 2002, she convened the 
Southeast Planning and Coordinating Committee (SPCC). The SPCC was made up of 
planning and development professionals, neighborhood representatives, architects, members 
of the education community, representatives of the nearby Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, 
area business people, religious organizations in the area, local politicians and various other 
interested parties.69 The group was tasked with addressing planning issues in the area.70 The 
group met regularly for almost two years to study the area and to get a sense of what 
residents and area land and business owners envisioned in terms of future development.71 
 
The ASLD’s activities in the Houghton Road area, as well as the city’s own sense that it was 
time to start actively planning for growth in the area, led to the formal commencement of the 
Houghton Area Master Plan development process.  
 
THE CITY OF TUCSON CONVENES THE CITIZENS REVIEW COMMITTEE 
 
Tucson’s Department of Urban Planning and Design began work on the Houghton Area 
Master Plan (HAMP) in early 2003. As part of this process they decided to include a public 
participation element in the form of the Citizens Review Committee (CRC). The city’s 
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decision to create a citizens committee was reflective of both its general management 
philosophy and the way it perceived the community expected to be engaged on civic issues.72 
The city saw the CRC as a way to receive feedback on the HAMP from a variety of local 
interests and perspectives.73 The city’s expectations for the CRC were that its members 
would review and provide input on the policies, concepts and other components of the 
HAMP as they were developed.74  
 
As the major landowner in the area, the Arizona State Land Department (ASLD) also was 
asked to participate on the CRC, an offer that they accepted in an advisory capacity. Greg 
Keller, a project manager in the ASLD’s Real Estate Planning Division in Phoenix, attended 
the majority of CRC meetings on behalf of the ASLD. Keller served as a resource for the 
CRC on issues relating to state trust land management, but was not an official member of the 
group. The ASLD prefers being involved in community planning groups in an advisory 
capacity to maintain a greater amount of flexibility in their final decision making about how 
to manage their land assets.75 
 
Prior to the creation of the CRC, city council member Scott asked the city to assume the role 
of managing the SPCC because it was becoming too difficult for her office to manage.76 The 
city did not fulfill Scott’s request, instead deciding that it would be better politically if a new 
committee was created.77 The Mayor and Council decided that membership in the group 
should include representatives of registered Neighborhood Associations, appointees from city 
Wards made by city council members and individuals and professionals from a broad range 
of interests applicable to the development of the HAMP.78 Using these recommendations, the 
city’s Department of Urban Planning and Design’s project leader for HAMP, Roger 
Schneider, then extended invitations to a large number of potential members to join the 
CRC.79 While quite a large group, many participants thought that the appropriate range of 
interests was represented (Table 7-1).80  
 
The city’s Department of Urban Planning and Design’s project leader for HAMP, at first 
Roger Schneider and then later Michael Wyneken, was in charge of preparing materials and 
running the meetings, while professional facilitator Freda Johnson was hired by the city to 
facilitate CRC meetings for the first year.81 Officials at the Department of Urban Planning 
and Design thought that it would be beneficial to have an outside facilitator because of the 
large size of the group and because the city had never run a citizens input process for a 
project of the magnitude of the HAMP process.82 While Johnson kept meetings running on 
time, some CRC members commented that this adherence to process sometimes came at the 
expense of creative discussion.83 Professional planner and CRC member Linda Morales 
summed up her impression in this way: “Freda ran an amazingly structured meeting. She 
made sure you stayed on topic and you got out on time, which everybody loves. She didn’t 
allow anyone to dominate, but in a way this stifled some of the creative process.”84 
 
Johnson’s one-year contract was renewed around the time that the CRC went on hiatus until 
there was a complete HAMP draft on which to comment.85 By the time the group 
reconvened, however, Michael Wyneken, the city’s project leader for the HAMP, decided the 
group could effectively proceed without an outside facilitator and assumed the facilitation 




The city also created a Technical Advisory Team (TAT), to advise them on the creation of 
the HAMP. The TAT was made up of representatives from the City of Tucson, Pima County, 
the Arizona State Transportation and Land Departments, Vail School District and private 
utility companies. The group was tasked with addressing the technical aspects of providing 
services for any future development in the HAMP area.87 The TAT, as the name suggests, 
was more technical in nature and did not contain the citizen element of the CRC. The two 
committees served different purposes for the city and worked relatively independently of one 
another, although information about what each group was working on was shared 
intermittently between the two.  
 
Table 7-1: Houghton Area Master Plan Citizens Review Committee Members 
 
Affiliation Name 
Diamond Ventures Ken Abrahams 
Sonoran Institute Suzanne Bott 
Community Technical Assistance Center Dale Calvert 
Saguaro National Park Sarah Craighead 
American Institute of Architects Brent Davis 
Resident Sheila Enos 
Bear Canyon Neighborhood Association Margaret Fowler 
School of Landscape Architecture, University of Arizona Mark Frederickson 
Vail School District Margie Hildebrand 
Washington Mutual Sandie Jacobson 
Esmond Station Historical Interests Bill Kalt 
Transportation and Infrastructure Planning Curtis Lueck 
McGraw’s Restaurant Lex McGraw 
Commercial Federal Bank Carl Maass 
South Harrison Neighborhood Association John Macko 
Pima College East Suzanne Miles, Ph.D. 
The Planning Center Linda Morales 
Coyote Corridor Neighborhood Association Peggy Nolty 
Development Center for Appropriate Technology Tony Novelli 
Civano Housing and School Design Cathy Rex 
Eastside Neighborhood Association Frank Salbego 
Ray Schneider Company (real estate) Ray Schneider 
Bicycle Community Roy Schoonover 
Pantano Stables James Shinn 
Pantano Stables Betty Shinn 
Civano Neighborhood Association Jeff Simms 
Architect, SPCC member Phil Swaim 
Rita Ranch Neighborhood Association Michael Tone 
Rincon Institute Michelle Zimmerman 





The first CRC meeting was held in March 2003. The original schedule for the group included 
a monthly meeting for one year, after which the HAMP would be submitted to the Tucson 
Mayor and City Council for approval in April 2004.88 This schedule was later revised 
because of delays in the plan development process and the HAMP was eventually approved 
in June of 2005.  
 
During the first CRC meeting, participants introduced themselves and identified the group or 
interest they represented. Then, led by the facilitator Freda Johnson, CRC members 
developed a set of ground rules to guide the meetings:89 
 
• Stay on point 
• Start and end meetings on time 
• No one person should monopolize the meeting 
• There will be a “parking lot”, or list of questions and requests for information from 
city staff to be answered in writing by city staff at future meetings 
• Be nice and play fair 
• No side conversations  
• Meeting participants will put $1.00 in a communal pot if their cell phone or beeper 
goes off during meetings 
• Add new rules as needed 
 
In response to questions from CRC members during this first meeting, the city later clarified 
for the group that decisions generally would be made by consensus, but that some voting 
would occur on specific proposals and anyone wishing to make a minority statement on a 
vote was welcome to do so.90 
 
Also at the first meeting, Roger Schneider, HAMP project leader for the city, presented 
background information on the area covered by the HAMP and the themes of the plan 
development project and described the advisory role the CRC would take in the process.91  
 
Linda Morales, a professional planner and CRC member, commented that the first meeting 
was a bit of a surprise for some members: “I think everybody was a little taken aback when 
we started because it was a huge committee first of all, and we went to the very first meeting 
and they started presenting plans and it felt like we were there just to kind of rubber stamp.”92 
Frustrations continued at different points throughout the plan development process because 
of differing perceptions and expectations of the role of the CRC members.  
 
The CRC met monthly for the next two years, with the exception of a few interruptions. 
During these interruptions the city gathered and assessed data on the area, and during one 
six-month period the city finished writing the full draft of the HAMP.93 These interruptions 
were frustrating for CRC members and city staff, alike, and many commented that they 
caused the group to lose momentum and connection to the plan development process.94  
 
For the most part, meetings consisted of a brief review of the previous meeting, a 
presentation to the group on some element of the plan development process or other relevant 
information by city staff, outside consultants or experts and, on at least two occasions, CRC 
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members themselves and a discussion period. During one meeting, CRC members worked in 
small groups to brainstorm a list of issues and concerns they had about future development in 
the HAMP and identify important topics they would like discussed in future meetings.95 
Also, in an effort to provide an opportunity for a shared experience and to make sure 
everyone on the CRC had a good sense of the area they were discussing, the city organized a 
field trip to the Houghton Road area in April 2003.96 
 
THE CITIZENS REVIEW COMMITTEE PROCESS FALTERS 
 
Although the CRC’s involvement in the development of the HAMP was at first envisioned as 
an engaging experience, some elements of the process began to fray. Between a change in the 
city’s HAMP project leader, delays, a lack of data on the area being planned and frustration 
and confusion over the roles of the CRC, the city and ASLD, attendance at CRC meetings 
dwindled and many members stopped participating.97  
 
A few months after the CRC began meeting, the city’s Department of Urban Planning and 
Design’s original HAMP project leader, Roger Schneider, retired. Michael Wyneken, another 
planner in the department, was assigned the task of managing the process.98 As Wyneken 
jokingly told it, “I personally got involved because everybody who was working on the plan 
left and it got dumped on me while I was out of town.”99 Wyneken found it difficult to work 
within the parameters the previous manager had established for the development of the 
HAMP and the use of the CRC. He found that with the budget and time constraints already 
facing the HAMP development process, “the care and feeding of a monthly meeting process 
drives the process … you spend more time on that at some points than you do on the actual 
plan.”100 He also reflected that if he had been in charge of the process from the beginning: 
 
I personally would have done all of the constraints mapping and then brought 
in as many good examples as we could of what master planned communities 
are like with some pictures and maps and descriptions and said “Okay, here’s 
our landscape, here are the constraints, here is the policy direction we have 
from the General Plan. How do we get from these constraints in this area to 
[the HAMP] and what components do you want to put emphasis on?”101 
 
Developing a plan for an area of undeveloped land as large as the one covered by the HAMP 
was a new experience for the city. As CRC member, and local planning professional Linda 
Morales noted, “a lot of times [in Tucson] the planning is done after the horse is out of the 
barn and you’ve got development that you’re working around. This was a blank slate and was 
a really unique opportunity.”102 However, the CRC was initiated before the city had compiled 
information on the natural and physical constraints of the area and relevant social and 
economic data.103  
 
The city tried to simultaneously collect this data and run the CRC input process, but this led 
to interruptions and delays in the CRC meeting schedule and frustration for CRC members 
who felt their time was being used inefficiently. CRC member and local developer, Ken 




It was so obvious to us that what was going on was so confused … [the CRC 
asked the city to] show us what you’re trying to do, and they couldn’t do that 
… they were busy worrying about hydrology maps when they didn’t have an 
idea of where they wanted to drive the bus they were driving.104  
 
Phil Swaim, a local architect and CRC member, mentioned that his previous experience with 
developing a land use plan was typically that, “you do your research, and then you bring it 
forward and you do the planning after, you keep people moving and building consensus and 
then go out and resolve things. Unfortunately I think the momentum [of the HAMP 
development process] was difficult to keep going.”105 
 
Eventually, the city completed the necessary mapping and developed a partnership with the 
Sonoran Institute, a Tucson-based non-profit dedicated to community-based environmental 
stewardship, to, with support from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, hire the consulting 
firms Clarion Associates and Economics Research Associates to complete background 
research on the economic and social issues affecting planning in the area. The two firms 
produced two reports that helped inform the planning process. One, Growing Smarter at the 
Edge, was a selection of case studies that served as examples of successful models of 
development similar to what was being envisioned for the HAMP area.106 The second was a 
market conditions report that set the context into which the HAMP was being introduced by 
describing the regional economic context, market, population and employment trends, and 
the success of other master planned communities in the Tucson area.107 
 
In addition to concerns about the CRC meeting process, there was also confusion about what 
role, and the influence of that role, each of the three main entities – the city, the ASLD and 
the CRC – was playing in developing the HAMP. Some CRC members used terms like 
“rubber stamping” and “a box checking exercise” to describe how they or others perceived 
their involvement in the process.108 There was also confusion sometimes about how their 
input was being used and incorporated in the different drafts of the HAMP.109  
 
Some CRC members noted that although it was helpful to have a representative from the 
ASLD present at the meetings to answer questions and inform the group about the ASLD’s 
perspective on issues, there was also uncertainty about what kind of influence the plan would 
actually have over what the ASLD ultimately decided to do with the land they owned in the 
area.  
 
CRC member Ken Abrahams mentioned that in terms of the city and the ASLD working to 
define their roles with one another, “the communication between two governmental 
bureaucracies trying to reconcile two significantly different mandates is very interesting and 
kind of painful to watch.”110 Although the ASLD’s representative at the HAMP meetings, 
Greg Keller, was perceived positively by many involved, there was some frustration over the 
message of the strictness of the ASLD’s mandate in terms of what they could and couldn’t do 






COMPLETION AND ADOPTION OF THE HOUGHTON AREA MASTER PLAN  
 
Despite the challenges faced along the way, the Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP) was 
eventually completed. After a two-year planning process the document was submitted to the 
Tucson Mayor and City Council and was approved unanimously on June 7, 2005. 
 
The HAMP not only provides a plan for the Houghton Road area that is in compliance with 
Tucson’s updated General Plan, but also helped the city clarify its vision for growth in that 
area. The process of developing the HAMP also allowed the city to communicate this vision 
to the Arizona State Land Department (ASLD) and in turn learned what the ASLD’s 
expectations for the area are. Building on some of the ideas already proposed for the area, the 
HAMP also includes many of the elements found in the Houghton Road Plan Associates plan 
from 1999 and the subsequent ASLD plan from 2001.112 
 
The HAMP includes written policy guidance on six major development elements, including 
proposed land use patterns, circulation and mobility patterns, the treatment and incorporation 
of natural and cultural resources, the provision of public services and facilities, the ways new 
development will help pay for itself and generally how parcels of land within the HAMP area 
should be developed.113  
 
The HAMP also includes maps that show the area covered by the plan and its surroundings, 
the existing constraints on development in the area (e.g. washes and existing development), 
an example of the components of a planned community and how they are usually arranged, 
conceptual land uses and circulation routes, a cross section of what major streets should look 
like (complete with pedestrian paths and vegetated areas), conceptual parks and trails, 
locations of the 100-year floodplain and riparian habitat, a chart with the parameters of 
different kinds of parks and the potential location of public facilities.114 
 
Many involved in the planning process call the Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP) a 
qualified success, as it has yet to be implemented, and are reserving judgment until its 
effectiveness can be proven.115 Also, under Tucson’s current Land Use Code, there is no 
mechanism with which to implement the master planned community concepts included in the 
HAMP. The city’s Department of Urban Planning and Design has drafted an amendment to 
the Land Use Code that would establish a Planned Community District zone to allow for the 
implementation of the new planning concepts in the HAMP. Planning staff at the city are 
planning to present the new zoning classification to the Mayor and City Council in the spring 
of 2006 for approval.116 
 
A major factor in determining the outcome of the area seems to be the ASLD. The ASLD is 
under no legal obligation to implement the HAMP or require that whoever buys state trust 
land in the area act within its parameters. This is not to say, however, that the ASLD intends 
to disregard the plan, as they recognize the financial benefit of having a common 
development vision with the municipality in which their land is located.117 The significant 
uncertainty that remains about the eventual implementation of the HAMP will not be 




THE ANALYSIS: THE HOUGHTON AREA MASTER PLAN PROCESS 
 
The Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP) development process illustrates many of the 
benefits, costs and challenges of using a collaborative approach for land use planning. The 
benefits and costs of the HAMP process were in general similar to the elements typically 
found in collaborative processes, while the challenges faced by participants in the HAMP 
process illuminate some of the unique challenges of collaborative planning on state trust 
land. The challenges also are reflective of the unfamiliar situation the City of Tucson found 
itself in as it set out, without any previous experience, to develop a master plan for the 
thousands of undeveloped acres that make up the HAMP area.  
 
WAS THE HOUGHTON AREA MASTER PLAN PROCESS COLLABORATIVE? 
 
Participants in the HAMP development process had a range of opinions about whether or not 
it was a collaborative experience. Although there is no consensus among participants, it 
seems as though the HAMP development process was collaborative to a certain extent, as 
measured by the three representative categories used in this report: (1) breadth of 
stakeholders, (2) degree of transparency of process and (3) degree of influence the 
participants had on decision making.  
 
Breadth of Stakeholders: CRC member and architect Phil Swaim commented that he 
thought the city “did a good job of being inclusive” in the composition of the CRC, a view 
that was reflective of general sentiment about the group.118 Membership on the CRC was 
comprised of representatives from neighborhood associations, local business owners and 
citizens with professional planning and development backgrounds. Even though, the ASLD 
representative, Greg Keller, was not an official member (because of agency preference), his 
presence at the meetings helped provide an important link to the agency for the group. 
 
Degree of Transparency: CRC meetings were open to the public and meeting notes and 
summaries often were compiled and distributed to members, which lent a degree of 
transparency to the process. However, some CRC members expressed frustration over how 
the CRC’s comments were being incorporated into the creation of the HAMP. Ken Abrahams 
commented that he thought, “There was a gigantic disconnect between the dialogue [during 
CRC meetings] and what kept coming back when [the city] brought [the HAMP] back.”119 
There was also a fair amount of direct communication between city staff and the ASLD 
going on simultaneous to the CRC process, the results of which were not always shared 
openly with the group.120 Abrahams also offered the following critique of both the HAMP 
development process and other collaborative processes he had been involved in in the past: 
 
It was representative of what I’ve seen happen to the public input process over 
the last decade, which has been what I call the “talking into the microphone” 
approach. You can say anything you want, but the microphone isn’t connected 
to anything. It’s a process of checking boxes, having meetings, allowing 
people to gather, but there’s no connectivity between what is said and then 





Abrahams’ comments hold valuable lessons about the kinds of behaviors and techniques to 
avoid when developing and conducting an effective collaborative process 
 
Degree of Influence on Decision Making: CRC members’ use of terms like “rubber 
stamping” and “box checking exercise” to describe how they perceived the CRC’s level of 
influence over the decisions made during the development of the HAMP mark this as one of 
the least collaborative aspects of the process.122 Abrahams made this comparison to illustrate 
how he felt about this aspect of collaborative processes in general: “There’s a Bob Dylan 
lyric ‘the masters make the rules for the wise men and the fools’ and that’s what you feel like 
when you sit in those meetings.”123 
 
BENEFITS OF THE PROCESS 
 
Participants in the Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP) development process identified four 
major areas in which they found the process beneficial. These included: creating a higher 
quality product and ensuring a more beneficial outcome than would have been possible 
without the Citizens Review Committee, forming positive relationships that will make future 
interactions more effective, creating an experience to learn from and build off of in the future 
and planning for a larger amount of open space than may have been possible without a plan. 
ASLD Commissioner Winkleman also offered this observation about the benefit of land use 
planning activities to the trust: “Obviously planning will add value to our property – our 
business is to add value to as much as we possibly can and to maximize revenue for our 
beneficiaries.”124 
  
A Higher Quality Outcome 
 
City of Tucson officials’ decision to include the ASLD, the largest landowner in the HAMP 
area, in the Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP) development process was a step toward 
accomplishing its goal of creating the kind of planned development it envisions for the 
Houghton Road area. Opening a line of communication between the two agencies on what 
each wanted and was able to do allowed for greater understanding and more efficient 
decision making.  
 
Albert Elias, the Director of the City of Tucson’s Department of Urban Planning and Design 
recognized the mutual benefits to the city and the ASLD: 
 
All this planning work only enhances the value of their land and it’s good for 
the city too because it ensures that we have better quality development … our 
mission and their mission do have a lot of overlap and by working together 
instead of against each other we’ll have a better outcome. Both of us will have 
a better outcome and both of us will be in a better position to fulfill our 
respective organizational objectives.125  
 
Members of the CRC also recognized the benefits of working together on the plan 
development process in terms of the quality of the actual plan that was produced. CRC 
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member and local developer Ken Abrahams observed that “the product … does move us one 
step further and with its strong points and its weak points it’s still better than where we 
were.”126 According to Michael Wyneken, the HAMP project leader for the city, the plan the 
ASLD currently has in place for the area includes significant amounts of density and only 
about nine percent open space. In his view, the land use patterns outlined in the HAMP are 
much more attractive than the existing ones.127  
 
Relationships Created Through Collaboration  
 
Another commonly mentioned benefit that participants observed from the HAMP 
development process was the relationships that were forged through working together. 
Participants not only recognized the benefit of these relationships during the HAMP 
development process in terms of facilitating professional interactions, but also forecasted that 
they will be beneficial in future professional interactions between participants. 
In some cases the creation of these relationships came as a welcome surprise, as Albert Elias, 
the Director of the City of Tucson’s Department of Urban Planning and Design, observed:  
 
The level of trust and interaction and willingness to work together and all of 
that is a benefit of that planning process that I would never have predicted at 
the beginning of the process, and I’m very pleased about that, and I think 
those bode well for the challenges that we face ahead.128  
 
Freda Johnson, the facilitator for part of the HAMP development process, noted that she 
thought, “There was much more respect cultivated between people who might not normally 
be in the same camp on some of these issues.”129 The creation of this respect helped cultivate 
an atmosphere where CRC members could work together in a positive way, which had 
benefits both during the HAMP process and potentially in the future also.  
 
Addressing this benefit from a professional perspective, ASLD Commissioner Winkleman 
noted the historical significance of the relationship forged between the City of Tucson and 
the ASLD through the HAMP development process: “It showed that we could sit down with 
city staff and work cooperatively … this is a much better position for us to be in with the 
City of Tucson than the Land Department has ever been in before.”130 The ASLD opened a 
Southern Arizona Office in Tucson in May 2005 to focus more attention on its property in 
and around Tucson, of which the HAMP area is currently one of the most important 
pieces.131 The relationship building experience afforded by the HAMP development process 
served as the first step in the two agencies evolving involvement. 
 
In addition to the beneficial relationships created between the ASLD, the city and CRC 
members, HAMP Project Manager Michael Wyneken mentioned that, as a result of the 
HAMP process, the city has been working with staff from Pima County on wastewater-
related issues in the HAMP area, which has facilitated a broader discussion about drinking 
water issues.132 An unexpected benefit, this city-county dialogue is particularly significant 
because of the tension that has plagued the two entities since the 1970s regarding 




Learning from Experience  
 
The HAMP development process was the City of Tucson’s first experience creating a plan 
for such a large area. Albert Elias, the Director of the city’s Department of Urban Planning 
and Design, recognized how the HAMP experience can benefit future planning projects on 
large parcels of state trust land south of Tucson: “I think a lot of the lessons that we learned 
in the HAMP can be applied there, not that we want to replicate it, but getting through the 
hard parts will be easier because of the things we learned in the Houghton process.”134 
 
Going through the HAMP development process also gave the city an opportunity to clearly 
express its vision for development in the southeast part of Tucson. This experience doing 
large-scale planning may prove helpful in the future as other similar planning opportunities 
arise. Thus, the city is now in a better position professionally than they were prior to 
initiating the HAMP process. Albert Elias commented that “We are better positioned to 
continue in the process of what ultimately is going to happen out there … we’re better 
equipped to make good decisions about the quality of growth and development there than we 
were before.”135  
 
Opportunities for Conserving Open Space 
 
One of the benefits of engaging in master planning is the opportunity to approach the 
development of an area holistically and plan for features like open space. Although there is 
debate in Tucson over the benefits of continuing to develop at all, HAMP project leader, 
Michael Wyneken noted that “We can’t stop people from coming here, so what we have to 
do is make sense of it. Plan it out and be ready to make [the development] the best we 
can.”136 
 
Although the ASLD is very clear on its mission to maximize revenue for its beneficiaries, 
Ron Ruziska, Director of the ASLD’s Southern Arizona Office, mentioned that it is 
sometimes possible to accomplish this goal while also creating open space if a parcel is 
appropriately planned and includes open space as part of a larger development plan.137  
  
Adding Value to the Trust 
 
From the ASLD’s perspective, working together with the municipality within which the land 
it owns is located to develop a common vision for how the land should be planned can lead to 
an increase in revenue for the trust. 138 Developing a common vision can help eliminate the 
uncertainty that potential state trust land buyers face in terms of knowing what they will be 
allowed to do with the land once they buy it. Typically, the less uncertainty there is for the 
buyer, the higher the price of land can be, which translates to an increase in revenue 
generation for the ASLD.139  
 
In reference to this benefit in general terms, ASLD planner and CRC meeting attendee, Greg 
Keller, said, “Chances are, if you collaborate with [the community] and you show that you’re 
willing to listen to their issues, most of the time, not all … we’re able to enhance the value of 
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the trust land which is really our goal.”140 Gordon Taylor, ASLD Planning Section Manager 
elaborated on this point and gave a specific example in terms of going through the land 
entitlement process, which can at times be lengthy: “When you have a collaborative effort … 
by the time you bridge all your differences and you have a final product, there is normally a 
consensus which means it’s going to be easier to sail it through that entitlement process.”141 
Likewise, ASLD planner Greg Keller observed that “Before, Tucson had nothing in that area, 
but they now have a vision for that area that didn’t exist before that … As far as the 
collaborative effort, it [has] helped both the city and their vision.” According to Keller, the 
process also was a success for the ASLD because a land use plan has been created which will 
“further the effort of the agency to generate revenue, to get those properties out to 
disposition.” 142 
 
COSTS OF THE PROCESS  
 
When the Citizens Review Committee (CRC) was convened, members anticipated a one-year 
process, however, it actually took two years to develop the HAMP. The monthly meetings 
during the HAMP development process imposed significant time costs on citizen CRC 
members. Professional planner Linda Morales mentioned that this cost was manifested for 
CRC members as personal time given up, or missing spending time with family.143  
 
However, when asked if they would engage in a similar collaborative effort in the future, all 
the citizen CRC members interviewed responded that they would. The biggest reason for this 
was because they cared about their community and wanted to be involved in the way it was 
developed.144  
 
Commissioner Winkleman expressed the same sentiment about time, although not from a 
personal perspective, but from one of deciding how to devote scarce staff resources.145 
Allocating staff time to the Citizens Review Committee meant that other things could not be 
done. However, in this case the benefits of engaging in the collaborative process outweighed 
the costs. 
 
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES  
 
The HAMP planning process was full of challenges. However, there is a lot that can be 
learned about collaborative planning by examining these challenges and extrapolating from 
them lessons about when collaborative planning can be a useful tool, what kinds of elements 
need to be in place for a collaborative planning effort to be successful and what should be 
avoided. The challenges faced during the HAMP development process include dealing with a 
new planning situation and a new interaction between the city and the Arizona State Land 
Department (ASLD), creating an effective structure for the collaborative process to occur in, 
interpreting and working within the parameters of the ASLD trust mandate and addressing 
issues of authority, bridging expectations about the outcome of the process and grounding 
them in political, economic and market realities and dealing with both the ASLD and city’s 




A New Experience  
 
Not only had the City of Tucson never engaged in the large-scale planning of a mostly 
undeveloped area before, but the city had never worked together with the ASLD on such a 
project. Michael Wyneken commented: 
 
The whole thing was new, it was new to everybody, so it’s just a dance that 
you have to do. You have two entrenched bureaucracies who are trying to do 
something a little bit, you know, totally new, a little bit innovative and it was a 
struggle on both parties’ parts.146  
 
Wyneken also highlighted another aspect of this challenge by discussing the differences 
between Phoenix, which embraces development and is “the Land Department’s world … 
when it comes to selling their land,” and Tucson, which is less clear on its development 
position and where finding a balance between continuing to develop or not is hard to find. 147 
As Wyneken put it, “It’s almost like you have to drive a bulldozer or you have to be chained 
to a tree, there’s no middle ground allowed here.”148 He also reflected on how these polarized 
views can be difficult for a planner who recognizes that, “we’re going to grow, we can’t stop 
people from coming here so what we have to do is make sense of it. Plan it out, be ready and 
make it the best we can do.” Wyneken was curious to see if the HAMP could become a 
working example of finding middle ground on this issue. 
 
Creating and Implementing an Effective Process 
 
One of the first challenges faced by the CRC came in the first few months of the HAMP 
development process when the city planner that had initiated the HAMP process retired. 149 
Michael Wyneken was assigned to take over the project management and, in his own 
assessment of the situation in which he found himself, Wyneken reflected, “Always try to be 
the person who starts the project, it’s really difficult to take over a project.”150 Around the 
same time that the HAMP project manager changed, the Department of Urban Planning and 
Design experienced a reorganization that left it with fewer planners and a reduction in the 
amount of money that had been allocated for the HAMP process and product development.151  
 
Although more a result of circumstance than any controllable element, these changes in staff 
and resources created a situation where the project manager felt constrained by the 
parameters set by the previous manager. While Wyneken was recognized as a talented 
planner by the CRC members interviewed and many appreciated his technical ability and 
grounded approach to the HAMP, he lacked the group process expertise that would have 
helped guide more effective CRC interactions.152 This point illustrates the importance of 
recognizing and preparing for the human elements demanded by a collaborative planning 
process. As Calvin Baker, the Superintendent for the Vail School District and Technical 
Advisory Team member observed, “It seems so easy to call a group of people together and 
work on something, but it’s not, there are a lot of nuances involved.”153 Having someone 
leading the process who recognizes the nuances of running a collaborative planning process 
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and has a sufficient amount of time and resources at their disposal is an important step in 
creating an effective collaborative planning effort.  
 
Providing Adequate Information to Enable the Process 
 
Once the HAMP development process began, the city’s inexperience with large-scale land 
use planning quickly became apparent. This inexperience frustrated many of the CRC 
members with professional planning or development backgrounds; in their opinion, the city 
had not conducted the background research necessary to meaningfully involve the CRC in 
the planning process. This lack of research meant that the CRC had very little context in 
which to base their recommendations with regards to the natural features and economic and 
market conditions of the area. It also meant that there were periods when the CRC was not 
meeting to plan, but waiting for the necessary research to be completed. According to CRC 
member and local architect Phil Swaim, the HAMP process was not following the typical 
structure of collaborative planning efforts: “You do your research, and then you bring it 
forward and you do the planning after, you keep people moving and building consensus and 
then go out and resolve things.”154  
 
Joint fact-finding and research often is identified as a benefit of collaborative planning; by 
uncovering the information together, the group often strengthens its bonds and the outcome 
of the process. However, this particular critique of needing to have basic information in place 
before beginning the collaborative planning process addresses a slightly different situation. In 
this case, the issue was not about what was already in the HAMP area, but what was going to 
be there; basic maps and studies about existing conditions were needed to inform the plan 
that was being produced.  
 
CRC member Linda Morales recognized that while the research phase may have been helpful 
for the members of the CRC without professional planning or development backgrounds, 
others more familiar with the planning process found it frustrating and attributed some of the 
attrition the committee experienced to this factor.155 This comment raises an interesting point 
that in addition to the importance of having basic information in place before beginning the 
collaborative planning process, it is important to recognize and manage disparate levels of 
familiarity with the subject during a collaborative planning effort so that everyone is engaged 
and appropriately informed. 
 
Both ASLD planner Greg Keller and CRC member and local developer Ken Abrahams 
commented on the unusualness of the city attempting to produce this background information 
in-house. In their prior experiences, consultants usually are hired by a municipality to 
develop it before the planning process begins. Eventually, the city, in partnership with the 
Sonoran Institute, contracted for two studies, one of which examined the existing market 
conditions of the area and another that provided examples of other Western master planned 







Clarifying the Role of the Citizens Review Committee  
 
Another challenge of the HAMP process was clarifying and communicating the expectations 
for the Citizens Review Committee (CRC). This ambiguity frustrated some CRC members, 
as they struggled to figure out what their role in the process was. CRC member Phil Swaim 
remembered the group asking themselves, “Why are we here if you’re just coming and 
presenting to us as opposed to actually getting our feedback and what we are supposed to be 
able to tell you?”156 Linda Morales, another CRC member also mentioned that at first the 
CRC felt like they were being asked to just “rubber stamp,” or approve the city’s ideas 
without much discussion or opportunity to provide substantive input.157 This confusion over 
whether the CRC was to absorb information about the process or actually participate in plan 
development decisions fueled CRC members’ frustration. 
 
The issue of how to best use the expertise and time of the CRC members also arose in some 
CRC members’ response to how meetings were structured. Suzanne Bott, a former employee 
of the Sonoran Institute and CRC member made this observation, “I think a citizens 
committee needs a lot of structure so that people really can evaluate various elements and 
have kind of a road map to follow as they proceed through discussion.”158 In her assessment, 
the CRC meetings lacked this element.  
 
Maintaining Momentum  
 
The delays caused by the need to complete background research and later write the HAMP 
impaired the momentum and continuity of the planning process. This lack of momentum led 
to feelings of disconnection, lack of interest and attrition. Developer and CRC member Ken 
Abrahams expressed this frustration:  
 
In fact, the committee process was not what it should have been because it just 
got burned out. You can’t restart the process four times and have people come 
and spend hours and hours of their personal time and say “now we’re going to 
start all over again, now where going to start all over again,” people stopped 
coming. 159 
 
This lack of momentum also led to an unanticipated lengthening of the timeframe for the 
plan’s completion and contributed to some of the attrition of the CRC. According to CRC 
member Phil Swaim:  
 
It went for months and months at a time and nothing happened. They hired a 
consultant to go out and do floodplain mapping and said “this will take three 
months” and it actually took nine months … Because it was drawn out so 
long, probably half the Committee stopped participating … It was very 
difficult to be able to maintain interest and keep things going.160  
 
One of the ways the city tried to address this challenge was to send updates and schedule 
meetings only when there was something new to present to the CRC.161 However, Michael 
Wyneken, the city’s HAMP project leader recognized that the loss of momentum due to 
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unanticipated breaks in the meeting schedule was a challenge and concluded that even 
though he sent periodic updates to the CRC during those breaks “we just really lost all 
connection.”162 
 
Getting Bogged Down in Process 
 
The city’s inexperience with a collaborative planning process for such a large-scale project 
also made it difficult for the CRC and city to find a balance between developing the process 
and developing the product. Ken Abrahams offered this critique of the situation: “What 
happens in this new style of public input and committee work is you talk a lot about process 
and hardly at all about product … Talking all about process and hardly anything about 
product isn’t any way to have public input.”163  
 
Some CRC members also observed that the professional facilitator who was involved for the 
first year of CRC meetings occasionally emphasized keeping the meeting process moving in 
a way that “stifled some of the creative process” to the detriment of productive group 
discussion. 164 
 
The Unique Nature of State Trust Land Management 
 
The ASLD’s mandated obligation to maximize revenue generation in its management of state 
trust lands adds a unique element to the collaborative planning process. Usually 
collaboration, like any kind of negotiation, involves parties making certain concessions in 
pursuit of a mutually-accepted outcome. However, the ASLD’s legal obligation to generate 
revenue for the trust beneficiaries presented a challenge to making any kind of concessions 
during the HAMP development process.  
 
ASLD Commissioner Winkleman offered this perspective that recognizes the importance of 
collaborative planning, but also the potential limitations of the process for the ASLD:  
 
I’m personally always a proponent of trying to work with people and 
accomplish something. While we can sit back and say, “Well, we’re the state 
and we’re not going to listen to your plan and if you don’t like our plan we’re 
going to take our ball and go home,” that really doesn’t further our mission of 
generating revenue … But, that being said, it’s something that we’d be 
supportive of unless we get to the point where you’re saying “well, our goals 
are not the same and the ASLD is not being treated fairly and we can’t afford 
to spend this much time and effort working with folks with whom we’re not 
going to get anything accomplished so we’re going to go work somewhere 
else.”165 
 
All of the HAMP development participants interviewed had a clear understanding of the 
ASLD’s trust mandate and understood the limitations within which they were working. 
However, even though the CRC’s understanding of these parameters was essential to the plan 
development process, some expressed frustration with what this meant in terms of 
participation in a collaborative process. Some members of the CRC noted that participants 
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sometimes struggled with how their collaborative planning efforts would effect the ASLD’s 
ultimate decision on what they did with their parcels in the HAMP area.166  
 
However, CRC member Suzanne Bott observed that the ASLD’s mandate does not have to 
impede collaborative planning, “For the most part as long as people can agree that they are 
working toward the ultimate goal of getting the state land department the most revenue, and 
yet providing the local community with the best possible outcome, then they can agree that 
they’re not working at cross purposes.”167 
 
The biggest challenge the ASLD faces when participating in collaborative planning processes 
is the lack of public understanding of what state trust lands are and how they are managed. 
Mary Mangotich Grier, an Assistant Attorney General in the Natural Resource Section of the 
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, who was peripherally involved in the HAMP 
development process, assessed the situation in this way, “The land department is in a 
relatively unique position because it’s a state agency and citizens expect there to be 
responsiveness to their concerns, but it’s a state agency with a private party mandate.”168  
 
Commissioner Winkleman narrowed this point by explaining under what kinds of 
circumstances this becomes an issue: 
 
We don’t get along well with communities who see state trust land as their 
open space. And so instead of trying to facilitate growth or add value they say, 
“well, that’s public land so we’re not going to have any growth out there,” and 
that is obviously counter to our mission. Generally speaking, we’re going to 
be okay with somebody if we’re treated similarly to similarly situated private 
land.169 
 
Commissioner Winkleman elaborated further on how this issue should be addressed in a 
collaborative planning process by saying, “To have a successful process I think there needs 
to be an education of ‘here’s what the trust is, here’s what it’s set up to do, here’s what it can 
do, and here are the things we can’t do,’ and acknowledge that up front.”170  
 
Defining the Boundaries of the Arizona State Land Department’s Authority 
 
The ASLD believes that in order to engage in collaborative planning in a way that remains 
beneficial for the trust, it must make sure that it is protecting its interests. This position 
makes it difficult for the ASLD to find a balance between participating and maintaining 
decision-making authority. During the HAMP Process, this position also posed a challenge 
for the CRC participants in terms of determining the influence the HAMP will have and the 
evaluating the value of their participation.  
 
One of the ways the ASLD tries to maintain its decision-making authority during a 
collaborative process is by remaining in a resource role. The reason for this approach was 




We get involved with committees, but it’s as a resource person. We’ve found 
that if we get put on a committee, like a general planning committee or a 
steering committee, and then they craft their document and we’re listed as one 
of the people that has supported it even though we may be in objection to 
certain elements of it, but by virtue of our association with the committee then 
there’s … tacitly the buy in, if you will, and that could conceivably be used by 
the community to leverage the Department on various land issues. So for that 
reason we … basically like to be on the outside looking in and be there in an 
advisory capacity and not to have our name listed on the document.171 
 
Taylor went on the mention that in the case of the HAMP development process he thought 
the ASLD was able to find this balance of participation and maintenance of decision-making 
authority by making their mandate clear to the group.172 Commissioner Winkleman further 
elaborated on the issue of maintaining the ASLD’s interests throughout a collaborative 
planning process and also recognized an additional aspect of the ASLD’s balancing act in 
terms of trying to strategically make the best use of the additional resources that can be 
provided by a collaborative planning process: 
 
We don’t have enough people and we don’t have the money to do an adequate 
job. One of the things I’ve stressed since I’ve been here is we’re going to 
accept the help and embrace the help as much as we can, don’t be fearful of 
these people, we’ll look after our own interests. But if somebody can truly 
help us, let them help us because we can’t adequately help ourselves. But, you 
do that knowing that everybody’s going to have a reason for helping. There 
are few times where it’s just the benevolence of “we want to help the Land 
Department.” It’s because they’re furthering some issue. The City of Tucson 
has its goals, the Sonoran Institute has its goals, and the citizens that show up 
at these meetings have the things they like. So the challenge for us is 
accepting help and accomplishing something, but not having somebody 
undermine our goals and satisfy their own to the detriment of the beneficiaries 
and us. So that is the tension that always goes with these processes.173 
 
However, these actions by the ASLD also can be challenging for other participants in terms 
of determining what influence their advice and participation in the collaborative process has. 
CRC member Phil Swaim noted that it is “difficult with the State Land Department sort of 
sitting back and saying we’ll wait and see what you come up with and see if we support it or 
not.”174 
 
Another challenge related to the ASLD’s authority was the uncertainty among CRC members 
as to the extent to which the ASLD will use the HAMP as a guide when disposing of land in 
the Houghton Road area, as it is under no legal obligation to follow it. While the ASLD does 
not anticipate that it will radically depart from the guidance of the HAMP, questions still 
remain about how the plan will be implemented.175 CRC member and former Sonoran 
Institute employee Suzanne Bott commented, “[The ASLD doesn’t] feel like they have to 
abide by the plan. That can be particularly frustrating and make participants feel, ‘well, why 
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are we even going through the exercise, what difference does it make?’ yet it is empowering 
because it is a public process.”176 
 
Linking the Plan to Effective Implementation 
 
Throughout the HAMP development process, the CRC faced the challenge of figuring out 
how to make sure that the product that resulted from the collaborative effort was grounded in 
economic and development realities and could be realistically implemented. The reports 
produced by Clarion Associates and Economic Research Services on similar kinds of planned 
communities and the specific market conditions in the Tucson area helped address this 
challenge by providing the HAMP participants with information with which to make more 
informed decisions. However, uncertainty remains because of the possibility that market 
conditions will change over the course of the many years it will take to develop an area as 
large as the area covered by the HAMP. For this reason, some participants expressed the 
importance of the plan having the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions because, as 
Commissioner Winkleman put it, “You can’t plan the perfect community, things are going to 
evolve, trends will come and go.”177 Ken Abrahams, developer and CRC member also 
commented on the importance of having flexibility in a master plan: “It is a living thing, it’s 
not just a paper exercise and it has to have in it a pretty flexible adaptability to changing 
market conditions because they are ten- to fifteen-year projects.”178  
 
Another challenge was Tucson’s ability to implement the HAMP under its current land use 
code. CRC member and developer Ken Abrahams explained the situation:  
 
Probably the biggest concern, which the city is working on with its planned 
community district ordinance for the land use code, is there’s no tool in the 
tool box to implement this plan, it’s a plan that has to sit on the shelf until they 
amend the land use code.179  
 
The city’s Department of Urban Planning and Design has addressed this challenge by 
developing an amendment to Tucson’s Land Use Code that would create a Planned 
Community District zone to allow for the implementation of the new planning concepts in 
the HAMP. The city’s planning staff intends to present the new zoning classification to 
Tucson’s Mayor and City Council in the spring of 2006 for approval.180 
 
Lack of Resources 
 
Both the ASLD and the City of Tucson’s Department of Urban Planning and Design 
experienced the common challenge faced by many government agencies of being 
understaffed and underfunded.  
 
This challenge was manifested in the HAMP development process on the part of the city in 
terms of being able to complete the necessary background research on the area and keeping 
the process moving effectively to meet plan development deadlines.181 One of the ways the 
city addressed the challenge of completing some of the necessary background research was 
to take advantage of some of the additional resources brought to the planning process by 
 
 212
other members of the collaborative process. In partnership with the Sonoran Institute, with 
support from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, the city was able to hire the consulting 
firms Clarion Associates and Economics Research Associates to complete background 
research on the economic and social issues affecting planning in the area. 
 
The ASLD also faced this challenge in the sense that they had to be strategic about how they 
devoted their limited resources. According to Commissioner Winkleman: 
 
We really do have to be careful how we allocate our people and our planning 
dollars … so where we devote time to the HAMP it means we’re not devoting 
it to something else. And when you look at the amount of land that is in the 
path of growth – as a matter of fact growth has leapt over and gone beyond us 




There were a number of elements of the Houghton Area Master Plan Process that helped 
facilitate the collaborative effort. These include participants having a common goal, a 
financial interest and the potential for a higher quality outcome.  
  
A Common Goal 
 
In the HAMP Process, the City of Tucson’s Department of Urban Planning and Design and 
the Arizona State Land Department (ASLD) shared the common goal of wanting to plan for 
development in the Houghton Road area. By initiating a collaborative process in the form of 
the Citizens Review Committee, the city was able to create a forum in which both 
governmental agencies, as well as interested citizens, could work together in pursuit of that 
goal. While there was a certain amount of variation in why and how each party wanted to 
accomplish this goal, they were able to work together to begin achieving it. The city and the 
ASLD had professional and financial reasons for wanting to plan for development in the 
Houghton Road area, while some members of the CRC expressed both a professional and 




As the majority land owner in the area covered by the HAMP, the ASLD had a financial 
motivation to remain involved in the CRC process and be party to the creation of the HAMP. 
By both working with the city on a common goal for development in the area, and by 
planning for the development, the ASLD may be able to realize an increase in revenue for the 
trust once it starts to sell or lease its land in the area. Working with the city on a common 
vision of how the area will be developed could help eliminate some of the uncertainty that 
may otherwise face potential buyers of the state trust land. Having a better idea of what they 
will be allowed to do with the land once they buy it makes the land more valuable to 
potential buyers, which could translate into an increase in the amount the land would sell for 




The Potential for a Higher Quality Outcome 
 
Planners in the City of Tucson’s Department of Urban Planning and Design and participants 
in the CRC, alike, recognized the potential to produce a higher quality outcome for 
development in the Houghton Road area by working together in a collaborative planning 
process. By creating the HAMP, the city was able to both express its vision for how it would 
like development in the southeastern part of town to take place, and create a plan that it hopes 
will guide future growth in the area. Some members of the CRC were motivated to engage in 
the collaborative process because of the potential to help create a plan that could result in 
higher-quality development in the area and that some see as an improvement over the plan 




1. Prepare appropriate background information and research before initiating a 
collaborative process. 
 
One of the keys to an effective collaborative process is gathering as much relevant 
information relating to the issue at hand before initiating the process. Being prepared in this 
way will not only allow for a more efficient and effective use of participants’ time, but also 
help avoid possible delays while addition information is collected. In the case of the HAMP, 
the City of Tucson had not prepared enough information about the physical, social and 
economic characteristics of the area they were planning and had to interrupt the schedule of 
meetings in order to do so. CRC member Phil Swaim commented on the critical aspect of 
keeping up process momentum: “I think there needs to be a certain amount of momentum 
and efficiency in keeping people involved and enthusiastic about what’s happening. 
Otherwise there’s no way to keep everybody going and so as soon as you start loosing all the 
members then it’s no longer this collaborative effort.” 183 
 
2. Have a clear vision of what is to be accomplished and how the collaborative process 
will help achieve it. 
 
Having a clear idea of what is to be accomplished by the end of a collaborative process will 
help structure how to get there. This is not to say that a specific result should be 
predetermined, but that it is helpful to have a clearly communicated goal for the content of 
the end product or result of the collaborative effort to guide the process. Some participants in 
the HAMP Process felt confused at points about what the goal for the product was. CRC 
member Ken Abrahams expressed his frustration about this element of the HAMP 
development process in reference to the city: “They ought to just sit down and figure out 
what they want to do and then start from there.”184 It is also important to have a clear idea of 
how the collaborative process will help achieve these goals. Clearly defining participants’ 
roles and addressing any concerns regarding participants’ expectations can help alleviate 






3. Set and keep realistic deadlines. 
 
Having a clear sense of how long a collaborative process will take and sticking to deadlines 
once they are set will make participating in or running a collaborative planning process much 
more enjoyable and productive. The process of developing the HAMP took twice as long as 
originally expected, and many members, frustrated by what they saw as an inefficient use of 
their time, stopped participating. If deadlines need to be extended or modified, it is important 
to clearly communicate the reasons for the delays and work to keep participants engaged in 
the process during them.  
 
4. Understand the unique management mandate of the state trust land agency. 
 
Collaborative planning on state trust land is different from other kinds of land use planning 
because of the unique mandates of state trust land agencies. Understanding these mandates 
from the beginning can help clarify the parameters within which the collaborative group is 
working.  
 
HAMP participants offered a lot of advice on the importance of understanding the unique 
management requirements of state trust land based on the lessons they learned during the 
HAMP development process. Albert Elias, the Director of the city’s Department of Urban 
Planning and Design mentioned:  
 
The only advice I would give is really try to learn as much as you can about 
how the trust land was originally established and learn all the background … 
Learn as much as you can about the enabling statutes, learn as much as you 
can about the agency that has a fiduciary role in managing the trust, learn as 
much as you can about the politics associated with trust land and their own 
unique challenges … It’s a very different animal, it’s not like operating a 
relationship with a regular private landowner.185 
 
HAMP project manager Michael Wyneken offered this advice: “Do the best you can to get 
the land department into the process from day one and fully absorb what their constraints are, 
because the more you do that the easier the whole thing is going to be.”186 Likewise, Citizens 
Review Committee (CRC) member Ken Abrahams noted, “Understand their mandate. It 
doesn’t do any good to try and put something together unless you really understand and 
accept the box that the other person’s in.”187 
 
Officials from the ASLD also commented on the importance of making sure a collaborative 
group understands their trust mandate and how it influences their land management decision-
making. The ASLD’s Southern Office Director, Ron Ruziska, encouraged collaborative 
planning participants to “think long-term, embrace the mandate of the trust”.188 
Commissioner Winkleman recognized the role that the ASLD can play in helping others 
achieve a greater understanding of what the ASLD’s trust mandate:  
 
Probably the biggest key for us to succeed is to sit down with whoever it is, 
whether it’s the city, the citizens group, or the county or whoever and say, 
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“Here’s who we are, here’s what we do, here’s the things we can do and 
here’s the things we can’t do.”189 
 
5. Maintain communication throughout the process. 
 
Maintaining communication between parties during a collaborative planning process will 
ensure that everyone is informed about how things are developing as the process progresses. 
This communication also will help participants maintain a feeling of relevancy if they are 
well-informed about how their suggestions are being incorporated into the final product.  
 
CRC member Suzanne Bott offered some suggestions on ways the feelings of uncertainty felt 
by CRC participants about the effectiveness of what they were doing could be alleviated:  
 
I think more of a commitment to take the information under advisement by the 
state land department would help people feel like they weren’t just whistling 
in the wind and that their voices were going to be heard and would have an 
effect, would enhance the credibility of the process.190 
 
HAMP project leader Michael Wyneken pointed out that he learned from his experience 
during the HAMP development process that in order to keep participants interested in 
continuing to work collaboratively it is important to, “Provide as much information and have 
a series of meetings and then come back and develop some alternatives and show how the 
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Case Study by Matt Stout 








ake Whatcom is the primary source of drinking water for approximately 87,000 residents 
in Whatcom County, Washington, including most of the residents of the city of 
Bellingham. More than half of the lake’s watershed is state trust land managed primarily for 
timber revenue by the Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR). State trust land 
revenue supplements state taxes for the funding of schools and other public institutions in 
Washington. 
 
Because it offers scenic views, outdoor recreation and a short commute to downtown 
Bellingham, Lake Whatcom has experienced significant residential development along its 
shore in the last few decades. However, urban development and to a lesser degree timber 
harvesting in the lake’s watershed have contributed to the deterioration of water quality, and 
public safety remains a key concern of residents in the watershed. In 1983, a major landslide 
washed homes, cars and 65 acres of timber into the lake. While considered a naturally 
occurring event, the slide, precipitated by a major rain storm, was exacerbated by decades-
old logging practices. 
 
In 1998, road building by the DNR in preparation for a timber sale above a residential area 
heightened public concerns over another landslide. In response to public safety and water 
quality concerns expressed by local residents, the Washington State Legislature passed a bill 
in 2000 that put a moratorium on logging on state trust lands in the watershed until a 
Landscape Plan could be developed with higher standards for water quality and public safety. 
The bill directed the DNR to establish an Interjurisdictional Committee to help develop the 
Landscape Plan.  
 
The Committee consisted of representatives from several state agencies, local government 
and tribes and two members of the public. During the three and half years it took to develop 
the plan, the DNR met with the Committee several times and went through an extensive 
process to meet and exchange information with the community and other interested parties. 
The Committee concluded its work by making consensus recommendations to the DNR that 
identified management strategies for the watershed. In November 2004, the Washington 
State Board of Natural Resources approved the Lake Whatcom Landscape Plan. The DNR is 
currently in the process of implementing the plan. While approval of the plan heralded a call 
from the local community to once again support commercial logging in the watershed, Skagit 
County, a neighboring county, and Mount Baker School District in Lake Whatcom County 
have filed a lawsuit challenging the plan. As of the April 2006, the lawsuit is still pending. 
 
The Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process demonstrates how an interjurisdictional, 
collaborative planning effort with strong state and local representation can help achieve 
watershed management standards that are more protective and enjoy greater community 
support. At the same time, the case exemplifies why it is critical to make decision-making 
authority clear from the beginning and to let stakeholders participate in defining how the 
process will be conducted. This case also shows the importance of including the full range of 




planning process reveals the need for setting realistic timelines and having procedures in process 
ground rules for overcoming disagreements. 
 
 
CONTEXT FOR COLLABORATION 
 
The following descriptions of state trust lands in Washington, Lake Whatcom and its watershed 
are provided to give insight into the environment in which the multi-party landscape planning 
process for Lake Whatcom took place. 
 
PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF STATE TRUST LAND IN WASHINGTON  
 
The state of Washington contains approximately 2.9 million acres of state trust land. These lands 
are dispersed across the state (Figure 8-1) and are of varied terrain.1 The Cascade Range, a series 
of mountains that run north-south and whose highest peak, Mt. Rainier, climbs to 14,410 feet, 
divides the state geographically.2 To the east, Washington’s interior is a vast semiarid expanse. In 
this part of the state, much of state trust land is grasslands and is used for grazing and agriculture.  
 
In the Pacific coast region, west of the Cascades, where Lake Whatcom is found, heavy rains 
support dense forests of spruce, fir, cedar and hemlock. State trust lands in this region are used 
primarily for logging. The timber industry is one of the Washington’s largest industries and has 
been an important part of the state’s history.3 However, because of heavy logging, Washington 
has witnessed some of the most notorious environmental conflicts in the United States, including 




The laws that govern state trust lands in Washington, including those found near Lake 
Whatcom, are set forth in the state’s Enabling Act and Constitution. With the Omnibus 
Enabling Act of 1889, Congress admitted Washington as the 42nd state of the United States 
and granted the state sections 16 and 36 in every township, a total of 2.4 million acres, to 
underwrite “Common Schools.”4 With additional grants for other public institutions, 
Washington’s land grant at the time of statehood totaled approximately three million acres.5  
 
The state’s Enabling Act allowed Washington’s state trust lands to be sold, leased and 
exchanged under certain conditions. Congress amended Washington’s Enabling Act several 
times to “allow for the grant of easements, longer-term leases for mineral lands and 
hydroelectric purposes, public sales of agricultural and grazing lands, land exchanges and to 
create a Common School Construction Fund for support of the construction of school 
facilities.”6 Washington’s Constitution requires that sales of state trust land be conducted at 





Judicial rulings over the years have upheld that the state’s Enabling Act and article 16 of the 
state Constitution “operate to create a binding trust responsibility” and that the state has the 
same fiduciary duties as a private trustee.8 In County of Skamania v. State, the court found a 
decision by the legislature to nullify timber sale contracts unlawful because doing so 
benefited the local economy and the timber industry at the expense of trust beneficiaries.9 
This ruling established that the “state must act with undivided loyalty to the interests of the 
beneficiaries.”10 Other rulings have prohibited the granting of state trust land to the federal 
government for public projects and have allowed for the use of a sustained yield plan for 
timber harvesting on Common School land.11 
 
In addition to the laws and court rulings described above, federal and state laws pertaining to 
natural resources, the environment, public safety and affairs with Native American tribes 
apply to the management of state trust lands. These laws include the federal Endangered 
Species Act (ESA), the State Forest Practices Act, the State Environmental Policy Act 
(SEPA), the State Multiple Use Act and several federal and state treaties with Washington 
State Indian tribes. In 1996, in compliance with the ESA, a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) 
for state trust lands was created by the DNR and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The 
HCP laid out habitat protection measures for the next 70 years on 1.6 million acres of state 
trust land in western Washington. 
Source: “Washington Trust Lands,” Trust Land: A Land Legacy for the American West, The Sonoran Institute & 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, available at http://www.trustland.org. 






The State Legislature acts as trustee of Washington’s state trust lands by enacting laws that 
protect trust assets. The Department of Natural Resources serves as trust manager and 
implements laws created by the legislature. DNR management activities are controlled by the 
Board of Natural Resources (Board), an administrator and a supervisor.12 The Board is a six 
member body, consisting of the Commissioner of Public Lands (Commissioner), the 
Governor or the Governor’s designee, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Dean of 
the University of Washington College of Forest Resources, the Dean of the Washington State 
University College of Agriculture and Home Economics and a County Commissioner from a 
county that contains Forest Board Transfer Lands (described below). The administrator is the 
Commissioner of Public Lands, an elected official who serves four year terms with no term 
limits. The Commissioner appoints the Supervisor. The Commissioner and Supervisor run 
day-to-day management of the trust. The Board sets policies and adopts rules for trust 
management as it sees necessary.13 
 
State trust land is managed to generate revenue for public schools, universities, community 
colleges, prisons, mental hospitals and other public institutions. Several trust types have been 
established to support different beneficiary groups (Table 8-1). The Common School trust is 
the largest trust with over 1.7 million acres and benefits public schools (K-12) in the state. 
The second largest trust by acreage is the Forest Board Transfer Lands trust with over 
600,000 acres. Forest Board Transfer Lands were acquired by the state through tax 
foreclosures and are "held in trust" for the benefit of the taxing districts in which the lands 
are located.14 The Lake Whatcom watershed contains both federally granted Common School 
lands and state acquired Forest Board Transfer Lands. 
 
Table 8-1: Trust Beneficiaries 
Trust Beneficiaries Acres % Total
Agricultural & Scientific School Washington State University 151,148 5%
Capitol Building State Capitol Campus 108,234 4%
Charitable, Penal and Reformatory Various state institutions 70,247 2%
Common School Public schools (K-12) 1,774,460 62%
Forest Board Transfer Lands County governments 623,558 22%
New Trust Lands Community & Technical College Reserve 3,312 0%
Normal School Western, Central and Eastern Universities 64,304 2%
University Original & Transferred University of Washington 86,721 3%
Total 2,881,984 100%  
Source: Washington State Department of Natural Resources, http://www.dnr.wa.gov. 
 
Distribution of trust revenue is determined by state laws and varies by trust. Typically, 75 
percent of trust revenue is distributed to the trust beneficiaries and 25 percent is distributed to 
the Resource Management Cost Account, which finances DNR management activities related 
to federally granted state trust lands. The state budget process determines how funds in the 
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accounts are appropriated. Distributions to trust beneficiaries pay for capital expenditures and 
operating expenses or are deposited in trust permanent funds, which are managed by the 
Washington State Investment Board. 
 
While state trust land provides wildlife habitat, watershed protection, open space and 
recreation opportunities, the DNR primarily manages it to generate revenue for trust 
beneficiaries.15 According to DNR officials, trust lands yield about $200 million per year for 
trust beneficiaries.16 Timber harvesting provides the greatest source of revenue. In 2004, 
timber sales accounted for 66 percent of the revenue generated on State Grant Lands (Table 
8-2).17 Land sales and transfers accounted for 16 percent of 2004 State Grant Lands revenues, 
followed by agriculture and grazing at seven percent and real estate at six percent. Mining, 
oil and gas and other commercial activities made up the remaining four percent of 2004 
revenues. 
 
The DNR generates revenue from state trust lands through sales transactions, commercial 
leases and land exchanges and manages the land to meet environmental, natural resource and 
recreation-oriented objectives. The DNR sells timber as well as agricultural and grazing 
leases at public auction. All timber sales are reviewed by the Board and must first go through 
the SEPA process. SEPA ensures that the DNR considers the environmental consequences of 
its proposed actions. The DNR is allowed to exchange state trust land for land owned by 
private or government entities as long as the exchange does not result in a decrease of the 
value of the trust. The DNR has consolidated many of its holdings in western Washington to 
form large contiguous tracts of land to make management easier and more effective.18 
Recreation is allowed on nearly all DNR managed land, although funding for recreation 
management has recently been reduced by the legislature.19 In 2004, the DNR adopted a 
“sustained yield plan” for the management of its timber resources. The plan calls for 
“harvesting on a continuing basis without a major prolonged curtailment or cessation of 
harvest.”20 The plan will increase harvesting by 23 percent from previous levels.21 A 
coalition of environmental groups in Washington filed a lawsuit against the plan shortly after 
it was released claiming the plan would harm salmon, wildlife habitat and clean water.22 
 
($ in thousands) State Grant % Forest Board % Non "Trust" % Department %
Lands Total Transfer Lands Total Revenue Total Total Total
Natural Resource Activity
Agriculture and grazing $8,576 7% $241 0% ($209) 0% $8,608 3%
Mineral and hydrocarbon 660 1% 91 0% 218 0% 969 0%
Timber 77,005 66% 98,506 99% 14,834 17% 190,345 62%
Commercial Activity
Real estate 7,417 6% 59 0% (58) 0% 7,418 2%
Communication sites 1,815 2% 956 1% 1 0% 2,772 1%
Rights-of-way 729 1% 135 0% 1,553 2% 2,418 1%
Miscellaneous leases 891 1% 0 0% 312 0% 1,203 0%
Aquatic lands 0 0% 0 0% 15,781 18% 15,781 5%
Land sales and transfers 18,704 16% 0 0% 15,096 17% 33,800 11%
Interest and other 232 0% (149) 0% 42,264 47% 42,347 14%
Total $116,030 $99,839 $89,792 $305,661
% Total 38% 33% 29% 100%  
Table 8-2: Department of Natural Resources 2004 Revenue 





THE LAKE WHATCOM WATERSHED 
 
Lake Whatcom supplies drinking water to the residents of the city of Bellingham. The lake is 
fed by two separate watersheds: the Lake Whatcom Watershed, which surrounds the lake 
itself, and the Middle Fork Nooksack Watershed, supplied partially by glacier melt from Mt. 
Baker, which drains into a river, a portion of which is seasonally diverted into Lake 
Whatcom. Before being delivered to city residents for use, water is treated at a plant at 
Whatcom Falls Park.  
Forest land is the primary land use in the Lake Whatcom watershed, representing 91 percent 
of all land uses. Developed areas represent four percent of land uses in the watershed.23 
However, current zoning would allow for a much higher percentage of urban development 
(Figure 8-2). 
 
The DNR manages approximately 15,700 acres of state trust land in the watershed mostly for 
timber revenue. The majority of the state trust land in the watershed is in Whatcom County. 
A small portion is in Skagit County, which borders Whatcom County to the South. 
 
Table 8-3: Trust Types in the Lake Whatcom Watershed 
 
Trusts Acres % Total
Forest Board Transfer Lands (Whatcom County) 8,473 54%
Forest Board Transfer Lands (Skagit County) 690 4%
Forest Board Purchase Lands (Skagit County) 881 6%
Common School (K-12 schools) 4,627 29%
Agricultural School (WSU) 193 1%
Capitol Buildings 286 2%
Scientific School (WSU) 557 4%
Total 15,707 100%  
Source: “Report to Legislature: Lake Whatcom Landscape Pilot Project,” Washington State Department of 
Natural Resources, 2004. 
 
There are seven different trust types in the Lake Whatcom watershed (Table 8-3). Forest 
Board Transfer Lands make up a majority of the state forest land in the watershed.24 The 







Figure 8-2: Zoning Map of the Lake Whatcom Watershed 
Source: Lake Whatcom Landscape Plan Preliminary Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Washington 
State Department of Natural Resources, http://www.dnr.wa.gov/htdocs/agency/whatcom/index.html. 
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THE STORY: THE LAKE WHATCOM LANDSCAPE PLANNING PROCESS 
 
EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE PLAN 
 
In 1983, heavy rains triggered landslides above Lake Whatcom causing several houses, cars, 
part of a golf course and about 65 acres of timber to wash into the lake. Damage was 
estimated at about $12 million (in 1983 dollars).25 Mass wasting, as it is called by geologists, 
is a natural process in the Lake Whatcom watershed, but logging and road building in 
decades past exacerbated the landslides. While the degree to which logging activity caused 
the landslides is debated, the DNR settled a lawsuit with a group that sued for damages 
incurred by the slide. According to the DNR, the logging activities that contributed to the 
landslide were carried out in the 1920s and 1930s by private foresters who were operating 
under more lenient standards than those currently mandated by the DNR.26 Regardless of 
fault, the slide was a traumatic experience for lake residents. Since 1983, the number of 
people living in the area has grown significantly, increasing the potential for loss of life and 
injuries from another landslide. 
 
While there has not been a major mass wasting event since 1983, the lake has experienced its 
fair share of problems related to water quality. Most notably, pollution levels in the lake have 
increased significantly as a result of residential development. The main issues of concern are 
low dissolved oxygen, total phosphorous, dieldrin, total PCBs and mercury pollution in the 
lake and high levels of bacteria (such as fecal coliform) in tributaries to the lake.27 There are 
several sources of pollution impacting the lake including forest practices, mining, recreation, 
hazardous waste and solid waste spills, storm water runoff, transportation, 
urbanization/development and wastewater systems.28 
 
The city of Bellingham has undertaken several initiatives to combat pollution in Lake 
Whatcom, including a ban on the use of carbureted two stroke boat motors and outreach to 
residents about the harms of runoff. While several formal plans and initiatives to protect 
water quality in the watershed have been implemented over the years, residents of 
Bellingham have witnessed a rise in mercury pollution, E. coli warnings and sewage 
overflows into Lake Whatcom, the source of their drinking water. In 1998, the EPA listed 
Lake Whatcom as a 303(d) impaired water body, which required the Department of Ecology 
to conduct a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) study that would set standards for 
acceptable levels of pollution from point and non-point sources.29 
 
In response to deteriorating water quality in Lake Whatcom in the late 1980s, city and county 
officials began looking for ways to slow residential growth and protect their municipal water 
supply. Local officials decided that public management of forest lands offered the best 
solution for protection of the watershed, knowing that private timber companies could readily 
sell off land for development.30 Accordingly, the city and county approached the DNR with 
an idea of a land exchange, in which the DNR would acquire lands in the watershed owned 
by the Trillium Corporation in exchange for land owned by DNR elsewhere. Despite that the 
lands proposed in the exchange were in a public watershed and near an urban area, the DNR 
decided that acquiring more land in the Lake Whatcom watershed would be in the best 
interests of trust beneficiaries, presumably because of the timber revenue potential.31 The 
 
 226
exchange was completed in 1993, doubling the DNR’s land ownership in the watershed to 
about 15,000 acres.32 
 
As part of the land exchange, the DNR agreed to conduct a joint planning process with 
Whatcom County to develop a forest management plan for state trust land it owned in the 
watershed. Efforts to meet this obligation began in 1994 with approval from Commissioner 
Jennifer Belcher to draft the Lake Whatcom Landscape Plan. At the time, according to Bill 
Wallace, DNR’s Northwest Regional Manager, the DNR determined that drafting the plan 
would likely not require a full environmental impact statement, but that public input into the 
process would be desirable.33 
 
Development of the Landscape Plan faced several delays. First, the planning process was put 
on hold so that a watershed analysis could be conducted by the DNR, to satisfy requirements 
of Washington’s Forest Practices Act. The DNR decided that the analysis would be necessary 
to create a baseline of information about unstable slopes and forestry impacts on water 
quality. The watershed analysis, which affects management of both private and public lands 
in the watershed, was not completed until 1997, at which time work on the Landscape Plan 
resumed. Work stalled again when Commissioner Belcher decided to develop a new, 
statewide template for Landscape Plans.34 According to Wallace, the Lake Whatcom 
Landscape Plan was put on hold so that the new template could be developed.35 However, the 
new statewide template was never completed, for reasons not fully explained. As a result, the 
Landscape Plan for Lake Whatcom was further delayed. Meanwhile, timber sales and forest 
management continued in the watershed.  
 
THE COMMUNITY GETS INVOLVED  
 
In 1998, faced with new timber sale activity on the south side of Lake Whatcom, the 
community mobilized to stop logging. The DNR had begun building access roads in 
preparation for a timber sale in Austin Flats, a timber stand above the residential, lake-side 
community of Sudden Valley (Figure 8-3).  
 
According to Wallace, the Austin Flats timber sale had been pending for some time.36 
However, there had been no commercial forestry activity in the area in recent years. Sudden 
Valley resident Linda Marrom described the events that ensued as follows: 
My neighbor, Jamie Berg, and I one day were outside and we heard what 
sounded like blasting sounds coming off the mountain. We thought we heard 
guns but you’re not supposed to hunt in the area. We came down to the Valley 
Market. Other people had gathered. We got word that the Department of 
Natural Resources was blasting with dynamite to widen a logging road. We 
were surprised to hear that because in 1983 this area flooded due to clear-
cutting on unstable slopes.  
We thought if they knew about what happened before, why are they doing it 
now. We started asking questions. We both must have been crazy to think we 
could take on the state. We were not geologists. It just seemed like common 
sense to do something about it. We wrote up a petition to see if we could 
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generate interest, to see if people would support us. We left about 15 pages 
with space for signatures on each side [at the Valley Market]. We came back 
after three days and it was full front and back. I think we had about 350 
people. We were shocked. We are both working moms. We thought we were 
crazy to continue but we got possessed with it. The floodgates were open 
whether we wanted it or not. People started coming to us once they knew we 
were involved.37 
Berg and Marrom continued to step up their efforts to stop logging above their homes. They 
began meeting with local public officials and scientists and found that several people were 
willing to lend their expertise to the cause. According to Marrom, “people were coming out 
of the woodwork to help us.”38 Their efforts gained traction when they began meeting with 
state legislators representing Whatcom County. Senator Harriet Spanel, a Democrat whose 
district includes Lake Whatcom, was especially responsive, and she continued to stay heavily 
involved with the issue. With her help and the involvement of additional city officials, Berg 
and Marrom were able to arrange a public meeting with Commissioner Belcher. 
 
Figure 8-3: Sudden Valley Marina Beach Park 
 
Source: Photograph by Matt Stout 
 
The meeting, which drew over 300 people and was reportedly the biggest meeting ever at the 
County Courthouse, provided an opportunity for Berg and Marrom to present their petition to 
the Commissioner.39 The petition, which had around 5,000 signatures, called for an end to 
clear-cutting in the Lake Whatcom watershed, to protect public safety and water quality. 
Despite the raucous crowd, Commissioner Belcher explained that the law required the DNR 
to manage state trust land to generate revenue for trust beneficiaries. To stop logging the area 
would violate this responsibility. She challenged the community to raise the money to buy 
the land if they wanted to stop timber harvesting in the watershed. According to those in 
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attendance, her message did not make Belcher a friend of many residents of Bellingham, but 
it did serve as a call to action for those who wanted land use change in the watershed.40 
 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION TAKEN  
  
After learning more about the relationship between the DNR as managers of the trust and the 
State Legislature as trustees, Berg and Marrom decided to target their efforts on state 
legislators, in order to change the laws that dictated forestry policy in their watershed. 
Senator Spanel, who had previously helped the “moms in tennis shoes” as they had come to 
be known after frequent trips to the state capitol, agreed to sponsor their bill.41 In addition to 
her long tenure in both the House and Senate, Senator Spanel had been a member of several 
natural resource and environment related committees. She had also become increasingly 
interested in the effects of forest practices on water quality statewide.42  
 
The original version of the bill Spanel sponsored, Senate Bill 5536, required a review of and 
report on the adequacy of DNR management plans for state forest lands within municipal 
watersheds across the state. The bill included a moratorium on logging while the study 
occurred. The bill was referred to the Natural Resources, Parks & Recreation Committee, 
where it passed. However, the bill met strong resistance from the timber lobby and the DNR 
in the Senate Ways and Means Committee. These groups were concerned the bill would 
result in a loss of revenue to trust beneficiaries.43 As a compromise, the bill was scaled back 
to apply only to the Lake Whatcom watershed. The bill passed unanimously in the House and 
Senate and became law on July 25, 1999.44 
 
The new law required that a study be undertaken by the DNR in the Lake Whatcom 
municipal hydrographic area to determine state trust land forest management strategies that 
would achieve water quality standards above those required by existing law (see Appendix, 
Exhibit 5). The bill also directed the DNR to establish a committee (herein called the Study 
Committee) consisting of “a representative each of the city of Bellingham, Whatcom County, 
the Whatcom County Water District 10, the Department of Ecology, the Department of Fish 
and Wildlife, and the Department of Health and three general citizen members” to assist the 
DNR in this effort.45 The bill did not specify that the DNR be a member of the Study 
Committee, only that the Study Committee and the DNR reconcile any differences. A 
deadline for completing the study was set for June 30, 2000; all timber sales in the study area 
were banned until the project was complete.  
 
After several months of deliberations, the Study Committee made a number of 
recommendations to the DNR. The Study Committee’s recommendations included riparian 
management zones on all stream types, no new road building on unstable slopes, a sustained 
yield model of harvesting and a road management plan. 
 
However, Senator Spanel and the bill’s supporters realized that the legislation did not require 
implementation of the Study Committee’s recommendations and, according to Senator 
Spanel, it had become apparent that the DNR did not plan to implement the 
recommendations once the moratorium on logging ended.46 Combined with growing 
frustrations over the languishing Lake Whatcom Landscape Plan, Senator Spanel, Berg, 
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Marrom and other supporters of the bill began drafting a second bill to require 
implementation of the Study Committee’s recommendations and completion of the 
Landscape Plan. 
 
Despite a very tight timeframe, Senator Spanel again succeeded in passing the legislation 
with unanimous support. Senator Spanel recalls that she could not have pushed the bill 
through without the help of Marrom and Berg who spent a lot of time in the state capitol 
talking to legislators. While the timber 
lobby did not oppose the bill, because 
it affected only one region, Senator 
Spanel noted that in retrospect, “they 
said they would not have supported it 
if they knew what it was going to be 
about.”47 Similarly, the DNR did not 
speak out against the bill: “I don’t 
think they [the DNR] supported the 
second one, but they didn’t strongly 
oppose it either – after all we did put 
money in it,” the Senator recalled.48  
 
The second bill became law on March 
29, 2000, and required the DNR to 
complete the Lake Whatcom 
Landscape Plan by June 30, 2001, a 15 
month timeframe (see Appendix, 
Exhibit 6).49 The law stated that “the department shall establish an interjurisdictional 
committee for the development of the Landscape Plan, to review the site-specific activities 
and make recommendations.”50 Membership of the new interjurisdictional committee was 
not specified in the bill but it required the committee to include two members of the public. 
Committee membership and its authority relative to the DNR would later become two highly 
contentious issues.  
 
In addition to consultation with the interjurisdictional committee, the bill required the DNR 
to consult with other major forest landowners in the watershed, watershed residents and the 
Lake Whatcom Management Committee (a standing committee consisting of the Mayor of 
the city of Bellingham, a Whatcom County executive and a representative of Water District 
10) during the creation of the plan. The bill also required that the Lake Whatcom Landscape 
Plan include the Study Committee’s recommendations (described above). Finally, the bill 
extended the moratorium on logging and road construction in the watershed until the 
Landscape Plan was approved.  
 
THE LAKE WHATCOM INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMMITTEE IS CREATED 
 
The Lake Whatcom interjurisdictional committee (herein called the Committee) commenced 
its work on August 1, 2000, four months after the legislation had passed, leaving just eleven 
months to complete the plan.51 The initial Committee consisted of representatives from the 
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same groups that participated in the 1999 Study Committee: Whatcom County; Water 
District 10; the city of Bellingham; Washington State Departments of Health, Ecology and 
Fish and Wildlife; the Lummi Tribe and two private citizens. The only difference in the 
make-up of the Committee compared to the make-up of the Study Committee, other than the 
actual people who represented each group, was that the second Committee only required two 
members of the public as opposed to the three that were required under the first bill. 
Commissioner Belcher had the discretion to appoint additional members and choose which 
representatives from the public would sit on the Committee. The state agencies and local 
authorities had discretion over who they would appoint to the Committee. Committee 
membership is shown above. 
 
While the legislation only applied to state trust lands in the Lake Whatcom Watershed, 
representatives of private industry had an interest in sitting on the Committee, because the 
plan would affect regulations governing their activities. Commissioner Belcher decided, 
however, not to include industry, because their concerns would be voiced in the Lake 
Whatcom Forestry Forum, a recurring meeting between DNR, local government and 
commercial forest interests, and their interests and concerns would be represented by the 
DNR in Committee meetings. The Committee’s membership is shown below. 
 
The Committee’s Charter summarized the mandates contained in the legislation passed in 
2000 and broadly defined interaction between the Committee and the DNR (see Appendix, 
Exhibit 7). The Charter, for which Jennifer Belcher was the primary author, stated that the 
DNR would “consult with the Lake Whatcom Inter-Jurisdictional Committee” during the 
Landscape Plan development and that the committee would “review draft materials as they 
are developed and provide input to the department.” Some members of the Committee 
questioned the Charter’s alignment with the intent of the legislation, but they let the issue go 
because they felt that it would not hinder development of management strategies they could 
all support.52 
 
In the beginning, the Committee elected a Chair and established ground rules for conducting 
meetings and making decisions. The Committee elected Steve Hood, the Department of 
Ecology (DOE) representative, Chair of the Committee. Although not explicitly asked to 
facilitate the meeting, Hood recalls during the second meeting that the Committee elected 
him Chair because it needed “a benevolent dictator of the agenda.” 53 The DNR also assigned 
one of its employees, Michael Perez-Gibson, to help Hood facilitate meetings. Decision 
making by the Committee was to be by consensus. Aside from customary rules about treating 
each other with respect, the Committee developed a process to handle issues for which 
consensus could not be found. First, a “cooling off” period of at least one week followed any 
failure to reach consensus. If after a week, the group felt that consensus could still not be 
achieved, a vote would be taken. If consensus was not achieved by vote, a majority report 
and minority report documenting the points of disagreement were required to show that 
consensus had not been reached on the issue.  
 
To ensure transparency, the Committee’s meetings were open to the public, and local 
reporters and legislators regularly attended. In addition, meeting minutes and materials were 
distributed to all interested parties. The Committee also instituted a “No Surprises Rule” 
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which ensured internal transparency by prohibiting members from leaking information to the 
press before coming to the group with that information. On several occasions, the group took 
walks together through some of the planning sites to raise awareness of why they were at the 
table. Finally, Tom Edwards, Jr., the Lummi Nation representative, started of each meeting 
with a traditional Lummi song and prayer, an event remembered fondly by Committee 
members. 
 
DIVERSE OBJECTIVES COME TO THE SURFACE 
 
The public members of the Committee and representatives from city and state agencies 
brought a diverse set of objectives to the process. Linda Marrom, who had been selected as 
one of the public representatives because of her involvement in passing the legislation, felt 
she had a great deal at stake because her family home was located in Sudden Valley, where 
landslides had occurred in the past. Her primary objectives were to end clear-cutting in the 
watershed and to see that the recommendations made by the Study Committee were included 
in the final Landscape Plan.54  
 
Alan Soicher, the other public representative and a geologist with forest management 
experience, felt an obligation to the community to find a solution that the DNR would accept 
and that would protect public safety and water quality. He described his objective this way: 
“We wanted a plan that would meet conservation goals and allow for cutting trees in the 
watershed. It had to be good enough that we could stand behind it and support DNR logging 
in the watershed.”55  
 
Bill McCourt, the city of Bellingham’s representative and an experienced local water quality 
specialist, hoped that his involvement would help align DNR forest practices on state trust 
lands with the Lake Whatcom water quality initiatives that he had helped develop in the 
past.56 Tom Edwards stated that his goal in joining the Committee was to protect “natural and 
cultural resources that are significant to the Lummi Nation.”57 He was concerned that logging 
was contributing to sedimentation of sacred bathing pools and that logging and road building 
were destroying petroglyph sites. 
 
Bill Wallace, manager of the DNR’s Northwest Region and a professional forester by 
training, was an active participant in nearly all of the meetings. He was supported by several 
staff members, including Jeff May, the project’s coordinator. According to Wallace, the 
DNR’s objective was to complete the Landscape Plan and to implement policy directives of 
the legislature and the Board of Natural Resources. However, Wallace also noted that the 
DNR was concerned that the legislature’s requirements to end road building and harvesting 
on all unstable slopes and to end logging in stream buffer zones on the smallest stream types 
would unnecessarily reduce revenue for trust beneficiaries.58 
 
Despite the group’s diverse objectives, Wallace said the group agreed that a mutually 
acceptable solution could be found if it were to balance fiduciary, social and environmental 
objectives.59 According to Wallace, the primary fiduciary objective was to generate income 
for trust beneficiaries, the primary social objective was to ensure public safety and the 




THE PLANNING PROCESS IS SLOWER THAN EXPECTED 
 
Despite establishing fairly robust ground rules, the Committee got off to a slow start. First, 
questions had been raised about the Committee’s role in relation to the DNR. The issue 
played out in debate over whether DNR representatives were intended by the legislation to be 
members of the Committee or whether the Committee was to be strictly advisory to the DNR. 
Some Committee members argued that if DNR representatives were members of the 
Committee, then consensus reached by the group would carry more weight, because 
additional rounds of agency approval would be unnecessary. However, DNR officials felt 
they would be ceding some of their decision-making authority by becoming a full fledged 
member of the Committee and viewed it as inconsistent with the legislation. 
 
Considerable debate also occurred over the weighting of importance among the group’s 
fiduciary, social and environmental objectives. Wallace maintained that strategies that failed 
to provide enough income for the trust were unacceptable.61 However, some members of the 
Committee felt that all options should be kept on the table to allow for the most creative 
solutions to be found.62 The DNR insisted that not only did the Landscape Plan have to make 
money for the trust but that it also had to be consistent with DNR’s Forest Resource Plan, 
DNR’s Habitat Conservation Plan, Forest Practices Rules and the law passed in 2000.63 
 
According to Wallace, it became apparent early on that working with the Committee was 
going to make it difficult to meet the June 2001 deadline, presumably because of the diverse 
objectives and interests represented at the table.64 Some of the delay was also caused by 
uncertainty over how the Department of Ecology’s TMDL study for the watershed would 
affect the Committee’s recommendations. 
 
A NEW COMMISSIONER IS ELECTED AND AN IMPASSE ENSUES  
 
In November 2000, Doug Sutherland was elected Commissioner of Public Lands. By the end 
of his first year in office, the planning process had come to an impasse. Many of the 
Committee participants acknowledged that with Commissioner Sutherland’s arrival, the DNR 
as a whole returned to its more traditional, timber production focused policies.65 Comparing 
Commissioner Sutherland to Jennifer Belcher, the previous Commissioner, Senator Spanel 
observed: “there was a whole philosophical difference between the two commissioners.”66 
Commissioner Belcher was known for her strong environmental values and her vision for 
sustainable forestry. Commissioner Sutherland, on the other hand, while recognized as a 
leader on environmental issues, was more accomplished as a fiscal manager and steward of 
economic development.67 He had previously served as County Executive of Pierce County, 
City Manager of SeaTac and Mayor of Tacoma.68  
 
As to the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, Commissioner Sutherland was 
concerned about the precedent a watershed plan specific to Lake Whatcom could set for the 
rest of the state.69 A plan that restricted logging activities would reduce income for trust 
beneficiaries, and other counties in Washington could seek similar plans for their watersheds, 
further reducing trust income. Committee members argued that municipal watersheds, 
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whether in Bellingham or elsewhere, should receive special consideration because of the 
importance of safe drinking water. 
Under Commissioner Sutherland, the DNR made several decisions that impacted the 
planning process. One of Commissioner Sutherland’s first decisions was to send Jack Hulsey, 
the DNR’s Regions Operations Manager from Olympia, to Committee meetings. Hulsey 
reflected the new Commissioner’s style in the way he conducted himself at meetings with the 
group. According to Richard Rodriguez, the Department of Health representative, “He was 
hard-nosed. He was predisposed to the [DNR] mindset.”70 
 
Shortly thereafter, the DNR announced that it would conduct an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) in conjunction with the planning process. Sutherland described the decision 
this way: “If we were going to do this we wanted to do it right. That’s why we did the EIS.”71 
According to Wallace, the DNR decided that an EIS was necessary because the public safety 
and water quality issues surrounding forest management in the watershed justified a 
“declaration of significance.”72 Under the State Environmental Policy Act, a “declaration of 
significance” requires that an EIS be conducted. Although he acknowledged that the EIS 
would further delay the process, because it would require additional assessments and a public 
commenting period, Wallace argued it was necessary because it would allow the DNR to 
gather additional input from the full breadth of stakeholders affected by the Landscape 
Plan.73 The EIS process was formally initiated with a scoping notice released on August 31, 
2001. 
 
Some members of the Committee felt that the DNR’s decision to conduct an EIS reflected 
the DNR’s concerns with the direction the Committee was heading. The public members of 
the Committee accused the DNR of using stall tactics and trying to further shift power away 
from the Committee. Marrom recalls it this way: “They decided to do an EIS. That threw 
everything off. They were running the whole process. It was so political.”74 Realizing the 
process was going to happen whether they wanted it or not, members of the Committee 
discussed whether it was more appropriate to have a third party conduct the EIS, rather than 
the DNR. Soicher recalled, “There was some back and forth about who would do it. We 
wanted it to be rigorous and independent.”75 
 
Ultimately, the group yielded to the DNR’s wishes. The EIS would be conducted and paid 
for by the DNR. However, Committee members felt that they should have a say as to which 
scientists and experts would provide assessments in the EIS. In addition, they wanted 
assessments in the EIS to be eligible for peer review. Wallace worried that with peer review, 
people would fight over whose “folks [peer reviewers] were the best.”76 It appeared that 
mistrust between the Committee and the DNR was growing. According to several Committee 
members interviewed, the planning process had reached its lowest point. To resolve the issue 
of peer review and concern over potential bias from having mainly DNR scientists conduct 
the EIS, Wallace decided to conduct a Preliminary Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
(PDEIS) that would allow the public to comment on the assessments used in the Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS).77 
 
Meanwhile, in an effort to head off further criticism of existing forest practices and 
additional restrictions on logging in the Lake Whatcom watershed, Commissioner Sutherland 
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requested formal opinions from the heads of the Departments of Health and Ecology about 
the degree to which the DNR’s forestry practices contributed to pollution in Lake Whatcom. 
His letter also asked these agencies whether additional water protection measures on state 
forest lands were necessary, beyond those provided in existing state forest land rules and 
regulations. Both Departments responded that state forest land activity contributed to only a 
small percentage of the pollution in Lake Whatcom compared to amount attributed to 
residential development. Both Departments also concurred that existing state forest land rules 
and practices including the provisions of the 2000 Lake Whatcom bill were sufficient to 
protect water quality.78 These responses by the DOH and DOE focused the Committee’s 
energy on the issue of public safety and other issues contained in the legislation, such as 
creating a sustained yield harvest plan for the area and incorporating new scientific 
information into the planning process. 
 
OUTSIDE HELP IS SOUGHT 
 
With the Committee feeling like it was losing control over the process and mistrust growing 
on both sides, the question of the Committee’s role in terms of its influence over decision 
making resurfaced with new vigor. Some members of the Committee argued the DNR should 
be a member of the Committee and that the Committee’s recommendations should be 
implemented without further authorization. They believed that this was what the legislation 
had intended. On the other hand, Bill Wallace described the role of the DNR in the process 
this way: “We are here to get feedback from the Committee and from the entire community, 
including forest landowners and tribes, and it is up to us to make the determination, given the 
legislation, what we would propose the plan should be.”79  
 
With the debate going in circles, a request was made by the Committee for an opinion from 
the state Attorney General about whether the role of the Committee was advisory or 
authoritative. The January 2002 opinion rendered by the Attorney General confirmed the 
DNR’s view:  
 
The Department of Natural Resources has the primary responsibility for 
developing the Lake Whatcom Management Plan with the advice of the 
Interjurisdictional Committee. The Committee was created to assist the DNR 
in developing the Landscape Plan. Because the Committee is advisory to the 
DNR, the DNR need not be a member of the Committee.80 
 
More than a year and half after the Committee convened, the debate over who had decision-
making authority came to a close.  
 
On the heels of these disagreements over decision-making authority and whether to initiate 
an EIS, the group collectively decided to explore professional third party facilitation to assist 
in negotiating preferred management strategies for the watershed. The group also realized 
that growing tension made it more difficult for Steve Hood to serve as the facilitator in his 
role as Chair of the Committee and to represent the interests of the Department of Ecology. 
In addition, the DNR’s tight control of the process, with Hulsey’s participation, was viewed 
by some with increased concern.81 Some felt that with the DNR controlling the preparation of 
 
 235
reports (especially on the financial impacts of the alternative management strategies), the 
dissemination of information and the preparation of the agenda, decision-making power had 
been shifted further away from the Committee. 
 
The DNR agreed to bring on and pay for a facilitator. A subcommittee was formed consisting 
of Wallace, Senator Spanel and Soicher to draw up a Request For Proposal and began 
reviewing applications from professional facilitators. The decision came down to two 
proposals, one that the Committee favored and one that the DNR favored. The DNR agreed 
to go with the Committee’s preference and chose Mary Dumas and Rob Kelly, a two-person 
team from Resolution Services, Inc. The facilitators took over running meetings and 
collecting input during public hearings. Several Committee members remarked that 




Negotiating a preferred management alternative for the watershed involved identifying a set 
of agreed upon management objectives, along with the best strategies for meeting those 
objectives. In doing so, several technical issues came to the surface. Management scenarios 
focused primarily on where and how to harvest timber in the watershed to ensure income for 
trust beneficiaries while protecting water quality and ensuring public safety. In addressing 
these management scenarios, the group considered technical issues such as water quality, 
chemical treatments, stream buffers, slope stability, wetlands protection, soil retention, mass 
wasting activities, sustained yield, rotation duration, harvest methods and protection of 
archeological and cultural resources.82 As part of the planning process, DNR commissioned 
several assessment reports, most of which were conducted by DNR staff. These reports 
brought new scientific information and professional knowledge into the planning process. 
According to Wallace, the selection of experts was contentious, because different people 
wanted to bring in their preferred experts.83  
 
Guided by the assessment reports, the DNR developed five alternative management strategies 
(Figure 8-4). The alternatives ranged from a “no action” scenario, Alternative 1, to establish 
a baseline for comparison, to a “restoration” scenario, Alternative 5, that eliminated 
commercial logging in the watershed. Alternative 2 implemented the recommendations 
contained in the 2000 legislation. Alternative 3 added additional non-logging areas and the 
protection of cultural resources. Alternative 4 further reduced logging areas and increased 
harvest rotation age. Alternatives 3 and 4 were plans proposed by the Committee. The 
alternatives were analyzed by scientists, foresters, geologists and engineers, who were 
primarily employees of DNR. The alternatives were also included in the DNR’s Preliminary 














Alternative 1 (No Action): This alternative incorporates the Department’s existing policies, legal 
requirements and management commitments, including but not limited to the Forest Resource Plan, Forest 
Practice Rules and Habitat Conservation Plan. This alternative is consistent with the Tier 3 alternative 
identified in DNR’s statewide sustainable harvest calculation. 
 
Alternative 2: Legislative Requirements. This alternative adds the legislative requirements of E2SSB 6731 
[2000 Washington Laws Chapter 205] to the No Action alternative. It reduces the geographic area available 
for active forest management.  
 
Alternative 3: First Alternative to #2. This alternative, developed by the Committee, further reduces the 
geographic area available for active forest management, increases the number of trees retained after harvest 
and lengthens the harvest rotation age. It also increases the coordination with tribes to protect cultural 
resources.  
 
Alternative 4: Second Alternative to #2. This is the second alternative developed by the Committee. It further 
reduces the geographic area available for active forest management and further increases the trees retained and 
harvest rotation age. 
 
Alternative 5: Restoration Alternative. This alternative was developed by the Committee in response to 
comments received earlier during the public scoping process. This alternative pursues a restoration approach 
that focuses on restoring older-forest conditions, with limited, short-term silvicultural activities, and that relies 
on non-traditional means of securing alternative revenue to meet the trust revenue objectives. 
 
Source: Lake Whatcom Landscape Plan Preliminary Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Washington State 
Department of Natural Resources, http://www.dnr.wa.gov/htdocs/agency/whatcom/index.html. 
 
After receiving public comment on the Preliminary Draft Environmental Impact Statement, 
the DNR and the Committee met five times in 2003 between January and April to negotiate a 
so-called “Preferred Alternative” for the Draft Environmental Impact Statement.84 The 
Preferred Alternative put forth in the DEIS was a compromise between Alternative 2 and 
Alternative 3. It contained all of the provisions outlined in the 2000 legislation, which 
included “adding buffers to Type 5 streams, prohibiting road construction on unstable slopes, 
carefully regulating harvest and road construction on potentially unstable slopes, and 
providing interjurisdictional review of site-specific activities.”85 To accomplish the last 
objective, a new Interjurisdictional Committee would be formed to monitor on-going site 
specific activities (herein referred to as the Implementation Committee). This 
Implementation Committee would ensure that future management activities in the watershed 
were consistent with the plan.  
 
In addition to the legislative requirements, the Preferred Alternative included a commitment 
by the DNR to establish agreements with the local tribes to protect cultural resources and to 
provide tribes access to the watershed. In the plan the DNR also committed to completing 
road abandonment and maintenance within four years of the effective date of the plan and to 
eliminating aerial application of pesticides and fertilizers.86 The Preferred Alternative 
enjoyed consensus support from the Committee and the DNR. Tom Edwards of the Lummi 
Nation remembers that the Preferred Alternative “was the one they could live with and we 
could live with.”87 




On January 30, 2004, the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), which included the 
Lake Whatcom Landscape Plan, was approved and released to the public. With the release of 
the FEIS, the Committee’s work came to an official conclusion.  
 
Two areas of contention remained after the release of the FEIS. The first issue was about 
whether the Implementation Committee should have veto power over the DNR concerning 
future management activities in the watershed, such as a timber sale. The DNR argued that 
the Implementation Committee should be advisory. While the issue caused the Committee to 
fail to reach consensus for the first time, a majority of the Committee disagreed with the 
DNR, arguing in favor of veto power. The issue of veto power represented the only item for 
which the Committee did not reach a consensus. The second issue related to diagonal oil and 
gas drilling, a process that drilling underneath the watershed by starting from outside its 
boundaries. The Committee’s consensus recommendation was that diagonal drilling should 
be prohibited in the watershed. However, the DNR did not consent to this recommendation. 
In the FEIS, the Preferred Alternative allowed for slant drilling and left the question of veto 
power of the Implementation Committee over the DNR unclear. 
 
For a long period of time, there was no indication from the Board of Natural Resources 
whether the Landscape Plan contained in the FEIS would be approved. According to one 
Committee member, the Committee believed that the process was stalled because the 
Commissioner did not want to approve the plan.88 The Committee met and discussed its 
options. Committee members decided if the Board did not approve the plan, legal action 
should be taken. Shortly thereafter, the city sent a letter to Commissioner Sutherland stating 
that they would file a lawsuit if the plan was not adopted.89 On October 21, 2004, the city, 
county and water district filed a lawsuit to force the Commissioner to adopt the plan.90 An 
editorial by the Bellingham Herald reported that “there were suspicions that Doug 
Sutherland, the state's Public Lands Commissioner, was going to try and sink the plan and 
possibly sell or trade the state's property around the lake.”91 
 
On November 2, 2004, the day of statewide elections, including a vote for Public Lands 
Commissioner, the Board of Natural Resources passed Resolution No. 1141, authorizing the 
DNR to implement the plan. Several members of the Committee and the Mayor of 
Bellingham accused the Commissioner of playing politics by waiting until election day to 
sign the plan.92 Those making this accusation believed that approving the plan prior to the 
election would have cost Commissioner Sutherland support from timber interests. 
Nevertheless, the city dropped its lawsuit against to force implementation of the plan. The 
Board addressed the two remaining unresolved issues between the DNR and the Committee 
by deciding that the Implementation Committee would not have veto power and by putting 
off a decision about slant drilling for up to two years to allow for additional information to be 
provided to the DNR for its reconsideration of the issue. 
 
Several aspects of the Board approval process and the resolution left Committee members 
upset. First, several of the Committee members were angry with how the DNR presented the 
Landscape Plan to the Board of Natural Resources. According to one Committee member, 
not all members of the Committee were asked to participate, and the DNR was said to have 
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talked mostly about the loss of revenue to the trust that would occur from implementing the 
plan.93 Second, some Committee members were upset about how the Board resolved the 
issue surrounding the Implementation Committee. A majority of the Committee had wanted 
the Implementation Committee to have veto power, but the Board did not grant the 
Implementation Committee this authority. 
 
In addition, according to a Committee member, the DNR made a change to the plan 
concerning how members of the Implementation Committee would be chosen without the 
Committee’s input. The Committee believed when it delivered its consensus 
recommendation that the county, city and water district would each be allowed to appoint a 
member of the Implementation Committee and that the DNR would be allowed to appoint 
two members. Referring back to the original language of the bill, the DNR insisted that it 
would be able to pick who from the county, city and water district would be put on the 
Committee. The Commissioner asked each group to nominate two individuals. Once 
submitted, he would pick one from each set of nominations. The DNR emphasized that it 
wanted technical experts on the Committee. Commissioner Sutherland commented: “If we 
were going to take advice, we wanted it from experts.”94 In the end, the Committee felt that 
the process for determining membership was fair, but that it was not the process to which 
they had agreed. 
 
Committee members were not the only ones raising issues with the outcome; the Board had 
its misgivings with the plan as well. In the Resolution, the Board raised concerns over the 
“the balance of costs and benefits of implementing the plan, in relation to the state’s fiduciary 
responsibilities to manage for the trust beneficiaries.”95 The Board also expressed concerns 
about the “equity of locally enjoyed benefits at the expense of statewide trusts that must pay 




Despite these concerns expressed by the Board, the DNR began implementing the plan. In its 
first implementation report, the DNR reported completing a Road Maintenance and 
Abandonment Implementation Plan, well before the 2016 deadline required by state forest 
practice law. In addition, the DNR is currently planning its first timber sale since the 
moratorium on logging began in 1998. The sale was approved by the Implementation 
Committee. 
In January 2005, a lawsuit was filed by neighboring Skagit County and the Mount Baker 
School District in Lake Whatcom County challenging the legality of the plan. The lawsuit 
alleges that the legislation and the DNR’s Landscape Plan resulted in benefits for the local 
community at the expense of trust beneficiaries. In the previously decided case, County of 
Skamania v. State, the court found that the legislature could not enact laws that benefited the 
local economy and the timber industry at the expense of trust beneficiaries.97 As of April 






THE ANALYSIS: THE LAKE WHATCOM LANDSCAPE PLANNING PROCESS 
 
This section identifies and discusses the benefits, costs, challenges, facilitating factors and 
lessons learned associated with the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process. This 
analysis is based on stakeholder observations and reflections, as well as the researchers’ 
external evaluation. 
The analysis begins with an in-depth look at whether the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning 
Process was collaborative based on the breadth of stakeholders represented, the transparency 
of the process and the level of influence participants had over the outcome. 
 
Next, the benefits and costs of the process are examined. The main benefits of the process 
included more protective watershed management standards, greater trust and respect, shared 
expertise and better informed decisions, improved relationships, local support for the 
landscape plan and an unintended benefit: cultural resources protection. The costs involved 
planning costs, a reduction in trust revenue compared to the “no action” alternative, a drain 
on peoples’ time and personal and emotional costs. 
 
Next, challenges and responses to those challenges are identified. The primary challenges 
identified included the dispute over decision-making authority, mistrust between the 
Committee and the DNR, time delays/impasses and the influence of contentious state and 
local politics.  
 
Challenges and response is followed by a discussion of facilitating factors. The facilitating 
factors included legal and financial incentives to proceed, a clear sense of purpose aligned 
with organizational goals, a commitment by local participants and professional facilitation. 
 
Finally, the analysis concludes with a look at the key lessons learned. The most important 
lessons from the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process are to include the full range of 
stakeholders, to hire a facilitator when one appears needed, to set realistic timelines, to 
implement ground rule for overcoming disagreements, to let stakeholders help define the 
process, to make decision making authority clear and to share ownership of expert-based 
analyses. 
 
WAS THE LAKE WHATCOM LANDSCAPE PLANNING PROCESS COLLABORATIVE? 
 
In assessing the degree of collaboration in this case, one should consider whether the 
appropriate breadth of stakeholders were included, whether the process was transparent to the 
public and among participants and whether the participants had influence over the outcome. 
It is also helpful to consider the participants’ own views about whether the process was 
collaborative and to put the process in context by considering more broadly the DNR’s 
attitude towards collaboration and the unique legal mandate that brought about the planning 
process.  
 
Despite occasions of conflict and disagreements over certain issues, especially over decision-
making authority, the process was collaborative in terms of breadth of stakeholders, 
transparency and the level of influence participants had over the outcome. After 
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consideration of these factors and participants’ own view about the process, it is evident that 
the process was collaborative.  
 
Attitude of the DNR towards Collaboration 
 
DNR publications and conversations with officials at the DNR at the highest level indicate 
that the agency looks upon collaborative planning favorably. According to the DNR’s 
website, one of the agency’s core principles is “inclusive decision making.”98 To this end, the 
DNR endeavors to consider local input in its management decisions, and it must do so by law 
in situations requiring an Environmental Impact Statement. When asked about collaboration, 
Commissioner Doug Sutherland stated that collaborative planning with multiple stakeholders 
is “money spent up front so that you don’t have to spend it on the back end. A lot of times 
you get much greater acceptance by the local community.”99 According to Bruce Mackie, the 
DNR’s Lands Steward, collaboration is a necessity in natural resource management: 
 
In land management in this day and age, if you don’t have an open process, if 
you don’t have a public process, if you don’t get people involved … if you 
cram a solution down the public’s throat, then your ability to operate in the 
future is compromised. We use the Cooperative Resource Management Plan, 
it’s a formulized manual for how to do collaborative planning.100 
 
A Legal Mandate to Collaborate 
 
The law passed in 2000 required the DNR, in its development of the Lake Whatcom 
Landscape Plan, to consult with an Interjurisdictional Committee that included members of 
the public. Because of this legislative mandate, the degree of collaboration was questioned by 
some of the participants. Richard Rodriguez of the Department of Health noted that “it would 
not have happened in my mind if there was not a legislative mandate to do it.”101 Bill 
McCourt, the city’s representative, put it more bluntly, “It wasn’t a group getting together 
because they all had a common interest. DNR had a gun to their head.”102 But despite their 
motives for being there, the DNR participated in the process, one that was deliberately set up 
to be collaborative, and they did so according to several Committee members in good faith 
and with professionalism. In the same train of thought, McCourt continued by saying, “But to 
their credit they have done a really good job with it. Bill Wallace was terrific. Their 
facilitators did a good job. Overall, I am impressed with the DNR people.”103 
 
Participant Views on the Degree of Collaboration 
 
Responses were mixed as to the degree to which the process was collaborative, but most 
participants believed that it was. Despite tension over roles, Wallace noted that the work was 
collaborative: “There was always some tension about what they [the Committee] wanted to 
have done and what role they wanted to play, but taken in its whole, in terms of the work 
done, it was very collaborative.”104 However, Alan Soicher did not feel it was as 
collaborative as it could have been. He noted: “We were hoping that it would have been more 
collaborative where everyone would come up with something together, rather than reacting 
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to proposals.”105 Despite these concerns, most of those involved in the case felt it was 
collaborative. Mary Dumas, one of the facilitators, noted:  
 
They informed one another about why they felt strongly about certain 
approaches in order to find a common way to represent their interests in a 
Landscape Plan. In that sense, it was a true example of collaboration. It was 
really about drawing together what is common and what is possible, in 
comparison to what we call, in the old school, “deal making.” The spirit and 
sense all along was collaborative.106  
 
Tom Edwards viewed the process as collaborative and appreciated that the tribes were 
included, stating that “we had a voice in the process. Usually, the tribes don’t even get 
notified until the 11th hour when something like this occurs.”107 
 
Breadth of Stakeholders: Several Committee members and the DNR acknowledged that 
industry representation was missing from the Committee. Today, the DNR feels strongly that 
the Committee was not fully representational.108 In hindsight, current DNR officials felt that 
the group should have had representation from forest industry, local economic interests and 
local school districts; however, most of the debate focuses on whether commercial forestry 
interests should have had a seat at the table.109 Wallace noted: “From a definition standpoint, 
it did not meet the collaborative test for representation, not as a self-contained committee. 
Industry was missing, as well as more community members, homeowner groups and 
recreational groups, such as hikers and horseback riders. Nobody on the Committee was 
representing their interests.”110 
 
However, it should be noted that at the time of the Committee’s creation, it was 
Commissioner Belcher’s decision not to include commercial foresters on the Committee and 
that nothing in the legislation prevented her from including them. In addition, according to 
Wallace, “When Commissioner Sutherland came on board, industry again asked for a seat at 
the table. The DNR’s decision was again no, since the Committee’s work was well down the 
road at that point; instead, the DNR would continue to gather industry input from other 
processes. We meet offline from the Committee meetings with the community quite 
regularly.”111 On this topic, Alan Soicher commented that “potentially, industry was missing, 
but DNR was bringing that perspective to the table. It was missing physically on the 
Committee but DNR was pursuing forest management in as wise as a way as they could. I 
don’t think it would have changed the resulting Landscape Plan.”112 
 
Degree of Transparency: According to those interviewed, the process was sufficiently 
transparent to the public. The meetings were open to the public and Committee documents 
were distributed to interested parties. Reporters from the press often attended Committee 
meetings and several stories about the process were run in the local newspaper. In addition, 
because an EIS was conducted, several meetings were held specifically to gain public input. 
In addition to transparency to the public, the group strived to keep decision making 
transparent to one another. The “no surprises” ground rule ensured that Committee members 
shared their concerns or new information with each other before going to the press; although, 
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one member remarked when asked about the rule that “people were surprised by the DNR at 
times.”113 
 
Degree of Influence on Decision Making: DNR officials felt strongly that they and the 
Board of Natural Resources were the ultimate decision makers in the process; nonetheless, 
many participants in the planning process felt like they had a good deal of influence over the 
Landscape Plan. Wallace noted: “We can’t abandon our responsibilities to be trust managers 
… we are the ones statutorily responsible. We cannot give that away to others.”114 Despite 
the DNR’s insistence on making the final decisions, the Committee still felt that they had a 
significant impact on the outcome. Had the Committee not felt they could affect the outcome, 
it is unlikely that they would have stuck with it after the Attorney General released his 
opinion that the Committee would be advisory only. Richard Rodriguez, the Department of 
Health official, noted that “because it was a consensus based process they [the Committee] 
very much had an influence on what was put forward. In that regard, they had a great deal of 
influence.”115 Because the consensus represented the opinions not only of local community 
members but also representatives from state and local government, one could imagine that 
the DNR likely felt a certain sense of agency peer pressure to accept the Committee’s 
recommendations. However, the influence of the public should not be discounted. On this 
subject, Bill McCourt commented: 
 
I worked for 31 years for the city of Bellingham, and I have watched how 
things work within the agencies. For the most part, we seem to work to protect 
the status quo. We do not do a very good job with leadership. We really owe 
most of what happens in situations like this to people like Linda Marrom and 
Jamie Berg, people that are on the outside of the organization who somehow 
get this idea burning in their mind that they are willing to do what it takes and 
stick it out and challenge the professionals and the status quo. It’s amazing 
how much impact they can have. They are the ones that effect change. The 




While the planning process was an emotional rollercoaster and while it is too early to say 
whether the plan will be fully implemented and stand up to legal challenges, the Committee 
members and local DNR staff identified several positive outcomes. The main benefits 
included more protective watershed management standards, greater trust and respect between 
the DNR and the community, shared expertise and better informed decisions, improved 
relationships, local support for the Landscape Plan and cultural resources protection.  
 
More Protective Watershed Management Standards 
 
From a technical standpoint, the Landscape Plan included protective measures that would not 






• An accelerated road abandonment and management plan 
• Elimination of road building on unstable slopes 
• Carefully regulated logging and road construction on potentially unstable slopes 
• Stream buffers on all types of streams including Type Five, the smallest classification 
of streams 
• The elimination of aerially applied fertilizers or herbicides 
• A sustained yield harvest model consistent with the statewide sustainable harvest plan  
• Identification of cultural resources and strategies to protect them  
 
While the DNR acknowledged that these measures would further reduce risk of impairments 
to water quality and slope instability, they also emphasized that following existing laws and 
practices would have had “no probable significant impacts to either water quality or slope 
stability.”117 Some also pointed out that many of these measures listed above were required 
by the 2000 legislation.118 However, others felt it was a success to have been able to sustain 
the consensus support necessary to include these provisions in the plan.  
Some questioned to what extent the sustained yield harvest plan achieved an improvement in 
forestry practices. Soicher commented: “There are two levels of it: 1) where to log and where 
not to log and 2) how to log. We answered the first question pretty well, but the plan still 
calls for sixty-year rotations and even-age harvest management [clear-cutting] … I wouldn’t 
consider it long-term sustainable forestry.”119 Despite some remaining disagreement by 
Committee members over the success of the plan, the city of Bellingham welcomed the plan 
with enthusiasm.120 
 
Greater Trust and Respect 
 
Overall, it appeared that the process helped restore trust between the DNR and the 
community, though trust was eroded when it appeared that the Board would not approve the 
plan. When the DNR began building roads above Sudden Valley, mistrust between the 
community and the DNR was at its peak, primarily because the DNR had failed to develop a 
Landscape Plan for the watershed six years after agreeing to do so. Wallace recalls: “Our 
reputation frankly had been damaged.”121 By engaging in the planning process with the 
Committee and inviting public input throughout the process, the DNR felt that they had 
begun to reestablish trust with the community and to build mutual respect. Wallace recounts 
“there was more mutual understanding, respect and to some degree trust” after the planning 
process. 122 
 
One factor that contributed to the rebuilding of trust was that the local community and the 
Committee developed a better understanding of the DNR’s trust obligations and existing 
forestry policies. This new awareness may have dispelled any feelings that the DNR’s actions 
were intentionally harmful. Senator Spanel remarked, “Some people saw the DNR in a light 
they hadn’t before … as very reasonable people and realized [the DNR] had to follow the 
law.”123 
 
However, the DNR recognized that restoring trust was not something that would happen 
overnight or without consistent behavior in the future. Wallace stated: “There is still a lot of 
mistrust and skepticism by some of the members about what the department will do now, 
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what our motives are.”124 Other Committee members expressed similar feelings. Rodriguez 
commented: “There was mistrust about DNR following through with the recommendation in 
the final document.”125  
 
Shared Expertise and More Informed Decisions 
 
The Committee and the various experts called upon during the process provided the DNR 
with a wealth of outside scientific information and practical knowledge that ultimately led to 
more informed decision making. In a report to the legislature, the DNR stated that the 
process brought forth “the best available information to make forest management 
decisions.”126 Wallace put it this way: “There was a lot of information shared. We learned 
from each other … as we got input, ultimately, the recommendations from the Committee 
were as informed as they could be over this period of time.”127 
 
Representatives from the Departments of Health, Ecology and Fish and Wildlife each 
brought their specific knowledge and expertise to the planning process, while the local 
authorities and citizens, including the tribes, brought local knowledge and an understanding 
of the needs of the local community. One Committee member later stated that there was “a 
good team of experts on the Committee.”128 Alan Soicher, the public representative, was a 
geologist with forest management experience and an education in geological engineering and 
water quality. Soicher quickly earned respect among group members because of his technical 
knowledge of forestry issues.129 Richard Rodriguez, the Department of Health’s 
representative, said that Soicher “provided the counter points to the DNR forestry specialists. 
Without him the Committee would have been at a loss in terms of getting another 
interpretation of forestry practices.”130  
 
Others brought important expertise as well. Steve Hood added water quality knowledge as 
the official responsible for the TMDL process for Lake Whatcom. In addition, he was trained 
as a forest engineer and had seven years of experience with a private timber company. The 
Whatcom County representative, Dan McShane, brought his experience as a geologist to the 
table. As the grandson of the tribe’s spiritual healer and a member of the tribe’s “Way of 
Life” Committee that shaped policy to protect traditional tribal ways of life, Tom Edwards 
Jr., the Lummi Nation representative, had deep knowledge of cultural and archeological 
resources in the watershed.131 He took a holistic view to protecting the watershed, stating that 
“everything is connected: the plants, land, the water and the animals … if you disrupt one, 




Most Committee members agreed that relationships among the participants in the process 
developed for the better, despite very different viewpoints about appropriate management of 
the watershed. Rodriguez commented that during a collaborative process, “you develop 
personal relationships whether you like each other or not.”133 Similarly, Clare Fogelsong, 
who represented the city of Bellingham, remarked that the process “builds this odd sense of 
camaraderie with people you would never do anything else with. If you come in and you 
 
 245
speak to the issues and you are trustworthy, there is a certain amount of cache that gets built 
up.”134 
The DNR believed its relations with other state agencies and local governments improved, 
especially with the Department of Ecology and the Lummi Nation. Edwards agreed, noting 
that in the past there had been miscommunications between the DNR and the Lummi Nation, 
but that now the relationship is stronger.135 He credited the Lake Whatcom Landscape Plan 
planning process for the improved relationship.136 
 
Local DNR staff and other Committee members also acknowledged that the relationships 
built during the planning process would make working together with the local community 
and other state agencies more productive in the future. According to Rodriguez, the 
Department of Health’s water quality department relies heavily on cooperation with local 
stakeholders in its everyday work.137 Therefore, he noted, “there were intangible benefits 
from participating at that level with other agencies, the local community and the local 
utilities.”138 The group’s facilitator recognized this benefit as well: “It creates another whole 
environment for them to work together in the future because they have a relationship built on 
real information … These folks are going to have an ongoing relationship for years to come. 
They’ll be able to have a conversation in the future when there is a timber sale in the 
watershed.”139 Edwards believes that because of his participation in the planning process, the 
city of Bellingham will be better able to address concerns of the Lummi Nation. He noted: 
“Now we [the Lummi Nation] are working with the city of Bellingham and the Port of 
Bellingham on the Bellingham Waterway Project ... we are going to go through the same 
process to show them cultural and archeological resources in the areas where they are going 
to be doing a lot of the clean up.”140 
 
Local Support for The Landscape Plan  
 
The process resulted in greater local acceptance of DNR activities in the community. The 
DNR does not think it would have been able to move forward with its most recent timber sale 
in the watershed without the ability to stand behind a plan that included community 
involvement.141 Soicher agreed, noting that “had they done that without having this plan, 
without the local endorsement, DNR would have a really hard time logging [in the 
watershed]. That is a benefit.”142 The DNR was able to educate the community about their 
trust mandate and the important role state trust land in the Lake Whatcom watershed played 
in generating revenue for trust beneficiaries. As a result, the community more clearly 
understood that timber harvesting could go hand in hand with watershed protection. This 
understanding represented a return to the opinion, expressed at the time of DNR’s land 
exchange with Trillium Corporation, that logging was a preferable land use in the watershed. 
 
This sense that the community would support the DNR’s timber activity because of 
community involvement in the Landscape Plan was articulated shortly after the plan’s release 
in an article in the Bellingham Herald: 
 
Citizens have to step up too and accept that logging around the lake is not 
only a reality, but also a preferred land use. Despite the years of work and 
public discussion about this plan, when the chainsaws start and the logging 
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trucks begin rolling, one can almost predict there will be members of this 
community up in arms about it. Our wonderful county is far from immune 
from "not-in-my-backyardism." But everyone in this county should back the 
careful logging plans that were ironed out over four hard years for the Lake 
Whatcom Watershed. It's frankly quite nice to see so much public hard work 
finally pay off in a way that should be beneficial to the community.143 
 
An Unintended Benefit: Cultural Resources Protection 
 
Several group members agreed that one of the Committee’s most significant achievements 
was the plan’s identification of cultural and archeological resources in the watershed and the 
development of strategies to achieve protection of those resources (primarily those of the 
Lummi Nation, the Nooksack Tribe and the Samish Indian Tribe). As a result of the planning 
process, the DNR will develop agreements with local tribes that establish a consultation 
process, cultural resource protection measures and tribal access to those resources. 
 
The Committee believed that this element of the plan was significant because it resulted 
entirely from the planning process. The protection of cultural resources was an unexpected 
benefit of the group’s work because it was not identified in the 1999 or the 2000 legislation. 
The Committee expressed a real sense of pride for these new measures to protect an 
otherwise overlooked resource in the watershed. Rodriguez commented:  
 
For me the most significant element that came out was the tribal involvement 
as a government entity. There was a totally new element introduced: the 
cultural resources. Spots for ceremonies and purity bathing were identified. 
They did not have to tell us exactly where they were. Instead the entire area 
would come out of the mix. The tribal participation was very unique. The 
status quo is that tribes review timber sales. This made a recognition of tribal 
resources more prominent than usual.144 
 
Soicher expressed similar praise: “Cultural resources are identified in the plan. There is a 
matrix for what kind of protection you provide for different types of resources. It is 
somewhat unique … That is progress.” The DNR agreed that its relationship and reputation 
with tribes improved and that “strategies and resource information in the plan will be very 




The most common success discussed was that the group was able to bring the Landscape 
Plan to completion without anyone leaving the table. Edwards commented, “We came up 
with good recommendations and we stuck together.”146 Not only was the plan completed but 
the group reached consensus on all but one issue in its recommendations to the DNR. Dumas 
noted: “The recommendation that they delivered had consensus on all major points. That was 
one of their big accomplishments.”147 The Committee believed that success came not only 
from reaching consensus but also from how it was reached. Success included understanding 
one another’s viewpoints. Senator Spanel, who attended several of the meetings, observed: 
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“Successes came in their discussions when they would understand each others 
viewpoints.”148 Others felt that the group’s dedication and willingness to compromise made it 
a success. According to Rodriguez, “the group was willing to learn new information and they 
were committed enough to make the effort to be prepared for every meeting. I’d say that is a 
prerequisite of an effective group. They have to be willing to compromise. They cannot be 




The process included a number of costs both monetary and non-monetary, including 
approximately $1.2 million in planning costs, reduced future revenue from timber production 




The DNR reported that preparing the EIS and the Lake Whatcom Management Plan cost the 
agency approximately $800,000.150 This figure does not include costs incurred by Committee 
members, such as salaries for members from other state agencies and local authorities and 
wages given up by voluntary members. While an estimate has not been calculated to account 
for costs incurred by the Committee, one could calculate a rough estimate of the costs of the 
time spent by Committee members as follows. The Committee met 37 times, not including 
the public hearings they attended. Assuming an average of ten hours per meeting (five hours 
of preparation and five hours of actual meeting time - some meetings lasted all day and were 
convened during work hours) and that all nine members of the Committee were in attendance 
at every meeting, the process required 3,330 hours of the Committee’s time. Assuming a 
billing rate of $120 per hour for state and city employees (an estimate provided by a state 
agency employee for the state agency staff level represented at Committee meetings) and $50 
per hour for public citizens (case writer estimate), the planning process costs approximately 
$350,000 in salary opportunity costs. Combined with the DNR’s planning costs of $800,000, 
total expenditures for the planning process were approximately $1.2 million. 
 
According to DNR officials, the costs incurred by the DNR will be borne by all state trust 
land beneficiaries. The $800,000 was deducted from the DNR’s general state lands 
management account, which means that beneficiaries, not just those whose trust land is 
contained in the planning area, incur the plan’s development costs.151 In addition, the DNR 
estimates that it will incur costs of an additional $800,000 from implementation of the plan 
over the next two decades.152 According to a DNR official, these costs will also be deducted 
from the general state lands management account which will again impact all of the state 
trust beneficiaries. The 1999 legislation required trust beneficiaries to be compensated for 
additional management costs related solely to protecting drinking water quality.153 These 
management costs, however, may help avoid much larger costs in the future that could arise 






Reduced Timber Revenue 
 
Most significantly, the DNR estimates that because of logging restrictions in the Landscape 
Plan, the area will generate about half the revenue that would have been generated without 
the plan. The plan’s requirements beyond current rules and regulations resulted in an increase 
in land taken out of commercial forest management, causing a reduction of 35 percent in the 
planning area’s asset value based on future earnings from logging.154 The Final 
Environmental Impact Statement reported lost revenue to trust beneficiaries as follows: 
 
The projected revenues generated through implementation of the FEIS 
Preferred Alternative would be significantly lower than those estimated for the 
No Action Alternative. For the entire 200-year modeled planning period it is 
estimated that revenues under the Preferred Alternative would total 
$177,210,000, a reduction of $160,182,000 from the anticipated revenues of 
$337,392,000 under the No Action Alternative.155 
 





In addition to monetary costs, the process required a significant commitment of time by all of 
those involved. Excluding the work of the Study Committee after the 1999 legislation, the 
Committee met 37 times usually for a full day over three and a half years. Bill Wallace, the 
DNR regional manager, added that the process caused his team to spend a lot of its personal 
time on the project with much of the work on weekends, and it caused the DNR to ignore 
others important issues.156 However, Senator Spanel noted that “it took a long time, but it 
was a very fair process. Everybody got their say.”157  
 
Personal and Emotional Costs 
 
The process was emotionally and personally draining for several participants. Wallace 
commented, “You’ve got folks that are yelling at you from all directions. It’s tough on 
staff.”158 He added that the process took an “enormous personal toll on staff, me included.”159 
Edwards also felt the process was difficult emotionally. On one occasion, he noted that an 
upper-level DNR staff member did not believe him when he said that a road under 
construction in the area was going to destroy tribal petroglyphs. According to Edwards: 
 
There was a time when I had to walk out of a meeting. The DNR staff, an 
upper staff member, treated me with disrespect. That is a slap in the face not 
only to me but to Lummi Nation. I said [the petroglyphs] were there. [The 
DNR staff member] said they were not there. The DNR laws are that we don’t 
have to show them exactly where cultural resources are located, but this time 
we did. They said, “Okay, we saw it.” We said, “Don’t let anyone else know.” 
Everyone agreed we should put the road through the corner of a wetland to 
save a petroglyph that was about 4,000 years old. There were only two people 
 
 249
at Lummi and two people at DNR who knew about those petroglyphs. By the 
time we got back, those petroglyphs were chiseled out. There was a historical 
mask in a cave too that we showed them. It was also stolen. Our relationship 
was pretty shaken with them.160 
 
BENEFITS VERSUS COSTS 
 
The issue of benefits and costs remains a very contentious subject. Wallace observed, 
“Frankly, based on the analysis, [the plan] is characterized as high costs to the trust 
beneficiaries and relatively low benefits in terms of water quality and slope stability based on 
our analysis.”161 Some of the Committee members remarked that the DNR’s estimates for 
lost revenue to the trust increased with each meeting and were unreliable. Linda Marrom 
remarked, “The loss to the trust got bigger with every meeting. Any time we had a public 
meeting, the number would just skyrocket. It got to the point where you’d expect them the 
next time to say, ‘It’s going to cost another 250 gazillion billion dollars.’ Their statistical 
information was hysterical.”162 Another critique of the calculations for the loss of trust value 
concerns the baseline for comparison. The loss is based on a comparison to the “No Action” 
alternative, which assumes management according to existing policies, legal requirements 
and management commitments. Considering the moratorium on logging that was in place 
prior to the planning process, one could argue that a no logging scenario better represented 
the baseline. If this were the case, then the Landscape Plan would represent a gain of $177 
million in trust value. 
 
It is also important to note that several methods from the field of economics exist to value 
benefits of non-market goods that a protected watershed might provide; however, there is no 
record of attempts by the DNR or the Committee to quantify in dollars the benefits resulting 
from the plan.163 Therefore, there is not enough information to compare benefits versus costs 
in a fashion that would allow one to arrive at the net benefits to society of the plan as a 
whole.  
 
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 
 
The Committee faced several challenges during the planning process that slowed progress 
and increased tensions. The key challenges included a long dispute over the decision-making 
authority of the Committee, mistrust between the Committee and the DNR, the influence of 
contentious politics and time delays. 
 
Decision-making Authority of the Committee Disputed 
 
A dispute over the decision-making authority of the Committee lingered during the early 
years of the process, slowing its progress. There was disagreement from the beginning over 
whether DNR was a member of the Committee or whether the Committee was advisory to 
the DNR. The issue pertained to who had the authority to develop the Landscape Plan. While 
the Committee initially conducted its work without resolving this question, the issue reached 
a boiling point when the DNR decided to conduct an Environmental Impact Statement to 
obtain additional scientific information and broader public input. Some members of the 
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group felt that the DNR’s decision to conduct an EIS was an attempt to weaken the influence 
of the Committee. In response to this challenge, the group decided to seek an opinion from 
the Attorney General, as to what the Committee’s role was. The Attorney General responded 
that the Committee was advisory and that the DNR had decision-making authority. 
 
Mistrust between the Committee and the DNR 
 
Mistrust between the Committee and the DNR led to problematic attitudes of parties towards 
each other. The mistrust stemmed from the DNR’s history in the watershed. Local citizens 
felt some hostility towards the DNR for not fulfilling its original promise to complete a 
Landscape Plan for the watershed after taking over ownership from the Trillium Corporation. 
Hostilities culminated in 1998 when the DNR began road construction above Sudden Valley.  
Because the DNR was required by law to participate in the collaborative planning process, 
the historic mistrust carried over to the negotiating table. While the lead DNR official, Bill 
Wallace, was respected by the group members and known for his high degree of 
professionalism, some viewed him as representing the old line of professional DNR foresters 
“who think they are the only ones who ought to be making decisions about forest 
practices.”164At the same time, the DNR may have viewed the Committee with some degree 
of suspicion or resentment, considering that the Committee was formed without the DNR’s 
input to serve as a quasi watch-dog group over DNR planning activities. The DNR had also 
been put on the defensive by the moratorium on logging activities and the threat of further 
legislation. 
 
Although the early proceedings seemed headed in the right direction, the lack of trust became 
apparent again following the DNR’s decision to conduct an Environmental Impact Statement. 
Some members of the Committee felt the EIS was the DNR’s way of exerting its control over 
the process and diluting the influence of the Committee by putting its recommendations on 
equal footing with public comments. Also, the Committee and DNR appeared even more 
suspicious of one another when the debate over peer review of assessment reports broke out. 
Looking back, Alan Soicher, one of the public members on the Committee, commented, 
“Had it happened [peer review], maybe some of the provisions for stream buffers may have 
been questioned for inconsistency with best available science. The standards for stream 
buffers would have been higher. Peer review likely would have caught that.”165 
 
Mistrust also sharply reentered the picture after the DNR made changes to the FEIS and 
Board Resolution that were not consistent with the consensus agreement reached by the 
Committee. Senator Spanel said: “[The process] was fair until I found out that the Board 
could do whatever they wanted … those persons weren’t involved in the whole process they 
didn’t know the compromises that had been reached by that point.”166 
 
The Influence of Contentious State and Local Politics 
 
A challenge noted by Wallace and several others was the political nature of the whole 
process. Those involved with the process at the time of the 1999 legislation accused the DNR 
of delaying its report to the legislature in order to prevent a second bill from being passed 
before the end of the 2000 legislative session.167 Also, when the legislation was being passed, 
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timber interests in the House inserted an amendment at the last minute that almost killed the 
2000 legislation and resulted in some of the disagreement over the role of the Committee.168 
 
Perhaps, the biggest effect of politics on the process was the change in Commissioner of 
Public Lands. Senator Spanel noted that “several of his [Doug Sutherland’s] staff started 
coming to all the meetings. There was a pressure of a whole new style present at the 
meetings.”169 The two Commissioners had contrasting political views and leadership styles. 
Commissioner Sutherland is a Republican with a strong record of fiscal management. 
Commissioner Belcher, a Democrat, was remembered as a strong environmentalist.  
 
At the time, the state seemed divided along similar political lines. Commissioner Doug 
Sutherland defeated Mike Lowry, the Democratic nominee, by a margin of just 3.3 percent in 
the 2000 election.170 While the State of Washington has voted for Democratic in each of the 
five presidential elections since Ronald Regan, Governor Christine O. Gregoire, a Democrat, 
won in the 2004 election by the narrowest margin in state history with just 133 votes after 
two recounts over her Republican opponent Dino Ross.171 
 
With a politically divided populous, interests compete on the management policies of the 
DNR in several ways. The Governor appoints a member of the Board of Natural Resources. 
In addition, the State Legislature controls the DNR budget and has legal authority over the 
agency. As of the 2004 election, the State Legislature has a majority of Democrats in both the 
Senate and the House. Bill Wallace noted that “There were some hands tied behind both of 
our backs from a political standpoint and expectations, which made it very difficult.”172 
 
Local politics also had a detrimental affect on the process. Part of the dispute over 
appointments to the Implementation Committee involved Dan McShane, a member of the 
Committee and a County Council member for Lake Whatcom County. When he was not 
chosen by the Commissioner to be a part of the Implementation Committee, some accused 
the DNR of political bias, because McShane’s wife, Lisa McShane, is a staff member of 
Conservation Northwest. Conservation Northwest, formerly known as the Northwest 
Ecosystem Alliance, is a local environmental group that had taken an interest in the Lake 
Whatcom process and had been active in supporting Commissioner Sutherland’s opponent in 
the past election.173 Conservation Northwest also provided financial support to Linda 
Marrom, one of the public members of the Committee. All of these interrelationships and 
political ties may have had made political divisions more distinct in Committee negotiations 
with the DNR. Finally, Ted W. Anderson, a member of the Board of Natural Resources, is 
one of the three County Commissioners from Skagit County responsible for the lawsuit 
against the Lake Whatcom Landscape Plan, although by the time he began his term on the 
Board the plan had already been approved. 
 
Time Delay and Impasses 
 
The Landscape Plan development process took longer than anticipated for a number of 
reasons. The EIS slowed the process because of public commenting periods and the 
sequential nature of the “preliminary,” “draft” and “final” EIS reports. The time delay 




The unfortunate thing in my mind is that it took forever to get to this point. It 
got to the point where people were asking what was going on. There was 
anxiety about the time it was taking. There was a lot of posturing. It could 
have been a lot easier had their not been so much of a tug-o-war going on.174 
 
Another reason the process was delayed was that there were points at which the Committee 
reached an impasse. For instance, the dispute over the relationship of the Committee and the 
DNR ultimately required an Attorney General opinion, which took several months. 
However, the Committee did find ways to get past deadlocks. Developing ground rules about 
how to reach consensus was one solution. These ground rules allowed for a cooling off 
period and required a minority and majority report if consensus was not reached. The 
minority report requirement meant that if someone disagreed with a decision, those in the 
minority would have to put their position in writing. On some occasions this caused people to 
change their vote and live with the decision. Steve Hood, the Department of Ecology 
representative, described the effects of this rule as follows:  
 
When it came down to a vote where we knew we wouldn’t have consensus, 
we knew someone would have to write the minority report opinion. If no one 
was willing to represent the minority, then why bother taking the vote if you 
are not going to put your minority opinion in there. If you don’t care enough 
to state why you are against it, why can’t you just say you can live with it. 
People would often say “I guess I could.”175 
 
Another approach for getting past impasses was to defer the issue to the Implementation 
Committee, the group that would oversee ongoing management in the watershed. Clare 
Fogelsong, a member of the Committee who represented the city of Bellingham, described it 
this way:  
 
I think for a lot of the impasses, like slope stability or buffers and what kind of 
limitations you put on future logging, the solution was to defer the issue to the 
[Implementation Committee] with the understanding that they would have the 
final voice about whether the cut went ahead. I think this is noteworthy. I 
think it actually worked out during this first round of implementation this 
year.176 
 
The hiring of facilitators also reduced the time spent at loggerheads. Wallace, the DNR 
regional manager, recalled that hiring facilitators “helped and there was more acceptance and 
ownership of the facilitators by the group.”177 Senator Spanel noted that hiring facilitators 
was “one of the best things that happened.”178 The facilitators helped the group come up with 
a unified voice so that DNR could respond to it. 
 
Finally, as relationships evolved, the group was able to help each other find ways to move 
past emotional disagreements. Rodriguez noted that: “When things got really heated and 
we’d have breaks … because of the personal involvement you could have a direct 
conversation with someone about how they were behaving. People would reflect and you 
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could see a change of behavior when we reconvened.”179 Edwards also noted that because of 
relationships he had built, he returned to negotiations after leaving the table. He recalled: 
“There were times when I walked out. Friends on the Committee would come out and tell me 




Several factors contributed to group’s decision to persevere despite moments of feeling like 
no end was in site. The primary factors that facilitated collaboration included legal and 
financial incentives to proceed, a clear sense of purpose aligned with organizational goals, 
commitment by local participants and professional facilitation. 
 
Legal Incentives to Proceed 
 
The 2000 legislation clearly stated that the DNR should develop a Landscape Plan in 
consultation with an Interjurisdictional Committee. In addition to this legal requirement to 
proceed with the planning process, the DNR felt that the plan had very high stakes. The plan 
had the potential to set a precedent for other communities. There was the threat of additional 
legislation requiring the DNR to complete the plan. And, there were threats of lawsuits from 
all sides. According to some, these legal considerations were a reason the DNR chose to 
continue its work. 
 
Financial Incentives to Proceed 
 
The moratorium on logging, which was imposed until the Landscape Plan was approved, 
provided a financial incentive for the DNR to participate. Similarly, the city and county 
wanted to see a completed management plan because without DNR management activity the 
forest in the watershed could become a liability to them in the form of public safety, risks to 
water quality and maintenance of public roads. That is, the city and county would have to 
bear the management costs. Wallace explained: “Once you lose the revenue that comes from 
it, then it becomes strictly a cost and liability for the DNR and the county. Even left in its 
natural state, these stream systems flush out and there are county roads and housing 
developments down below them. It’s not lost on [the county] that there is a cost of owning 
that land.”181 
 
Clear Sense of Purpose Aligned with Organizational Goals 
 
A key reason the group chose to proceed is that they felt there was a clear sense of purpose 
for participating that aligned with their organizations’ goals. Dumas described it this way:  
 
A clear sense of purpose helps make collaboration successful. People have to 
understand why they are there because it is going to take time. The level of 
investment it takes to understand someone else’s viewpoint is high. People 
have to see value in what they are doing. That will motivate them. This group 




In the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, there was a clear sense of purpose to 
protect water quality and public safety and these objectives were shared by all of the state 
agencies, local governments and community members involved. For example, the 
Department of Ecology’s participation aligned with its mission “to protect, preserve and 
enhance Washington's environment,” something, it can do more effectively by collaborating 
with the DNR, an agency that makes decisions over forest practices that can directly affect 
the air, land and water.183 Similarly, the Department of Health seeks to protect drinking water 
for the citizens of Washington, which can only be achieved if the management activities of 
the DNR seek to do the same. 
 
Commitment by Local Participants 
 
The group continued its efforts despite moments of frustration because of the high level of 
emotional commitment by local participants. Rodriguez noted: “The outcome of the effort 
would not have happened without the strong commitment of Linda Marrom. She was the soul 
of the group. She would have tirades. She’d go to the press. That level of emotion and 
commitment provided the continuity and emotional commitment to follow through.”184 Many 
others agreed that unless you have a dedicated local contingent that is willing to follow 
through, you are unlikely to be successful. Soicher also noted that the presence of public 
officials and the press elevated the group’s emotional commitment: “There were also elected 
officials there. It helped elevate the stature of the Committee. People felt the process was 




Several Committee members commented that the facilitators did an excellent job keeping the 
group on task and committed to following through. Fogelsong talked about how the 
facilitators’ work included “setting up the agenda, setting up the room, taking agenda 
comments, taking minutes and being in charge of the minutes.”186 He continued, saying that 
the facilitators were always “making sure there was a flow of communication, making sure 
no one could hide and not participate and, conversely, that no one dominated discussion, 
preventing other people from talking” and about how the facilitators had a way of “fading 
into the background but always being present.”187 Dumas reflected on the issues facing the 
Committee when she joined the process as facilitator: “When they realized that the DNR 
would not be a member of the Committee, it was important for them to ask themselves what 
they could achieve if they did come to a consensus.”188 Conversely, the facilitators pressed 




While several lessons can be learned from this case, the key lessons are described below. 
 
1. Include the full range of stakeholders to help create lasting decisions. 
 
Although an agreement had been reached on how forest industry concerns would be 
incorporated into the Committee’s planning efforts, in retrospect the Committee’s 
 
 255
recommendations would have been stronger in the long run had industry been represented on 
the Committee. On this point Senator Spanel commented: 
 
The timber industry was left out and maybe they should have been there, but 
what I do support, and I’ve seen it work well, is that everyone has to be at the 
table. If they are not a part of the whole process to come to a decision, it’s 
much easier for them to oppose it in the end. DNR has done a good job of 
representing industry, but [industry] would not have the ability to do a lot of 
complaining at the end if they would have had someone at the table.190 
 
2. If facilitation appears needed, bring it in early to avoid getting off track. 
 
If facilitation is necessary, bring it in early so that the group can continue work in a 
productive way. In this case, Soicher noted: “we should have had them [the facilitators] right 
from the start.”191 Another reason to seek outside facilitation is that in some cases it is 
difficult for a participant to serve both as the facilitator and a representative of a group that 
has a stake in the process. In this case Steve Hood, who was filling both positions, did not 
find it a productive way of interacting with the group. Senator Spanel noted: “At the time, 
Steve Hood was chairing the Committee. As the chair, he did not have the ability to 
participate as much [on behalf of the Department of Ecology].”192 At times, the DNR also 
found itself in an uncomfortable, dual role. Soicher noted, “It was always kind of awkward to 
have the DNR engaged in policy discussion and to have them running the meetings.”193 
 
3. Set realistic timelines to manage expectations and to avoid disappointment with the 
process. 
 
The process’ ill-conceived initial deadline and the subsequent missing of that deadline hurt 
Committee members’ expectations about the process and contributed to process fatigue. 
According the 2000 legislation, the Lake Whatcom Landscape Plan was supposed to be 
completed by June 2001. This gave the Committee only 15 months to form and develop their 
recommendations. As it turned out, this deadline did not allow adequate time for the 
Committee to complete their work. When either developing or deciding whether or not to 
participate in a collaborative planning process it is important to take a realistic look at how 
long it might take and anticipate room for delays along the way. By addressing the issue of 
time commitment up front you not only set a timeframe for when things will happen, but also 
give participants an accurate perception of what they are agreeing to do. Soicher noted: “If I 
knew it would drag on this long I would not have been able to agree to participate. The 
legislation intentionally set a tight time frame, which is what we expected it would take.”194 
 
4. Implement mechanisms in process ground rules for overcoming disagreements. 
 
Another important lesson from this case is that it is important to figure out ways to keep the 
collaborative process moving when conflicts arise. The Committee set several ground rules 
to help get passed roadblocks, which have been described above. These rules included a 
cooling off period, a minority report and deferring issues to an Implementation Committee. 
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While the process stalled at times, participants believed that these ground rules helped keep 
the process moving forward by overcoming disagreements.  
 
5. Let stakeholders participate in defining the process to build commitment to follow-
through. 
 
The DNR found it difficult to remain committed to the process because it did not play a hand 
in defining it. The legislation mandated that the DNR work with the advisory Committee. It 
also included management measures that were to be included in the Landscape Plan. The 
DNR felt that the legislature was too heavy-handed in defining the process.195 Wallace 
described one way to approach this:  
 
Get some of the key stakeholders together to decide what the process should 
be. So that there is some ownership of what the process will be. What kind of 
outcome do we want? What kind of a timeframe do we want? Who should be 
represented on the Committee? What are some processes that we have some 
experience with? Whatever you pick it will have ownership from the folks that 
are going to be involved in this to determine what we are going to do, 
recognizing there may be some adjustments along the way. If you start that 
early with the collaboration, you are going to ownership of not only the 
product you come out with but also with the process by which you do it. I 
would say the most important part is to start with collaboration, to create 
ownership of the process to help achieve a more durable outcome. 
 
6. If collaboration is mandated, make sure membership and decision-making authority 
are clear. 
 
If a collaborative process is required by a legal mandate, make sure roles and decision-
making authority are clear. The membership of the Committee was not clearly defined in the 
2000 legislation. It was assumed that it would be the same as for the Study Committee, 
resulting from the 1999 legislation. The process for setting up the Implementation Committee 
was also not clearly defined, nor was the decision-making authority. Senator Spanel 
commented when looking back at the legislation, it could have had “better clarification, no 
loose ends like the IJC [Implementation Committee] and better definitions in there.”196 Alan 
Soicher commented, “[you need] clarity in the relationship, going further than that, be really 
clear about whether it is going to be collaborative or whether you are going to have one 
group making recommendations and another group making decisions.”197 
 
7. Share ownership of expert-based analyses and decisions to avoid mistrust. 
 
Collaborative processes, such as the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, bring 
together people with different areas of expertise. There is a tendency for groups to defer 
decision making related to a particular skill or knowledge set to the group member with 
expertise in that area. While it is efficient to make use of an expert’s skill and knowledge, 
providing that member with too much control or discretion over the decision or the 
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preparation of data for that decision could lead to suspicion by other members of the group 
about the objectiveness of the expert’s analysis.  
To avoid the perception of bias, the group and the expert at hand should share ownership of 
expert-based decision making throughout the process. This procedure will build buy-in for 
the group’s decision related to this area of expertise. For example, in the this case, some 
members of the group felt that the DNR was controlling the financial analysis of the impact 
of the plan alternative’s on the generation of future revenue in the watershed.198 While the 
DNR possessed expertise in preparing the financial models necessary to conduct this 
analysis, some members of the group considered it biased because of their lack of 
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he largest undeveloped parcel of land in any North American city sits just five minutes 
southeast of downtown Albuquerque, New Mexico. A wide-open desert scrubland home 
only to a few ranchers, an isolated concert venue and a drag racing track, Mesa del Sol is 
hardly glamorous. Yet it borders Kirtland Air Force Base, the top-secret Sandia National 
Laboratories, Albuquerque International Sunport Airport and the ever-growing city of 
Albuquerque whose sprawl now extends west across the Rio Grande River. Major 
transportation corridors run nearby, but not through the property. It is 12,900 acres of largely 
unfulfilled development potential, largely out of the public’s mind.  
 
Though the State Land Office (SLO) first became interested in developing this property over 
twenty years ago, only recently have they secured a legitimate developer and promises of the 
necessary infrastructure upgrades necessary to connect Mesa del Sol with New Mexico’s 
largest city. The complex, often turbulent process leading to this stage was the struggle and 
signature of four Commissioners of Pulic Lands. Without an official working group or formal 
collaboration, Mesa del Sol is unlike the other cases researched in this report. The hallmark 
of the process is a series of informal collaborative strategies focusing on relationship building 
and open communication, instituted by commissioners with a sincere desire to increase 
community involvement in state trust lands issues. The process was not without its 
challenges, though. At times, relationships between the SLO and beneficiary, the University 
of New Mexico (UNM), became estranged, as when UNM sued Commissioner Jim Baca to 
block Mesa del Sol’s sale at its original auction in 1987. The SLO spent years erasing the 
negative press surrounding the lawsuit and building a collaborative foundation that would 
carry the project forward when important political interests aligned in its favor.  
 
Political interests have also played a significant role in delaying the Mesa del Sol project. 
Their influence often overwhelmed supporters of Mesa del Sol, forcing the project to take a 
back seat to other developments elsewhere. As several participants noted, success largely 
depended on the “political stars” aligning, meaning the Mayor, City Council, UNM and other 
influential parties. There also was considerable disagreement over the physical nature of the 
development itself: at least four master plans have been written. The SLO worked hard to 
form collaborative relationships with all interested parties, even succeeding in addressing the 
needs of its neighbors with hidden interests, particularly the Isleta Pueblo and Kirtland Air 
Force Base. 
 
Without a collaborative process, the land likely would have been sold at auction in small 
sections to individual developers, promoting urban sprawl and placing overwhelming 
demands on municipal services and infrastructure. Regarding the lengthy collaborative 
process, current Commissioner of Public Lands Patrick Lyons freely admits, “I wouldn’t 
have done it that way.” Rather, Lyons would have left the planning process to the local 
community, significantly reducing the SLO’s role and investment in the process.1 But 
instead, this case illustrates the gambles of progressive Commissioners of Public Lands 
invested in collaboration, green development and long-term beneficiary revenue, investments 
that appear to have paid off. Today, a public-private partnership will develop Mesa del Sol at 




Planned Communities Criteria, requiring principles of mixed-use, high-density development 
and open space. 
 
KEY THEMES  
 
This case illustrates the importance of three factors. First, progressive leadership is seen as a 
key component in complicated urban development of state trust land. Many participants cited 
the SLO’s creativity as a primary reason why this complex, lengthy development project 
looks certain to become a reality. By embracing a new management paradigm of informal 
collaboration and public outreach, the SLO attracted a national developer with the resources 
to develop Mesa del Sol and maximize long-term revenue to the trust. The commissioners 
most intimately tied to Mesa del Sol, Jim Baca and later Ray Powell, have exhibited a strong 
desire to involve stakeholders and other interested parties to create a development in which 
the community can take pride. Despite this community involvement, commissioners have 
neither neglected nor violated their constitutional mandate; rather most participants believe 
collaboration led to increased revenues for the beneficiary. 
 
Second, community involvement emerges as a significant factor in maintaining interest in the 
fate of a project that often times appeared out of the SLO’s control. Mesa del Sol’s crucial 
role in the development in greater Albuquerque attracted interest from a variety of 
community members, including powerful political interests the SLO often had little or no 
ability to align. This case illustrates the complexity of development on state trust lands in or 
near metropolitan areas and the necessary ability to achieve increased stakeholder and 
community commitment. As in many development projects, addressing and satisfying 
competing political interests was a formidable challenge and figured prominently delaying 
Mesa del Sol. 
 
Finally, this case exemplifies the power of a public-private partnership in state trust land 
development, as a credible private sector partner was a boon to the process. Forest City 
Covington, LLC (FCC) is repeatedly commended by interviewees and major parties involved 
for its experience, resources, and strong community vision. As Tim Callahan, an SLO 
planner notes, “When Forest City came to town, that was the defining moment.”2 
 
 
CONTEXT FOR COLLABORATION 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE TRUST LANDS IN NEW MEXICO  
 
Prior to its induction into the United States, the territory of New Mexico was provided state 
trust lands as sections 16 and 36 in each township in 1898. Under 1899 legislation the State 
Land Office (SLO) was created and the first Commissioner of Public Lands appointed to 
administer state trust lands. Later, New Mexico’s Enabling Act, passed in 1909, set aside 
township sections 2 and 32 as additional state trust lands (Figure 9-1). The Enabling Act also 
confirmed the Land Grant Permanent Fund that holds all allocated lands in trust to the public 
school system and other state institutions. All of this was completed prior to New Mexico’s 




Since New Mexico was one of the last states to be given state trust lands, the restrictions 
imposed on these lands by the Enabling Act are much more rigid than in other states that had 
already abused and sold much of their trust land assets. Such restrictions guide the SLO’s 
planning process today, dictating the manner in which the SLO may conduct business and 
























Figure 9-1: State Trust Lands in New Mexico 
Source: “New Mexico Trust Lands,” Trust Land: A Land Legacy for the American West, 




HISTORY AND CULTURE OF THE SLO 
 
The Commissioner of Public Lands is the head of the SLO and is an elected state official. 
The commissioner is advised by the Office of General Council and the State Land Trusts 
Advisory Board. Ultimately, however, the commissioner is entrusted with the “control, 
jurisdiction, care, and custody of all trust lands” by the New Mexico State Constitution which 
provides him with final decision-making power.3 While leadership changes, key members of 
staff are often retained by the next administration, which was true in the Mesa del Sol 
Planning Process. This continuity is essential to maintaining organizational momentum and 
knowledge required for success in such complex and long-term projects.  
 
Originally distributed in a checkerboard pattern across the state, New Mexico’s trust lands 
have been somewhat consolidated as a result of land exchanges with public and private 
institutions. The SLO’s portfolio now includes some large coherent tracts of state trust land 
as a result of exchanges, particularly outside of Albuquerque in Mesa del Sol and in the 
southeastern portion of the state. These larger tracts allow for more consistent land use in an 
area and as well as master planned developments in urban settings like Mesa del Sol. 
 
MANAGEMENT CHANGES AND THE FOCUS OF THE SLO 
 
Within the past couple of decades, land development and leasing opportunities have been 
given increasing attention in the SLO. The SLO’s Planning and Development Workgroup 
recently identified 30,000 acres of state trust land with current development potential, having 
acquired strategic parcels in the mid-20th century in anticipation of urban growth.4 As with 
Mesa del Sol, many of these lands are now in metropolitan areas and are ripe for 
development.  
 
While commissioners are not bound to the decisions and policies of former administrations, 
Commissioner Lyons has continued many of the efforts of his predecessors, land 
development being one of those efforts. Mesa del Sol in particular has been a major project 




THE STORY: THE MESA DEL SOL PLANNING PROCESS 
 
Despite its close proximity, Mesa del Sol was fairly isolated from Albuquerque for most of 
its existence under SLO ownership (Figure 9-2). As a result, through much of the twentieth 
century the land was leased solely to a handful of ranchers for grazing. In 1963, seeking a 
remote venue, the Albuquerque National Dragway obtained a 160-acre lease from the SLO to 
operate an automobile drag racing strip on Mesa del Sol. The Dragway has operated on 
consecutive five-year leases continuously with the exception of a two-year period from 2000 
to 2002 when Commissioner Powell cancelled the company’s lease. As in much of the West, 
Albuquerque began a period of rapid growth in the 1970s that continues today. This growth 





SLO Planner Tim Callahan stated that 
potential development of Mesa del Sol has 
been discussed for several decades.5 As 
beneficiary of the parcel, the University of 
New Mexico (UNM) envisioned Mesa del 
Sol as a long-term future source of revenue, 
but never developed a concrete plan. As 
debate over Albuquerque’s growth grew in 
the 1970s, the SLO began to explore the 
possibility of developing Mesa del Sol. 
Credit for the specific plan to develop the 
site is generally given to Jim Baca 
(Commissioner of Public Lands from 1982 
to 1986 and from 1990 to 1992), though a 
1970s pamphlet promoting the development 
potential of the site was mentioned by one 
interviewee.6 As SLO Planner Tim 
Callahan described, “Jim was a very 
progressive type of a Land Commissioner. 
There’s no doubt about that. It was not business as usual.”7 As opposed to his predecessors, 
Baca wanted to wean the SLO from its reliance on resource extraction and explore the 
possibility of residential and commercial development on state trust lands. He also believed 
the SLO should become more accountable to the public in general, through collaboration and 
an eye towards conservation. Blair Brown and Susan Gorman of the Sierra Club agreed, 
saying Baca “believed that there needed to be more transparency in state lands operations.”8 
The SLO under Baca began to recognize that resource extraction on SLO lands must 
someday end and took a long-term approach to generating revenue. Brown and Gorman 
credit Baca as the first commissioner to open the doors to environmental groups and their 
concerns.9  
 
With increased urban growth and additional development pressures in recent decades, trust 
lands such as Mesa del Sol have become more valuable as potential sites for development 
and conservation alike. Recent administrations in the SLO have focused on these lands. 
Former Commissioner Jim Baca, for instance, was intent on selling land directly to the 
private sector in development projects such as Mesa del Sol to produce what he saw as the 
greatest revenue for the trust.10 His successor, Ray Powell, also saw the importance of future 
land sales and development and continued this legacy. Powell later created the Commercial 
Leasing Division at the SLO, dedicated to land sales, leases and development. Powell also 
shifted the SLO’s land development practice towards the public-private partnership model.11 
These two commissioners conceived of the Mesa del Sol vision and provided the 
infrastructure within the SLO to make it possible.  
 
In his first term, Baca publicly introduced a plan for developing Mesa del Sol. Realizing 
Mesa del Sol as an integral cog in Albuquerque’s growing population and economy, the SLO 
hired a local firm to draft a master plan. The plan was written in consultation with outside 
Figure 9-2: Mesa del Sol 
Source: “Community Master Plan” June 2005,  Forest 
City Covington New Mexico, LLC, 15. 
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parties, including representatives of the Sierra Club, though there is some disagreement 
between UNM and Baca over whether Baca adequately shared his vision with UNM, the 
beneficiary of the revenue generated from this parcel of state trust land. As Baca’s plans 
progressed, UNM became more concerned because they felt that they had not been involved 
in the process, had no control over the outcome and disapproved of the events to date. Under 
Baca’s original plan, the SLO master plan would guide development once title to the land 
was sold at auction to a private developer. Baca is generally praised for his direct nature and 
intense focus. As Kim Murphy, former SLO Planner and Director of Real Estate at UNM, 
stated, “I give [Baca] a lot of credit for having the vision to start this project. I think he’s very 
politically astute, but he also can be very abrasive and turn a lot of people off.”12 Baca was 
close to the UNM President, a relationship that facilitated progress on the SLO’s plans. 
However, his relationship with the UNM Board of Regents was decidedly unproductive.13 
This dynamic emerged from the responses towards the results of the SLO’s first auction. 
 
In early 1987, with less than one year remaining in his term, Commissioner Baca put 5,200 
undeveloped acres of Mesa del Sol up for auction. In preparation for the auction, Baca 
worked with the city of Albuquerque, the Sierra Club, the UNM and others to design the 
master plan for development. The auction attracted only one bidder, Bellamah Community 
Development, Inc., a New Mexico-based regional developer. Bellamah won the right to 
develop that section of Mesa del Sol in accordance with the SLO master plan. At the time, 
the land was not annexed into the city and did not prove an extensive plan for development 
that was needed. UNM Director of Real Estate Kim Murphy explained that Baca’s auction 
served as a wake-up call for the University, prompting them to become attuned to the 
immense revenue potential associated with Mesa del Sol and to become interested in taking a 
more proactive role in planning its development.14 In response to the auction, the UNM 
Board of Regents believed that a single bidder represented below-market compensation for 
the Mesa del Sol property and requested that Commissioner Baca not accept the bid. Baca 
refused to accommodate their requests, and the Regents filed a lawsuit, the settlement of 
which required Bellamah to give a larger percentage of the sale of each parcel to UNM. Their 
investment was no longer certain, Bellamah lost interest in Mesa del Sol and rescinded its 
offer. Had Bellamah in fact gone through with the purchase, it would have forever changed 
the history of Mesa del Sol, as the company declared bankruptcy in 1989 and would have lost 
the land to unknown parties. 
 
Bill Humphries replaced Baca as commissioner later in 1987 and inherited freshly-damaged 
relationships with UNM resulting from the lawsuit over the auction. Public perception of 
Mesa del Sol was also reeling from the litigation, and many people felt the land never would 
be developed due to the contentious atmosphere surrounding it. At the same time, the rapid 
growth on Albuquerque’s west side was creating increased congestion, sprawling land use 
and pressure on city services. Responsible urban planning would have all but required the 
city to build on Mesa del Sol. 
 
While few Mesa del Sol Planning Process participants recognized the influence of 
Humphries’ term, one participant said Humphries continued the vision of developing Mesa 
del Sol.15 Unfortunately, his term coincided with a downturn in the local economy and a lack 
of interest from Albuquerque, two factors that hampered progress. Tim Callahan recalled that 
 
 266
he and then SLO planner Kim Murphy (now Director of Real Estate at UNM) devoted time 
to the project during Humphries’ time in office and created a new master plan.16 Most of the 
work was done in house and it was several years until others acknowledged that the SLO 
instituted a true collaborative planning process. 
 
When Baca won election for his second term as commissioner in early 1991, he intended to 
revive his campaign for developing Mesa del Sol, but scarcely had time to settle into his 
office before being nominated the following year as Director of the U.S. Bureau of Land 
Management. New Mexico Governor Bruce King appointed Ray Powell, his Special 
Assistant on Environment, Health and Natural Resources to finish Baca’s term. In addition to 
his experience in natural resources, Powell is a professional veterinarian and, like Baca, 
comes from a politically prominent New Mexico family.  
Powell completed the remaining two and a half years of Baca’s term and was then elected to 
two consecutive terms in his own right, serving more than ten years as commissioner. In 
Powell’s own words, a major policy focus for his administration was a “different way to 
approach things,” where trust lands were not sold at raw land values, but instead leased to a 
developer who could make improvements to raise their value.17 To achieve this goal, Powell 
created a Commercial Leasing Division at the SLO, which was comprised of architects, 
planners and others who embodied Powell’s belief that “the land office had been looked at as 
a solitary unit,” but now would actively “become an integral player in the bigger picture” of 
New Mexico’s economic development, a strategy which meant partnering with other 
entities.18 “That’s what we tried to do with every project,” he stated, “have that inclusiveness, 
go seek [the community] out at the beginning of the process, talk to them before they heard 
about the project from someone else.”19 
 
Consequently, the process of developing Mesa del Sol became a primary focus of the SLO 
during Powell’s tenure. Whereas Baca planned to sell Mesa del Sol at auction, Powell’s 
administration aimed to lease the property and develop it in conjunction with a private 
company before selling parcels at an amount above their raw value. As Powell said, he 
wanted the SLO to be the “architects” of the deal and “really decide what was going to 
happen on that land.”20 But to make the Mesa del Sol property an attractive investment to a 
private developer, Powell had to erase the negative stigma resulting from the lawsuit and 
create more investment certainty for the potential developer. 
 
In order to do so, the SLO instituted a series of informal collaborative outreach measures that 
became the hallmark of the development process. Powell’s desire was to involve people and 
gather their input as early as possible. He explained, “my philosophical standpoint is to be as 
inclusive as you can on the front end and include as many people as you can in the 
discussion, and you’re going to end up with a much better product and not end up with 
lawsuits.”21 Powell also wanted the SLO to “get involved and help make [Mesa del Sol] 
something important for their community.”22 Rather than convene a formal working group, 
Powell pursued collaboration by opening the SLO’s doors to the public and visiting, along 
with his staff, various community meetings to talk with concerned parties and stakeholders 
such as the Sierra Club, neighborhood associations, business associations and others. Of the 
collaborative process, Powell said, “we were there from the beginning and people were very 
anxious about what we were going to do because this hadn’t been done before. At the end of 
 
 267
the meetings they were right there with us—that was their project.”23 His collaborative 
strategy helped increase community buy-in and quell the fears of neighboring entities 
including UNM Board of Regents, who represented the University in negotiations with the 
SLO. 
 
The results of the SLO’s collaborative efforts manifested themselves in various aspects of the 
process. SLO Planners Harry Relkin and Tom Leatherwood drafted additional master plans 
for the parcel, incorporating environmentally responsible “new urbanism” designs and 
suggestions from the local Sierra Club chapter. Powell and his staff reached out to Bernalillo 
County to build their enthusiasm for the project, resulting in a 624-acre lease for a concert 
amphitheater, completed in 1997, and a regional recreational park that is still under 
construction. As Tim Callahan describes the amphitheater and park, “[The SLO] thought that 
would be a … catalyst to get things moving. You’d have a public-private enterprise.” Not 
only did the lease improve relations with the County, Callahan explains, but it also provided 
the general public with a reason to visit Mesa del Sol, restoring its image in the public’s 
conscience: “I think it put Mesa del Sol more on the map,” Callahan concludes.24 
 
Powell also involved Mesa del Sol’s neighbor to the east, the Kirtland Air Force Base (and 
specifically Sandia National Laboratories, which is housed on the Base), in the collaborative 
process. Because of the secretive nature of Sandia Lab’s work harboring and developing 
national security secrets, understanding their interests was a difficult task. Powell’s proposal 
to create a buffer of open space, La Semilla, that insulates Sandia Labs and Kirtland AFB 
from any future development was a creative solution that resulted directly from active 
involvement of outside parties in the planning process. As Callahan remembered, “Talk 
about working with stakeholders, that was one we really went out, over, maybe overboard to 
make sure that [Kirtland AFB] is benefiting.” Without a collaborative approach by the SLO, 
the development could have stalled or fallen victim under the influence of the military’s 
immense political power. Callahan acknowledgeed this was one of SLO’s motives for 
collaboration: “The military guys can do what they want to do anyway.”25 
 
While the SLO’s collaborative efforts were successful in many aspects, the SLO faced 
numerous challenges and complexities in bringing together a diverse set of interests. In 
particular, the agency had difficulty with political forces beyond their control. Albuquerque’s 
population explosion caused the city to sprawl westward, across the Rio Grande to distances 
nearly 15 to 20 miles from downtown. By all accounts, Mesa del Sol, with its close proximity 
to the center of Albuquerque and the airport, would have been a more desirable location for 
this growth. Unfortunately for the SLO, though, west side growth was promoted strongly by 
private development interests in powerful positions. Interviewees cited the Mayor, banks, 
members of the UNM Regents and other city officials as having a financial interest in seeing 
Albuquerque develop to the west, rather than in Mesa del Sol to the southeast.26 
 
In some respects, the story of Mesa del Sol is as much about politics as collaboration. Harry 
Relkin, former SLO Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Resources and current 
consultant to FCC, explained that the complexity of Mesa del Sol means “projects like this 




Oftentimes the political agendas of the participants clash or don’t align, so it 
can either facilitate or hinder the progress of a project. The additional 
complication is that Mesa del Sol is a key development opportunity within the 
city of Albuquerque and so in order to move the project forward you have to 
have the support of the Council and the Mayor and those are also political 
people.28 
 
The SLO constantly has looked for windows of opportunity when political forces aligned in 
Mesa del Sol’s favor. For example, when Powell and the SLO decided to apply to annex 
Mesa del Sol into the city of Albuquerque, it should have legitimized the SLO’s master plan 
for development and created an avenue for building relationships with the city. Near the 
same time, SLO Planner Harry Relking decided to apply Mesa del Sol for approval under 
Albuquerque’s Planned Community Criteria, a set of rules governing the layout of large 
developments. These actions should showed that the SLO was determined to make Mesa del 
Sol a responsible contribution to Albuquerque’s growth by subjecting it to the same planning 
criteria as private developments. Instead, the Mayor of Albuquerque, Martin Chavez, catered 
to west side development interests and stalled Mesa del Sol. Tim Callahan believed that 
“annexation was probably the worst thing we could have done because the Mayor said, ‘Ok, 
I’m in control: nothing’s going to happen.’ And that’s what did happen. Nothing happened 
for four years.”29 
 
Although politics certainly influenced when the development of Mesa del Sol could or could 
not proceed, the SLO’s informal collaborative processes were the guiding force that 
determined whether it happened at all. Throughout the 1990s and continuing to the present, 
the SLO was meeting with neighborhood organizations, non-profits and other organizations 
to share ideas, gather input and build enthusiasm for the project. Powell said, “My 
philosophical standpoint is to be as inclusive as you can on the front end and include as many 
people as you can in the discussion.”30 Sierra Club volunteers Susan Gorman and Blair 
Brown who participated in the process since 1997, stated that they were very impressed with 
the outreach conducted by Powell and his staff. They expressed that they feel that Powell 
“feels working together is how you get stuff done.” He has “always been open, we know him 
to be very pro-environment but at the same time knows it’s got to work for everybody.”31  
 
Meanwhile, when the Bernalillo County’s Journal Pavilion amphitheater opened in Mesa del 
Sol in 1997, the Dragway began to lose some of the isolation that made Mesa del Sol such an 
attractive venue for automobile racing. Bill Elliott, Communications Director for the 
Albuquerque National Dragway, said he “[did] everything I [could] to maintain a positive 
open working relationship with [the amphitheater],” but that it did not always worked out. 
Ensuing disagreements with the amphitheater over noise and degradation in relationships 
with the SLO resulted in Powell suspending the Albuquerque National Dragway’s lease in 
2000. The closure, officially stated to stem from rent payment discrepancies, was spurred by 
several years of antagonistic relationships between the Dragway and Powell. The Dragway 
also believed Powell’s pro-environment stance left no room for an automobile drag racing 
venue at Mesa del Sol. Elliott believed the Powell administration had already decided the 
Dragway’s fate: “In the back of their mind, they were thinking, ‘You know what, we need to 
get rid of this thing.’”32 This experience was the only instance where Powell’s informal 
collaborative tactics clearly produced an adversarial outcome and failed to secure buy-in for 
 
 269
further development of Mesa del Sol. After being elected as Commissioner of Public Lands 
in 2002, Patrick Lyons fulfilled his campaign promise to reopen the Dragway. Elliott said the 
Dragway is still worried about their long-term future: “It’s a little touchy subject and … who 
knows what’s going to happen. I know we don’t have problems with Patrick Lyons but the 
election is next year and he’s only got four more years beyond that and then who knows who 
were dealing with.”33 
 
Powell intended to conduct another auction for a significant portion of Mesa del Sol before 
the end of his second term. Feeling that he had successfully erased most uncertainties 
surrounding the property, he offered Mesa del Sol to potential bidders in 2001. The 
successful bidder would be able to lease the land and develop it according to the city’s 
Planned Community Criteria and SLO guidance. Three companies submitted bids and former 
SLO Planner Chris Hyer remembered, “They were all very highly scrutinized; and it wasn’t 
just, ‘Who is going to give us the best bang for the buck.’ It was, ‘Let’s go out and visit every 
one of their projects and see what they’ve done’… we want this to be a viable 
development.”34 Forest City Covington, LLC was chosen as the new developer. FCC is a 
large, national company with a long history of progressive urban development and 
redevelopment, including the former Stapleton Airport site in Denver, Colorado. The lease 
contract for Mesa del Sol was signed on December 30, 2002, the final day of Powell’s 
administration. From a business perspective as well as a collaborative community relations 
perspective, the importance of FCC was underscored by many people involved in the 
process. Many participants saw the addition of this well-reputed company as an important 
factor in Mesa del Sol’s current success.  
 
Patrick Lyons was elected commissioner in 2002 by a slim margin of approximately 8,000 
votes.35 Although the commissioner enjoys nearly complete autonomy, because FCC had 
already signed the lease contract, it would have been more difficult for Lyons to abandon the 
Mesa del Sol project. As a result, but also because Lyons reported that “We’re supportive of 
it … we’d like to see it 
happen,” Lyons continued 
work on Mesa del Sol, 
including working with 
members of Congress to 
secure funding for the 
University Boulevard 
extension that provides 
better access to Mesa del 
Sol. But Lyons differed from 
Powell in his belief about 
planning: “We just feel like 
we ought to let the local 
communities do it.” 36 
Correspondingly, he turned 
over most of the daily 
planning responsibilities and 
the community outreach to 
FCC. Lyons believed FCC 
Figure 9-3: Campaign Sign at the Albuquerque National Dragway 
Source: Photograph by Emily Kelly 
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has sustained a positive working relationship with the public and stakeholders. He describes 
FCC’s approach as such: “It’s ‘Here’s our plan, here’s how the plan is, and if you don’t like 
it let us know.’” 37 Blair Brown and Susan Gorman of the Sierra Club agree, saying FCC is 
“very professional and seem to be willing to talk with us as equals” and appreciate the fact 
that little of the Sierra Club’s time is required, a bonus for volunteers.38 
 
The last major physical hurdle to developing Mesa del Sol was recently cleared through the 
work of Lyons’ administration and several federal elected officials. Work on the $25 million 
University Boulevard extension began on September 30, 2005.39 
 
Lyons also changed the SLO’s relationship with the Dragway (Figure 9-3). Shortly after 
Lyons’ narrow victory in the election. Bill Elliott, Communications Director for the Dragway 
said, “ I called him up the next day and I told him, ‘Patrick, congratulations and I want you to 
know there’s exactly 8,000 drag racers in the state of New Mexico.’”40 Lyons reciprocated by 
reissuing the Dragway’s five-year lease. For its part, the Dragway still harbors fears that it 
will not be included in Mesa del Sol’s future. They will again campaign heavily for Lyons in 
2006, but understand there is no long-term guarantee concerning their lease. FCC’s lease 
may even include a clause for them to exercise an option to take out the Dragway.41 
Since FCC has taken over daily management of the Mesa del Sol process, Baca expressed 
that it will be “interesting to see if the collaboration keeps happening.”42 Despite the 
Dragway’s concerns, the pattern of informal collaboration appears to be the preferred method 
of community outreach for the future as well. FCC held meetings with several community 
groups and even flown others, including members of the Sierra Club, to Denver to view other 
FCC projects.43 Whether or not the Dragway’s relationship with FCC blossoms remains to be 
seen. Bob Labatte, owner of the Dragway said, so far “our relationship with Forest City, I 
would say, has been good.”44 
 
 
THE ANALYSIS: THE MESA DEL SOL PLANNING PROCESS 
 
LEVEL OF COLLABORATION 
 
Our research team identified three axes for measuring the level of collaboration in each case. 
They include breadth of stakeholder participation, degree of transparency and degree of 
influence on decision-making. Each element by itself contributes to a productive, inclusive 
process, but a mix of all three factors brings the interrelationship of each into play and 
produces a truly collaborative process. Mesa del Sol incorporates all of these elements.  
 
Breadth of Stakeholders: The number and variety of parties mentioned in our interviews 
illustrates the breadth of stakeholder involvement. Highly collaborative processes often are 
grounded in the input and involvement of most or all interested parties or stakeholders. By 
including multiple voices, solutions are more likely to be successfully implemented and have 
greater chance of future compliance and reduced risk of opposition or litigation. People and 
organizations consulted or involved in the Mesa del Sol process include: UNM (several 
departments, the Board of Regents, Real Estate Office, administration, and others), city of 
Albuquerque (Planning, Economic Development, City Council), Greater Albuquerque 
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Chamber of Commerce, Bernalillo County, Isleta Pueblo, Kirtland Air Force Base (and the 
non-profit Kirtland Partnership), Department of Energy (Sandia National Laboratories), 
Sierra Club, 1000 Friends of New Mexico and neighborhood groups (South Valley and 
Mountain View Neighborhood Associations). As discussed above, most groups feel their 
involvement has been beneficial. It appears that all relevant, interested parties were invited to 
submit input during the process. The SLO did a commendable job of opening its doors to 
each and every interest and actively visiting with the community to solicit public comment. 
 
Degree of Transparency: The Mesa del Sol Planning Process also displays a fair amount of 
transparency, facilitating a clear understanding of all available information in the decision-
making process and the means by which decisions were made. Specifically, transparency 
requires that meetings, agreements and decisions be open to all participants, thereby 
maintaining the credibility of the process. Throughout his tenure, Ray Powell made 
transparency a cornerstone of his business strategy. He clearly saw the benefits of involving 
parties from the onset when he said, “That’s what we tried to do with every project – have 
that inclusiveness, go seek them out at the beginning of the process, talk to them before they 
heard about the project from someone else.”45 Jim Baca also endeavored to this end, but his 
style seemed allowed the private sector to take more responsibility for dealing with 
stakeholders.46 As representatives from the Sierra Club put it, Baca “believed there needed to 
be more transparency in state lands operations, so he kind of opened the doors and Ray 
Powell took over and welcomed us all in.”47  
 
Today, with a contracted developer in FCC, Patrick Lyons puts more onus on the private 
sector to handle the daily communications responsibilities. Still, the Dragway has been very 
pleased with Lyons’ open-mindedness and ability to listen to interested parties.48 We believe 
that Mesa del Sol has been quite successful in respecting the requirements of transparency in 
a successful collaborative process. Had communication between Baca and the UNM Regents 
been better, the process might have unfolded differently; although it is difficult to tell. There 
exists a possibility the 1987 auction might never have happened, as the two parties may have 
chosen a collaborative approach and delayed sale and lease of Mesa del Sol for several years. 
 
Degree of Influence on Decision Making: The informal nature of the SLO’s collaboration 
meant that interested parties provided tacit approval of Mesa del Sol, rather than a binding 
vote in a formal decision-making venue. Therefore, it is more difficult to evaluate the level of 
influence in decision making among parties. By distributing decision-making power more 
evenly, collaborative processes build investment and ownership in the outcome while 
reducing dissent. This distribution of decision-making power results in greater adherence to 
solutions. In New Mexico, the constitutional mandate defining state trust lands management 
precludes the possibility of complete equality in decision-making authority, although 
decision-making power may be shared to some extent. Tim Callahan, who has worked for the 
SLO for 23 years, admitted that, “I’m probably a little biased in that I don’t see other 
stakeholders [other than the beneificiary, UNM].” Nonetheless, he added, “We invite 
[parties] in … because we want input as to what is out there, but we just don’t want to 
relinquish the control and let them drive [the decisions].”49 Ray Powell added, although “the 
concept [behind Mesa del Sol] is to do things so that you’re part of the community,” the SLO 




By using informal collaboration to gain support from one party at a time, the SLO slowly 
built momentum for Mesa del Sol, using previous voices of approval to influence future 
negotiating. The general idea of environmentally-friendly development came from 
Commissioners Baca and Powell,51 though they solicited ideas from the Sierra Club to some 
extent.52 The SLO could then use the Sierra Club’s approval to leverage other groups’ 
support. Likewise, the Isleta Pueblo had concerns over the possibility of Albuquerque 
mandating a golf course on Mesa del Sol, because of an unusual city ordinance requiring a 
course for every development of a certain magnitude. By convincing the city that no golf 
course was necessary, the SLO could placate the Isleta’s fears of losing golfers from their 
course and allow them to come closer to giving tacit approval of Mesa del Sol. Finally, the 
La Semilla buffer, though necessary to implement new urbanism densities in Mesa del Sol, 
responded to the military’s particular needs. Callahan observed, “They want to do what they 
want to do. And the military guys can do what they want to do anyway.”53 Again, satisfying 
the desires of interested parties, be it the local Sierra Club or U.S. Air Force and Department 
of Energy, helped the SLO toward its vision and gain additional support for Mesa del Sol. 
Whether or not each interested party has legal decision-making authority, it is important to 
gauge their interests and concerns before moving forward with a decision. 
 
The SLO’s decision-making authority has also troubled some participants, particularly the 
Dragway representatives, who believed strongly that the commissioner should be more 
accountable to its stakeholders and lessees.54 Similarly, UNM, as the beneficiary, felt early 
on that Baca did not allow adequate influence given their fiduciary relationship. As the 
process progressed, Kim Murphy cited problems when “political agendas of the participants 
did not align,” perhaps pointing to instances where the University and SLO did not see eye to 
eye on a decision and power struggles erupted.55 Others, like representatives from the Sierra 
Club, have been largely pleased with how the SLO has listened to their suggestions, though 
they, too believed “it would probably be nice if there were something more like a NEPA 
process” to make the input process easier and more comfortable for non-profit groups.56 In 
all, the level of decision-making influence has been fairly moderate, and it was perceived by 
many to be much higher than in most of the SLO’s more traditional trust land leases or sales. 
 
BENEFITS OF THE PROCESS 
 
The informal collaborative process surrounding Mesa del Sol’s development produced many 
benefits for a variety of stakeholders and interested parties. Because of its size and strategic 
location, Mesa del Sol is a showcase trust land parcel serving as a model for future 
development projects. While this case highlights one particular type of collaboration, the 
benefits readily translate to other projects, helping outside parties understand the advantages 
of partnering with the SLO and in turn improving future SLO policies and practices. 
 
Awareness of Trust Lands and Community Buy-In 
 
One of the single most important benefits of this process was the increased community buy-
in that resulted from involving of a broad constituency. Through their involvement, the 
constituency developed heightened awareness of trust land, its existence, purpose and 
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management, throughout the greater Albuquerque area. The informal collaboration begun by 
Baca and Humphries and accelerated during the Powell administration was a successful 
strategy for fostering community awareness and involvement in state trust lands issues and 
brought the SLO to the forefront of discussion of planned development in Albuquerque. 
Powell’s goal was for collaboration to develop joint ownership by helping “get [stakeholders] 
involved and help make it something important for their community.”57 Both Powell and his 
staff went to numerous community events to share their ideas about Mesa del Sol, and it was 
Powell who first contacted the Dragway to solicit their involvement. Former SLO planner 
Kim Murphy personally represented the SLO at business luncheons and neighborhood 
meetings during the Humphries administration, trying to drum up support for Mesa del Sol. 
He expressed that increased awareness and community buy-in could be intimately tied 
together: “Maybe the misperception about what the [state trust] lands are for actually 
provides the vehicle to broaden the constituency base … Once constituencies are brought 
into the the polical process, then they can be aligned and useful in the developments of 
projects that maybe they can support.” He has been pleased with the level of community buy-
in in this specific process, explaining that it built “further interest in development.”58 
 
Advancing a Public-Private Partnership Model 
 
The SLO also benefited from its collaborative partnership with FCC, helping advance and 
refine the public-private partnership model for state trust land management in New Mexico. 
Powell explained the great benefits in this model:  
 
I was really interested and am really interested in that private-public 
partnership where you take that real entrepreneurial spirit and the creativity in 
the private sector and you match it with the responsibility and public benefit 
of the land office. You match the two together and it’s a powerful 
combination.59 
 
Though the SLO had some previous experience with public-private partnerships, working 
collaboratively with FCC helped the SLO realize greater potential from its commercial 
operations. In addition, many involved in the process agreed that acquiring a partner of 
FCC’s stature, a national developer with extensive capital and resources, was imperative to 
developing such an immense area. Jerry King said of FCC, “They really sit down with all the 
groups” and have been a key benefit to the Mesa del Sol process.60 Learning from the Mesa 
del Sol Planning Process, Lyons said the SLO will collaborate with private sector partners 
and the community to design a master plan for an upcoming project in Las Cruces, but giving 
the developers even more responsibility and therefore decreasing the SLO’s time investment 
in the process.61 
 
Revenue from Leases and Sales 
 
Another benefit of a public-private sector partnership is the potential for increased return on 
leases and sales. In describing a collaborative partnership, Powell said, “You can help the 
developer succeed, and the more the developer succeeds, the more the school kids 
succeed.”62 In New Mexico, the SLO cannot invest any money into improving the land, 
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meaning that parcels have traditionally been sold at their raw, undeveloped values. With 
Mesa del Sol’s complex, creative leasing structure, FCC leases the land, invests in 
improvements and the beneficiary receives a percentage of the profit from sales of the 
improved land. Collaboration therefore has great monetary benefits for the trust. Through a 
land swap with the SLO, UNM increased its ownership of Mesa del Sol to 3,480 acres, 3,000 
of which will be sold to FCC for the first stage of development. FCC will eventually sell 
some lands and lease others.  
 
In an example, at its raw, unimproved values, land in Mesa del Sol might be worth 
approximately $3,000 per acre. FCC will prepare the land for resale through investments in 
infrastructure and other improvements, creating more value. When the land is sold or leased, 
the SLO is guaranteed the $3,000 or so of raw land value, plus approximately 14 percent of 
the additional value above $3,000. For its work, FCC receives approximately 86 percent of 
the sale price over $3,000. Thus, FCC and the SLO have an incentive to create as much value 
as possible at Mesa del Sol. As the beneficiary and partial land owner of Mesa del Sol, UNM 
will also receive a percentage of FCC’s net profits, by one account possibly 15 percent.63 
 
The SLO’s collaborative community outreach helped guide the style of development FCC 
will implement. A former SLO planner, Tom Leatherwood, created what Callahan described 
as a “very, very impressive master plan” with “every bell and whistle” of new urbanism 
design. He expressed that Leatherwood’s plan served as a model for FCC’s current plan, 
written by the progressive planning firm Calthorpe Associates.64 Having a series of SLO 
master plans, greatly influenced by the community, in place for Mesa del Sol became a 
tangible benefit when FCC could use their ideas and concepts as the backbone for its 
development vision and master plan. Had the SLO disposed of the Mesa del Sol property in 
the traditional manner, at auction without guidance for development, the beneficiary would 
have received only the raw value of the land and other parties, notably Kirtland AFB, would 
not have had the same ability to provide input and would have been more likely to protest. 
The collaborative process of working with outside groups and hiring a competent private 
sector partner with a strong history of community collaboration increased revenue and 
avoided additional time and money consuming conflicts. 
 
Employment and Urban Form 
 
The city of Albuquerque and surrounding community will likely benefit from increased 
employment and improved urban form stemming from the development of Mesa del Sol. 
FCC anticipates 13,000 direct jobs and 22,000 indirect jobs will be created by 2020.65 In 
response, the city and community have become more involved in the process, recognizing the 
positive impact it will have on urban growth. In addition to employment opportunities, the 
development provides an enticing alternative to runaway west side sprawl and its associated 
infrastructure costs. Results of the SLO’s collaborative approach, particularly new urbanism, 
are improving urban form across the city. As Powell explains, other developments in 
Albuquerque “are now mimicking what we were doing because they see that it’s attractive to 





Chris Hyer, Planner for the city of Albuquerque and former SLO Planner, agrees that Mesa 
del Sol will benefit Albuquerque’s urban form: 
 
The west side of Albuquerque has a lot of problems … typically it hasn’t 
developed the way it should have. All of the employment is on the east side, 
all of the housing is on the west side. Outside of the city is where the 
development is happening and it is not the most quality development. So Mesa 
del Sol is happening. I think it’s very good. It’s exactly what the city needs.67 
 
These improvements to urban form are a key benefit of Mesa del Sol’s collaborative process, 
particularly in the negotiations between the SLO, Kirtland AFB and Sandia National Labs 
that resulted in the La Semilla open space. La Semilla, a one-mile by four-mile area along the 
east side of Mesa del Sol, will provide a buffer zone between Sandia National Laboratories 
and future development. Sandia Labs, part of Kirtland Air Force Base and run by the 
Department of Energy (DOE) harbor top-secret military secrets and were originally 
concerned about the proximity of potential development on Mesa del Sol. By addressing 
Kirtland’s concerns over its operations within Sandia Labs, Tim Callahan believed La 
Semilla is one instance where “we really went out, over, maybe overboard to make sure that 
the base is benefiting.” He acknowledges that the military often has the political muscle to 
get what they want, but also says Ray Powell and Harry Relkin did a commendable job 
coming up with the buffer idea.68 Further, through the creation of the buffer zone the SLO 
was able to take the development rights from La Semilla and transfer them to other portions 
of Mesa del Sol, increasing the permitted number and density of lots to allow for ‘new 
urbanism’ densities and ultimately increase profits. 
 
New urbanism relies on open space to increase development density, reduce the overall 
development footprint, bring people and buildings closer together and reduce dependence on 
motorized transportation. Inclusion of the La Semilla buffer into the new urbanist design 
format helps Mesa del Sol meet Albuquerque’s progressive Planned Communities Criteria, 
discussed below. To Relkin, collaborating with the DOE to structure a lease on the La 
Semilla buffer was a good solution to the “‘highest and best use’ requirement of the Land 
Office.”69 For the DOE, working collaboratively with the SLO solved two problems. First, by 
bringing Mesa del Sol one step closer to fruition, the DOE assured itself of potential 
employee residences and commercial and industrial partners. Second, the La Semilla buffer 
avoided a potentially lengthy, costly and crippling political and legal battle over Mesa del 
Sol. The La Semilla collaboration has proven to be a tremendous benefit for the SLO and 
DOE. 
 
Increased Community Relationships and Input 
 
Likewise, the informal collaborative process allowed local business interests and the Greater 
Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce (GACC) to become involved at the ground level, 
building support and forming community relationships to promote Mesa del Sol as a site for 
commercial and industrial enterprises. As GACC Vice President of Business Advocacy and 
Government Jacqueline Dubose Christensen states, a primary benefit of working with the 
GACC is that “we can bring a lot of pressure to bear on an issue” to local government and 
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are “sometimes able to play a role in bringing the various groups together to locate the 
issues.” For Mesa del Sol, GACC issued official position papers in support of the project and 
advocated and testified before city council.70 
 
The Mesa del Sol Planning Process welcomed increased input from interested parties beyond 
the business community. In a traditional planning process, groups like the Sierra Club, 1000 
Friends of New Mexico and even the neighboring Isleta Pueblo may not have been consulted. 
Informal collaboration allowed these parties to voice their concerns, provide input on 
solutions that could help them support the project. This effort did not go unnoticed by the 
parties. Blair Brown and Susan Gorman, Sierra Club volunteers, say of Ray Powell, “He 
feels working together is how you get stuff done.” They also add, “[The Sierra Club] helped 
reinforce what they wanted to do … to know they had support out there in the community.” 71 
The SLO incorporated some suggestions, but Ray Powell, Chris Hyer and Tim Callahan 
stressed that the SLO never lost sight of its constitutional obligation to the trust. As Hyer 
recounted, “We were stuck with the Enabling Act guiding us and we didn’t have a whole lot 
of latitude around it.”72 Despite this, the SLO was able to solicit outside opinion, largely 
satisfy those groups’ desires, and remain loyal to its constitutional obligation. 
 
PARTICIPANTS’ MEASURES OF SUCCESS 
 
State Land Office and University of New Mexico 
 
The broad set of interested parties resulted in diverse measures of success. As the 
beneficiary, UNM is interested in maximum revenue from the lease and sales of Mesa del Sol 
as well as a model development tied to their name showcasing “environmental resource 
issues and community development.”73 SLO representatives consistently mentioned funding 
for school children as a direct measure of their success. The ability of informal collaboration 
to bring parties to a consensus also factored strongly in their perception of the process’ 
success. In addition, as commissioner, Ray Powell wanted Mesa del Sol to “set the standard 
for how you live in an arid environment.” In doing so, he believed it was possible to earn 
more money than business as usual would allow.74 By their accounts, these parties have been 




Other parties such as the Sierra Club also measure success partly through the environmental 
impact of development.75 Blair Brown and Susan Gorman, Sierra Club volunteers, stress that 
the Sierra Club is also very concerned with how the commissioner involves the public in 
decision making. The Sierra Club currently is deciding how to evaluate Mesa del Sol, an 
environmentally responsible greenfield development. 
 
City of Albuquerque 
 
Defining success for the city is complex. By some measures, the city is most concerned that 
Mesa del Sol simply meet technical planning criteria, not necessarily that it exhibit 
collaborative characteristics. But economic and political measures are also important to 
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particular figures within the city, and Mesa del Sol scores well on those scales as well. 
Technically, any project is successful if it meets the requirements of the Planned Community 
Criteria. Mesa del Sol is currently under review by the Planning Commission, though no 
participants voiced concerns about its ability to meet the criteria. Economically, it must help 
bring economic activity to downtown while not drawing business away from other 
neighborhoods. Mesa del Sol will certainly draw business in Albuquerque closer to the center 
of the city, but at what expense to other areas is yet to be seen. On a political scale, Mesa del 
Sol has had to wait until west side development is largely complete. At this point in time, 
west side development interests in the city may be more open to considering Mesa del Sol as 
a viable, successful addition to the city. In general, it seems that Mesa del Sol is a benefit to 
the city, having been integrated into the development landscape through a collaborative 





Adjacent landowners’ concerns were addressed effectively through informal collaboration, 
despite the hidden interests of the Isleta Pueblo and Kirtland AFB. La Semilla stands as a 
measure of success for Kirtland AFB. According to the concerns of the Isleta Pueblo, namely 
competition for their golf course, casino and water supply, it also appears that the 
collaborative process has placated any fears. 
 
Harry Relkin stated that the DOE is very pleased with the SLO’s outreach and collaboration 
that resulted in the La Semilla open space buffer, which will serve as an environmental 
education venue and cushion for military lands to the east.76 Because the DOE must keep its 
secrets close, dissatisfaction would likely arise through political maneuvering to prevent 
development near Mesa del Sol’s border, which has not occurred. 
 
Albuquerque National Dragway 
 
The Dragway stands as the only party unhappy with the present status of Mesa del Sol. They 
were under whelmed by their relationship with the Powell administration, citing unreturned 
calls and a general lack of respect for their business. Powell’s suspension of their lease made 
them particularly nervous about investing in improvements for their race track and facilities. 
In contrast, their relationship with the Lyons administration has been very positive. It also 
appears they relate well to Lyons on a personal level. Dealings with FCC have been 
lukewarm, though the Dragway is hopeful regarding future collaboration with the company. 
As described by Dragway representatives, the Dragway’s primary goal is to continue racing 
at a venue they have operated for more than forty years and without impact to any current or 
future neighbors.77 They do not view the process as successful because they feel the SLO has 
largely ignored their concerns and they have been unable to sign any guarantees with FCC 
regarding their long-term future. 
 
Overall, however, the Mesa del Sol process was perceived as a positive endeavor for the 
SLO. First, most community and local government representatives are pleased with the way 
the SLO has communicated with stakeholders and will maximize revenue for the beneficiary. 
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Second, environmental organizations are pleased with Mesa del Sol as an infill development 
with new urbanism characteristics and significant open space. Finally, the process has been a 
political success for the SLO as the two commissioners most actively promoting Mesa del 
Sol were elected to second terms. 
 
To most participants, excluding the Dragway, the process also appears to have been fair. 
Though we were unable to discuss the drag racing issue with SLO employees, our perception 
is that honest efforts to reach out or be available to the community were made in most all 
cases, but for various reasons this particular relationship broke down. 
 
COSTS OF THE PROCESS 
 
Costs associated with the Mesa del Sol Planning Process varied among the participants. In 
one example, Brown and Gorman, representing a non-profit organization with little or no 
experience working with the SLO, found their experience sometimes frustrating in that their 
organization lacks the resources necessary to address such a lengthy timeline and informal 
methods of public input.78 In another, one former SLO employee, who was deeply involved 
in the technical aspects of developing the plan and guiding the process, was quick to cite 
increased demands on time as a primary cost.79 
 
Increased Demands on Agency Time and Resources 
 
Increased staff resources resulted from the steep learning curve associated with the 
collaborative process to garner support for Mesa del Sol. The learning curve necessitated a 
“learn as you go” approach by the SLO and likely contributed to agency’s increased staff 
resource costs. Tim Callahan, long time SLO planner, expressed that the SLO’s inexperience 
with projects of Mesa del Sol’s physical magnitude led to extra staff costs associated with 
drafting four separate master plans.80 The SLO financed several early in-house master plans 
through special legislative appropriations, but provided its own money for the plan written by 
SLO Planner Tom Leatherwood that would influence FCC’s own plan. In addition to the 
costs incurred writing the plans associated with the SLO, a partial plan was funded and 
drafted by UNM early in the process, but never made public.81 While additional costs 
associated with drafting these plans were sizable, there are also benefits associated with the 
failed internal plans, described in the section above. In a traditional management scenario for 
state trust land in which a developer bought land at auction without prior collaborative efforts 
by the SLO, the developer would have been responsible for coordinating future collaboration 
with other entities. In this case, however, the SLO worked with other entities as well as the 
developer upfront, thus devoting additional SLO time and energy to the project. 
 
Another significant cost resulting from the process was the considerable time spent during 
the technical planning stages. The SLO devoted time to convincing Albuquerque that the 
land should be annexed and working with Kirtland AFB and the DOE to design a lease for 
the La Semilla buffer.  
 
Additional time was dedicated to the process of attracting and selecting a suitable developer. 
Because Commissioner Baca’s auction failed, the Powell administration took additional steps 
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to make Mesa del Sol an attractive project for a capable private sector partner. Time spent 
doing so would not have been necessary under Baca’s original plan. As part of sweetening 
the deal for the prospective developer, Harry Relkin attempted to approve the Mesa del Sol 
site via the Albuquerque Planned Communities Criteria (PCC), a decision he admits likely 
cost the process one full year.82 The PCC is a set of planning guidelines for all developments 
of a certain magnitude within the city of Albuquerque. They are designed to ensure that these 
developments come at no net expense to the city and integrate certain amounts of open space 
and other land use requirements. In the end, PCC approval was sought after FCC was 
selected as developer. To date, Mesa del Sol is the only development that has submitted an 
application for PCC approval. 
 
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 
 
Looking back at the process and its challenges, FCC Consultant and former SLO Planner 
Harry Relkin succinctly noted, “It’s been a pain in the ass.”83 This comment reflects the 
general sentiment of frustration over Mesa del Sol’s lengthy and challenging history and 
hints at the many specific challenges that surfaced throughout the last two decades. 
Interviewees cited challenges ranging from power struggles and miscommunication between 
parties, to complex negotiations and trouble adjusting to a lengthy planning timeline. 
 
Rigidity of the Trust Land Mandate 
 
The SLO no longer engages in outright sales of land as this is largely considered to be a 
breach of its mandate by limiting the trust’s long-term viability. This policy was initiated in 
response to actions of a commissioner in the 1950s who sold nearly four million surface 
acres of trust land, some in questionable deals, creating a disparity between surface and 
subsurface holdings. Thus, lands are either exchanged or leased. This practice was an initial 
hurdle for the Mesa del Sol project as residential development on which people lease their 
property prohibits homeownership. The master plan and close relationship between the SLO 
and outside developer became essential to overcoming this obstacle to practical development.  
 
Continuity of Stakeholders 
 
Active planning for Mesa del Sol spanned more than two decades, involving dozens of 
individuals. Changes in participants and representation have been inevitable but challenging. 
Tim Callahan, SLO Planner, explained: 
 
You have presidents change at the University, Regents change at the 
University, Land Commissioners change, Mayors change, County 
Commissioners change. So all this makes for a moving target. So it’s very, 
very difficult to get any really good consistency going, but we kept it going 
and pushed it and pushed it and pretty soon UNM was working closer and 
closer with us. We had more buy-in from them. I think more confidence with 
each other. And then finally the Mayor, this recent Mayor, finally saw some 




The dynamic relationship between beneficiary and trust fluctuated between productive and 
disinterested or even contentious over the past two decades. Part of the challenge was rooted 
in the fact that new UNM Regents are appointed by each Governor, threatening continuity in 
the University’s relationship with the SLO. The Regents have varied widely in their interest 
in the project. In addition, the memory of UNM’s lawsuit has remained fresh and it has been 
imperative that the SLO avoid future litigation by devising a development plan that would 
satisfy the beneficiary. 
 
Illustrating the challenge a change in Regents could bring, in 2003 the SLO signed a contract 
with UNM to exchange 1,500 acres the University owned elsewhere in the state for 1,500 
acres of Mesa del Sol owned by the SLO. UNM would then outright sell its new Mesa del 
Sol acreage to FCC. Not believing this was a fair deal, Jerry King, Assistant Commissioner 
of Surface Resources, requested an additional 1,500 acres be included in the exchange and 
during negotiations a new set of Regents was appointed. As King says, “the old Regents, they 
just really didn’t care” about the detail of the exchange. The new Regents, however, came in 
and said, “‘We really don’t like this deal. If we’re going to swap with Forest City we want to 
have certain percentages from them’” and other specific details. King and the SLO were 
extremely worried that the increased demands by the new Regents would scare FCC from the 
entire project. “We thought Forest City was going to walk away,” King explained.84 
 
Changes in UNM leadership also impacted Jim Baca’s ability to move forward with a 
collaborative process. There was concern from some stakeholders that Baca’s combative 
instincts stalled progress and Tim Callahan believed that Baca’s plans took a hit when the 
University President, with whom he was very close, left and Baca was forced to deal with a 
set of Regents who were more wary of his plans. Callahan explained the President’s 
departure meant that “all of the sudden, Baca had no allies.”85 Baca’s ability to effectively 
respond to this challenge was hampered by his strong personality that some people find 
abrasive. 
 
Continuity of Agency, Private Partner and Community Interests 
 
Other parties identified changes in SLO staff as a challenge as well. For the Dragway’s 
Owner Bob Labatte and Director of Public Relations Bill Elliott, staff changes were 
particularly frustrating. Many of Powell’s staff with whom the Dragway originally worked 
have since left their jobs. Though the Dragway campaigned heavily for Patrick Lyons in 
2002 and their hard work paid off when Lyons renewed their lease, they are reluctant to 
hedge bets on future improvements to their facility as they expect SLO staff and their lease 
may change when Lyons leaves office. 
 
The Dragway also experienced frustrations with employee continuity at FCC, as the 
company’s representatives have also recently changed. Bill Elliott, Communications Director 
at the Dragway, says, “We’ve sat in a couple of meetings with [FCC]. Some of the people 
have changed. Some that got in there we don’t get along too well with.”86 In all, the Dragway 
feels it has been terribly challenging to work with partners whose representatives and 
philosophies constantly change, especially when the nature of their business requires periodic 
major investments in infrastructure. Elliott adds, “[Bob Labatte] has put a lot of blood, sweat, 
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tears and money into this [drag strip],” but cannot make major investments without a clearer 
assurance of the drag strip’s future. 87 They hope their relationship with FCC improve and 
claim to be more than willing to find a solution that includes the Dragway in Mesa del Sol’s 
future 
 
In addition, parties with limited staff, financial resources and time have found it increasingly 
difficult to follow the process. This challenge was most acute for groups reliant upon 
volunteer labor and who have limitations relating to high turnover. The Sierra Club is an 
excellent example of a group very interested in the development of Mesa del Sol, yet unable 
to consistently devote the proper resources to evaluating plans and designs due to limited 
volunteer staff human resources. Brown and Gorman, Sierra Club volunteers, explained that 
their organization traditionally devotes most of its time to non-urban environmental issues. 
Even though they have support to focus on Mesa del Sol, many other staff and volunteers are 
focused elsewhere. Compounding this issue, the Sierra Club, like many non-profit 
organizations, must deal with a high rate of volunteer turnover, making it difficult to assign 
additional people long-term to Mesa del Sol. Their organization has found it “really hard to 
maintain continuity on a project that goes over a long, slow period like that.”88 The solution 
for the Sierra Club was to assign two dedicated volunteers to monitor the process. This 
strategy was more effective when Ray Powell, a personal friend, was commissioner, though 
their relationship with FCC has been productive. 
 
Continuity of Commissioners and Administration 
 
Commissioner discontinuity also challenged the process. Commissioners in New Mexico 
serve a maximum of two consecutive four-year terms, a relatively short length of time 
compared to the lifespan of the Mesa del Sol project. Each new Commissioner of Public 
Lands brings with him or her an entirely new sets of beliefs and policies. Participants in the 
Mesa del Sol Planning Process sometimes felt challenged to adapt to each new 
administration’s own set of ideals and policies. These changes were sometimes enough to 
derail projects begun in pervious administrations. When Powell began his first term, he 
wanted to institute more planning and collaboration into the SLO. This was a significant 
change from previous administrations, and he learned that “folks wanted [the old policies] to 
continue, including Mr. Baca.”89 
 
The current commissioner, Patrick Lyons, has markedly different business philosophies from 
his predecessor Ray Powell. Lyons indicated he would not have chosen to spend agency 
resources on such an involved collaborative process for Mesa del Sol. Rather, he described 
his philosophy as, “I want to put it on the ground,” minimizing the SLO’s role in planning 
and placing the responsibility of collaboration and on the private developer.90 Lyons, just like 
any commissioner, has the authority to implement his own business strategies, but for his part 
Lyons said, despite having gone through a process counter to his own style, “We’re 
supportive of [Mesa del Sol] … We’d like to see it happen.”91 
 
Continuing projects from previous administrations as Lyons did, is one method of addressing 
continuity, though there is no legal mandate to do so. Making the choice to honor such a 
precedent is much easier and compelling and can be more easily accomplished through more 
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formal means of collaboration than are displayed in this case. A formal collaborative 
strategy, including instituting a working group, could help a new commissioner better 
quantify and understand the investments in a particular project and bring weight to bear on 
the decision to continue the process.  
 
The lawsuit and ensuing changes in SLO administrations, UNM Regents and others likely 
created some level of uncertainty in the private sector whether Mesa del Sol was a safe 
investment. It is difficult for a private developer to accept the risk of a project of this scale 
when relationships between the SLO and UNM fluctuate so often and characters change over 
the lengthy timeline. Collaboration appears to have succeeded in creating a process that was 
less affected by discontinuity and where trust in the community and private sector could be 
built. That FCC is devoting tens of millions of dollars over several decades is a credit to 
Powell and others at the SLO for their style of collaboration and the persistence they 
exhibited through many changes in participants. Whether or not the informal collaborative 
precedent set through Mesa del Sol will change the way the SLO conducts business, Powell 
said, “It has the opportunity to do and it depends on the leadership of the Land Office in the 
future because it is such an autonomous office.”92 
 
Understanding the Commissioner’s Authority and Power 
 
Despite a focus on collaboration, the commissioner’s unchecked authority presented 
challenges for several parties, notably UNM and the Dragway, who prefer a more level 
playing field and a greater say in the outcome. UNM’s frustrations first came out in their 
lawsuit against Baca, but challenges also surfaced at other times. At one point earlier in the 
process, relationships deteriorated to the point where the SLO considered severing UNM’s 
ties to Mesa del Sol by exchanging the land for property owned by Bernalillo County. This 
consideration forced UNM to come in line with the SLO or risk losing this valuable property. 
The result was reestablishment of a clear hierarchy between SLO and beneficiary.93 
 
Similarly, the Dragway struggled with the commissioner’s authority and autonomous nature. 
To the Dragway, Powell’s ability to let their lease expire was deeply troubling, especially 
because it was based on alleged unpaid portions of lease payments, charges the Dragway 
representatives emphatically deny. The Dragway expressed a desire to see an oversight board 
to temper the Commissioner of Public Lands’ decision-making power. Bill Elliott elaborates, 
“[The Commissioner] can’t tell the Governor [what to do]. The Governor can’t tell him. So if 
you stop to think about it, it’s a powerful position. And I don’t think many people recognize 
it.” 94 Powell addressed his view of the commissioner’s powerful authority in New Mexico, 
in saying, “In that autonomy is a real strength because you can take those risks, you can 
move forward. But also there’s real risk because you can head in a direction that really can be 
very deleterious and everybody else just kind of sits on the sideline”95 
 
Working outside the process was an effective method for members to increase their 
influence. Though UNM’s official authority is limited, they have been adept at taking 
creative measures to stall or maneuver the process to further their interests. In 2004, the 
University sidestepped the SLO to deal privately with FCC to demand a higher percentage of 
profits from each UNM-owned parcel, creating frustration at the SLO that the deal would 
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sour the leasing structure on parcels the agency owned. In addition, UNM used political 
power to influence the city to stall development when not fully satisfied and generally caused 
frustrations when a new Board of Regents has shown little or no interest in developing Mesa 
del Sol according to the SLO’s plans. These periodic attempts to stall progress outside the 
collaborative relationship presented a great challenge to the SLO, which was sometimes ill-
prepared for such tactics and unable to retaliate against them. Once, the SLO reversed roles 
and leaked a plan to exchange its Mesa del Sol acreage with less valuable Bernalillo County 
lands. The exchange would have meant that UNM was no longer beneficiary for a large 
percentage of the lucrative Mesa del Sol parcel. While hardly collaborative, this tactic was 
successful in motivating the Regents to again engage in a working relationship with the SLO. 
Often, however, the SLO simply was forced to wait for opportunities where relationships 
with UNM were more productive, which usually meant the appointment of a new Board of 
Regents or the fulfillment of west side development investments some Regents held. 
 
The Albuquerque National Dragway also used non-traditional methods to exert their power 
and cause unique challenges to the process. The Dragway has been operating on Mesa del 
Sol since 1963 on consecutive five-year leases. Though they are not opposed to the 
development, they believe their operation is consistent with the vision of Mesa del Sol and its 
planned adjacent industrial uses. In response to the termination of their lease by 
Commissioner Powell in 2000, the Dragway organized a campaign to prevent further 
development on Mesa del Sol. According to Tim Callahan, this campaign caused major 
headaches for the SLO and through garnering community support, came fairly close to 
succeeding.96 The SLO was forced to divert resources to fight this campaign and prevent it 
from undoing years of collaborative work aimed at improving community relations. 
 
The Challenge to Create and Maintain Personal Relationships 
 
Personal relationships formed throughout this process were a benefit to some and a great 
challenge to others. The most egregious example is the Dragway, which freely admits that 
Commissioner Powell originally asked if they would like to be incorporated in the planning 
process for Mesa del Sol, but view their relationship with Powell as a complete failure. Any 
possibility of collaboration was overshadowed by conflict in the personal relationship 
between Bill Elliott and Bob Labatte of the Dragway and Powell. Powell’s termination of the 
lease represents a point of no turning back between the two parties. As Bill Elliott explained, 
“When they shut our drag strip down, they made some serious issues. And that was a 
personal vendetta between Ray Powell and [Bob Labatte].”97 Reeling from this bad 
experience, the Dragway has since been forced to limit its long-term planning to the term of 
the commissioner in office 
 
A less antagonistic example, but one that had a greater impact on the process, comes from the 
four years (1998 to 2001) when Jim Baca was Mayor of Albuquerque and Powell was 
commissioner. This would seem an ideal opportunity for building stronger collaboration and 
moving Mesa del Sol forward. However, differing personalities and visions of the SLO’s role 
in collaboration and urban development resulted in an unexpected standstill. Powell says, 
“We kept working on things, but it wasn’t particularly helpful” to have Baca in the Mayor’s 
office. Baca believed Powell simply should sell sections of Mesa del Sol, counter to Powell’s 
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desire to partner with the private sector. “It was just a very different philosophical 
viewpoint,” Powell believed.98 
 
A lack of personal relationships unraveled progress while Martin Chavez was serving his 
first term as Mayor from 1993 to 1997. At that time, Mesa del Sol recently had been annexed 
and the SLO anticipated developing a strong relationship with the Mayor’s office and 
working closely with the city to speed approval from various planning requirements. Chavez, 
though, was coming off a term as State Senator representing Albuquerque’s west side (and its 
development interests) and was unreceptive to helping the SLO develop on the opposite side 
of town. What should have been an opportunity for progress unraveled under incompatible 
personal relationships. Again, the solution to this challenge was simply to wait for political 
offices and representation to shift such that a window of opportunity opened, sparking 
collaboration and continued progress.  
 
Problems with Communication due to Organizational and Cultural Differences 
 
Several participants commented on the difficulties communicating with such a broad set of 
interested parties with diverse and often hidden interests. This difficulty was most evident in 
interactions with Kirtland AFB and Isleta Pueblo. Harry Relkin recalled frustrations with the 
intrinsically secretive nature of the military, explaining that it was often impossible to talk to 
the necessary people or get complete answers regarding their concerns over the project. The 
classified nature of certain base activities made it extremely challenging to understand how 
Mesa del Sol would negatively impact Kirtland AFB and how a collaborative approach could 
mitigate those impacts. Relationships with the Isleta Pueblo similarly presented a unique 
challenge. The Isleta Governor is the head political official and also responsible for dealing 
with outside parties. Often times, though, decision-making power is held by tribal members 
behind the scenes. Because the SLO was only permitted to speak with the Governor, it was 
difficult to truly understand the Isleta’s concerns. In addition, Indian pueblos often have 
explicit interests that propagate their public image and maintain other interests that are not 
available for public knowledge.  
 
Despite these difficulties communicating with the Isleta, the SLO understood the Pueblo’s 
core issues to be fear of competition for the pueblo’s golf course, casino and water resources. 
Tim Callahan and Jacqueline Dubose Christensen both mentioned the golf course and casino 
issues as being necessary to resolve before the Isleta could accept development on Mesa del 
Sol. Jerry King, Jim Baca and Jacqueline Dubose Christensen also mentioned concessions or 
acknowledgements that were made to address Isleta concerns over water supply and quantity. 
Dubose Christensen stated that the Pueblo’s had “concerns because they’re south of us in 
terms of development and water.”99 Baca said the newest development agreement would not 
drill for water within one mile of the Pueblo.100 Working with the military and pueblo 
necessitated skillful, delicate negotiating that makes the other party less reluctant to speak 
about their concerns. Interpreting their concerns and addressing them is one of the unique 
and important challenges of the Mesa del Sol Planning Process.  
 
Competing and hidden interests surfaced in other ways as well, often coupled with fierce 
political forces. Specifically, the west side development interests presented a powerful 
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political challenge to the Mesa del Sol Planning Process. Baca described how he was 
hampered by development interests early in the process, “If the business community were to 
get behind the Mesa del Sol project, it would make the life of the Land Commissioner much 
more simple.”101 Baca’s struggle was compounded by the fact that the business community 
was represented by elected officials, thereby allowing private interests to guide their 
decisions on Albuquerque’s growth. Increasing the difficulty is the secretive nature of these 
interests. Chris Hyer explained, “You won’t find it printed in the paper … like ‘I have major 
land holdings on the west side.’ There are issues like that that caused the path of Mesa del 
Sol to happen the way it happened.”102 Jim Baca was more explicit, saying his work on Mesa 
del Sol “backfired because of a string of Mayors who favored west side development.”103 
Powell added, “The real dilemma was that a lot of the large private landowners saw [Mesa 
del Sol] as competition to their efforts and were not really pleased about us [developing Mesa 
del Sol].”104 Communicating with these interests was extremely challenging, as Jim Baca 
observed, “The west side development interests represented were on the UNM Board of 
Regents, through the banks; just direct conflicts of interest.”105 The solution was twofold. 
The SLO had to use the support of other parties garnered through informal collaboration to 
press political entities to support Mesa del Sol and also wait until these entities have other 




Mesa del Sol is unlike most of the other cases in this report in that it had no formal 
collaborative group that spearheaded the planning efforts. Collaboration on the project 
occurred solely through the SLO’s outreach efforts and can be characterized as a loose 
affiliation of relationships and partnerships with concerned parties and the beneficiary. 
Therefore, most factors facilitating success come not from a formal collaborative structure, 
but from business strategies and philosophies implemented by the SLO. These factors 
include informal collaboration, progressive leadership in the commissioner’s office, the 
SLO’s vision, the relationship between politics and time and intergovernmental cooperation. 
 
A Broad Informal Collaborative Strategy 
 
While the Mesa del Sol Planning Process resulted in an extended timeline and an inability for 
some groups to devote the twenty plus years of their time and attention, the informal nature 
of collaboration was key to many parties’ participation. The SLO’s strategies appear 
successful in moving the process forward by achieving isolated pockets of support that grew 
into broad community buy-in. 
 
This less formal structure was largely a benefit to the process, possibly functioning as the key 
factor that enticed parties with hidden interests to participate. For Kirtland AFB and the Isleta 
Pueblo, Mesa del Sol’s informal collaborative process may have been the only acceptable 
vehicle for collaboration. 
 
For parties who were only interested in certain stages of the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, 
the SLO’s informal collaborative strategies were appropriately targeted. When the process 
was at a point in time where some parties had no desire to be involved, they had no need for 
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regularly scheduled meetings. In the place of such meetings, participation of parties in the 
planning process could be solicited when appropriate or relevant to that party through an 
open door policy at the SLO. As a result, neighborhood organizations and other interested 
parties were able to support Mesa del Sol without dramatically increasing demands on their 
time and resources. 
 
The only party that expressed that an informal approach led to decreased collaboration is the 
Dragway. They feel their view has been continuously ignored throughout the process and 
they would have likely welcomed a formal venue to voice their concerns. Bill Elliott 
explained, “This is what was really strange. Ray Powell came to Bob [Labatte] and said, 
‘How would you like to be a permanent part of Mesa del Sol?’” and the Dragway never 
heard back from Powell.106 
 
Commitment to Building Personal Relationships 
 
Close relationships with individuals also fostered collaboration. The SLO’s informal 
collaboration was designed to develop relationships with stakeholders and other parties and 
placed a premium on bringing people together and building community investment to foster 
progress. At the very beginning of the process, Baca enjoyed a close relationship with the 
UNM President, whose trust allowed Baca to go forward with his ideas for developing Mesa 
del Sol. The true benefit of that relationship surfaced when the President left his position and 
Baca was forced to work with a Board of Regents who eventually sued him. Baca also 
collaborated closely with Brent Coggins, then President of the local Sierra Club chapter. 
Later, Ray Powell used his personal relationships with Sierra Club volunteers Blair Brown 
and Susan Gorman to convince them to weigh in on Mesa del Sol and evaluate (and 
eventually support) its environmental merits. Overall, Powell stated that “interactions with 
other people went very well. We built good relationships with other people and developed 
credibility.”107 
 
Personal Commitment and Attitude of the Commissioner 
 
One of the most important facilitating factors was the commissioner’s personality. Because 
the position is so autonomous, the commissioner can set the stage for how business will be 
done during his term. With a focus on collaboration and community buy-in, Powell 
repeatedly sent his staff to visit with interested parties. As Jacqueline Dubose Christensen of 
the Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce remembered, Powell often went out to the 
community himself: “He put enormous time and resources into this notion of developing 
Mesa del Sol and he worked people to sell it. He was actively out there. He didn’t send his 
team; he went out to sell it.”108 Without collaboration and an open relationship with the city, 
annexing the property and submitting it for planning approval, Mesa del Sol may have 
become yet another sprawling development. Because of the vision of Commissioners Baca, 
Humphries and Powell to design a process whereby the community and city could help 







An Enduring and Compelling Vision 
 
The importance of vision, from the commissioner and others involved in the process, 
emerged multiple times in interviews. At certain times, vision was necessary to keep Mesa 
del Sol a viable project. After UNM’s lawsuit against Baca, Kim Murphy remembers 
spending time during Humphries’ tenure “just trying to keep the vision alive for a few years 
until we could pick up the pieces and move along.” Likewise, vision was necessary to focus 
on what Mesa del Sol would look like in the coming decades and, despite the long timeline, 
what it meant to the trust and beneficiary. Tim Callahan said UNM “already had visions of 
this being their endowment, their future endowment” before Baca approached them with his 
development plan.109 
 
Vision is also commonly associated with the commissioner’s office. Murphy gave Baca “a 
lot of credit for having the vision to start this project.” Blair Brown and Susan Gorman of the 
Sierra Club said of Powell, “Without his vision none of this would have happened.”110 
Powell himself defined the importance of vision in a few ways, one being an integral 
requirement for collaboration: “It’s a matter of really having a vision, expressing that vision 
[and] getting people to subscribe to it because they contributed to it and it’s part of their 
vision.” Jacqueline Dubose Christensen praised Powell for his vision and his ability to 
translate his ideas to other parties and create a shared vision: “If there was any one individual 
that made a difference in this it was Ray [Powell’s] commitment to it and his willingness to 
go out in the community and explain it and ask for help and not be shy about what he 
envisioned.”111 
 
Powell also knew his developer needed to share those views, something he found in FCC. He 
noted when FCC became interested, he had “finally found a master developer that had the 
deep pockets, had the vision.”112 Kim Murphy also praised FCC, saying he thinks Powell 
made “exactly the right choice in choosing a company with the vision in [CEO] Albert 
Rattner.”113 FCC’s vision, prestige, professionalism and experience are all qualities cited by 
participants. 
 
Electoral Politics and Political Windows of Opportunity 
 
Given the fact that the commissioner is an elected official, politics has guided this process 
and often been a determining factor in progress and delays. Kim Murphy stated that there is a 
“political overlay to most everything the Land Commissioner is doing. So is everything 
they’re doing just politics or are they personal motivations and visions? The truth is, it’s a 
mix. They’re all political creatures,” though personal philosophies and beliefs also guide 
their trust land management.114 The commissioner’s political nature places great importance 
of garnering the public’s support. This political nature can promote accountability and 
constituent outreach in a collaborative way to the public. 
 
Collaborative processes should be alert to changes in political will and periods of opportunity 
that provide a mechanism for overcoming delays. The Mesa del Sol Planning Process 
depended on the commissioner’s ability to wait for political windows to open. The 
commissioner constantly interacted with other political actors and their agendas, specifically 
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parties with financial interests in west side development. These powerful actors have come 
and gone, representing various elected and appointed offices at various times throughout the 
process. As Dubose Christensen stated, success of the project hinged on “who’s in office. 
Timing is everything.”115 The current Mayor of Albuquerque, Martin Chavez, also has ties to 
west side development, but he eventually gave in to the growing popular support to Mesa del 
Sol. As Tim Callahan explained, “He just eventually realized that Mesa del Sol was probably 
win-win.”116 Chris Hyer stated that today, Mesa del Sol has reached a time where “politically 
you have the motivations behind it” and “it’s just an alignment of the stars” that is allowing 
the project to go forward.117  
 
The Value of Intergovernmental Cooperation 
 
The SLO also was required to work with local and state government and national legislators 
to secure transportation access to Mesa del Sol. Funding for the University Boulevard 
extension was appropriated as the result of intense lobbying from the SLO, City, FCC and 
bipartisan support from federally elected officials. Tim Callahan explained, “We had 
Congressional support. Bipartisan. Domenici, and we had [Senator] Bingaman, 
[Representative] Heather Wilson bringing home the bacon on funding for the roads for the 
interchange.”118 In a poor state with limited funding, it is seen as a major achievement that 
“they’ve already got the 8 million dollars for this thing … that was surprising.”119 
 
A Capable Private Sector Partner 
 
Many participants cited FCC’s capabilities in community relations and urban planning as key 
to facilitating progress. As a national company with decades of experience in large, complex, 
progressive urban development projects, FCC brought a level of technical know-how to 
Mesa del Sol that local companies could not match. In addition, their proven ability to work 
well with community interests made them a very attractive partner in the Mesa del Sol 
process. Kim Murphy remembered that attracting FCC “was a major, major 
accomplishment.”120 Chris Hyer, former SLO Planner, claimed that because of FCC’s strong 
planning resources, “I think this is going to be one hell of a development. Rather than just 





The Mesa del Sol Planning Process was an enormous learning process for the SLO. The size 
of the land and complexity and duration of the process made it a unique challenge and 
opportunity. Participants cited both positive and negative lessons associated with the process. 
Interestingly, few groups had serious regrets. Often we heard of minor procedural lessons 
regarding technical planning matters, but these have little or no bearing on the collaborative 
process. Lessons learned relate to: government and community buy-in, private sector 






1. The importance of government and community buy-in in informal collaboration 
 
Mesa del Sol exemplifies the value of establishing buy-in from the community and other 
parties early in the process. Ray Powell and his former staff often spoke of the importance of 
building community support and involving them from the onset. Powell said, “We went and 
talked to people, sat at their kitchen tables, one on one … everybody that worked for me.”122 
Even with ultimate authority over the final decision, many participants believe the SLO’s 
community outreach and involvement was more than adequate. Establishing buy-in from one 
group could be used to gain the support of another, eventually building into a coalition that 
swayed dissident political interests. Therefore, Tim Callahan explained, “We spent years 
bringing Mayors out there, City Councilmen out there, County Managers out there, Regents 
out there, Presidents of the University, all the Deans, and the School of Architecture, bring in 
the business.”123 Jacqueline Dubose Christensen says the Greater Albuquerque Chamber of 
Commerce has been pleased: 
 
I think that the initial effort was successful because of Ray Powell’s 
willingness to go out and work it … if there was any one individual that made 
a difference in this it was Ray’s commitment to it and his willingness to go 
out in the community and explain it and ask for help and not be shy about 
what he envisioned.124  
 
The importance of involving interested parties from the very beginning cannot be 
underestimated. This strategy ensured all groups were on the same page and reduced 
confusion and conflict as the process developed. Powell’s goal that stakeholders learn about 
Mesa del Sol from the SLO and not elsewhere was key to success and should function as a 
mantra for other collaborative processes. 
 
2. A capable private sector partner is key to the process 
 
Second, many participants recognized the importance of a dynamic, powerful private sector 
partner. Traditionally, Jerry King explained, “It’s been really, really hard for New Mexico to 
attract [companies like] Forest City Covingtons.”125 The necessity of a prestigious, 
competent partner related to selecting a developer capable of handling such a large and 
lengthy development and to ensuring the developer shares the SLO’s vision and works within 
the constraints of the trust land system. Just as several participants praised FCC’s vision, the 
company also was lauded for its ability to meet the preceding requirements. Chris Hyer said, 
“That’s the advantage of having a Forest City and its partners.”126 
 
For its part, FCC seems well-prepared for the intricacies of developing on state trust lands. 
The company has a long history of collaborative community involvement in its development 
projects. The feeling among the public that Mesa del Sol was too contentious an area to be 
developed made it even more important that the private sector partner be capable of 
communicating with and involving the public in the planning process. 
 
As with many other aspects of the case, Ray Powell’s involvement was essential for 
developing an intimate private sector partnership. Attracting a competent partner was a direct 
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outcome of the SLO’s business policies, he said: “When you do neat stuff, you attract neat 
people.” To make the relationship productive for everyone, Powell again brought up the 
notion of vision. He said he made “exactly the right choice in choosing a company with the 
vision in [CEO] Albert Rattner.” Consequently, the private partner must be willing to work 
closely with the SLO and stakeholders and benefit the trust over the long-term. Powell 
remembered, “When I signed [FCC] on, I signed them on to do a first class development to 
benefit our community.”127 
 
3. Be prepared for extra time at the front end (and less at the tail end) 
 
A third lesson discussed at some length with regards to facilitating factors is recognizing that 
a collaborative process may require an extended timeline. This lesson was true for Mesa del 
Sol. Had Commissioner Baca’s original auction succeeded in 1987, Mesa del Sol would have 
been much less collaborative, though years of work might have been saved. While the 
extended timeframe added significant challenges to on-going participation in the process 
from many interested parties, it also provided opportunities for ultimate political approval 
and for forward movement on the project. 
 
State trust land departments should expect collaborative processes to require a longer 
timeline. To help streamline operations, Ray Powell sought to include parties at the 
beginning of the process, before large decisions had been made.128 This strategy appeared to 
be the correct prescription, as the only lawsuit to date revolved around a breakdown in 
communication. The Mesa del Sol Planning Process supports the general idea that 
collaborative planning processes frontload time demands but reduce conflict and increase 
productivity in the end. 
 
4. There is no strict formula for satisfying hidden political interests 
 
Politics also played an enormous role in delaying and then permitting Mesa del Sol to move 
forward. The Mesa del Sol Process illustrates that Land Commissioners and their staffs must 
be savvy with competing interests, especially when those players wield influence over the 
process or final outcome. Looking back, participants acknowledged that the political stars 
must align for a project of this magnitude and that the alignment becomes more difficult as 
the number of parties involved increases. The political parties of primary concern in Mesa 
del Sol were the SLO, Albuquerque Mayor, City Council and UNM Regents, each with their 
own interests and visions for growth and development in the Albuquerque region. 
Representation within these groups changed every few years, complicating negotiations 
surrounding Mesa del Sol. For example, Baca cited a string of Mayors who were interested in 
west side development, thereby stalling infrastructure or annexation approval of Mesa del 
Sol: “There were too many money interests and too many politics involved.”129 
 
5. Build experience in collaboration to streamline future processes 
 
Finally, the process may be slowed due to inexperience working with the peculiarities of 
other parties. Similarly, for the SLO working with the private sector requires some amount of 
adaptation. Current and former SLO planners Tim Callahan and Chris Hyer (who is now with 
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the city of Albuquerque) told us that all three bidders in 2001 were highly scrutinized, both 
for their contribution to the bottom line and their potential as partners invested in working 
with the community to make it a better place in which to live and do business.130 This process 
may be a bit more tedious than simply selecting the highest bidder, but the payoff in terms of 
economic development, trust revenue and ultimate success of the project can be increased 
dramatically. Powell acknowledged that “some of this may be idealistic; we’ll see. But I 
think this is based on good sound business sense if you look at the big picture over the long 
period of time – and that’s what a trust is for.”131 
 
These lessons provide clear guidance for future collaborative endeavors regarding 
development. Heading into the process Ray Powell said, “I told our folks right from the start: 
you’re going to make mistakes. I’m not going to come down on you as long as you’re honest, 
hard working [and] consult [with] me and the public. Let’s learn from what we did 
wrong.”132 Other state land departments will also want to budget time for institutional 
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he turn of the century brought growing concern regarding the decreasing populations of 
the lesser prairie chicken, gaining publicity in the 1980s with significant population 
declines following a severe drought in the southwestern United States. In response, several 
agencies based in the Southwest attempted interstate conservation initiatives with little 
ultimate success. Eventually, the prairie chicken, as well as the sand dune lizard, another 
southwestern species experiencing population declines, became candidate species for listing 
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). In an attempt to mitigate harm to prairie chickens 
and sand dune lizards in the state of New Mexico and prevent the need for federally-imposed 
restrictions on oil and gas and ranching land by ESA regulations, the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) initiated a Resource Management Plan (RMP) Amendment process that 
would update the land use and oil and gas leasing in prairie chicken and sand dune lizard 
habitat. It was within this context that the BLM, in cooperation with the New Mexico 
Department of Game and Fish (NMDGF), convened a stakeholder Working Group to inform 
the RMP Amendment Process and address prairie chicken and sand dune lizard conservation 
issues in the heart of New Mexico oil and gas country to create an overall conservation plan.  
 
The Southeast New Mexico Working Group was formed in early 2003 to design a 
conservation plan for the lesser prairie chicken and sand dune lizard that would preclude the 
need for listing of the species under ESA while maintaining local livelihoods. Along with 
two outside facilitators, the group consisted of representatives from the BLM, the NMDGF, 
the State Land Office (SLO), USFWS, the ranching industry, the oil and gas industry and 
conservation organizations. The ultimate conservation plan, the “Conservation Strategy,” 
would address ranching and oil and gas practices in prairie chicken habitat while informing 
the BLM’s RMP Amendment.  
 
Unlike the other agencies at the table, the RMP Amendment and the ESA would not have 
directly impacted the SLO. Yet, the SLO was a consistent and active participant in the 
Working Group. The SLO joined the Working Group in order to participate in the 
construction of the broader plan, understanding that changes to BLM land management 
would impact adjacent state trust lands due to their checkerboard pattern. Ultimately, the 
SLO felt that a conservation plan with consistent standards across all lands would lead to 
more effective leasing and fewer conflicts in the future.  
 
From an initial meeting of approximately 80 individuals anticipating six to nine months of 
discussion emerged a two and a half year process involving 30 to 40 representatives of 
interested groups throughout the state. During this period of time, the group encountered a 
number of stumbling blocks to progress including delays due to a lack of data and mapping 
information, mistrust between group members and the overall length of the process. 
Ultimately in March 2005, the group faced a BLM deadline for consideration in the RMP 






The collaborative process of the Southeast New Mexico Working Group draws attention to 
the need for adequate pre-process planning, including the collection of sound technical 
information and adequate maps to be available early in the process to inform timely decision 
making. It also highlights the importance of outside deadlines to catalyze decision making 
and compromise in the process. The Working Group also highlights how distrust and 
stereotypes between participants can be a major obstacle to progress but also can be 
overcome during the process. For the SLO, the Working Group provides an example of the 
leadership role the agency can assume given their expansive lands and expertise. More 
broadly, this case presents an alternative method for land management planning under the 
threat of ESA.  
 
 
CONTEXT FOR COLLABORATION 
 
The unique nature of New Mexico state trust land management as well as the political history 
of state trust lands provide necessary background to understanding the constraints as well as 
the capabilities and opportunities of the SLO and other agencies, groups and individuals to be 
involved in a collaborative process. This history is outlined in brief below.  
 
FORMATION OF NEW MEXICO AND THE STATE LAND OFFICE (SLO) 
 
New Mexico became a U.S. territory in 18481 and in 18982 sections 16 and 36 in each 
township were set aside as state trust lands to be managed for maximum and perpetual 
revenue largely for the state’s public school system.3 In 1899 the State Legislature created 
the SLO and appointed the first Commissioner of Public Lands to administer state trust 
lands.4 New Mexico’s Enabling Act, passed in 1909, set aside township sections 2 and 32 as 
additional lands for state trust lands, making state trust lands a significant portion of the total 
land area of the state.5 The Enabling Act also confirmed the Land Grant Permanent Fund that 
holds all allocated lands in trust to the public school system and other state institutions. Thus, 
state trust lands have a long history in New Mexico, being established well before New 
Mexico became a state in 1912. 
 
ORGANIZATION AND CULTURE OF THE SLO 
 
The Commissioner of Public Lands is the head of the SLO and is a state-elected official. The 
commissioner serves a maximum of two consecutive four-year terms. The major departments 
of the SLO include Commercial Resources, Surface Resources and Mineral Resources. The 
commissioner is advised by the Office of General Council and the State Land Trusts 
Advisory Board. Ultimately, however, the New Mexico State Constitution entrusts the 
Commissioner of Public Lands with the “control, jurisdiction, care and custody of all trust 
lands” and this provides him with final decision-making authority.6  
 
The SLO manages 13 million subsurface acres and nine million surfaces acres of land.7 
Originally distributed in a checkerboard pattern across the state, New Mexico’s trust lands 
have been somewhat consolidated in some areas as a result of land exchanges with public 
and private institutions, particularly in the southeastern portion of the state and outside of 
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Albuquerque (Figure 10-1). Throughout New Mexico, federal and private land holdings abut 
state trust lands, making cohesive management more challenging. This is particularly true in 
the checkerboard pattern regions.  
  







According to former Commissioner Jim Baca, the SLO historically allowed the interests of 
the mining and oil and gas industries to dictate SLO business, a practice typical of the 
Source: “New Mexico Trust Lands,” Trust Land: A Land Legacy for the American West, 




management of many western states’ trust lands. These industries were often the only parties 
willing to bid on isolated New Mexico trust land parcels.8 As a result, the SLO accepted bids 
from the extractive industry at the exclusion of others to satisfy constitutional revenue 
requirements. Baca mentioned that it has only been within the past several decades that the 
SLO has taken a more aggressive step toward active state trust land management. With 
recent increased pressures for urban development as well as open space, former 
Commissioner Baca believes it is beneficial for the SLO to include conservation interests in 
land management. He noted, “There are places that should be saved and should not be 
exploited.”9  
 
CHARACTERISTICS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF STATE TRUST LANDS 
 
In 2004, SLO revenues provided approximately 15 percent of the state’s $2.2 billion pre K 
through 12 education budget.10 New Mexico has significant oil and natural gas reserves and 
today those two resources account for 95 percent of the SLO’s annual revenue, which is 
deposited into the Land Grant Permanent Fund.11 Grazing leases also are common and are a 
significant part of the SLO’s leasing constituency and culture but provide much smaller 
receipts. Reflecting this disparity, the SLO staff distribution is heavily tilted towards 
subsurface resource management. 
 
Increased demand and high oil and natural gas prices have led the current commissioner, 
Patrick Lyons, to expand lucrative resource extraction leases. Royalties from oil, gas and 
minerals in fiscal year 2005 increased more than 25 percent over those in 2004. The most 
productive oil and gas trust lands lie in the southeastern portion of the state. In August 2005, 
the SLO joined the BLM to fight a lawsuit that hoped to restrict drilling in this area. New 
Mexico Governor Bill Richardson and Attorney General Patricia Madrid had filed a lawsuit 
against the BLM to challenge the agency’s plan to allow drilling in part of Otero Mesa.  
 
Different political philosophies and market conditions during past commissioners’ terms 
have greatly influenced the direction of the SLO. Former Commissioner Ray Powell, a 
Democrat, was heavily involved in conservation and open space issues on state trust lands 
and had particularly good ties to the environmental community, though he did continue oil 
and gas exploration in the state. Currently, Republican Commissioner Lyons focuses on the 
present profitability of resource extraction and has good rapport with his oil and gas, 
minerals and grazing constituencies. His political affiliation and relationships with these 
industries added credibility to SLO involvement and his own actions regarding the Southeast 
New Mexico Working Group. The SLO may have played a very different role in the 
Working Group under a different commissioner. 
 
SLO RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Given the large expanse of state trust lands in New Mexico and limited SLO staff, 
historically the SLO has worked with other state and federal agencies including the NMDGF 
and the BLM on field research and land management.12 Commissioner Lyons noted that he 
tries to work with other agencies consistently because he feels it makes land management 
easier.13 This is particularly true in areas with checkerboard sections of state trust land. 
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Relationships with other agencies and organizations have been ongoing and while the nature 
of the Commissioner of Public Lands as an autonomous decision maker allows the 
commissioner to be independent of the decisions and policies of past commissioners, 
Commissioner Lyons continues to invest in their viability through continuing several of his 
predecessors’ projects. The Southeast New Mexico Working Group, initiated during the 
Powell administration, is one of these projects. 
 
CURRENT NEW MEXICO DEMOGRAPHICS AND POLITICS 
 
Currently, New Mexico is home to more than 1,800,000 residents, one quarter of whom live 
in the city of Albuquerque.14 As a result, the state has a fairly low population density. New 
Mexico has a racially diverse demographic exemplified by large Native American and 
Hispanic populations. New Mexico is also one of the poorest states in the U.S., with an 
average per capita income of $21,931.15 
 
In contrast to some of its western neighbors, New Mexico currently has a strong Democratic 
Governor and Legislature. Commissioner Lyons is the highest-ranking Republican in the 
state’s executive branch and is the first Republican to be elected to that position since Bill 




THE STORY: THE SOUTHEAST NEW MEXICO WORKING GROUP 
 
Prior to the late 19th century, lesser prairie chicken populations were estimated in the 
hundreds of thousands and birds were found in Texas, Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado and New 
Mexico on state, federal and private land. Bob Findling of The Nature Conservancy (TNC) 
noted, “Prairie chickens were sufficiently plentiful that many homesteaders relied upon them 
as a food source.”17 Since that time, however, prairie chicken populations have plummeted to 
three percent of their historical numbers in the state of New Mexico, and similar trends have 
occurred in the four other states comprising their range.18 
 
Field research on prairie chicken ecology has indicated that there may be several causes of 
prairie chicken population decline. First, increased human development, encroachment and 
conversion of prairie to agriculture are cited by some as the most influential factors in 
population decline.19 Such changes have a major effect on shinnery oak and sand sage-
grassland communities in southeastern and east-central New Mexico, the prairie chicken’s 
habitat. Further, associated infrastructure such as roads and power lines divide habitat and 
provide raptors with perches in open prairie previously inaccessible to them. Another 
contributing factor to prairie chicken population declines and fluctuations is drought. Many 
ranching families that have lived for generations on the land attest to the powerful influence 
of rain on prairie chicken populations, as increased rain provides more nest cover from 
predators.20 There is a discrepancy between how conservationists and industry view these 
factors and their relative impact on prairie chicken populations.21 This discrepancy became a 




Declining prairie chicken populations meant the risk of state or federal “threatened” listing. 
For the BLM, listing could result in more restricted land management, fewer land leases, 
decreased lease revenues and many hours of paperwork. In the 1970s, in hopes of avoiding 
such consequences of further prairie chicken decline, the BLM worked in partnership with its 
ranching lessees to implement best management practices for protection of prairie chickens. 
Workshops to this effect largely involved ranchers and BLM staff in coordination with 
outside prairie chicken biologists.22 
 
To form greater partnerships with other landowners and lessees, the BLM formed a multi-
stakeholder group to address prairie chicken conservation in 1981. Persisting through the late 
1990s, the so-called “Little Chicken Group” included members of the BLM, NMDGF, the 
SLO, ranchers and members of the oil and gas industry.23 Despite its longevity, the Little 
Chicken Group made little progress in identifying and implementing conservation 
measures.24  
 
Until 1996, the BLM continued to lease all its land with prairie chicken habitat. However, in 
1996 the BLM made the decision to remove some land in prairie chicken habitat east of 
Roswell in southeastern New Mexico from oil and gas leasing in accordance with its mandate 
to prevent “irreversible commitment of resources” that would negatively impact the prairie 
chicken.25 Biologist Roger Peterson noted that while most of the BLM’s birds were in that 
area, most of the birds’ habitat area was on other BLM land.26 While the BLM made no 
additional removals, the 1996 removals marked the first major economic impact on the oil 
and gas and ranching industries on behalf of prairie chickens and represented a taste of what 
further species protection might cause.  
 
Historically, the NMDGF has monitored and regulated prairie chicken populations as a game 
bird for hunting. According to the NMDGF’s mandate to protect and regulate game species, 
NMDGF Endangered Species Biologist Jim Bailey conducted a detailed study of prairie 
chicken populations after which the agency recommended the prairie chicken be listed as a 
“Species of Concern” in 1997 in response to falling populations.27 Ultimately, however, the 
State Game Commission required the NMDGF to withdraw this recommendation.28 While 
the NMDGF has continued to monitor prairie chicken numbers as well as the number of lek, 
or breeding, sites throughout the state, the agency has not listed the prairie chicken as 
threatened in New Mexico in its biennial review of state species under the New Mexico 
Wildlife Conservation Act. This inaction is despite the efforts by numerous conservation 
groups in New Mexico, including Forest Guardians who reenter the limelight in another five 
years at the start of the Southeast New Mexico Working Group.29 
 
In 2000, a Five-State Working Group was convened to address prairie chicken populations 
across the full extent of the bird’s range. Both statewide and interstate working groups 
addressed prairie chicken conservation, yet bird populations persisted at low levels and none 
of the groups produced a conservation plan. While the NMDGF adopted its own agency-
generated plan, this did not include input from the oil and gas industry, a point of contention 




Amidst these diverse and troubled planning processes, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(USFWS) named the prairie chicken a candidate for listing under the federal Endangered 
Species Act (ESA). Another species with a similar geographic range in New Mexico, the 
sand dune lizard, also was declared a candidate at a higher priority than the prairie chicken. 
Should either species be listed as endangered under ESA, the BLM and private landowners 
who leased federal land containing either species would face significant restrictions in land 
management. Listing would directly impact 1.2 million acres of BLM land and could 
indirectly affect 680,000 acres of state trust land.30 The threat of listing provided increased 
urgency for conservation action. At this time, the BLM initiated a Resource Management 
Plan (RMP) Amendment process to address prairie chicken and sand dune lizard habitat 
management on BLM land. Under the 1976 Federal Lands Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA), an RMP Amendment Process directs a periodic revision for BLM land 
management and incorporates public comment. In early 2002, the BLM decided to receive 
public comment through a multi-stakeholder working group, a decision that the Washington, 
D.C.-based Wildlife Management Institute (WMI) had encouraged as a means to use 
collaborative processes in more western land issues.31 
 
THE WORKING GROUP IS CONVENED 
 
With the RMP Amendment Process getting underway, the Southeast New Mexico Working 
Group was soon to be a reality. The NMDGF and WMI officially convened the Working 
Group, as the BLM could not take the lead in what would serve as the RMP Amendment 
public comment period. Bill Dunn, at the time a predator and gamebird biologist at the 
NMDGF, recalled WMI’s key role: “They saw the train wreck coming and they said, ‘Here’s 
an opportunity for us to avert this.’”32  
 
Before the Working Group had its first official meeting with all parties, the NMDGF and 
WMI invited state agencies to meet in Santa Fe to gauge interest in participation. Jennifer 
Parody, a wildlife biologist at the SLO, attended the meeting and agreed to the SLO’s 
participation in the formal group. While Parody had an interest in the group as a result of her 
background in wildlife ecology, the SLO also felt that participating in the group was an 
opportunity for the agency to provide input in the management of neighboring lands that 
would affect their own interests. 
 
On December 9, 2002, the day after invitations for participation in this new group were 
mailed, a number of conservation organizations joined forces and submitted a 60-day notice-
with-intention-to-file petition to address and adopt a lesser prairie chicken Area of Critical 
Environmental Concern (ACEC) with the BLM.33 The signatories of the petition included, 
among others, Forest Guardians, the Center for Biological Conservation and Jim Bailey, a 
future member of the Working Group. The ACEC program, also outlined in the FLPMA 
legislation, allows the BLM to protect habitat of endangered or threatened species on BLM 
land. In this case, the petition requested that the BLM set aside significant portions of oil and 
gas and ranching lands as an ACEC for prairie chicken habitat. Once an ACEC petition is 
filed, the BLM must respond within sixty days, a process that would result in significant 
delays for the budding Working Group. Given the nature of the petition, its timing in 
alignment with the formation of the Working Group and the signatures on the petition, the 
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ACEC petition became one of the early controversies the Working Group dealt with at its 
inception.34 
 
The first official meeting of the Working Group was held in Roswell in southern New 
Mexico. This meeting, open to any interested party or individual, had 80 people in 
attendance. Given such an unwieldy size, the group narrowed participation to several core 
representatives from each interest group. This core group was determined through election of 
representatives by each of the relevant agencies, the oil and gas industry, ranching interests, 
conservationists and hunters and sportsmen. Technical advisors also joined the group, though 
not necessarily at the outset. The final Working Group consisted of between 30 to 40 
participants and two facilitators (Table 10-1). Hired by the BLM, professional facilitators 
Toby Herzlich, of the private company Toby Herzlich & Company, and Ric Richardson, 
Professor of Community and Regional Planning at the University of New Mexico, would 
guide the Working Group.  
 
Participants had a variety of motivations for joining the Working Group. For the oil and gas 
and ranching industry, ESA’s potential affect on the economic bottom line provided a major 
incentive to try to prevent listing.35 Similarly, the SLO was concerned about the economic 
impact of listing a species. Commissioner Lyons noted, “If the prairie chicken was listed as 
endangered, there would be an economic fallout in New Mexico, a tremendous economic 
fallout. If you couldn’t produce oil and gas down there, then you could lose millions and 
millions of dollars. Probably a couple hundred million dollars.”36  
 
For some, the Working Group provided the best means for creating a conservation plan that 
would be legitimate and effective in lieu of listing either of the species. Roger Peterson, 
originally a consulting scientist to the group with the New Mexico Natural History Institute 
and later a conservationist representing the Sierra Club, noted that he was motivated to 
participate in the Working Group in order to produce the best conservation plan possible for 
the bird. This motivation was not coupled with the goal of preventing listing under ESA, 
however. Peterson added, “I did not want to prevent their listing. I think they should be 
listed.”37 Peterson saw, however, that a process was being created to produce a conservation 
plan that would likely be implemented for the conservation of the species, listed or not, and 
felt compelled to make it as strong as possible.38 
 
For other participants, incentives to participate were multifaceted. The desire to help the 
species often was coupled with the fear of federal regulation that would result should the 
prairie chicken or sand dune lizard be listed. Thus, there were both carrot and stick issues that 
contributed to individuals’ participation. John Clemmons, a rancher located 60 miles 
northeast of Roswell, New Mexico, stated his reasons for joining the group as two-fold: “One 
is positive – the animals I like. One is negative – fear of disrupting our business.”39 For Bill 
Dunn of the NMDGF, preventing listing of the species was part of the agency’s duty. He 









Participant Agency/Company/Organization Title 
Agencies 
Paul Sawyer BLM Santa Fe Office Director of Threatened and 
Endangered Species 
Rand French BLM Roswell Field Office Wildlife Biologist 
David Coss SLO  Director of Field Operations 
Jennifer Parody SLO / USFWS* Conservation Biologist 
Shawn Knox SLO+ Wildlife Biologist 
Bill Dunn NMDGF Predator and Gamebird 
Biologist 
Doug Lynn Department of Energy WIPP site  
Oil and Gas 
Dan Girand Mack Energy Corporation Regulatory and 
Environmental Affairs 
Jeff Harvard Harvard Petroleum Company LLC President 
Chuck Moran Yates Petroleum  Senior Landman 
Raye Miller Marbob Energy Corporation Secretary and Treasurer 
Ranching 
John Clemmons  Rancher 
Lewis Derrick New Mexico Cattle Growers and 
Eddy County 
Rancher and Eddy County 
Commissioner, District 2 
Bill Marley  Rancher 
Mark Marley  Rancher 
Conservation 
Jim Bailey  Biologist 
Roger Peterson New Mexico Natural History 
Institute / Sierra Club++ 
Ecologist 
Tom Jervis Audubon Council Ecologist 
Terry Riley Wildlife Management Institute 
(WMI) / Theodore Roosevelt 
Conservation Partnership 
Director of Conservation / 
Vice President of Policy 
Bob Findling The Nature Conservancy (TNC) Director of Conservation 
Projects 
Scientific and Technical  
Kristine Johnson University of New Mexico Natural 
Heritage Program 
Director 
Dawn Davis NMDGF Lesser Prairie-Chicken 
Biologist 
Hunters and Sportsmen 
All representatives dropped 
out early on in the process. 
  
Facilitators 
Toby Herzlich Toby Herzlich & Company Principal 
Ric Richardson University of New Mexico Professor of Community and 
Regional Planning 
 Table 10-1: Key Working Group Participants 
∗ One year into the process, Jennifer Parody changed jobs to work for the USFWS. She continued to participate in 
the Working Group under USFWS. 
+ The SLO hired Shawn Knox after Jennifer Parody left. He joined the Working Group one year into the process.  
++ Roger Peterson originally signed into meetings as a representative of the New Mexico Natural History Institute as 
a member of the Scientific and Technical component of the group, but later chose to sign in under the Sierra Club 
when he felt that there were too few conservationists at the table. 
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In addition, facilitators Herzlich and Richardson also were eager to work with the group. 
Herzlich noted her enthusiasm for joining the process, citing her past positive professional 
interactions with Richardson and her desire to help find new and innovative ways to advance 
solutions to western land conflicts.41 She commented: 
 
I have seen the conflict and the controversies and the “stuckness” around 
western land issues very frequently. So it felt to me that if there was an 
opportunity to “unstick” some of those [western land] issues and give some of 
the people who are different forms of stakeholders an opportunity to be in 
relationships, work together, forms some kind of new ways of understanding 
together and maybe even solve this problem, then that would be an overall 
contribution and benefit to all the work that’s going on in the west around 
natural resource management.42  
 
Despite participants’ high expectations for the process, parties recognized the process would 
be difficult. Herzlich and Richardson conducted one-on-one interviews with participants at 
the beginning of the process to build relationships with participants and to gauge their 
concerns, interests and fears regarding the Working Group.43 From these interviews the 
facilitators gleaned several potential process obstacles. First, the positions of different parties 
were very far apart from one another. Second, while the oil and gas industry, ranchers and 
agencies had longstanding working relationships, they did not have extensive experience 
working with conservationists on management issues. According to facilitator Toby Herzlich, 
the greatest lack of familiarity existed between the conservationists and the other parties at 
the table.44 
 
THE GROUP GETS ROLLING 
 
The group met predominantly in Roswell, New Mexico, within an hour’s drive of some 
ranchers like John Clemmons and Lewis Derrick and close to the headquarters of oil and gas 
companies like Mack Energy. For agency and conservation representatives, however, 
meeting in Roswell meant long traveling distances to meetings, an issue cited as a major 
challenge to participation for many conservationists as well as some less interested agency 
representatives. The group met approximately once a month, usually for two days at a time 
during the workweek. The timing of the meetings was therefore appropriate for those 
participants representing their employer such as agency and oil and gas members. However, 
for groups like hunters and sportsmen who were not participating as part of their jobs, 
attending meetings became an impossibility and they dropped out.45 
 
While there was no explicit timeline for the group, most participants anticipated that six to 
nine months of two-day monthly meetings would be sufficient to complete the conservation 
plan and agreed to participate with this understanding. Both Herzlich and Richardson were 
wary of such a short timeline, being especially concerned that this would limit the ability to 
build relationships and trust in the group. However, they were hired to carry out meetings 
according to this timeframe.46 As such, Herzlich and Richardson led the group in several “get 
to know you” meetings at the beginning of the process47 before moving the group into “an 
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accelerated process of education and issue identification” regarding prairie chicken and sand 
dune lizard conservation.48 
 
During one of these first meetings, the Working Group developed a guiding statement for the 
group that would encompass the common goal of all present. This goal, solidified in a formal 
statement, was:  
 
To create a conservation strategy for the management of shinnery oak and 
sand sage-grassland communities in southeastern and east-central New 
Mexico, recommending a range of specific actions to enhance and secure 
populations of Lesser Prairie-Chickens and Sand Dune Lizards, so that federal 
or state listing of these species is not needed, while protecting other uses of the 
land.49 
 
The Working Group would address major conservation issues affecting prairie chickens and 
sand dune lizards, particularly the impact of oil and gas development and ranching on species 
populations. The final products for the group were two-fold. The group would produce a 
stand-alone conservation plan, the “Conservation Strategy,” for implementation by the 
participants. In addition, certain chapters pertaining to oil and gas regulations also would be 
submitted to the BLM for possible inclusion in an RMP Amendment alternative. 
 
The Working Group also developed a set of ground rules with help from the facilitators. 
Richardson recalled that such ground rules included the requirement that if a participant 
could not agree to an item up for discussion, he or she needed to propose an alternative that 
would represent the interests of the group.50 Other rules, such as “respect one another” and 
“listen to each other” were also established.51 Often, the ground rules were posted during 
meetings and Herzlich and Richardson always emphasized that the rules were a “working 
document” that could be revisited if the group desired.52  
 
In addition, the group created a definition of consensus. Richardson noted that consensus 
does not equal overwhelming unanimity. Rather, the group agreed consensus had been 
achieved when the participants had offered alternatives that satisfied internal stakeholder 
interests as well as the interests of the other participants. Consensus also meant that the 
participants agreed that they collectively supported a decision because it was arrived at 
openly and fairly, and was the best solution for the group at the time. Richardson also noted 
that the group acknowledged that if there was no consensus on an issue or proposal, the pros 
and cons of the approach would be noted and the process would move forward. During the 
final days of approving the text of the Conservation Strategy, the group instituted a “thumbs-
up, thumbs-down” policy in which only a thumbs-down would prevent agreement.53 
 
In between meetings, the Coordinating Committee worked to develop future meeting 
agendas. The Coordintating Committee was comprised of a few members of the Working 
Group, including representatives from each of the key agencies involved, the oil and gas 
industry and ranching. A member of conservation was not on the Coordinating Committee 
because none of the representatives were available for these extra planning meetings. Both 
Herzlich and Richardson and the scientific writer, Scott Norris, were also members of the 
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Coordinating Committee. Norris, a professional writer, was brought on to be a neutral 
recorder of meeting proceedings and agreements. He compiled meeting notes and provided 
the group with a written version of agreements. This allowed the group to respond to a 




As the group began to delve into substantive issues regarding prairie chicken habitat, location 
of lek sites, where current populations existed and other such issues, major tensions between 
parties persisted. Part of this tension may have been due to the different reasons parties came 
to the table. While the group had a common vision statement, the oil and gas industry wanted 
to “prevent listing” while conservation wanted to “preclude the need for listing.” This was a 
subtle but important different pointed out by several participants.55 
 
In addition, many participants at the table did not trust each other and did not trust the 
motivations of others at the table. Bill Dunn of the NMDGF commented further on this point. 
He stated: 
 
I can’t tell you the number of times where they [oil and gas representatives] 
would say, “We’re just trying to make a living out here.” I’d shoot back and 
say, “Look. This isn’t a volunteer thing for us. We have a legislative 
mandate by law. We’re not saving the chicken just because we want it. 
We’re saving the chicken, we have to conserve the chicken, because the 
people of New Mexico said you will.” And that’s a key thing.56 
 
Understanding and trusting other participants’ motivations and concerns was difficult 
for the Working Group as they moved ahead in discussing possible management 
strategies.  
 
While the Working Group continued to have formal meetings, over the first six months the 
group hosted several “town hall” meetings at various locations in southeastern New Mexico 
in order to inform and involve as many ranchers and other individuals as possible.57 During 
such events, Working Group participants sat as a panel at the front of the room facing the 
community and fielded questions, comments and concerns. In the dominantly ranching 
communities in southeastern New Mexico there was considerable skepticism with regards to 
the Working Group, particularly its conservation representatives. At one of these meetings in 
Portales, New Mexico approximately six months into the process, one individual in the 
community became irate and began to accuse Jim Bailey of trying to sabotage southeastern 
New Mexico through the ACEC. Jennifer Parody recalls: 
 
[The community member] had the ACEC petition in his hand and somehow in 
his mind, [the Working Group was] the same as this ACEC. He got up and 
said, “Dr. Bailey, did you say that prairie chickens like water?” Every five 
seconds he’s yelling, “Dr. Bailey! Where’d you get your degree?” He was so 
angry and so mean and we were all floored. This was the kind of thing that 
should be in a movie. And he was just ripping Jim apart for the ACEC and we 
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kept trying to say this isn’t part of us. But there was nothing [we could say 
that calmed him down]. So then Bill Marley stands up and he says, “I just 
wanna say that I’ve worked with this man and I trust him and you need to 
show him some respect.” He basically put this guy in his place and defended 
the conservationist. I just thought, “Oh my God! That was so great!” It was so 
awesome. “Look what we’ve accomplished!”58 
 
This town-hall instance was one of the first illustrations of a long process in which 
participants began to build trust and respect for one another. Further relationships between 
participants in the Working Group developed through informal means. Bill Dunn of the 
NMDGF noted:  
 
On some field trips, I’ve brought my bird dogs along, and they’re a great way 
to kind of break the ice. And you can’t help but talk your personal life when 
you’re out to lunch standing in line. You say, “Hey, you got any kids?” The 
next time, maybe “How are your kids doing?” The more you get to know 
these people, the more time you spend with them, the more you get on a 
personal basis and so it breaks down from just “Dan Girand, oil and gas 
representative,” to “Dan Girand the person, another fellow citizen in America, 
trying to make a living.”59  
 
Back in the formal meetings, the Working Group proceeded by addressing the two major 
industries in southeastern New Mexico: ranching and oil and gas. The group tackled issues 
related to ranching first.  
 
The major threat of ranching to prairie chicken populations was loss of dried grasses (Figure 
10-2). Roger Peterson noted, “Without livestock, dried grasses remain for years, serving to 
hide [prairie chicken] nests. With livestock, they do not.”60 To mitigate this harm, potential 
solutions suggested by agency and conservationists included seasonal removals of cattle from 
land with active leks or complete closings of some land to grazing. Ranchers were not 
completely opposed to such possibilities but stated simply that if they were asked to change 
their operations, they must receive financial compensation for any lost revenue.61 Rancher 
and Eddy County Commissioner Lewis Derrick commented, “We’ll go along with pilot 
projects [for conservation] as long as we can still pay the banker.”62 He added, “Wildlife 
doesn’t keep jobs.”63 While there was some negotiation on this point, the Working Group 
agreed nine months into the process to establish some kind of compensation process if the 





PROGRESS STALLS WITH OIL AND GAS 
 
After success with ranching measures, the 
group moved on to issues surrounding oil and 
gas development, which would dominate the 
rest of the meetings. Jennifer Parody, at the 
time with the SLO, recalled, “We started in 
February [2004] and by September of that 
year we had come to an agreement on what to 
do about ranching. So the next year and a half 
was oil and gas. That’s all we did. Not 
surprisingly, that was the big nut to crack.”64 
Parody also highlighted differences in the 
perception of how to tackle the problem as an 
initial and on-going stumbling block to 
creating a plan for oil and gas. She 
commented: 
 
We came up with a series of ways that 
could allow oil and gas to continue out 
on the land but protect prairie 
chickens. One way is take the actual 
lek sites off the table and just say for a 
mile and half around the lek, you can’t 
drill, period. You can’t lease. You 
can’t drill. Oil and gas had this other 
way, which was “Let us lease it all, but just won’t develop it.”65 
 
In addition to a different perspective on appropriate management strategies to be 
incorporated in the Conservation Strategy, the Working Group also struggled with 
establishing criteria for what outside scientific information would be legitimate at the table. 
Such research would inform the strategies of the final Conservation Strategy. Tom Jervis of 
the New Mexico Audubon Council noted, “After substantial discussion, it was agreed that 
only published data could be used to justify positions in the [Working Group].”66 Jervis 
continued that while the conservation representatives honored this decision fairly well, the oil 
and gas community did not.67 Jeff Harvard of Harvard Petroleum commented that there was 
“a lot of frustration about anecdotal evidence on both sides.”68 Harvard felt that agencies and 
conservationists, however, did not stick to the agreed-upon criterion of published studies.69 
 
In addition, most participants attributed major delays at this point in the process to the lack of 
agreement on data regarding the impacts of oil and gas development on prairie chicken 
populations as well as a dearth of maps that identified prairie chicken lek sites. Oil and gas 
representatives maintained they were unconvinced of the negative affects of oil and gas 
development on prairie chickens.70 In addition, considerable debate surrounded the size of a 
protective buffer for lek sites that would be off-limits to drilling. Bill Dunn noted, “More 
than 90 percent of lesser prairie chicken nests are within two miles of the lek on which the 
Figure 10-2: Ranch in Southeastern New Mexico 
Source: Photograph by Emily Kelly 
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females were bred.”71 While conservationists and many agency representatives favored a 
two-mile radius around all leks to protect these nests, the group lacked maps of lek locations 
and areas of oil and gas leases in order to understand the impact of such distances on leasing. 
Thus, oil and gas reps resisted agreement on a buffer size. Ecologist and later conservation 
representative Roger Peterson noted, “There were meetings where we had scheduled 
ourselves to come to a decision and we failed to do so because of disagreements.” Facilitator 
Toby Herzlich cited additional frustration over interest groups backtracking on past 
agreements between meetings. She noted that discussion would start “looking like we were 
coming to an agreement, and then at the next meeting people from one stakeholder group or 
another would say, ‘No, start over.’”72 
 
As time wore on and the group continued to miss agreement deadlines, the Working Group 
became increasingly frustrated over the amount of time the process was taking, now far 
exceeding its original six- to nine-month timeframe. In addition to the overall length of the 
process, each Working Group meeting was also a two-day all-day marathon that wearied 
group members. John Clemmons noted that what small progress was made during this period 
of time was a result of these long days. “Sometimes when it’s 4:30 in the afternoon or 5:00 or 
5:30 and you’ve been there all day, you’re more likely to agree to something than you 
wouldn’t have in the morning because you’re tired. That’s just the mechanics of a group 
meeting.”73 He added, “We wore each other down and we talked and rehashed and went over 
minute details over and over.”74  
 
After considerable frustration attempting to formulate proposals on oil and gas regulations, 
the Working Group actively pursued mapping information. However, there were several 
large impediments to getting the necessary information to help move negotiations along. The 
primary problem was that many of the maps of leases in prairie chicken habitat were 
proprietary information and therefore could not be distributed to the Working Group. Yet 
without this information, the group could not move forward.  
 
ONGOING ACTIVITY OUTSIDE THE WORKING GROUP 
 
In late 2003 during the lull in Working Group activity, Jennifer Parody and David Coss of 
the SLO were in constant dialogue with the Oil, Gas and Minerals Division (OGMD) of 
Mineral Resources at the SLO to confer on the Working Group’s on-going discussion 
regarding which lands could be leased and which could not. Finally, that division suggested it 
would be simpler to make a formal rule and remove an entire section of potential prairie 
chicken habitat from future leasing. Thus, in early 2004 Commissioner Lyons took the 
initiative to limit oil and gas drilling in some key areas of prairie chicken habitat by placing a 
moratorium on all new oil and gas leasing in a 119,000-acre area. This resulted in 54,000 
acres of unleased protected land. The moratorium sent a strong signal to all participants of 
the Working Group that the SLO was willing to cooperate to make strides toward prairie 
chicken conservation. The moratorium will be up for renewal in 2006 at which time Lyons 





Also in early 2004, a ranch in southern Roosevelt County in eastern New Mexico came up 
for sale. The Nature Conservancy (TNC) had studied this area extensively and viewed it as 
essential to lesser prairie chicken recovery. In an effort to protect prairie chicken habitat 
before the Working Group could produce, much less implement, any conservation measures, 
TNC purchased the Creamer Ranch in September 2004. Bob Findling, Director of 
Conservation Projects at TNC in New Mexico and a member of the Working Group, handled 
the transaction. The ranch continues to be managed as a working cattle ranch with some 
changes in the grazing program in order to provided improved prairie chicken nesting cover. 
TNC feels the purchase of the ranch was an important step in prairie chicken conservation 
irrespective of the Working Group’s success.75 
 
MAPS BECOME AVAILABLE 
 
Recognizing that progress was stalled until the group could see maps of prairie chicken 
habitat and leks and leasings, the SLO and NMDGF began to work on accumulating this 
information. The SLO set staff member Natalie Runyan, now Natalie Guilmet, to work on 
this information. Guilmet later came to meetings with maps that could be projected in front 
of the group during discussion. Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS), Guilmet could 
further show the group different scenarios of lek buffers and the impact on oil and gas 
leasings. Such capabilities helped facilitate productive discussion on oil and gas issues. In the 
fall of 2004 the Director of the University of New Mexico Natural Heritage Program, 
Kristine Johnson, joined the group to continue working on creating technical maps. These 
maps involved the aggregation of data across the SLO, BLM and NMDGF for data on leases, 
prairie chicken populations and priority habitat. 
 
Despite these added resources, however, the group continued to struggle with compromises 
for oil and gas measures as to the size of buffers surrounding leks that would be removed 
from leasing as well as the construction of roads and power lines that fragment chicken 
habitat and provide perches for raptors.76 As such, the facilitators asked each major 
stakeholder group (oil and gas industry, conservationists and agencies) to come up with their 
own draft of a management plan. From these small stakeholder subgroups came three very 
different documents representing the ideal scenarios for the conservation plan for each of the 
groups. For instance, the oil and gas plan had lek radii off limits of one and a half miles while 
the conservationists had three-mile radii around leks.77 To compare the differences in key 
points between plans, the group’s writer Scott Norris created a matrix of the conservation 
plans. Major headings of the matrix included (1) modifications on leasing, (2) acceptable 
impact development, (3) size of lek buffer, (4) definition of active leks and (5) type of 
ongoing monitoring.78 
 
Many members of the Working Group saw the matrix as a showcase of the differences in 
alternatives. Richardson noted that he was concerned that highlighting differences rather 
similarities or overlap in approaches would have a polarizing effect on the negotiations.79 
According to one participant, Toby Herzlich attempted to use the matrix as an example of 
common themes, perhaps in an attempt to salvage a feeling of shared goals within the 
group.80 However, many in the group felt the conservation plans that came out of the 
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stakeholder subgroups had not illuminated a common path towards a completed 
Conservation Strategy. 
 
OIL AND GAS TECHNICAL SUBCOMMITTEE HAMMERS OUT DETAILS 
 
In late fall 2004, out of frustration for the lack of progress that resulted from the individual 
conservation plans, several members of the Working Group including Jennifer Parody, Dan 
Girand and Jim Bailey, decided to convene a small subcommittee to address issues 
surrounding oil and gas 
provisions (Figure 10-3). 
Made up of one 
representative from five key 
stakeholder groups, the 
USFWS, BLM, SLO, oil and 
gas and conservation, the Oil 
and Gas Technical 
Subcommittee would 
attempt to hammer out the 
key elements of the oil and 
gas components of a 
conservation plan that were 
identified through the 
stakeholder-specific plans 
and the resulting matrix. The 
group would operate without 
either facilitator.  
 
In order for the small 
technical subcommittee to 
work effectively and for its recommendations to carry weight when brought in front of the 
entire Working Group, each member of the subcommittee was responsible for reporting the 
proceedings of the group to their constituencies and receiving feedback and support on these 
proceedings. Thus, in the subcommittee it was much easier for individuals to speak for the 
other members of their group. Jennifer Parody also noted that in the more intimate setting of 
the subcommittee, individuals were more frank with each other about what they thought 
could work for other participants of the larger Working Group.81 By the end of the year, the 
subcommittee came up with compromised provisions that would be brought back to the 
larger Working Group for continued scrutiny and approval. According to Rand French, at the 
time a wildlife biologist at the BLM, “The subcommittees were a must.”82 The 
subcommittees were a huge step forward in progress for the Working Group. 
 
BLM RMP AMENDMENT DEADLINE CATALYZES PROGRESS 
 
Even with progress in the Oil and Gas Technical Subcommittee, the Working Group 
continued to struggle over details of oil and gas provisions. Soon after the Subcommittee 
returned to the group in the fall of 2004, however, the Working Group faced a new challenge: 
 Figure 10-3: Pumpjack in Southeastern New Mexico 
Source: Photograph by Emily Kelly 
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New Mexico BLM Director Linda Rundell sent a message to the Working Group alerting 
them of the March 1st deadline for all RMP Amendment alternatives. This deadline was the 
BLM’s financial and administrative deadline it had submitted to Washington, D.C. 
headquarters at the beginning of the process. On March 1st, all RMP Amendment 
alternatives would be submitted to the D.C. BLM office, and the funding for the facilitators 
of the Working Group would end. If the group were to provide input into the RMP 
Amendment Process, it would have to produce a document by March 1, 2005. 
 
With additional details from the Oil and Gas Technical Subcommittee worked out and the 
increased pressure from the deadline now only six months away, progress in achieving 
agreements in the Working Group began to accelerate. Yet some members of the group 
commented that while there were more agreements made under this pressure, the substance 
of these agreements was too general and will prove ineffective in implementation. Given the 
time constraint, the group glossed over certain details regarding particularly contentious 
lands for oil and gas leasing to avoid lengthy and historically fruitless debates.83 Rand French 
noted that one major point that remains ambiguous in the document is how to determine 
success in an area such that leasing is reopened. He commented, “We never came to final 
agreement. We did in terms of the document, but I’m not sure how it’ll be implemented on 
the ground.”84 
 
For oil and gas participants, a major frustration during these final meetings was difference 
between the type of management strategies agencies and conservationists envisioned versus 
those preferred by industry. Dan Girand noted that other parties wanted to impose additional 
regulations on oil and gas companies while he and other industry representatives were 
interested in “doing something positive.” He recalled telling the group, “You tell us what will 
work and we’ll spend money on it. Tell us what to do. We’ll raise chickens. What else can 
we do?”85 Indeed, in the final Conservation Strategy did include a captive breeding site for 
prairie chickens on the Department of Energy’s Waste Implementation Project Plant (WIPP) 
site near the New Mexico-Texas border. The purpose of the captive breeding facility would 
be to raise and reintroduce prairie chickens into areas where prairie chicken populations have 
been declining or eliminated. While many conservationists were opposed to the idea because 
similar efforts had failed in other areas, other saw it as a positive effort in by the oil and gas 
industry and it was ultimately incorporated in the final Conservation Strategy.86 
 
The sand dune lizard, largely lost in debate throughout much of the Working Group’s 
discussion, finally received the group’s attention in the final push for the Conservation 
Strategy. While there was not considerable research available on sand dune lizard ecology, 
the science was much less controversial in the group. Thus, agreements for setting aside 
lizard habitat came fairly easily. 
 
As a result of these hurried efforts, the Working Group produced its final document on 
March 1st. The Conservation Strategy was a mixture of extremely detailed concessions and 
generalized statements relating to general prairie chicken conservation, some of which were 
ironed out on March 1st itself. Jeff Harvard commented that the group “stumbled into” the 
document but indicated that it was representative of the Working Group as a whole. He 
added that the Conservation Strategy was a manifestation of “where we were at the time and 
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what we had. It’s better than lots of us thought it would be. It is not nor should it be final.”87 
Despite its nature as an evolving document for the stand-alone Conservation Strategy, 
however, the recommendations for the RMP Amendment were turned into the BLM as they 
existed.  
 
FINAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The Conservation Strategy is a stand-alone document for future implementation by the 
agencies, industries and organizations involved in the plan. Certain chapters of the 
Conservation Strategy were submitted to the BLM for possible inclusion in an RMP 
Amendment alternative. The document as a whole, however, is a roadmap for future 
conservation of the prairie chicken and sand dune lizard in southeastern New Mexico. For 
agencies, the Conservation Strategy includes further stipulations for leaving designated areas 
surrounding lek sites undeveloped and includes restrictions on power lines and roads in 
prairie chicken habitat. Under the Conservation Strategy, oil and gas companies will pursue 
oil pad reclamation as well as work with the DOE WIPP site on prairie chicken captive 
breeding. There are also provisions for best management practices for ranchers as well as an 
agreement for compensation for lost revenue for ranchers.  
 
The Conservation Strategy has not yet been named the “preferred alternative” for the RMP 
Amendment Process, though it is considered likely.88 Implementation of the Conservation 
Strategy outside of the RMP Amendment is still in the early stages. An Implementation 
Team, composed of members of the original Working Group, is still being formed and has 
yet to set its first meeting. 
 
 
THE ANALYSIS: THE SOUTHEAST NEW MEXICO WORKING GROUP 
 
The following analysis of the Southeast New Mexico Working Group provides insight into 
the benefits, costs, challenges, facilitating factors and lessons learned from the process. This 
analysis is based on issues identified by Working Group participants, as well as those 
gleaned by the researchers.  
 
Of the many benefits of the process, some include the creation of the Conservation Strategy, 
increased agency coordination and new and improved relationships. Parties also incurred 
significant costs through participation in the Working Group such as time and opportunity 
costs as well as risks to reputation. Major challenges throughout the process existed in the 
lack of available habitat and lease maps, obstructionists to progress and distrust and 
stereotyping of other participants, among other things. 
 
There were a number of facilitating factors that helped the group overcome challenges. One 
of the most prominent of these factors was the clear RMP Amendment deadline. Other 
facilitating factors included the threat of regulatory action, small subcommittee work, 




Participants of the process had many words of wisdom for future collaborative endeavors. 
Such “lessons learned” include increase pre-planning prior to a process, establish a realistic 
timeframe, keep an open mind, keep management involved and updated and work in small 
groups to overcome impasses.  
 
WAS THE SOUTHEAST NEW MEXICO WORKING GROUP COLLABORATIVE? 
 
Of the participants we interviewed, all parties felt the process was collaborative. Rancher 
John Clemmons noted that “it had to be [collaborative] or we wouldn’t have gone forward at 
all.”89 Bill Dunn of NMDGF commented, “I think everybody gave a little and everybody got 
a little out of it. Overall, it’s a big positive. You can’t go into this asking them to give up 
everything without getting something in return. Collaborative is co-laboring. I think we were 
all there giving it our best.”90 Conservationist Roger Peterson provided yet another take on 
collaboration, saying, “Collaboration involves a few fists in the ribs, too, but yes, [the 
process] was very collaborative.”91 In defining collaboration, Bob Findling of TNC pointed 
to the structure of the final Conservation Strategy. He described the plan as being “a 
document that provided a list of management options which had been hammered out by a 
group of diverse stakeholders.”92 
 
Participants of the Working Group highlighted issues surrounding the processes that touched 
on three major themes central to collaboration: (1) breadth of stakeholders, (2) degree of 
transparency and (3) degree of influence on decision making. 
 
Breadth of Stakeholders: Overall, participants felt that the appropriate parties were at the 
table. While some members of the Working Group noted that they would have liked 
additional participation from the USFWS, DOE and NRCS, others felt that participation 
should have been more limited. Some of the representatives of the oil and gas industry, for 
instance, felt that some parties to the process should have been prevented from participating 
in the Working Group. Jeff Harvard explained, “You have your affected party and your 
affectee party which is essentially regulatory agencies … You have your primary parties as 
your affected parties which is ranching and in this case oil and gas.”93 While he noted that the 
environmental community was trying to give a voice to the species, the process was not 
threatening conservationists’ livelihoods. Thus, Harvard as well as Dan Girand of Mack 
Energy felt the conservationists should either not be given equal weight in the process or 
should not be invited to the table at all.94 Girand commented, “And so as far as being 
involved in this process, I just don’t think [the conservationists] oughta be. And let ’em sue 
us because they’re gonna do it anyway.”95  
 
While the representatives of the oil and gas industry and some ranchers emphasized this 
viewpoint, it was not widely shared among other participants. For instance, Rand French 
noted that had conservationists not been involved, they would have more aggressively 
pursued litigation and the Conservation Strategy would have been open to future challenges 
as to its legitimacy.96 Therefore, all parties were necessary in the Working Group in order to 
achieve greater buy-in from all those who could later influence the ultimate conservation 




While the Working Group had good breadth of representation of different interests, there was 
not consistent magnitude of participation by all groups. Jim Bailey, for instance, was 
sometimes the sole representative of conservation interests as other conservationists had 
difficulty attending meetings several hours away.97 While members of the group were 
pleased with Bailey’s contributions and leadership, the success of this arrangement was 
largely due to Bailey’s experience and personality. As such, in other collaborative processes 
a single representative may not have been as successful.  
 
Degree of Transparency: The group had a fairly transparent process, making meeting notes 
and current drafts of conservation plans available via email after meetings. Communication 
within interest groups typically was high. Jim Bailey spent considerable time reporting to 
various conservation groups throughout the state and reporting their feedback to the Working 
Group.98 Similarly, the ranchers were also very engaged in communication with their 
neighbors.99 Despite this effort, however, there was still considerable backtracking on 
commitments and claims of ignorance as to new concessions.  
 
The Oil and Gas Technical Committee, while only involving a handful of representatives, 
worked tirelessly to communicate with those representatives of the larger Working Group as 
well as outside constituencies to ensure they were able to negotiate fully and legitimately 
within the Subcommittee. Such a high level of transparency was rewarded when the 
Subcommittee came back to the larger Working Group with several acceptable options for 
the final Conservation Strategy.  
 
Degree of Influence on Decision Making: The final Conservation Strategy may impact 
decision making and land management policy through two avenues. First, participants are 
hopeful that the Conservation Strategy will become the “preferred alternative” in the BLM 
RMP Amendment Process. While this is not guaranteed, BLM staff provided encouragement 
that the BLM would be particularly interested in what the group decided as through 
addressing the needs and concerns of all parties, the Working Group’s conservation plan may 
be the most durable. 
 
The Conservation Strategy is also a roadmap for land management and conservation for 
parties involved in the Working Group. In this sense, the Working Group created a document 
that could presumably shape land management practices of all involved in the process. While 
there was no official or binding signature process for the final Conservation Strategy, none of 
the members of the Working Group felt this would hinder the implementation of the plan. 
However, participants were skeptical others following through on the obligations outlined in 
the plan. Implementation has yet to begin.  
 
What Would Have Happened Without Collaboration? While there is no way to know 
how the RMP Amendment Process and prairie chicken and sand dune lizard conservation 
would have proceeded without the Working Group, the BLM would likely have had a more 
traditional public input process involving letter-writing and public hearings. Meanwhile, the 
SLO would have likely had more of a reactive response to this problem than the proactive 
response exhibited by this case. A good example of this reactive response is the current 
lawsuit that the BLM and SLO are engaged in with the State of New Mexico regarding Otero 
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Mesa. Located in south-central New Mexico, Otero Mesa is home to several sensitive plant 
and animal species as well as rich natural gas reserves. The state sued the BLM to protect 
Otero Mesa, and the SLO has joined in support of the BLM.100 Commissioner Lyons has 
declared that the Governor cannot prevent the SLO from leasing state trust land in Otero 
Mesa as it sees fit and that any attempt to do so puts the SLO in violation of its mandate. Had 
the prairie chicken or sand dune lizard been listed under the ESA and restrictions placed on 
BLM lands, similar lawsuits may have ensued. 
 
BENEFITS OF THE PROCESS 
 
There were a number of benefits of participating in the Working Group, for individuals as 
well as for agencies and organizations. Some participants anticipated these benefits prior to 
becoming involved in the process, which influenced their decision to become involved. Other 
benefits were realized upon the completion of the process. 
 
Ability to Provide Input 
 
Perhaps the most cited benefit of the Working Group was the chance to have input into the 
planning process and the final Conservation Strategy. Rancher John Clemmons articulated 
his “desire to represent my neighbors, my rancher friends, to make sure they had a voice in 
this process.”101 Paul Sawyer of the BLM echoed this sentiment in the feedback the BLM 
received from its Washington, D.C. headquarters. He noted, “It was obvious that some of the 
[BLM] users weren’t happy and felt that perhaps they weren’t getting heard.”102 Sawyer saw 
the Working Group as a forum through which these users could have a voice. 
 
Equally significant to the benefit of being heard in the process was the cost of being excluded 
from the process or choosing not to participate. Lewis Derrick, a representative of ranching 
interests in the group, noted that if he not been involved in the collaborative process or if he 
had stopped attending meetings after discussion had moved on from ranching negotiations, 
he felt ranchers would have been “run over.”103 Similarly, Bob Findling of TNC highlighted 
this when he suggested, “[The Working Group] was more a defensive response to a situation 
which, if you elected not to participate, you risked being shut out of the process. That was an 
additional motivation to play some role.104 
 
Gained Experience in Collaboration 
 
For many members of the Working Group the process also provided on-the-ground training 
in collaboration that they planned to apply in the future. This was particularly true for agency 
representatives. Jennifer Parody, who began working for the USFWS halfway through the 
Working Group process noted, “I learned a lot. It’s still what I do. My whole job is 
collaboration now.”105 The USFWS, the BLM and the NMDGF indicated that collaborative 
planning was becoming more “business as usual” for state and federal decision making.106 





The Working Group also served as a case study for a broader national scale. Terry Riley, at 
the time with the national organization Wildlife Management Institute, saw the ability to 
learn from this process and extrapolate a “model” for collaboration that could be useful in 
other settings and other areas of the country.107 When WMI encouraged the BLM to initiate a 
working group process, the organization was enthusiastic about analyzing this New Mexico 
case study to understand how collaboration could be used in other western land issues. 
Facilitator Toby Herzlich similarly cited the desire to contribute to a greater understanding of 




Participants felt a major benefit of the Working Group was its less costly approach to land 
planning as compared to more traditional methods. Paul Sawyer of the BLM saw the 
Working Group as an alternative to time-intensive and difficult BLM processes for creating 
additional leasing stipulations on BLM land. He noted, “Frankly, the implementation of the 
stipulations is a very time-consuming, challenging process but then when you add additional 
controversy on top of that, things get bogged down.”109 Given the controversies inherent in 
the issues surrounding prairie chicken and sand dune lizard conservation, the Working Group 
provided the BLM with what Sawyer perceived to be a more favorable approach. 
 
The Working Group also provided an alternative to lawsuits. David Coss at the SLO, noted: 
 
I think the agency people and the oil and gas people and the ranching interests 
and more and more of the environmental groups are thinking, “There’s gotta 
be a different way than just lawsuits to manage wildlife and to manage land.” 
I think we’re all kind of mentally and emotionally ready to try something 
different.110 
 
Collaboration became the alternative to litigation for all Working Group members, many of 
whom had been involved in lawsuits over matters of conservation in the past.  
 
Positive Public Relations for the SLO 
 
Participation in the Working Group was also a source of positive public relations for the 
SLO. Shawn Knox, a biologist at the SLO, cited this public relations as a major benefit of the 
Working Group, noting that the SLO would be “seen in a light that [the SLO] can develop 
their resources, support public schools and do it in a sustainable way.”111 Thus, the Working 
Group provided a way for the public to see the SLO successfully maintain the long-term 
viability of the trust while still meeting its responsibility to the beneficiary. The high 
visibility of the group has contributed to the additional positive press for the SLO and 
Commissioner Lyons.  
 
Greater Understanding and Trust 
 
In addition to some of the more tangible benefits associated with the process, the Working 
Group also helped many participants gain trust and a greater understanding for one another. 
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A major testament to increased trust and respect over the course of the two and a half year 
process was rancher Bill Marley’s defense of conservationist Jim Bailey at one of the town-
hall meetings. As mentioned in the case story, Parody took that instance to be a landmark for 
the group’s accomplishment in coalescing.112  
 
Many participants commented on the group education the process offered. Jim Bailey noted 
that the group helped people understand “where each of us were coming from and what 
issues were most important.”113 Regarding this greater understanding for each other, Rand 
French added, “You can never stop building relationships and educating people.” He saw the 
Working Group as being a forum for this on-going education. 
 
The process also increased individuals’ understanding of substantive issues as well as the 
management and technical constraints placed on other participants. Bill Dunn felt that this 
increased understanding helped participants come to the table with better options for new 
management strategies. He commented that before the process, “I didn’t realize how 
important of a component state lands were.” Dunn continued: 
 
There’s a ton of stuff that I learned about the oil and gas industry that I 
didn’t know before. I can go into [a meeting] with more intelligent 
recommendation that I would before. We have a plan, we’re more 
knowledgeable about each other’s needs and desires, and I think that we’re 
going to break down the barriers of the “economy or ecology.” The old 
thing about well, if we save this species, it will just hurt the economy. We 
have the opportunity to show that one doesn’t have to preclude the other. 
We can have what I call a high quality of life.  
 
Dunn further saw the increased understanding from the process transfer into larger issues that 
plagued the process, namely the perceived tension between economics and conservation. He 
felt the Working Group and the final Conservation Strategy were able to start to disprove this 
perception. 
 
Jim Bailey also noted that the Working Group provided an education for the SLO and the 
commissioner. Whereas the prairie chicken previously had not been a high priority for the 
SLO, Bailey saw the Working Group raise the SLO’s awareness significantly. In fact, Bailey 
felt that without the Working Group, it was unlikely the commissioner would have issued the 
leasing moratorium on trust lands with prairie chicken leks.114  
 
Long-Term Relationships  
 
Participants often cited new relationships and their implications for future cooperation as a 
major long-term benefit of the process. New Mexico TNC Director of Conservation Projects 
Bob Findling noted, “[the Working Group] offered a good opportunity to get to know agency 
and industry staff and develop new relationships.”115 While Findling felt he had some 
previous familiarity with the other parties involved in the process, the Working Group 
allowed Findling and others to solidify these relationships and as well as get to know new 
individuals at the table. Some Working Group participants noted improved informal 
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relationships with one another. Bill Dunn of the NMDGF noted, “I’ve stopped by Jeff 
[Harvard]’s office on a number of days, just to say ‘Hi.’”116 
 
Many participants suggested the relationships resulting from the Working Group would be 
useful not only for future collaborative efforts but also for more informal professional use. 
Paul Sawyer of the BLM noted that he felt the Working Group provided a “better vehicle to 
work collaboratively in the future.”117  
 
For the SLO, the Working Group provided a group of individuals, agencies and companies 
that would now have a better understanding of the state trust land mandate and would 
therefore be easier for the SLO to work with in the future. Knox noted, “[The Working 
Group] created a better understanding of what [the SLO] can and cannot do. People are quick 
to point fingers but we’re not a multi-use agency. We’re not here for recreation. We’re here 
to make money.”118 Knox continued that in his work now, after the Working Group, he is in 
constant contact with the BLM and NMDGF, relationships he felt were significantly 
developed as a result of the Working Group process.119  
 
Structure for Coordination in the Future 
 
Many members of agencies in the Working Group noted that the Working Group was a 
response to a need for agencies to work across jurisdictional boundaries and to create more 
consistent land use plans across all types of land. Both the BLM and the SLO indicated that 
the process resulted in consistent policies that have ultimately helped facilitate management 
for all agencies involved.120 Pat Lyons noted that coordinated management with other land 
users “makes land management so much easier.”121 
 
For oil and gas companies, the Working Group and resulting Conservation Strategy helped 
outline future expectations for industry practice. Rand French was particularly interested in 
this aspect as he now works for Marbob Energy, having left the BLM after the completion of 
the Working Group. He considers the Conservation Strategy a success in that industry can 
foresee “where and how conservation actions are going to have most threat and how these 
can be minimized.”122 The Conservation Strategy allows industry to better manage future 
conflicts with conservation action. 
 
Conservation Strategy and Inclusion in the RMP Amendment Process 
 
Two of the major benefits of the process included completion of the final Conservation 
Strategy and the submission of the plan to the RMP Amendment Process. While the prairie 
chicken and sand dune lizard were not listed under ESA, participants placed less emphasis on 
this benefit compared to the conservation plan. 
 
The perceived benefits of the Conservation Strategy were multifaceted. Several participants 
were particularly excited about the plan itself. Bill Dunn of the NMDGF commented, 
“Number one, we have a plan. Number two, what’s in the plan is an incredibly 
progressive.”123 In addition, many participants noted that the Conservation Strategy would 
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serve as an important tool should there be litigation to list either species. John Clemmons 
explained: 
 
I know BLM will go to the judge and say, “Look, we got agreement from all 
different aspects that are involved down there and they worked together for a 
long period of time. You’re not going to come up with anything smarter than 
what they came up with. So look and see what their conclusions are.” And I 
think they’ll buy that.124 
 
The group also saw a major success in the Conservation Strategy being used as an alternative 
for the RMP Amendment. The BLM in particular considered the document a great success. 
The Working Group process reflected the BLM’s larger goal of increasing its use of 
collaborative planning on public lands and including public comment in the RMP 
Amendment Process.125 
 
Despite many participants’ enthusiasm for the Conservation Strategy, some participants were 
only mildly pleased with the plan and nearly all participants reserved final judgment until the 
plan is implemented. John Clemmons noted, “I think, it’s just a sigh of relief more than an 
excitement that something is going to benefit you. Ok, you’re not going to harm us and we’ll 
all agree that you’re not going to harm us. And maybe the species will benefit anyway.”126 
Mack Energy representative Dan Girand echoed this sentiment. He stated, “We didn’t get the 
species listed, but I don’t think we helped it.”127 
 
To Working Group participants, “success” was often accompanied by a caveat, often 
qualifying the meaning of success or commenting that the Conservation Strategy was only 
the first step in a long process towards conservation of the prairie chicken and sand dune 
lizard. Given the future implementation of the plan, TNC’s Bob Findling noted that beyond 
producing a document for the RMP Amendment, “I think it’s gonna take a while to 
determine if it was successful.”128 Bill Dunn similarly commented: 
What will be key is that we get this implemented and do it right and do it 
fairly. The proof in the pudding will be five years down the line, when people 
say, wait a minute, the chicken’s doing better, I made good profits this year, 
life is good. That’s going to be when we know this collaborative process 
worked. But, implementation is the absolute bottom line.129 
 
COSTS OF THE PROCESS 
 
Each participant of the Working Group incurred costs over the two and a half year process. 
While some participants attempted to quantify some of these costs, it is difficult to know the 
true costs of the process and how those were balanced by the benefits of the process.  
 
Financial and Opportunity Costs 
 
Members of the Working Group all highlighted similar costs to participating in the process. 
All participants cited the financial burden of the process being a major cost to participating in 
the Working Group either for themselves or for others. First, conservation and ranching 
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representatives participated in the Working Group at their own personal expense. For agency 
and oil and gas representatives, participation was a significant business and operational cost 
to the organization. The BLM also paid for the group’s facilitators and meeting space.  
 
Participants also commented that in addition to their explicit financial costs, engaging in the 
Working Group also took time away from other projects and was a strain on human 
resources. Shawn Knox of the SLO noted that by participating in the Working Group, “We 
were missing out on other opportunities. And that’s a downfall.” He added that he was 
spending about 50 percent of his time at the SLO on prairie chicken issues.130 Ultimately, 
potential representatives on the Working Group from understaffed agencies such as the New 
Mexico office of the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) did not sustain 
participation in the Working Group.131  
 
For some interest groups, costs had a major affect on participation in the group. Agency 
representatives and conservationists cited the financial cost to conservation representatives as 
a prohibitive factor in their on-going participation in the Working Group.132 Indeed, this was 
a major factor in many conservation representatives dropping out of the group as time 
passed. Oil and gas representatives noted the significant financial costs their companies 
incurred as a result of their participation in the group, though did not cite these as a major 
problem for continued participation.133 
 
Risks to Participation 
 
Some participants perceived risks associated with joining the Working Group. Bob Findling 
of TNC noted, “Regardless of what comes out of [the Working Group], if you participated, 
you risk criticism [from outside parties].”134 This was a significant risk for TNC, reflected in 
their organizational policy that surrogates may not speak for the organization.135 
 
The SLO also considered risks associated with participating as related to public perception of 
the organization and its mission. David Coss, Director of Field Operations at the SLO, voiced 
a concern that the SLO would be misconstrued as a “mini BLM.” He continued: 
 
We don’t want to be confused with the Bureau of Land Management. I think 
that was one of our biggest issues of keeping our separateness of a state trust 
with trust responsibilities that is not a federal land management agency. We’re 
in a different category. And we didn’t want that to get blurred. The oil people 
and the ranchers know that. But the general public doesn’t know that.136  
 
Despite these risks, however, most members of the Working Group continued to participate 
throughout the two and a half year process.  
 
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 
 
The Working Group faced significant challenges throughout its two and a half year tenure. 
Challenges ranged from lack of scientific data and adequate mapping of prairie chicken 
habitat to ingrained distrust and obstructionist tactics within the group. Both of these 
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challenges also contributed to the length of the process, which became a major stumbling 
block to participation and progress as the process continued. In addition, there were several 
key individuals or organizations that were not represented in the Working Group, a weakness 
in the process and in the final conservation document, as it does not reflect all available 
expertise. Finally, participants in the Working Group had mixed feelings on the effects of 
facilitation on the process. 
 
Lack of Scientific Data and Mapping 
 
One of the challenges emphasized by all members of the Working Group was the lack of 
available maps and data on prairie chicken habitat, lek sites and associated restrictions that 
would be imposed by proposed conservation measures. Rand French, former biologist for the 
BLM and now at Marbob Energy, noted that the oil and gas industry representatives needed 
to see specific areas of possible restriction clearly delineated on a map in order to move 
forward with possible management options.137 Without the appropriate mapping information, 
there was no way for the Working Group to see the impact of different buffer zones around 
lek sites or where “potential habitat” and “suitable habitat” were located.  
 
Controversy over prairie chicken ecology also was a significant challenge for the Working 
Group. While the Group accepted the science regarding sand dune lizard habitat, prairie 
chicken ecology data provided intense debate. In addition, the group could not agree on the 
effects of development and other human activity on the birds. Dan Girand commented, “We 
[oil and gas representatives] are not convinced of our damage to prairie chickens.”138 This 
became a major stumbling block for the group since members of the oil and gas industry 
resisted regulations and restrictions on their industries without clear evidence of the 
industry’s harm to prairie chickens. 
 
The group attempted to overcome this challenge by obtaining maps for the areas in question 
as they pertained to oil and gas production, private leases, ranching and prairie chicken and 
lizard habitat. This process took longer than expected, however, due to the proprietary nature 
of much of the mapping data. In the end, the group produced maps that participants could 
view during meetings and could not be removed for individual use. Jeff Harvard of Harvard 
Petroleum commented that the maps “helped a lot of people to see and understand what 
we’re dealing with.”139 Having the mapping information in front of the group created a 
shared understanding of the land in question for conservation and got the group rolling in 
negotiations for specific areas that had previously been impossible when done in more 
general terms.  
 
Overcoming Controversies and Stereotyping 
 
The group also struggled with overcoming external controversies and their stereotypes of 
each other in order to work together more effectively. The greatest external controversy was 
the ACEC petition filed at the beginning of the process. Jim Bailey’s support of the ACEC 
petition was seen as an aggressive move to impose more restrictions on BLM land and thus 
impact both ranching and oil and gas industries. At the first meeting of the Working Group, 
several participants voiced their distrust of the environmental community at the table.140 
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Though it was agreed that the ACEC would be put on hold so that the Working Group could 
move forward, distrust in the group seemed pervasive. In addition to the ACEC, rancher and 
Eddy County Commissioner Lewis Derrick voiced concerns about others in the group from 
his past experience. He commented that a “Cattle Free by ’93” sign in the NMDGF office put 
him off to working collaboratively with NMDGF staff.141 
 
While many participants stated that trust increased among participants through the process, 
others felt that stereotypes and mistrust remained. Dan Girand of Mack Energy felt some 
members of the Working Group labeled him as radical and therefore not a productive 
participant of the group. As a result, he felt certain members of the Working Group 
discounted his opinion. He commented, “Regulators and industry after a while tend to say, 
‘Well that’s just old Dan. He’s a radical redneck.’”142 Perceived alliances also fostered 
distrust in the group. John Clemmons commented that the general respect that developed 
between some members of the Working Group was misconstrued as coalition-building. He 
noted, “We [ranchers] were accused a little bit of the ranchers and the oil people siding 
against the various environmental groups which wasn’t necessarily true.”143 While there was 
significant progress overcoming stereotypes and distrust for some, others felt these elements 
persisted, stalling progress. 
 
In order to overcome the acute barriers of distrust and stereotyping present at the beginning 
of the process, facilitators Toby Herzlich and Ric Richardson involved the group in activities 
to increase shared understanding of issues and each other. Informal interactions on group 
field trips or at meals during meeting sessions also helped to increase trust among 
participants.144 Bill Dunn recalled one particular instance that helped him get to know Mack 
Energy representative Dan Girand better: 
 
The key thing there, talk about personal relationships, that day I had a flat tire 
on my bike so I had to bum a ride home, and Dan said, “I’ll take you home.” 
On the ride over to my house, number one he saw where I lived – middle class 
guy, you get to know a person. Secondly, on the way over, boy did we just 
have some good chit-chat, kind of a post-game analysis, it was really cool.145 
 
In addition to informal means of getting to know other participants and forming positive 
relationships, the small group setting of the Oil and Gas Technical Subcommittee fostered 
trust for its members. This trust was largely a result of the candid nature of the meetings 
where participants conveyed their groups’ interests and stopped insisting on the positions 
they often defended in the larger group. Members of the Subcommittee appear to trust each 
other more than members of the larger Working Group.  
 
By the end of the process, many in the Working Group felt they learned a lot from one 
another and had gained a greater understanding of each other’s interests. John Clemmons 
noted, “I think we all came away respecting each other’s point of view a lot more than we did 
going into it.”146 However, other members of the Working Group retained strong distrust for 
others. Lewis Derrick was straightforward about his continued distrust of conservation 
interests. He stated, “As far as the environmental groups, I’ll make this statement: I will 
never trust ’em.”147 Likewise, conservationist Tom Jervis of the Audubon Council stated, “I 
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heard nothing from the oil and gas folks that would lead me to believe that they would follow 
through with anything they promised, which was not much.”148 Just as this distrust hampered 
progress in the Working Group, many participants fear it may hinder implementation of the 
group’s Conservation Strategy. 
 
Perceived Presence of “Obstructionists” 
 
Another significant challenge to the process was the perceived presence of “obstructionists” 
in the process. No single interest group was uniformly considered to be obstructionists by all; 
rather each interest group considered the opposing interests to be obstructionists. Thus, 
conservationists identified the oil and gas industry representatives as stalling or blocking the 
process while members of the oil and gas industry considered the environmental community 
to be blocking the process.  
 
From the conservationist perspective, Jim Bailey noted, “Some members of the oil and gas 
community seemed perhaps to be intentionally going around in circles.”149 Oppositely, Jeff 
Harvard, President of Harvard Petroleum, noted, “The environmental community continually 
appears to pursue an obstructionist position rather than a solution-oriented [position], coming 
to the table to identify solutions.”150 While Harvard did credit Jim Bailey for coming to 
meetings to “recognize, listen and come up with realistic solutions,” he felt that others of the 
environmental community did not respect this effort and allow the group to work.151 
 
While both conservationists and oil and gas representatives placed the blame on one another, 
agency representatives understood both sides to take obstructionists positions at times. Bill 
Dunn of the NMDGF noted, “Oil and gas grandstanded some in the large group. 
Conservationists grandstanded some.”152 Thus, both sides periodically employed techniques 
other than those Harvard referred to as “solution-oriented.” 
 
The perception of obstructionists in the group may have resulted from the diametrically 
opposed viewpoints in the group from the start of the process. Participants were considered 
“so far apart” in their perspectives and interests at the outset of the Working Group.153 Terry 
Riley of the Wildlife Management Institute felt that this resulted in parties being dissatisfied 
with the fact that they were forced to compromise too much.154 Roger Peterson, initially 
representing the New Mexico Natural History Institute and the Sierra Club, noted that this 
resulted in “endless talk,” a contributing factor in the increased length of the process.155  
 
During meetings, Herzlich and Richardson worked to prevent any one interest from 
dominating the discussion and attempted to block unfounded protests. However, some 
members of the group felt that this was largely ineffective.156 Thus, obstructionist tactics 
persisted in the process until the pressure of the BLM deadline forced everyone in the group 
to move beyond such counterproductive strategies. 
 
Length of the Process 
 
The initial short timeframe for the process and the ultimate extended length of the Working 
Group process presented several challenges to the group. First, while the facilitators 
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recognized that the initial timeframe for the process seemed unrealistic, they were hired to 
direct the group according to this constraint. Facilitator Toby Herzlich commented, however, 
that if she and Ric Richardson had been able to alter the timeframe, they would have 
structured the group much differently.157 The facilitators had some time for participant 
interviews prior to the start of the process and Herzlich stressed that she and Richardson 
sought “opportunities to strengthen relationships, establish a shared knowledge base and 
build mutual understanding among the group.”158 However, due to the short timeframe of the 
process, this was limited more than both facilitators would have liked.159 Similarly, Paul 
Sawyer felt that the initial conception of a short process “colored how we went into the 
process in terms of how we got representation and how we framed the process so to 
speak.”160 He considered the set-up of the Working Group to be a challenge later in the 
process.161  
 
As the process continued to its eventual conclusion two and a half years later, its extended 
length posed new problems. As a result of the long timeframe, many participants noted that 
keeping people motivated to stay at the table was a major challenge at times. A contributing 
factor to the lengthy process timeframe was that participants did not adhere to past 
compromises on which the group had agreed in previous meetings. Especially as the process 
continued to drag on, the group stumbled into a period of extremely low productivity. This 
was largely due to backtracking on past commitments. Rand French, at the time a field 
biologist at the BLM, noted, “A lot of times we would take two steps forward at the end of 
the meeting but by the time we got to the next meeting, we were three steps back.” 
Backtracking caused frustration with the process and cost the group significant time.  
 
Ultimately, the group dealt with the challenge of a lengthy process by adhering to the RMP 
Amendment deadline imposed by the BLM. However, there was concern among several 
participants that this deadline forced compromise that does not result in a viable conservation 
plan for future implementation. Particularly, many feel that the Conservation Strategy is too 
general to be effective. Jeff Harvard noted, “I don’t know if [the RMP deadline] was 
beneficial, it just brought a close to the process.”162  
 
Lack of Participation and Representation of Some Groups 
 
Time, human resources and money, all listed as major costs of the process, were also indirect 
challenges as they limited the participation of some interest groups. Several members of the 
Working Group, for instance, noted that it would have been useful to have Brian Hansen of 
the USFWS be a more active participant as he could better relay the interests of the agency 
that would impose regulation under the Endangered Species Act. However, they noted that 
time constraints prevented him from doing so. Similarly, once the original representative 
from the NRCS retired, his successor came to one Working Group meeting and then stopped 
attending.163 No other employees from the short-staffed agency replaced him. Many 
participants felt this was a significant loss given the possible contributions of the NRCS 
regarding the Farm Bill funding and ranching conservation.164 In addition, a sportsmen 
representative had tried to participate in the group early on but had to terminate his 
participation given the timing of the meetings- weekdays during business hours. Thus, the 
timing and location of meetings played a role in the final composition of the Working Group 
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as both factors dictated the ability of different groups to participate. While the location of 
meetings in prairie chicken country was a conscious effort to ensure oil and gas and rancher 
participation, this resulted in greater exclusion of conservation and sportsmen interests based 
several hours north.165  
 
Many Working Group participants felt that it was a weakness of the group to have Jim Bailey 
sometimes be the sole representative of conservation. Just as there were varied oil and gas 
interests within the larger community, Paul Sawyer noted that there were differing opinions 
within the environmental community as well. He noted that Bailey “was representing maybe 
six or seven groups which was difficult for him because they all have a little bit different 
perspective.”166 Sawyer added, however, “[Bailey] did a good job trying to get back to his 




The perception of the facilitators and their effectiveness in the Working Group was 
somewhat mixed. While some participants thought that the facilitators were effective in 
motivating the Working Group’s progress (discussed in the “Facilitating Factors” section 
below), some perceived that the facilitators increased the length of the process unnecessarily 
and were “counterproductive.”168 Jeff Harvard commented to this effect. He noted: 
 
I think that the facilitators extended this whole stakeholder process probably 
at least six months and probably a year longer than it should have been … 
than it should have occurred if we would have been able to sit down and 
identify what we needed to accomplish, what we wanted.169 
 
Harvard was further frustrated because he perceived that the facilitators treated members of 
the Working Group “like school kids.”170 
 
Some felt frustration for the facilitators’ lack of enforcement of the Working Group’s ground 
rules, including that debate would only be acceptable on legitimate arguments. Jennifer 
Parody, at this point with the USFWS, noted, “They couldn’t sort through what was just 
rhetoric and what was actually legitimate debate so they treated everything like it was debate 
and debatable.”171 Parody noted that this contributed both to the length of the process and to 
frustration within meetings. Tom Jervis of the New Mexico Audubon Council was similarly 
frustrated with what he saw as unconstructive discussion and stated simply that for the 
facilitators, “Process took precedence over results.”172 Jervis felt that the final Conservation 
Strategy suffered as a result. 
 
Paul Sawyer noted that the facilitators had limited knowledge about the biology and 
regulations that were at play in the process. He noted, however, that this was a flaw the 
organization team for the Working Group should have dealt with and did not fault of the 
facilitators.173  
 
Some participants commented on perceived biases of either Herzlich or Richardson. While 
several oil and gas representatives insisted Herzlich was biased toward conservationists, 
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other participants felt that Richardson had biases toward the oil and gas industry.174 Herzlich 
commented on how she and Richardson could play off each other in meetings to help 
advance the process. She said: 
 
We could also do a little bit of good cop/bad cop where depending on which 
group we had an issue with that needed to have some work with offline, which 
came up a few times, if it felt like they would respond more easily with Ric 
[Richardson], then [he] would make the call. If it felt like they would respond 
more easily with me and more directly, then I would make the call. And there 
were also times in the meeting when one of us might be a little bit more fluid 
and the other could step in and really draw some lines about how it was time 
to come to a decision and what were they going to do.175 
 
While some members of the Working Group may have misconstrued these actions to indicate 
bias in the facilitators, regardless, some participants commented that this perception 




A Clear Deadline 
 
The greatest factor in overcoming the challenges of the group and creating a final 
conservation plan appears to have been the BLM’s deadline for input to be included in the 
RMP Amendment. Ultimately, members of the group cited this as the only reason the group 
started making significant headway on compromises for the Conservation Strategy. Shawn 
Knox recalled a typical conversation in the group in which group members said, “‘We have 
to make a decision. [The BLM is] going to publish this manual and there needs to be some 
recommendations from us. Do we want two years to go down the drain?’ I heard that said a 
dozen times.”176 Thus, participants did not want to “lose” two years of meetings by not 
contributing to the RMP Amendment. The deadline added pressure to keep the Working 
Group moving along.  
 
The RMP Amendment deadline also marked the end of BLM funding for the Working Group 
process. Knox continued, “The only thing that ultimately resulted in us finishing was a 
concrete deadline and the end of the money. I don’t know that there is anything else that 
would push such disparate parties to agreement.”177 Rand French was confident that meetings 
would still be underway had it not been for the BLM deadline.178  
 
The Threat of Regulatory Action 
 
Despite the lulls in Working Group progress and many participants’ desire to leave, the threat 
of listing either the prairie chicken or the sand dune lizard under the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) was significant enough to keep many people at the table. While David Coss felt it 
difficult to speculate what would have happened to the group in the absence of ESA, he felt 
confident that weariness for other options such as litigation kept people working 
collaboratively.179 Similarly, Jennifer Parody noted that while there was considerable 
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uncertainty that either species would be listed given the small number of total species listed 
each year, the risk of ESA listing was too great to be ignored.180 
 
Roger Peterson felt that the threat of ESA might similarly contribute to successful 
implementation of the Conservation Strategy. He noted, “If the document is not followed, 
Fish and Wildlife Service will say, ok, that’s it, we list [the species] and we take over. So 
that’s the stick behind it all.”181 Several other Working Group participants agreed with this 
assertion. 
 
Small Subcommittee Work 
  
Many participants credit the success in outlining oil and gas concessions to the Oil and Gas 
Technical Subcommittee. In this small group setting, individuals spoke candidly about their 
parties’ interests and motivations and made suggestions for how to create acceptable 
options.182 Such candid discussion was in contrast to the “grandstanding” that occurred in the 
larger Working Group. Bill Dunn commented to this effect. He noted:  
 
One of the problems of the large group is that people have a tendency to put 
up their defenses. Basically they can hide behind their group and they can get 
on the stage and spout the party line, whereas when you have it down to one 
person – and this subcommittee was just Dan Girand representing oil and gas, 
Jim Bailey representing conservation, and three of us from the agencies – 
there was more looking in the eye, less B.S. and more stating what's on your 
mind.183  
 
The Subcommittee forced participants to deal with each other as individuals and less 
as members of opposing groups. Jennifer Parody was pleased with the 
Subcommittee’s ability to come up with important decisions that could later be 
brought back to the whole group for approval. She commented that the agreements 




Several participants cited the institutional support of agencies as a major facilitating factor, 
particularly in getting the group off the ground. From a BLM perspective, Sawyer indicated 
that the support of BLM management and BLM headquarters in Washington, D.C. was 
essential to BLM’s successful participation in the Working Group. He added that both BLM 
and NMDGF management were behind the process. He commented on the essential role of 
management in all interest groups: “We recognized early on we needed that executive 
support, whether it’s in the private interests, oil and gas company, presidents or regional 
directors or the agency types. So that was a big plus.” While this support may have existed 
during the process, some members of the Working Group were frustrated with the lack of 





Role of the SLO and the Commissioner 
 
Finally, members of the Working Group felt the SLO’s participation was a major facilitating 
factor in the process. First, Pat Lyons’s removal of some trust lands from oil and gas leasing 
had a major positive impact on the Working Group. For Bob Findling, this increased his trust 
in the long-term commitment of participants in the Working Group. He noted, 
“[Commissioner Lyons] committed to placing a multiyear freeze on any new oil and gas 
leasing in this area and that provided us with sufficient additional assurance that our 
expenditure [on the Creamer Ranch] would not be in vain.”186 He continued, “Pat Lyon’s 
decision to commit to deferral or moratorium on new leasing in order to attempt to assist in 
recovery of the lesser prairie chicken was really a significant element of the whole 
process.”187 Paul Sawyer similarly said that the moratorium on new leasing “… was a 
monumental step forward. Huge step forward. If the [USFWS] was to evaluate a 
conservation strategy, that was a giant thing to do.”188 In addition to the sign of support that 
the moratorium offered the Working Group process, Commissioner Lyons’s action must have 
also shaken the confidence of the oil and gas industry to some extent as they came to realize 
that conservation measures and the alternatives to collaboration could go contrary to their 
interests despite historical alliances.  
 
Some members of the Working Group attribute Commissioner Lyons’ actions to his role as 
an elected official, thus increasing accountability and awareness of prairie chicken 
conservation. Jim Bailey commented that Lyons’s constituency extended to rural 
communities in New Mexico and as such, he must recognize their concerns. Bailey noted, 
“[Lyons] would like to be reelected, so he had to change his tune. And he rightfully 
recognized that none of us would benefit if this bird was federally listed. More stringent rules 
would hinder development on state trust lands.”189 
 
Participants also perceived Commissioner Lyons’s good relationship with other interests as 
beneficial to the process. Lyons noted, “I’ve got a good working relationship with 
everybody.”190 Shawn Knox and David Coss concur that this was helpful in getting buy-in 
for the process from other stakeholders. Knox commented, “Because the Commissioner is a 
Republican … he was at a better place to catalyze support of some of the industry that 
typically is Republican in nature, both the agricultural and oil and gas industries.”191 Knox 
mentioned that former Commissioner Ray Powell, who was “more left” in his politics, may 
have been a polarizing force instead of a catalyzing force in this respect.192 
 
In addition to Commissioner Lyons’ role, SLO staff members were highly praised by all 
members of the Working Group. Natalie Guilmet was lauded for her contribution to creating 
the maps necessary to start making decisions.193 David Coss was recognized by many as a 
strong leader in the group for pushing things forward towards progress. Paul Sawyer noted 
that the SLO “played a very pivotal role in the [Working Group] and I was quite pleased. 
They were way up there in the forefront amongst the lead. People always talk about the 







Many participants felt the facilitators were an integral part of the group’s progress. In 
particular, participants noted that facilitators Toby Herzlich and Ric Richardson kept the 
group on track, pushed for compromise and helped the Working Group overcome process 
challenges. Shawn Knox stated simply that without the facilitators, the Working Group 
“would be a waste of my time.”195  
 
Participants also noted that the facilitators helped the group recognize progress. Bill Dunn 
recalled a situation in which progress reports were especially helpful: 
 
Toby [Herzlich] and Ric [Richardson] did a pretty good job at saying “This is 
what we’ve accomplished.” There was a time when we were at an impasse 
with oil and gas late in the game … where [participants] said, “This had been a 
waste of time. We haven’t accomplished anything.” But we had a whole slew 
of recommendations that everybody was giving the thumbs up on, and we 
were down to probably ten out of 90 or 100 recommendations. We were like, 
wow, we’re almost there.196  
 
Dunn continued that in this situation, Herzlich highlighted the group’s progress, which lifted 
spirits and increased group momentum.197 
 
While some of the oil and gas representatives felt that an agency facilitator would have been 
more appropriate to facilitate the process, Bill Dunn of the NMDGF felt that having third 
party, neutral facilitators was essential. “If I’d gotten up there, then okay, there’s a slant 
toward wildlife. If Jeff Harvard got up there, a slant toward oil and gas. If John Clemmons, a 
slant toward ranching. With Toby [Herzlich] and Ric [Richardson], there was no slant. That’s 




There were several key “lessons learned” that emerged from this case as advice offered by 
participants as well as recommendations identified by the researchers. These “lessons 
learned” are based on participants’ experience in the Working Group with what worked well 
and what could have been improved. 
 
1. Preparation is essential and will pay off later in the process. 
 
This case highlights two main areas that would have benefited from greater preparation prior 
to the process. First, Working Group participants who helped structure the process stressed 
the importance of detailed preparation prior to the first meeting. Paul Sawyer of the BLM 
referred to this step as “pre-thinking.”199 He and facilitator Toby Herzlich addressed the need 
for greater pre-thinking regarding the direction of the process as well as the format for the 
final document.200 Facilitators should also be briefed on the major issues the group will 
discuss as well as the past history of these issues. Insufficient pre-thinking led to some lost 
time in the Working Group. For instance, participants floundered in discussion when they 
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were unsure of the vision for the final document. In addition, facilitators had to learn about 
the issues as they were brought up at the table.  
 
In addition to process structure, the Working Group would have greatly benefited from 
having more available technical and scientific resources. As the group began to dig into 
actual land management policies, it was clear the participants needed to be able to visualize 
the impacts of these strategies. If the Working Group had science and technical information 
more readily available, the group could have moved onto management details more quickly. 
 
2. Third party facilitators are helpful but must avoid the perception of bias. 
 
As several Working Group participants noted, the facilitators were major assets to the 
process as they helped direct discussion and kept track of successes and agreements. Toby 
Herzlich commented on the benefits of having two facilitators. She said: 
 
[Dual facilitation] was very beneficial in a lot of ways ways. One, because it’s 
a very complex project and Ric [Richardson] and I could think it through 
together and bring different perspectives to the understanding of what was 
going on, which is really important. Also, when it came time to do 
subcommittee working, when those needed to be facilitated we could work 
concurrently in that way.201 
 
However, facilitation conflicts arose when members of the Working Group felt the 
facilitators were partial to opposing interests. Thus, it is essential that facilitators recognize 
the challenge of preventing perceptions of bias. 
 
3. Working in small groups can help break down positions and help the group move 
towards constructive discussion. 
 
Several participants advised that future collaborative processes use small subcommittees to 
help move the larger group through impasses. The Working Group highlighted the Oil and 
Gas Technical Subcommittee as a major facilitating factor. Bill Dunn noted that in these 
groups it was appropriate to not have a facilitator but rather to let the parties hash-out issues 
on their own.202 Subcommittees provide a forum for representatives to candidly discuss their 
interests and the interests of their broader constituency as opposed to spouting the party-line 
as is typical in larger groups. Participants of subcommittees also work in closer contact than 
within the larger group and are often more compelled to create viable options instead of 
simply blocking proposals. Thus, Subcommittees may be better equipped to hammer out 
detailed options than the larger group. These options should then be brought back to the 
larger group for approval. 
 
4. Know what you’re getting into and keep an open mind for new ideas. 
 
A key point that many members of the Working Group highlighted as essential to a 
successful collaborative process was for process participants to understand the commitment 
and energy required in collaboration. Jennifer Parody added that participants need to be 
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“really open-minded to new ways of solving the problem.”203 She continued, highlighting the 
importance of “being really knowledgeable about where your bottom line is but being open 
about how to get there.”204 
 
The Working Group spent significant time trying to create new options to meet the multiple 
interests at the table. For a long time this progress was hindered by the entrenched positions 
of some groups and the opposed approaches of interest groups to the problem. Had 
participants been “open-minded” as Parody suggests, the group would have been more 
efficient. 
 
5. Agency and organizational management should be involved and informed about the 
process. 
 
One of the strongest suggestions from Jeff Harvard, Dan Girand and Rand French was that 
participants at the table need greater contact with managers. For the Working Group, Rand 
French commented that not having managers at the table was a “flaw in the system.”205 He 
continued that in order for participants to know how to best represent their agency or 
organization, they need to “get a stance on the political agendas that are there [in the 
organization] that staff don’t have.”206  
 
To incorporate increased managerial involvement, French suggested that managers 
periodically sit-in on working group meetings to get a sense of what’s happening in the 
process. In addition, he noted that representatives at the table could have monthly leadership 
briefings to keep managers and other officials up-to-date.207 In this way, Jeff Harvard noted, 
representatives at the table can make decisions with the approval of their organization. He 
stated, “It’s about having people [at the table] that understand what is needed and have the 
ability to accomplish the goals set out.”208  
 
While some participants in the Working Group were pleased with the institutional support at 
the table, others were frustrated with the lack of managerial buy-in for the final Conservation 
Strategy. This lack of support for the final document may have been averted if managers had 
been more involved or better informed about the proceedings of the Working Group. 
 
6. Set a realistic timeframe and have a concrete deadline. 
 
Many participants cited the unrealistic timeframe as a future challenge to the process. As 
mentioned earlier, establishing an appropriate timeframe for the process would have provided 
time for increased relationship building at the outset of the process that may have helped 
alleviate future tensions. In addition, Working Group participants became extremely 
frustrated when the process exceeded six to nine months. This frustration, coupled with the 
lack of progress, contributed to increased tensions at the table. Thus, collaborative processes 
should strive to outline a reasonable amount of time for a process, taking into account the 





A concrete deadline for the Working Group ultimately was the factor that brought closure to 
the process. As Shawn Knox of the SLO noted, “The only thing that ultimately resulted in us 
finishing was a concrete deadline and the end of the money.”209 Facilitator Ric Richardson 
agreed. His advice to future collaborative processes was to bind the group to a regulatory 
frame with a set deadline. Absent that, he suggested creating a timeframe with certainty. He 
noted that with an open-ended set of negotiations, people tend to burn out and the group loses 
momentum.210 
 
While there are benefits to establishing a realistic timeframe, there is a risk that some interest 
groups will not want to get involved in such a long process due to constrained resources. A 
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hitefish, Montana is a scenic Northern Rockies community located just outside Glacier 
National Park. Similar to many western towns, Whitefish has experienced significant 
growth and development pressure in recent years.1 In 2003, motivated by these pressures as 
well as an interest to become more involved in local planning, the Montana Department of 
Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) initiated a Neighborhood Planning Process on 
13,000 acres of trust lands in the immediate vicinity of Whitefish. Through this planning 
effort, the DNRC hoped to develop a Neighborhood Plan to guide the potential conversion of 
portions of these lands from traditional timber production to non-traditional uses including 
real estate development. The process, as crafted by the DNRC, solicited community input 
through a series of facilitated public meetings and smaller breakout groups. 
 
This planning effort was met with criticism from the Whitefish community, which valued the 
trust lands for their beauty, recreational opportunities and natural resources, and felt 
disenfranchised and detached from DNRC decision making. In an effort to become more 
involved in drafting the neighborhood plan, a group of Whitefish community members 
petitioned the Montana State Board of Land Commissioners (State Land Board) to modify 
the process. The result was a chartered stakeholder group – the Whitefish School Trust Lands 
Advisory Committee – which was to work collaboratively with the DNRC to develop the 
Neighborhood Plan. 
 
Comprised of diverse stakeholders including the Whitefish Chamber of Commerce, 
Whitefish Credit Union, Flathead County Schools, citizens of the area and special interest 
groups, the Advisory Committee met for approximately one year to develop a land use plan 
that would meet the needs of the trust, as well as the community’s interests. Over the course 
of that year, the Advisory Committee and DNRC developed a Whitefish Area Neighborhood 
Plan that defines future uses for the trust lands in the Whitefish area and provides a 
framework for reviewing and evaluating land use proposals. The group also overcame 
significant interpersonal challenges during the process to develop lasting professional and 
personal relationships. 
 
The State Land Board unanimously adopted the Neighborhood Plan in November 2004. The 
city of Whitefish and Flathead County also have approved the Plan. While the Neighborhood 
Plan is not a regulatory document, it will become an integral part of any future growth 
policies in the area. The Neighborhood Plan is the first large-scale collaborative land use plan 
prepared for any trust land in the state of Montana. 
 
The Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process highlights the value of establishing a process 
framework at the outset to clarify such issues as scope, timeframes and decision-making 
procedures. This case also reveals the importance of having a neutral facilitator guide the 
collaborative effort. Finally, the Whitefish case exemplifies how a strong sense of 
community and passion for surrounding natural areas can be an important facilitating factor 






CONTEXT FOR COLLABORATION 
 
Evaluating the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process as a collaborative planning effort 
on state trust lands requires an understanding of the context in which this process unfolded. 
This section provides a brief discussion of historical, legal and political events and issues that 
helped shape the Whitefish case. 
 
MONTANA’S LAND GRANT  
 
Montana was admitted to the Union through the Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889.2 Upon 
admission, the federal government granted Montana sections 16 and 36 from each township 
“for the support of the common schools.”3 This land grant totaled more than 5.1 million 
acres. In addition, the state received more than 600,000 acres for other educational and state 
institutions under the Enabling Act and subsequent legislation.4 Combined, these land grants 
totaled more than 5.8 million acres.5 Today, Montana holds more than five million acres of 
surface and 6.2 million acres of subsurface trust lands, constituting approximately 90 percent 






Source: “Montana Trust Lands,” Trust Land: A Land Legacy for the American West, The Sonoran Institute & Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy, available at http://www.trustland.org. 




THE OMNIBUS ENABLING ACT AND MONTANA CONSTITUTION  
 
Under the Omnibus Enabling Act, Montana may: (1) sell its trust lands at “public sale” for no 
less than ten dollars an acre, (2) lease trust lands for a limited period of years, (3) grant 
easements or other rights to specified parties and (4) exchange lands where the lands are 
equal in value and as equal as possible in area.7 The revenue generated from trust land sales 
must be placed in a permanent fund established to benefit those institutions for which the 
lands were granted.8 
 
The Constitution does not explicitly identify the beneficiaries of Montana’s trust lands; 
however, they presumably are the common schools and other educational institutions for 
which the federal government granted these lands.9 In addition to establishing a fiduciary 
responsibility to these institutions, the Constitution requires that the state “maintain and 
improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future generations.”10 
These constitutional obligations have fueled a debate in Montana over whether the state must 
maximize short-term revenue production for its beneficiaries, or adopt a more long-term 
management approach that protects its natural assets.11 Indeed, this debate emerged during 
the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, as discussed below.  
 
LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS OF MONTANA’S TRUST RESPONSIBILITY 
 
The courts have interpreted the Omnibus Enabling Act and Montana Constitution to impose a 
trust responsibility on the state, with the state (or the State Board of Land Commissioners) as 
the trustee of the trust.12  
 
Pursuant to this trust responsibility, the Montana Supreme Court has acknowledged that the 
state, as trustee, owes an undivided duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries of the trust.13 Thus, 
the state may not sell or lease trust land without adequate compensation.14 In the face of this 
fiduciary obligation, the Montana Supreme Court has recognized that trust land management 
is subject to state environmental laws, because income is only one of many considerations 
that must be considered when managing trust lands.15 Among the state environmental laws 
that apply to trust land is the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA).16 Similar to its 
federal counterpart, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), MEPA requires state 
agencies to review the environmental impacts of their proposed actions and draft 
environmental impact statements when necessary to ensure informed decision making. 
 
TRUST LAND MANAGEMENT IN MONTANA  
 
In Montana, two decision-making bodies are authorized to manage trust lands – the State 
Board of Land Commissioners (State Land Board) and the Trust Lands Management 
Division (TLMD) of the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC). This 
bi-level management structure played a significant role in the Whitefish Neighborhood 
Planning Process, posing a challenge for some stakeholders and serving as a key facilitating 




The Montana Constitution provides that the State Land Board is to “direct, control lease, 
exchange and sell school lands.”17 The State Land Board consists of Montana's five top 
elected officials: the Governor, Superintendent of Public Instruction, State Auditor, Secretary 
of State, and Attorney General.18 The Governor serves as chair of the Board,19 which is 
tasked with “secur[ing] the largest measure of legitimate and reasonable advantage to the 
state and provid[ing] for the long-term financial support of education.”20  
 
While the State Land Board oversees the care, management and disposition of trust lands, the 
DNRC (through the TLMD) carries out day-to-day trust land management such as preparing 
leases and timber sales.21 State law provides that this bi-level management structure is 
hierarchical with the State Land Board retaining ultimate authority over Montana’s trust 
lands.22  
 
There are four bureaus within the TLMD which cover the four primary trust land 
management areas.23 The Real Estate Management Bureau was most directly involved in the 
Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process. Responsible for managing residential, 
commercial, industrial and conservation uses of trust lands, the Real Estate Management 
Bureau is the newest of the four TLMD Bureaus. Recently, the Real Estate Management 
Bureau developed a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) to guide its 
decision making on trust land development. The Bureau developed the PEIS pursuant to 
MEPA. MEPA requires that whenever a state agency contemplates a series of agency-
initiated actions, programs or policies which in part or in total constitute a major state action 
significantly affecting the environment, the agency must prepare a programmatic review 
discussing the impacts of the series of actions.24 As is discussed further below, the PEIS 
process coincided with the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process. 
 
The DNRC (through the TLMD) manages surface and subsurface uses, as well as land sales 
and exchanges. According to TLMD Administrator Tom Schultz, the DNRC does not have 
financial targets for individual trust land parcels.25 The largest single source of trust land 
revenue comes from oil and gas extraction and other subsurface uses.26 Surface uses include 
agricultural and grazing leases, timber sales, cabin leases and residential and commercial 
uses. The Department also generates revenue via recreational use licenses (a component of 
“surface use”), which people can obtain from the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks to 
recreate on trust lands with legal public access.27  
 
While the Montana Constitution and state regulations permit the State Land Board to sell 
trust land, traditionally the state has preferred to retain ownership of its trust lands.28 If the 
state decides to sell trust land, it must do so at a public auction. The state must sell the land to 
the highest bidder for no less than the value determined by the board after appraisal by a 
qualified land appraiser.29 
 
When making management decisions on trust lands, the State Land Board and DNRC must 
consider the local policies of the jurisdiction in which a particular trust land parcel is located. 
These local policies may include zoning regulations, comprehensive plans and annexation 
rules. This obligation was clarified in early 2005 when the Montana legislature passed a 
“Good Neighbor Bill” – introduced by Representative (and former Whitefish City-County 
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State Board of Land Commissioners 
2003-2004  
 
• Governor Judy Martz (R) 
• State Auditor John Morrison (D) 
• Secretary of State Bob Brown (R) 
• Superintendent of Public Instruction 
Linda McCulloch (D) 
• Attorney General Mike McGrath (D) 
Planning Board Chairman) Mike Jopek – which recognized that the State Land Board, and 
hence the DNRC, must keep local policies in mind when making trust land management 
decisions. This obligation is not absolute, however. Because the State Land Board cannot 
abdicate their constitutional authority, the Board must consider local policies only so long as 




Since Montana trust lands are managed by a body of elected officials and state legislation 
controls this management, state politics played a role in the Whitefish Neighborhood 
Planning Process. Local politics also infiltrated the process because the neighborhood plan 
needed city and county approval. 
 
In contrast to other communities in the Flathead 
Valley and the greater Flathead County, 
Whitefish tends to be a fairly liberal 
community. According to many process 
participants and stakeholders, these liberal 
leanings combined with political connections 
helped the Whitefish community gain State 
Land Board support for their interests.31 During 
the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, 
the State Land Board was Democratically-
controlled. Prior to the 2004 elections, members of the State Land Board were: Governor 
Judy Martz (R), State Auditor John Morrison (D), Secretary of State Bob Brown (R), 
Superintendent of Public Instruction Linda McCulloch (D) and Attorney General Mike 
McGrath (D). All five members faced reelection in November 2004, just as the Whitefish 
Neighborhood Plan was being presented to the Board.32 Following the elections, Governor 
Brian Schweitzer (D) and Secretary of State Brad Johnson (R) joined the State Land Board to 
replace Martz and Brown, respectively.33 Both State Auditor Morrison and former Secretary 
of State Brown are native to Whitefish. Governor Schweitzer owned property in the 
Whitefish area during the planning process. 
 
During the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, both the state Senate and House of 
Representatives were Republican-controlled. In January 2005, the Democrats gained control 
of the Senate and the House became politically split. These politics are noteworthy for the 
Whitefish case because state legislation affects not only trust land management in Montana, 
but also implementation of the Whitefish Neighborhood Plan, as explored later in the context 
of the recent failure of conservation easement legislation.  
 
 
THE STORY: THE WHITEFISH NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING PROCESS  
 
Situated near the sparkling waters of Whitefish Lake in the shadow of Big Mountain, is the 
town of Whitefish, Montana. Originally a railroad and logging community, Whitefish is 



















Source: Photograph by Lisa Spalding 
also has become known throughout 
the state for being strong-willed and 
wealthy.35 This reputation has been 
fueled by the town’s transformation 
into a resort destination thanks to its 
close proximity to Glacier National 
Park and its own spectacular 
scenery and recreational 
opportunities (Figure 2). As word 
of Whitefish has spread, the town 
has witnessed not only an increase 
in tourists, but also an influx of 
celebrities and other wealthy 
individuals who have purchased 
and gated off acres of scenic 
landscape to build expansive 
“trophy homes.”36 While Whitefish 
has successfully leveraged this 
growth to fund a variety of community projects, the town currently is struggling with 
important issues like affordable housing and future demands for infrastructure. At the same 
time, Whitefish is trying to preserve the small-town feel and charm that have attracted so 
many visitors and new residents in recent years.37 
 
PRECURSORS TO A NEIGHBORHOOD PLAN  
 
The need for a Whitefish Neighborhood Plan emerged amidst these community growing 
pains. Approximately 13,000 acres of trust land surround the town of Whitefish in Flathead 
County. Traditionally managed by the DNRC for timber and agriculture, these lands are a 
mix of heavily-wooded areas and sprawling meadows and pastures.38 This area also has 
become popular with outdoor enthusiasts who enjoy mountain biking, horseback riding, 
hiking and motorized activities.  
 
As Whitefish’s popularity grew, however, the DNRC began receiving inquiries about other 
uses for these trust land parcels – specifically, development requests. With no decision-
making guidelines in place for these development (i.e. non-traditional use) requests, the 
DNRC – in particular its Kalispell and Stillwater field offices which were tasked with 
handling trust land proposals in the Whitefish area – found itself in the uncomfortable 
position of having to make individual land use decisions without understanding how the 
projects would fit on the larger landscape.39 Rather than venture down that unfamiliar path, 
the DNRC decided in early 2003 to place a moratorium on proposals for these 13,000 acres 
and initiate a neighborhood planning process.40 
 
The DNRC envisioned that the Neighborhood Plan would define future uses for trust land in 
the Whitefish area and provide a framework for reviewing and evaluating land use 
proposals.41 Pursuant to state law, this plan would not be a regulatory document, but rather an 
advisory tool for the DNRC and State Land Board. 42  
Figure 11-2: Glacier National Park 
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DNRC Goals for Whitefish 
Neighborhood Planning Process 
 
1. Develop framework for assessing trust 
land uses 
2. Address disparity between trust lands 
and adjoining private property  
3. Educate local government and public 
about trust land management  
 
The DNRC had three goals for its neighborhood 
planning process. First and foremost, the agency 
wanted to develop a framework for assessing 
potential trust land uses within and adjacent to 
the Whitefish City-County Planning Area.43 The 
DNRC recognized that growth in this part of the 
state was inevitable and could be a significant 
revenue source for the trust. Accordingly, while 
the agency sought to avoid piece-meal decision 
making, it also wanted to secure a way to 
leverage this development pressure.44 Second, the agency hoped to address the disparity 
between trust lands and adjoining private property regarding zoning, infrastructure and other 
public services by securing entitlements for trust lands that were comparable to those of 
neighboring land. At this time, both the city and county’s growth plans viewed trust lands 
akin to federal lands and improperly designated them as open space and recreational areas. 
The DNRC attributed this mistaken designation to the fact that the agency was not actively 
involved in the development of these growth policies. Since Flathead County was updating 
its growth policy in early 2003, this goal was not only important, but timely. Finally, the 
agency wanted to educate local governments and the public about trust lands. The local 
growth plans and interactions with the public suggested to the DNRC that many did not 
understand the trust mandate and how the DNRC fit in as trust land managers.45 
 
While the agency was unfamiliar with the uses being proposed for the Whitefish trust lands, 
it was not new to the neighborhood planning process. Two years earlier, the DNRC 
undertook a similar effort in the neighboring town of Kalispell on approximately 600 acres of 
trust land. That process facilitated the development of a Costco and Lowe’s. At the outset of 
the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the DNRC thought that it simply would 
replicate the Kalispell process. 46 The agency quickly learned, however, that the community 
dynamics in Whitefish were going to make this a very different and more challenging 
endeavor. 
 
WHITEFISH COMMUNITY CATCHES WIND OF NEIGHBORHOOD PLAN  
 
Before the DNRC arrived in Whitefish to hold its first public meeting, rumors were 
circulating and emotions were brewing about the potential Neighborhood Plan. One catalyst 
of this reaction was a letter that Whitefish community member Tyler Tourville received from 
the DNRC in February 2003. President of the Flathead Fat Tire Association, Tourville was 
approached by local DNRC staff in early 2003 about illegal extreme mountain biking that 
was occurring on Spencer Mountain, a locally-treasured parcel of trust land abutting 
Whitefish Lake (Figure 11-3). In an effort to work with the agency and continue recreating 
on the mountain, Tourville applied for a permit to legally construct, maintain and use bike 
trails on the mountain. In a brief letter, the DNRC denied Tourville’s permit application, 
citing the impending neighborhood planning process. This process was news to Tourville and 
most of the Whitefish community. In a town of 6500 people,47 word of the DNRC’s plan 
spread quickly. Local interest groups like “Friends of Spencer Mountain,” of which Tourville 
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Source: Photograph by Jessica Mitchell 
was a member, took the lead in making telephone calls and sending out emails to generate 
interest in the process and underlying issues.48 Whitefish Advisory Committee Chairman 
Alan Elm remembered receiving numerous emails from different groups and community 
members about the process prior to the DNRC’s first public meeting.49  
 
What provoked such a fervent response to a neighborhood plan? Whitefish’s growth and 
changing community dynamics probably played a large role. Tired of watching out-of-
towners purchase and gate off large parcels of once-publicly-accessible property, many 
Whitefishians viewed the neighborhood planning process as yet another effort to privatize 
and develop open space around Whitefish. The fact that the Kalispell Neighborhood Plan 
resulted in the razing of trust land for the development of a Costo and Lowe’s did not help 
matters.50 Moreover, several community members had spoken with local DNRC planner 
David Greer who verified many of the development rumors.51 One Whitefish community 
member even recalled seeing a copy of potential development plans for Spencer Mountain. 
 
In addition to these development 
concerns, many in the Whitefish 
community simply did not trust 
the DNRC. As DNRC Unit 
Manager Greg Poncin put it, 
“there was a healthy mistrust of 
the government up here.”52 Some 
of this suspicion probably was an 
offshoot of the “western 
mentality” about government. 
Much of the community’s 
mistrust also stemmed from the 
fact that, from the community’s 
perspective, the agency was not 
forthcoming about its interest in 
local trust land. The recent 
Kalispell planning effort only 
fueled the town’s doubt.53 
Likewise, the DNRC’s ongoing Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) 
process troubled Whitefish community members who were reading PEIS drafts that 
expressed an agency desire to match the intensity of residential and commercial development 
on trust land with that on private property.54  
 
Whatever the source of these emotions, by the time the DNRC published a notice about the 
planning process and upcoming public meetings, many in Whitefish already knew of the 








To initiate the neighborhood planning process, the agency hired a consultant to facilitate the 
public process and help develop the neighborhood plan. Through a Request for Proposals 
process, the DNRC contracted with Janet Cornish of Community Development Services of 
Montana. This $50,000 contract established a one-year timeframe during which Cornish and 
her team were to facilitate three public meetings and a series of smaller breakout groups and 
draft the Neighborhood Plan.55 To pay for Cornish’s services, the agency received donations 
from two wealthy Whitefish property owners, Mark Kvamme and Mike Goguen. Interested 
in possibly purchasing the trust land surrounding their properties to preserve them as open 
space, Kvamme and Goguen were among those who initially contacted the DNRC about non-
traditional trust land uses in the Whitefish area.56 Once they learned of the neighborhood 
planning process, Kvamme and Goguen donated $20,000 and $40,500, respectively, to help 
fund the planning process.57 According to the agency, this kind of planning effort often is 
privately funded.58 
 
With a facilitation team in place, the DNRC was ready to hold its first public meeting in 
Whitefish. Based on past experiences, both Cornish and the agency expected a turnout at the 
meeting of 50 or so concerned Whitefish citizens. As they drove into town on May 12, 2003, 
and saw signs posted everywhere about impending trust land development, Cornish and the 
DNRC realized that this process was not going to be like past efforts. In fact, more than 300 
people attended the first public meeting at Grouse Mountain Lodge in Whitefish. Cornish 
remembered this emotionally-charged evening: 
 
At that very first meeting, rather than 50 to 75 people, we had well over 300 
people come. The room we had arranged [for] was not large enough, so we 
had to break the meeting into two sessions. It was very warm. By the time the 
second session started, there had been plenty of time to go to the bar. So, we 
had a very unruly crowd. Also, they were preset to believe that we were there 
to screw them. Plain and simple.59 
 
The large turnout even surprised Whitefish community members who were lucky to find 
space to stand at the back of the meeting room.60 Over the next few hours, Cornish and the 
DNRC explained its neighborhood planning process and introduced the community to the 
agency and trust land management. The public meeting also provided the community with an 
opportunity to ask questions and comment on the impending planning process. Skepticism 
and anger characterized most of the public comments that night. Many attendees considered 
trust land development a done deal and repeatedly questioned the DNRC’s stated desire to 
maintain open space and recreational opportunities in the area.61 Consequently, Cornish and 
the DNRC immediately were put on the defensive, and the agency, which wanted to stay on 
the sidelines to preserve the perception of a publicly-driven process, was pushed into the 
spotlight.62 
 
Some observers beleived that the DNRC lost control over the process at this initial meeting.63 
The agency nevertheless moved forward with the planning effort. Throughout the summer of 
2003, Cornish held a series of focus group meetings with individual stakeholder groups, 
including the Flathead Fat Tire Association, Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and 
Parks and adjacent landowners, to begin identifying common issues and goals. Cornish also 
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held public workshops to identify current uses of the trust lands and continue articulating 
community objectives. 64 What Cornish and the DNRC did not know was that a group of 
community members – an “Ad Hoc Committee” – had formed to strategize ways to increase 
public involvement in the process. The events that followed would drastically change the 
course of the DNRC’s neighborhood planning process. 
 
THE CREATION OF AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
 
The Ad Hoc Committee formed out of frustration with and distrust of the DNRC-crafted 
process. Determined to increase the community’s role in the planning effort, Whitefish 
Mayor Andy Feury and Whitefish City-County Planning Board Chairman Mike Jopek 
convened a group of approximately eight community members to discuss how to “bring the 
process back home and make the decision locally.”65 Committee members wanted to become 
equal decision makers with the DNRC and discussed a variety of strategies to achieve that 
level of public involvement. To determine an appropriate and feasible course of action, 
Committee members contacted State Auditor John Morrison in Helena. Morrison was a State 
Land Board member, as well as a native of Whitefish.66 In the Whitefish Public Library, 
Morrison and the Ad Hoc Committee discussed the possibility of modifying the DNRC’s 
public process to involve a citizens advisory group to help the agency develop the 
neighborhood plan. With Morrison’s encouragement, the Committee decided to propose this 
process change to the State Land Board.67 The Committee was cautiously optimistic about 
their proposal because, in addition to Morrison’s support, the Committee anticipated the 
support of Attorney General Mike McGrath and Superintendent of Public Instruction Linda 
McCulloch because of their liberal leanings.68 Political persuasions aside, the community 
also hoped for the backing of then Secretary of State Bob Brown who, like Morrison, was a 
Whitefish native. Moreover, the community believed they had the tacit support of then-
gubernatorial candidate Brian Schweitzer who had attended the DNRC’s first public meeting 
and owned a ranch in the Whitefish area.69  
 
In August 2003, Committee members traveled to Helena to propose the formation of a 
citizens advisory group to the State Land Board.70 Committee members who spoke at the 
Board meeting included Chairman Jopek, Tyler Tourville, Jeff Gilman of Friends of Spencer 
Mountain, Whitefish resident Bick Smith and local attorney Diane Conradi. In addition, 
representatives from Montana Wood Products Association and MonTrust – a Montana trust 
land watchdog group – testified about the proposed citizens group, reminding the Board of its 
fiduciary responsibility to the trust land beneficiaries and advising them not to abdicate the 
DNRC’s decision-making authority.71 Perhaps because the Ad Hoc Committee had already 
met with Morrison to develop this proposal, there was little discussion about the proposal at 
the meeting. As one Committee member put it, “the idea was pre-sold.” The Board tabled the 
issue for a month so that the DNRC and Whitefish community (through the Ad Hoc 
Committee) could identify roles and responsibilities of a potential citizens group. However, 
this tabling appeared to be more of a formality than anything else.  
 
Over the next month, members of the Ad Hoc Committee met with DNRC planner David 
Greer and Unit Manager Greg Poncin to negotiate an Advisory Committee Charter (see 
Appendix, Exhibit 8).72 The Charter outlined the roles and responsibilities of the five key 
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players in this case – the DNRC, State Land Board, city of Whitefish, Flathead County and 
general public. According to the Charter, the DNRC was to lead the neighborhood planning 
process, but develop the plan “in cooperation with a public process and through a direct 
working relationship with [an Advisory Committee].” The State Land Board, city and county 
were to be kept informed of the planning process through periodic presentations. Likewise, 
the DNRC and Advisory Committee were to provide the general public with opportunities to 
offer input on the Neighborhood Plan.  
 
The creation of the Advisory Committee was to be self-selecting to the extent possible with 
specific interest groups being asked to designate representatives to speak on their behalf. The 
Charter limited the Advisory Committee to no more than 20 individuals, two of whom were 
to be DNRC staff. Consequently, while the DNRC was to lead the planning process, the 
agency lost the authority that it possessed coming into the neighborhood planning process. 
With the formation of the Advisory Committee, the agency became just another stakeholder 
sitting at the decision-making table. For the purposes of this case study discussion, however, 
“Advisory Committee members” refers to non-DNRC members. 
 
Finally, the Charter retained the DNRC’s original one-year timeline and called for the 
completion of the neighborhood plan by May 2004. In the first few minutes of the September 
2003 State Land Board meeting, the Board unanimously approved the Charter, thus initiating 
the Whitefish School Trust Lands Advisory Committee.73  
 
As the State Land Board and Ad Hoc Committee ironed out the details of a citizens advisory 
group, the DNRC watched from the sidelines. When asked for agency input at the August 
State Land Board meeting, TLMD Administrator Tom Schultz voiced support for the citizens 
group.74 Behind the scenes, however, Schultz and the rest of the agency grappled with how to 
react to this community proposal. Many within the agency did not want a formal citizens 
advisory group, since it inevitably meant that the agency would have to relinquish some 
control over the process. Schultz, however, saw the writing on the wall:  
 
At that point in time it was clear to me that if we did not formalize this 
[community interest], it was going to happen with or without the DNRC. So if 
we did not charter this group and empower this group – the group already had 
power with or without us. They were already talking to the Land Board 
members weekly and monthly about issues … We were out of the game. 
 
Moreover, Schultz firmly believed that the agency would become more effective once it 
relinquished some control to the community because “when people are doing things and feel 
like they are accomplishing things, that is when you get the most done.” The Advisory 
Committee Charter helped reassure Schultz and others in the agency that the DNRC would 
remain a decision maker in the neighborhood planning process.75 
 
Pursuant to the Advisory Committee Charter, the DNRC, Mayor Andy Feury and Flathead 
County Commissioner Gary Hall were to identify and select the Advisory Committee 
members. The Charter also provided a non-exhaustive list of stakeholder groups who were to 
be represented on the Committee. These groups were:  
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Whitefish Advisory Committee 
 
Charles Abell, Whitefish Credit Union 
Tyler Tourville, Flathead Fat Tire Club  
Sheila Bowen, Whitefish Chamber of Commerce 
Rob Hedstrom, Whitefish Rifle Club 
Richard Marriott 
Leesa Valentino 
Donna Maddux, Flathead County Schools  
Alan Elm, ReMax Whitefish 
Paul McKenzie, Stoltze Lumber 
Greg Gunderson 
David Greer, DNRC 





* Originally alternate members  
 
 
• Trust beneficiaries 
• Recreationists (e.g. hunters, anglers, mountain bikers, hikers and motorized vehicle 
users) 
• Existing lease holders 
• Business and industry groups 
• Service providers (e.g. police and fire) 
• Members of the general public and/or representatives of neighborhood/area 
associations 
• Representatives of local governing bodies 
 
With these guidelines in mind, Mayor 
Feury and Commissioner Hall published 
a notice in the newspaper76 and sent out an 
informational email77 soliciting letters of 
interest. Despite being designated as a 
participant in the selection process, the 
DNRC, for unknown reasons, was not 
actively involved in this stage of the 
process.78 Some members of the now-
defunct Ad Hoc Committee also 
approached individual members of the 
Whitefish community whom they thought 
would be valuable Advisory Committee 
participants. Mayor Feury and 
Commissioner Hall received approximately 
45 letters of interest. Using the charter 
guidelines and considering their own 
visions for an effective citizens group, they 
created a Committee of approximately 12 
members and two alternates (Table 11-
1).79  
 
The Advisory Committee ended up 
including representatives of such interests as business, real estate, tourism, mountain biking, 
logging, Flathead County Schools and the DNRC.80 The beneficiaries of the trust lands in the 
Whitefish area – primarily higher education institutions like Montana State University and 
Montana Tech – were not members of the Advisory Committee. According to Mayor Feury, 
they did not apply to be on the Committee, and their interests were adequately voiced by the 
DNRC.81 
 
THE NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING PROCESS RESUMES 
 
The Advisory Committee held its first meeting in November 2003. Pursuant to the Advisory 
Committee Charter, Janet Cornish was retained to facilitate the Advisory Committee 
Table 11-1: Whitefish Advisory Committee Membership 
Source: Whitefish School Trust Lands Neighborhood Plan, 
available at http://www.statetrustland.com/index.cfm 
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meetings and draft the Neighborhood Plan. As facilitator, Cornish tried to pick up where she 
had left off in August and continue identifying community goals and objectives for the plan. 
At this first meeting, the group developed five “major goals” to guide their discussions. 
These goals were: 
 
1. Balance traditional uses, including timber, on trust lands with new land use 
opportunities to produce revenue 
2. Look at opportunities to increase revenue to the Trust 
3. Protect the environment (wildlife corridors / habitat, watersheds, viewsheds) and 
reduce hazards associated with development 
4. Provide for public access to and management of trust lands for recreation and other 
open space amenities 
5. Integrate the Whitefish plan with local land use policy82 
 
Before the group could make any further progress, however, two events occurred which 
perpetuated the Committee’s mistrust of the DNRC and Cornish. First on the Committee’s 
radar was a planned land swap between the DNRC and Burt Sugarman, a Hollywood 
producer who owned 130 acres at the north end of Whitefish Lake.83 The plan had been in 
the works for nine years and called for Sugarman to exchange an office building in Glasgow, 
Montana and 80 acres of timber property for 50 acres of trust land adjacent to his lakeshore 
property. Committee members learned of this deal just as the process resumed in the fall of 
2003. The planned land swap upset the Committee because many thought it meant the 
privatization of treasured (and increasingly scarce) lakeshore property, in particular an 
important access point to Whitefish Lake. 84 While several process participants have clarified 
that this perception was mistaken and that the trust land at issue did not have lake frontage, 
many community members still believe the transaction would have involved lakefront 
property (Figure 11-4).85 In addition, this potential swap angered the Committee because 
Sugarman’s 50 acres were part of the 13,000-acre neighborhood planning area that the 
Committee had thought was off-limits for deal-making during the process.86  
 
The DNRC responded to this outcry by explaining that it had only suspended new project 
proposals; this project had been in the works for years and thus was not subject to the agency 
moratorium. Indeed, Janet Cornish mentioned this deal – albeit without naming names – in 
her opening remarks at the first public meeting back in May 2003.87 While this explanation 
did little to smooth the ruffled feathers within the Committee, Sugarman’s last minute 
decision to delay the land swap until completion of the Neighborhood Plan helped 
somewhat.88 
 
The second incident that fueled the Committee’s suspicion of the DNRC concerned funding 
for Janet Cornish’s services. As mentioned earlier, the DNRC received money from two 
wealthy Whitefish landowners to pay for Cornish’s $50,000 contract. While private 
donations were commonly used to fund agency planning efforts, the DNRC did not disclose 
this information to the community. Moreover, when confronted about the donations by the 
Committee, DNRC planner David Greer declined to reveal the funding source. To some on 


































In the face of these struggles with the DNRC, the Advisory Committee worked to define its 
role in the planning process. The Committee did not necessarily want to resume the DNRC-
crafted process, despite Cornish’s best efforts. The first thing to give way was the formal 
discussion structure that Cornish had established. Instead of focusing on values and goals, the 
Committee wanted to be more involved in the drafting of the plan; they wanted more 
substantive discussions. Consequently, while the Committee continued to create meeting 
agendas, the discussions themselves became more open-ended with a lot of back-and-forth. 
During this transition period, however, the Committee did not develop decision-making 
guidelines or ground rules. 90  
 
To increase involvement, Committee members sought more information about planning 
processes, trust land management and the 13,000-acre study area. In response, City-County 
Planner Eric Mulcahy conducted a “Planning 101” course and Cornish and DNRC planner 
David Greer held informational sessions on the trust mandate.91 The DNRC also brought in 
model neighborhood plans for the Committee to review and participated in a field trip with 
the group to the different parcels of trust land within the study area.92 Yet, disagreements 
Figure 11-4: Map of Sugarman Land Swap 
Note: The hatched area designates trust land acreage at issue; Whitefish Lake is shaded in lower right corner of map 
Source: Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation 
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between the agency and the Committee persisted. A key source of contention was the 
specificity of the Neighborhood Plan. The DNRC desired a broader, landscape level 
approach, identifying opportunities for “sub-areas.” Most Committee members, on the other 
hand, wanted security and hence sought a more specific “project level” approach.93 The six 
sub-areas of trust land studied within the 13,000-acare area were (Figure 11-5): 
 
• Happy Valley / KM Sub-area 
• Swift Creek Sub-area 
• Spencer Mountain Sub-area 
• Beaver Lake / Skyles Sub-area  
• Stillwater Sub-area 
• Haskill Basin Sub-area 
 
In addition to this divergence in opinion about the specificity of the plan, the DNRC resisted 
paying to acquire new information and maps on such issues as wildlife habitat, floodplains 
and fire history.94 The Committee considered this information integral to the planning 
process. Faced with the agency’s resistance, the Committee ended up collecting the new 
information independently, soliciting geographic information system (GIS) assistance from a 
Whitefish resident and designating task forces to research wildlife, fire, economics, land use, 
recreation and water.95 
 
Likewise, the DNRC and Committee argued throughout the planning process about the 
flexibility of Montana’s trust mandate. The agency’s interpretation faced vocal opposition 
because people like State Auditor John Morrison and his father, the late Montana Supreme 
Court Justice Frank Morrison, provided Committee members with a more flexible 
interpretation of the mandate. According to the Morrisons, there was sufficient ambiguity in 
the Montana Constitution, Enabling Act and statutes to conclude that the DNRC did not have 
to actively seek out maximum revenue; rather, the agency only had to maximize revenue 
when there was a trust land transaction underway.96 This interpretation did not necessarily 
reflect the opinion of the State Land Board, which, according to State Auditor Morrison, has 
never discussed the interpretation of the trust mandate in great depth.97 Nevertheless, the 
Morrisons’ interpretation was persuasive to Committee members. Committee members like 
Whitefish Credit Union President Charles Abell also crafted their own rebuttals to the 
DNRC’s analysis, citing constitutional provisions that indicated that the state was to hold the 
lands “in trust for the people,” and “maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment 
in Montana for present and future generations.” Moreover, Abell and others argued that 
because a large percentage of property taxes funded state schools, the Committee and DNRC 
should have been concerned with preserving open space in the area to maintain high property 
values.98 In response to this argument, Cornish noted that in the Whitefish area, most of the 
trust land parcels were assigned to specific beneficiaries, so an overall increase in property 
values would not be able to generate the revenue for those specific trusts.99 
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 Note: Trust land is shaded in turquoise on the map; red-hatched areas designate the six sub-areas  
Source: Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation 




While the Committee strove to define its role in the neighborhood planning process, its 
members worked to find their voice in the group. Early in the process, the group elected local 
realtor Alan Elm to chair the Committee. According to Mayor Feury, Elm was a good 
chairman candidate because he had been Vice Chairman of the City-County Planning Board 
and thus had planning and committee experience.100 Together with Janet Cornish, Elm ran 
the Committee meetings. Sheila Bowen, President of the Whitefish Chamber of Commerce, 
also assumed a larger role, taking on the job of Committee coordinator. As the coordinator, 
Bowen set up meetings and speakers, handled press releases and oversaw the meeting 
minutes.101 
 
As is inevitable in any group of diverse personalities and interests, the Advisory Committee 
had members who were more outspoken than others. These more vocal members also tended 
to be the ones who liked to “stir the pot” and “throw bombs into the group to try and get 
people riled up.”102 These personality differences, coupled with the Committee’s membership 
structure, generated some internal disagreements over who belonged at the decision-making 
table. As mentioned, the Committee was comprised of regular members and alternate 
members. “Support” people also regularly attended the meetings to offer guidance on legal, 
planning and natural resource issues. According to Mayor Feury, he and Commissioner Hall 
selected that membership structure to limit the size of the main group. The distinction 
between regular and alternate members, however, was never clarified to the Committee. 
Furthermore, some of the more outspoken members of the group were in fact alternate 
members. The group thus spent a significant portion of time early on debating who belonged 
at the table instead of discussing substantive issues. As a result, the Committee dropped this 
membership distinction between regular and alternate members and everyone became regular 
members.103 
 
Once the Committee resolved this internal membership dispute, it faced an external challenge 
to its membership. At the January 22, 2004, meeting, representatives from Montana State 
University and Montana Tech – two of the beneficiaries of the Whitefish trust lands – 
testified before the Committee. These representatives emphasized the unique nature of trust 
land management and the importance of generating revenue for the specific beneficiaries in 
the study area. The situation grew hostile as the Montana Tech representative threatened 
legal action if the Advisory Committee set aside too much land as open space.104 This 
testimony was not well-received by most Committee members who described the University 
representatives as “arrogant” and “overpowering.” Nonetheless, a motion was made to add a 
beneficiary delegate to the group. Fearing that such a vocal representative would “tilt the 
scales,” this motion was defeated by a vote of nine to five.105 This meeting marked the first 
time that the group used such a formal decision-making approach. It is not clear why the 
group opted to vote on this issue, since they had not established decision-making guidelines 
for the process. Regardless of its reasons, the Committee would not resort to voting again 
until months later, as discussed below.  
 
As the Advisory Committee increased its involvement in the planning process, Cornish 
began to realize that the project had radically transformed from the one she signed on to 
facilitate a year earlier. In Cornish’s opinion, it was inappropriate for the Committee to take 
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on a more substantive role in the planning process since the DNRC, not the community, was 
charged with managing trust lands. While she was willing to work in partnership with the 
Committee, she did not think that the Committee should have had a final say in the plan. 
Accordingly, in early spring, Cornish resigned from the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning 
Process.106 Around this same time, DNRC Planner David Greer was promoted to a planning 
position in Helena. DNRC planner Lisa Horowitz replaced Greer as one of the two agency 
representatives on the Advisory Committee.107 She also assumed Cornish’s facilitation 
responsibilities and worked with Committee Chairman Alan Elm in running the meetings.  
 
Throughout the winter and early spring of 2004, the Advisory Committee and DNRC worked 
under the guidance of Horowitz and Elm. In March, the Committee held its first public 
meeting. Up until this point, the community’s only formal contact with the Committee had 
been through the public comment period at the end of each Committee meeting. This hearing 
thus marked the first time that the Advisory Committee was to interact with the Whitefish 
community. In an effort to bring the public up to speed on the underlying issues, the DNRC 
led a trust lands 101 course similar to the one that they previously held for Committee 
members.108 The Committee also set up stations for each of the six sub-units within study 
area for the public to visit throughout the evening and review draft goals and policies. At the 
end of the hearing, the community had an opportunity to provide written and oral comments 
about the process and the plan. Most of these comments praised the Committee’s efforts. Not 
surprisingly, the community overwhelmingly was in favor of preserving the 13,000 acres as 
open space for recreation.109  
 
With this progress came the realization that the group did not have a professional among 
them to write the Neighborhood Plan. Janet Cornish had been the one tasked with drafting 
the document. In April 2004, the Committee thus contracted with Marty Zeller of 
Conservation Partners, Inc. in Colorado to help finish the planning process and ultimately 
write the plan. Zeller had been involved in a similar collaborative process regarding trust 
land management in Castle Valley, Utah (see Chapter 4 of this report) and was rumored to 
support conservation of trust land. The Committee thus thought that he brought the necessary 
expertise and perspective to help the group finish the Whitefish process.110 The DNRC did 
not object to Zeller’s participation because, in the agency’s view, he had the requisite 
experience with trust land issues. DNRC Unit Manager Bob Sandman credited Zeller with 
being able to articulate the agency’s position in a neutral manner that was well-received by 
Committee members.111 
 
To pay for Zeller, the Advisory Committee hosted a cocktail party, which was well-attended 
by many of Whitefish’s more affluent residents. Ironically, it was the wealthy homeowners 
whom many Committee and community members blamed for the enclosure and development 
of once-publicly-accessible property who ended up funding much of Zeller’s contract. 
Committee members estimate raising $60,000 at that cocktail party. In addition, the DNRC 
donated what was left of Goguen and Kvamme’s earlier contributions.112 
 
With Zeller on board, the Advisory Committee and DNRC were ready to start writing the 
Whitefish Neighborhood Plan. Zeller provided needed structure for the group, encouraging 
everyone to move forward with the plan in mind.113 Yet, by the time Zeller arrived, some 
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“bad habits” already had developed within the Committee.114 Early into the process a faction 
of the Advisory Committee formed what other participants and process stakeholders referred 
to as the “shadow group,” which held meetings about the planning process outside of the 
regular Committee sessions. According to Committee members and process stakeholders, 
those on the shadow group included local landowners Marshall Friedman, Jeff Gilman and 
Bick Smith and former Sonoran Institute representative Diane Conradi.115 While this group 
was not formally acknowledged, the larger Committee was fully aware of its existence. In 
fact, one did not need to be a part of the shadow group to know what they were discussing. 
According to Whitefish Chamber of Commerce President Sheila Bowen, “they always had 
[their meetings] at the Great Northern or Coffee Traders. If you ever wanted to know 
anything that is happening in town, you just go and hang out at Coffee Traders around 10 am, 
or you go to the Great Northern at noon.”116 
 
Despite their predictable meeting locations, the shadow group impaired the planning process. 
Several Committee members not involved in these outside conversations accused the group 
of preventing the process from fully functioning.117 Also, important decisions that impacted 
the planning process were being made during these side meetings without input from the full 
group. For instance, the idea of Committee-run task forces, mentioned earlier, was developed 
at a side meeting in the spring of 2004, between members of the shadow group and members 
of the DNRC staff, including Bob Sandman, Greg Poncin and Lisa Horowitz.118  
 
Side meetings also were the setting for the development of an important document which the 
group used to guide Committee meetings until Marty Zeller joined the process. Known as the 
“Top of the Mountain,” this document was based on the metaphor that the group should 
focus on reaching the top of the mountain (i.e. the end goal) instead of the different ways to 
get there. DNRC Unit Manager Bob Sandman drafted the Top of the Mountain document 
with shadow group members in the spring of 2004 ironically in an effort to unite the group 
by focusing on a common goal.119 Recognizing that the process was not going to meet its 
May 2004 deadline, this document changed the deadline to October 2004. The Top of the 
Mountain document also reiterated DNRC’s three main objectives for the planning effort, as 
well as the fact that the neighborhood plan would remain an advisory tool. Sandman 
presented the document to the entire Committee at the April 2004 meeting.120  
 
Both the Top of the Mountain document and the task forces proposal were presented to the 
full Committee for approval, however the larger Committee was excluded from the 
brainstorming sessions in which these important ideas were introduced and developed. 
 
In addition to making important decisions outside of the full Committee, some members of 
this shadow group were accused of using inappropriate, even aggressive tactics to achieve 
their agenda. Janet Cornish recalled being contacted early in the process by a few people who 
wanted her to “pick a position against the DNRC or engage in activities outside the confines 
of [her] contract.”121 Also, soon after Marty Zeller joined the process, some shadow group 
members attempted to “wine and dine him” to gain his support for their cause. When Zeller 
refused, this faction tried to discredit him, arguing that Zeller was inappropriately pushing 
the process in a pro-development direction. Finally, some shadow group members attempted 
to discredit Advisory Committee member and Whitefish Chamber of Commerce President 
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Sheila Bowen by telling her Chamber Board that she was not properly representing the 
Board’s interests by advocating for more development than the Board wanted. 122 
 
In addition to these struggles with the shadow group, the neighborhood planning process 
suffered a setback in July 2004 when the Advisory Committee learned the DNRC was in 
talks with Plum Creek – one of the largest timberland owners in the country and the largest 
private landowner in Montana – to develop a reciprocal access agreement to provide access 
to trust lands, a portion of which were within the 13,000-acre study area.123 As with the 
Sugarman land swap more than six months earlier, the Committee felt betrayed that the 
DNRC was making deals on property that they thought was temporarily off-limits.124 Unlike 
the Sugarman deal, however, the DNRC reassured the Committee that while discussions 
between the agency and Plum Creek had ensued, the DNRC was waiting to continue work on 
the agreement until after the Neighborhood Plan was finished.125  
 
Despite the DNRC’s reassurances, those on the Committee who opposed trust land 
development felt compelled to take more serious measures to ensure that the plan would 
reflect their vision for the 13,000 acres. Thus, a few members of the Committee, without 
informing the rest of the group, traveled to Helena in July 2004 to meet with State Auditor 
John Morrison and other State Land Board staffers. These Committee members wanted to 
gauge how much conservation and open space the State Land Board would be willing to 
support in the Neighborhood Plan. According to these Committee members, Morrison and 
other staffers agreed to support very little development at that meeting.  
 
Armed with some “ammo,” this group decided they were ready to take a hard stance on 
development in the plan. Just before the August 5, 2004, Advisory Committee meeting, the 
group convened those members who they knew would support no or very little development. 
In total, the group just barely constituted a majority of the Committee. Committee Chairman 
Alan Elm was among those invited to attend this session. During this informal discussion, the 
group agreed to enact “Roberts Rules of Order” (a method of making motions for majority 
voting) at the upcoming Committee meeting to call for a vote to protect various parcels of 
trust land.126 As planned, at the next Committee meeting when the group started discussing 
different sub-areas within the 13,000-acre area, members made motions to remove certain 
parcels from development talks and retain them in their traditional use. Since the group had 
not established a decision-making structure, there was no precedent for or against this 
approach. Elm’s participation in the preliminary discussions thus was viewed by at least one 
shadow group member as crucial because, as Chairman, his support for the approach helped 
legitimize it to the Committee. The group ended up voting on five parcels of trust land within 
the study area – all motions to protect these parcels, while not unanimously supported, 
passed.127 As mentioned, besides the group’s decision to exclude the beneficiaries from the 
Advisory Committee, this was the only time that the Committee explicitly voted on issues.  
 
The decision to implement Roberts Rules of Order upset some stakeholders outside of the 
Advisory Committee who began questioning some Committee members’ true motives. The 
hard-line approach even forced State Land Board staffer Kathy Bramer to travel to Whitefish 
to remind the Committee that it had to work with the DNRC and that, regardless of what the 
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Committee thought, it was not guaranteed State Land Board approval of the Neighborhood 
Plan. The Committee did not “have the State Land Board in its pocket.”128  
 
After this eventful Advisory Committee meeting, the group under Zeller’s leadership pushed 
to get the plan finished. The process had been dragging on months longer than anyone 
anticipated. With the upcoming November 2004 elections, the group also felt pressure to 
present a completed Neighborhood Plan to the State Land Board before any potential 
administration changes occurred. Their October 2004 deadline, articulated in the Top of the 
Mountain document, was chosen with the potential implications of these impending elections 
in mind. 
 
APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD PLAN  
 
Marty Zeller, the Advisory Committee and the DNRC completed the Whitefish 
Neighborhood Plan in September 2004 – more than a year after the Ad Hoc Committee first 
traveled to Helena to petition for a formal Advisory Committee (Table 11-2). In keeping with 
the Committee’s desire to separately consider the six sub-areas of trust lands within the 
13,000-acre study area, the Neighborhood Plan outlines separate management plans and 
goals for each area.129 The Plan allows for development on four percent of the 13,000 
acres.130 To generate revenue for the trust and meet other objectives, the Plan also includes 
such tools as: 
 
• Conservation easements 
• Conservation development (an approach that involves limited development on a 
property such that open and productive qualities of land are protected) 
• Public purchase of development rights or land 
• Land exchanges 
• Permitted recreational trail systems131 
 
The plan outlines management polices for the next 20 years. According to DNRC Unit 
Manager Bob Sandman, this timeline structure is one of the reasons why the Neighborhood 
Plan is “revolutionary.” There is an incentive system built into this 20-year timeframe 
whereby the DNRC has agreed to hold off initiating development projects in the areas 
identified for preservation for a specified period of time to give the Whitefish community 
time to plan how to protect that trust land and still generate revenue for the trust using the 
tools identified above. If the community succeeds in meeting its acreage targets, then the 
Plan allows the timeframe to be pushed out 20 years before the DNRC can begin considering 
development plans in the area.132 
 
Once the Plan was finished, the Committee held a final public hearing on September 9, 2004, 
to provide the community with a final opportunity to comment on the document. To the 
Committee’s surprise and frustration, many citizens at the hearing seemed unfamiliar with 
what had become to them basic trust land issues. Thus, the group spent a portion of the 
meeting reviewing trust lands 101 again.133 From the DNRC’s perspective, though, this 
public hearing was a tremendous success because the Committee members, not the agency, 
explained the legal mandate to the community. According to Unit Manager Greg Poncin, 
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“that’s about as rewarding as it gets. A year and a half ago, people didn’t even know what 
school trust land was. Now they’re defending it to their neighbors as a good thing.”134 
 
On November 15, 2004, Bob Sandman, Committee Chairman Alan Elm, local residents Jeff 
Gilman and Marshall Friedman, and former Sonoran Institute representative Diane Conradi 
traveled to Helena to present the 
completed Plan to the State Land Board. 
Also at the State Land Board meeting 
were some of the beneficiaries that the 
Advisory Committee had turned away 
from the process back in January. They 
voiced their concern with the Plan because 
a beneficiary representative was not on the 
Advisory Committee. They further 
worried that the Plan would not generate 
the revenue necessary to satisfy the State 
Land Board’s fiduciary obligations. A 
MonTrust representative also testified, 
raising several legal questions and 
requesting that the Plan not be adopted 
until answers were provided.  
 
Despite these objections, the State Land 
Board unanimously approved the 
Whitefish Neighborhood Plan. 
Subsequently, both the city of Whitefish 
and Flathead County approved the Plan, 
incorporating it into their growth policies.135 
 
In April 2005, the DNRC took the first step in implementing the Neighborhood Plan, pushing 
for legislation that would have explicitly allowed the agency to grant conservation easements 
to such parties as the Whitefish community and private individuals. Many argue that this 
clarification is needed because state law currently limits conservation easements to 
agreements between the State Land Board and the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 
and two specified nonprofits.136 This legislation failed to gain the three-fifths vote needed to 
reach the floor of the Montana House of Representatives, despite a strong lobbying effort by 
the agency and local Whitefish residents.137 Some attribute the bill’s failure to a lack of 
understanding among State Legislators about conservation easements and how they affect the 
State Land Board and DNRC’s fiduciary obligations.138 
 
Recognizing that “the ball is in [their] court” to make the Plan happen, the Whitefish 
community has begun taking action.139 Two informal groups have formed out of the 
Whitefish Advisory Committee – the Lewis and Clark Group and the Whitefish Community 
Open Lands Alliance (COLA) – to help implement the Plan. Members of COLA include 
Committee participants Marshall Friedman, Diane Conradi, Alan Elm and Mayor Feury. At 
the September 6, 2005 City Council meeting, the city announced that it would take the lead 
 
May 2003 First public meeting held 
Aug. 2003 Ad Hoc Committee petitioned 
State Land Board 
Sept. 2003 State Land Board chartered 
Whitefish Advisory Committee 
Nov. 2003 First Advisory Committee 
meeting held  
Jan. 2004 Beneficiaries challenged 
Advisory Committee membership 
March 2004 Advisory Committee held first 
public hearing 
April 2004 Marty Zeller hired to write 
Whitefish Neighborhood Plan 
Aug. 2004 Roberts Rules of Order enacted 
Sept. 2004 Advisory Committee held second 
public hearing 
Nov. 2004 State Land Board approved 
Whitefish Neighborhood Plan  
 




in building a recreational trail on trust lands that would circle Whitefish Lake. Under this 
plan, the city of Whitefish would become the first party to submit an application to the 
DNRC under the Whitefish Neighborhood Plan.140 With this at the forefront, COLA is 
working with Mike Goguen who wants to purchase large tracts of trust land in the Spencer 
Mountain and Beaver Lake areas to maintain as open space. Because of the community’s 
feelings about the increasing privatization of Whitefish property, the group is treading lightly 
with this project. Since some of the property Goguen wants to preserve falls along the 
planned recreational trail, the group is hoping to portray this deal as a way to increase 
community access to these trust lands.141 
 
With all of this activity, the story of the Whitefish Neighborhood Plan certainly is not over. 
Time will tell what this ambitious Northern Montana town can do with a Neighborhood Plan 
of which they fought so hard to be a part. 
 
 
THE ANALYSIS: THE WHITEFISH NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING PROCESS 
 
The following analysis identifies and discusses the benefits, costs, challenges, facilitating 
factors and lessons learned from the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process. This analysis 
is based on Advisory Committee and process stakeholder observations and reflections, as 
well as the researchers’ external assessment.  
 
Benefits of the process include the development of professional and personal relationships, 
enhanced public understanding of trust land management and increased conservation of trust 
lands. The 18-month planning process also imposed considerable time, financial and 
emotional costs for all involved. Moreover, Advisory Committee members, DNRC and 
process stakeholders encountered significant challenges during the planning effort, which 
include Montana’s bi-level trust land management structure, mutual mistrust between the 
Advisory Committee and DNRC and ineffective facilitation.  
 
Facilitating factors that helped the planning process persist include DNRC personnel 
adjustments, providing the Whitefish community with significant decision-making power and 
the community’s ongoing relationship with the State Land Board and individual political 
connections. 
 
Finally, lessons learned from the Whitefish case include recognizing that collaborative 
planning may not be an appropriate approach for all decision-making efforts, obtaining a 
neutral facilitator at the outset of a process and anticipating end-runs and taking proactive 
measures to prevent them. 
 
WAS THE WHITEFISH NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING PROCESS COLLABORATIVE? 
 
DNRC Unit Manager Bob Sandman emphatically believed that the Whitefish Neighborhood 




In fact, I think it almost epitomizes a collaborative process … In the beginning 
you have parties who can’t agree and don’t trust each other. And by the time 
you’re done, you’ve reached a solution neither one of you would have thought 
of in the beginning, but both think is a success at the end. 
 
Advisory Committee members and other process stakeholders disagreed as to whether this 
process was collaborative. Some like State Land Board staffer Kathy Bramer shared 
Sandman’s enthusiasm and said that the process “absolutely” was collaborative because there 
were so many different interests sitting around the table that did not normally sit down 
together.142 Referencing the emergence of the shadow group, former Sonoran Institute 
representative Diane Conradi reflected that the process was “ultimately, but not cleanly” 
collaborative.143 Janet Cornish, on the other hand, argued that the planning process was not 
collaborative because she and the DNRC were “strong-armed” out of their role.144 These 
reflections highlight the three normative lenses used to measure collaboration in this study of 
collaborative planning on state trust lands: (1) breadth of stakeholders, (2) degree of 
transparency and (3) degree of influence on decision making.  
 
Breadth of Stakeholders: From the outset, the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process 
strove to involve a wide range of interests. Before the Advisory Committee formed, Janet 
Cornish and the DNRC held numerous public meetings, as well as individual focus group 
sessions with different stakeholders in an effort to gain everyone’s input. Indeed, what 
motivated the Ad Hoc Committee to form and strategize about redirecting the planning effort 
was not the breadth of stakeholders, but rather the levels of transparency and decision-
making influence.  
 
The planning process continued to involve a wide breadth of stakeholders after the Advisory 
Committee formed. Committee members represented such interests as business, real estate, 
tourism, mountain biking, logging, Flathead County Schools and the DNRC. Despite this 
somewhat diverse membership, Committee members and process stakeholders have 
identified several interests that should have been represented on the Committee. First and 
foremost, a representative of the beneficiaries should have been a Committee member, since 
they are a key stakeholder in the management of these trust lands. Some, like Mayor Feury, 
have argued that a beneficiary representative was not needed because the DNRC adequately 
represented these interests. Moreover, another Committee member reasoned that former 
Flathead County Schools Superintendent Donna Maddux adequately represented the 
beneficiaries.145 Both Maddux and the DNRC (among others) thought, however, that a 
beneficiary Committee member was needed to fully take into consideration their stake in this 
planning process.146 
 
In addition, several Committee members have said that motorized vehicle and lakeshore 
representatives should have been on the Committee, since some of the trust land parcels in 
the 13,000-acre study area were used for motorized recreation and others abutted local water 
bodies like Whitefish and Beaver Lakes.147  
 
Degree of Transparency: The DNRC initiated the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning 
Process with the intention of holding a series of public meetings and smaller breakout groups 
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to gain the community’s input and provide progress updates. The agency did not plan to 
involve the public in the actual drafting of the plan. Nor did the DNRC intend to inform the 
community of the private donations used to fund Janet Cornish’s contract.148 Consequently, 
during these early months of the process, the DNRC made substantive decisions behind 
closed doors thereby compromising the transparency of the planning effort. 
 
The creation of an Advisory Committee increased the transparency of the process by 
providing community members with seats at the decision-making table and empowering 
them to help craft the neighborhood plan. Even after the Committee convened, though, the 
DNRC impaired transparency by continuing to negotiate deals, like those with Burt 
Sugarman and Plum Creek, on trust land within the study area.149  
 
Degree of Influence on Decision Making: The Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, 
as originally envisioned and implemented by the DNRC, did not provide stakeholders with a 
high degree of influence on decision making. While the public meeting format ensured that 
the DNRC would receive stakeholder input, it did not guarantee that the agency would 
incorporate this feedback into the Neighborhood Plan. The Whitefish community and other 
stakeholders thus had limited influence on the DNRC’s decisions. 
 
The advent of an Advisory Committee increased not only stakeholder involvement in 
decisions (which goes to transparency), but also the amount of stakeholder influence on these 
decisions. Instead of providing Janet Cornish and the DNRC with community goals, 
stakeholders (through the Advisory Committee) achieved equal decision-making power with 
the DRNC in crafting the Neighborhood Plan.150 That said, the Whitefish Neighborhood Plan 
is an advisory tool only, since state law prohibits it from being a regulatory document. The 
level of influence on decision making hence is legally constrained. But, the Whitefish 
community takes heart in the fact that the State Land Board, city of Whitefish and Flathead 
County have approved this document.151 
 
Effect of the Shadow Group on Level of Collaboration: In addition to the above-
mentioned factors, the emergence of the shadow group affected the collaborative nature of 
the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process. Throughout the 18-month process, this subset 
of the Advisory Committee held important discussions and even made key decisions outside 
of the formal meetings that significantly impacted the final scope of the Neighborhood Plan. 
The shadow group thus limited (1) the breadth of stakeholders involved in decisions, (2) the 
transparency of the process and (3) the level of influence that the Advisory Committee 
members had on decision making. 
 
BENEFITS OF THE PROCESS 
 
While the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process encountered bumps in the road during 
its 18-month duration, participants and stakeholders identified a variety of benefits to 






Development of Professional and Personal Relationships 
 
First, the process has facilitated the development of professional and personal relationships 
between the DNRC and community. Because the agency-community relationship 
traditionally had been plagued by mistrust, no one expected this benefit. According to DNRC 
Unit Manager Greg Poncin, “we have relationships up there in the community that we could 
never have hoped to have.”152 These connections, while rooted in the Neighborhood Plan, 
have extended to external professional and private issues, as Committee Chairman and local 
realtor Alan Elm explained:  
 
I can pick up the phone and call Bob Sandman on his cell phone whenever I 
want now and talk to him about a forest fire on my client’s property. There’s a 
lot of good relationships that have formed … Greg Poncin even called me the 
other day to tell me about a fire on some property that we own.153 
 
Because of the local nature of the process and the organization of the DNRC, the community 
has developed stronger relationships with local agency staff than with those located in 
Helena.154 Committee members predict that these relationships will prove vital in the 
implementation of the Neighborhood Plan. For instance, a COLA member reports that 
because of the planning process, the group is able to meet regularly with local DNRC staff to 
strategize about possible projects to help implement the Neighborhood Plan.  
 
Mobilization of Stakeholders 
 
The formation of the Whitefish COLA highlights a second benefit of the planning process – 
the mobilization of stakeholders to implement the Neighborhood Plan. Whereas prior to the 
planning process, trust land management and even land conservation in general were 
peripheral issues for the Whitefish community, today there are at least two groups which 
focus exclusively on them – the Lewis and Clark Group and Whitefish COLA. Formed to 
implement the Neighborhood Plan, these groups benefit the community because they ensure 
that local interests remain a consideration in trust land management decisions. This 
mobilization is also a benefit for the DNRC and State Land Board because they now have a 
group of motivated, knowledgeable stakeholders who are committed to realizing the goals of 
the Plan.155  
 
Provision of Otherwise-Unavailable Resources to the Decision-Making Process  
 
In addition to supplying creative implementation ideas, the Advisory Committee brought 
resources to the decision-making process that otherwise would not have been available to the 
DNRC. Committee members dedicated significant resources to help complete the 
Neighborhood Plan. They fundraised and paid for a significant portion of Marty Zeller’s 
contract. They also volunteered hours of personal time to this process. DNRC Unit Manager 
Greg Poncin acknowledged this time commitment: “It’s not that common that you find 
members of a community who are so passionate that they would dedicate hundreds, if not 
thousands, of hours of their time to something as specific as this with no compensation. The 
state of Montana owes them a huge debt of gratitude.” Furthermore, the agency benefited 
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from the interest, expertise and innovative ideas that Committee members brought to the 
table.156 Assistant Attorney General Candace West speculated that Committee members 
“came up with management and funding ideas that the DNRC probably wouldn’t have 
thought of if they were doing the plan on their own.”157   
 
Equal Allocation of Decision-Making Power  
 
By making the DNRC an Advisory Committee member rather than an entity separate from 
the Committee, the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process provided non-agency 
Committee members with not only a voice in the process, but equal decision-making power. 
This power dynamic enabled the Whitefish community to move beyond being a sounding 
board or a rubber stamp for the DNRC to become an active participant in the crafting of the 
Neighborhood Plan. As with the mobilization of stakeholders, discussed above, this change 
significantly benefited the community because it ensured that the plan would reflect local 
interests. Indeed, no one denies that the plan probably would have included more than four 
percent allowable development had the Advisory Committee not been involved in the 
planning process. The fact that the Whitefish Neighborhood Plan is not a regulatory 
document does not lessen the significance of this benefit because three levels of government 
– the state, county and city – have committed to using the plan to guide future land use 
decisions.158 
 
Improved Relationships within the Community  
 
The Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process also has benefited from improved 
relationships within the community. The process may have been contentious at times, but 
many Committee members say that they were able to get past labels and build trust as a 
group. Committee member and Whitefish Chamber of Commerce President Sheila Bowen 
said that these relationships have manifested themselves in more hugs on the street, as well as 
greater public involvement in community activities like City Council and local planning 
meetings.159 Many Committee members agreed that “the community is better off because we 
went through this process.”160 
 
Enhanced Public Understanding of Trust Land Management  
 
Another benefit of the planning process is the public’s enhanced understanding of trust land 
management. While there are some Committee members who remain partial to a more 
flexible interpretation of the trust land mandate, most members now acknowledge that these 
lands differ from public lands.161 According to State Land Board staffer Kathy Bramer, 
“everybody who has been engaged in [this process] now fundamentally understands that state 
trust lands are not parks. There is a mandate that they operate within and we’re not trying to 
be mean and we’re not trying to be greedy. It is what the law requires.”162 As discussed 
earlier, the Advisory Committee exemplified their heightened understanding of trust lands at 
their final public hearing in September 2004 when they took the initiative to explain these 





The Whitefish Neighborhood Plan 
 
Many Advisory Committee members and process stakeholders also pointed to the Whitefish 
Neighborhood Plan, itself, as a benefit of the process. From the community’s perspective, the 
Plan is “wonderful,” because it reflects local interest in preserving land for open space and 
recreation.164 DNRC Unit Manager Bob Sandman has called the Plan “revolutionary” and the 
document has been praised for introducing innovative approaches to preserving scenic trust 
land while generating revenue for the trust. The DNRC also has lauded the Plan because it 
secures zoning and infrastructure for the trust land parcels comparable to entitlements on 
adjacent private property. While the DNRC does not have financial targets for each trust land 
parcel, Sandman and fellow Unit Manager Greg Poncin say that the plan will enable the 
DNRC to produce the financial returns necessary to satisfy the agency’s fiduciary 
responsibility to the beneficiaries.165 The creative revenue-generating tools in the plan 
combined with the value added from land use planning support these predictions. 
 
There remain dissenters within the Advisory Committee and DNRC, however. A few 
Committee members, like Paul McKenzie remain concerned about the feasibility of the Plan. 
McKenzie questions the group’s reliance on its wealthy Whitefish neighbors to implement 
the Neighborhood Plan. He observes that these people are successful for a reason and are not 
going to carelessly spend their money. McKenzie and others thus remain in a wait-and-see 
mode, watching how implementation efforts unfold in the future.166 Likewise, TLMD 
Administrator Tom Schultz and Real Estate Bureau Chief Jeanne Holmgren anticipate 
debates and bumps in the road regarding the interpretation and implementation of the Plan, 
despite fully embracing the Plan and being committed to its success. While they recognize 
that there are good elements in the document, they are concerned about what is missing. In 
addition to limiting development to four percent, the Plan does not address affordable 
housing, which is a growing problem in the Whitefish area as the influx of wealthy Whitefish 
residents continues to drive up property values.167 In response to this concern, Mayor Feury 
has commented that the Plan never could have addressed affordable housing because the 
property at issue is miles outside of town and there is no public transportation system in the 
area. In his opinion, affordable housing is infill housing and thus must be addressed in other 
ways.168  
 
Indeed, affordable housing is a contentious issue not only in Whitefish, but throughout the 
West. The Whitefish Neighborhood Plan identifies the Happy Valley / KM sub-area, the 
southern most trust land parcel in the 13,000-acre study area, as “well-developed” and notes 
that “the neighborhood provides a diversity of housing types that are more affordable than 
[those] found in many areas near Whitefish.” This description suggests that the Happy Valley 
/ KM sub-area could be a good location for additional affordable housing. However, as the 
Plan details, the area also suffers from a high density of individual septic treatment systems 
and individual wells, as well as a high water table, which raises a question as to the 























Source: Photograph by Jessica Mitchell 
Conservation Benefits 
 
While there are members of the 
Advisory Committee and DNRC 
who are unhappy with the balance 
struck in the Neighborhood Plan 
between open space and 
development, they agree that the 
planning process produced 
conservation benefits.170 Pursuant to 
the advisory Whitefish 
Neighborhood Plan, only four 
percent, or 520 acres, of the 13,000-
acre area may be developed (Figure 
11-6). The plan also makes use of 
such tools as conservation easements 
and land exchanges to limit the local 
impact of trust land development. By 
preserving open space, the plan also 
indirectly will protect habitat for a 
variety of wildlife including grizzly bear, lynx, moose and elk, as well as environmental 
quality, particularly the water quality of Whitefish Lake.  
 
TLMD Real Estate Management Bureau Chief Jeanne Holmgren noted, though, that the Plan 
preserves the Flathead County zoning density of one home per 20 acres, which may hinder 
more environmentally-friendly development.171 Moreover, there is at least one Advisory 
Committee member, Whitefish Credit Union President Charles Abell, who is dissatisfied 
with the Plan because it only protects 96 percent of the trust land parcels. Abell sought no 
development on the 13,000 acres and expressed his feeling that the Plan lacks the teeth 
necessary to hold development to the four percent stated in the document.172 
 
COSTS OF THE PROCESS 
 
In addition to identifying benefits of the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, 
participants and stakeholders acknowledged that they incurred significant costs. These costs 




The Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process imposed significant costs on Advisory 
Committee members and process stakeholders. From start to finish, the process lasted 18 
months – six months longer than anticipated. During that time, DNRC staff members and 
fellow Advisory Committee members dedicated hours during and outside of Committee 
meetings and public hearings. Meetings averaged two hours in length, although some lasted 
upwards of eight hours. In addition to meeting time, DNRC staff and Committee members 
spent hours outside of these sessions following up on issues and preparing for upcoming 
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meetings.173 With bimonthly meetings for approximately nine months (November 2004 – 
August 2004), the time costs imposed by the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process thus 
were substantial. 
 
Committee member Paul McKenzie recalled having to spend time reading documents and 
making telephone calls during work. McKenzie and others also said that the process took 
time away from their families and other activities.174 As mentioned, the time costs were 
especially great for Alan Elm and Sheila Bowen who assumed additional responsibilities as 
Committee Chairman and Coordinator, respectively. They each estimated spending 15 to 20 
hours a week outside of the Committee meetings on trust land issues.175 In fact, the Chamber 
of Commerce had to hire an additional employee for the busy summer tourist season because 




In addition to time costs, the planning process imposed monetary expenses. While the DNRC 
did not pay for Janet Cornish’s $50,000 contract (because of the two private donations), her 
services nonetheless were financially expensive. Moreover, the DNRC had significant staff 
and resource costs as a result of this lengthy, labor-intensive process.177 Committee members 
also faced financial costs. In addition to hosting a community cocktail party, many 
Committee members donated money to help pay for Marty Zeller’s contract.178  
 
Criticism and Emotional Costs 
 
Committee members and process stakeholders also faced criticism and emotional costs as a 
consequence of participating in the planning effort. Throughout the process, the DNRC was 
criticized by Whitefish community members and trust beneficiaries for its approach to 
neighborhood planning. TLMD Administrator Tom Schultz recalls the local newspaper, The 
Whitefish Pilot, having a lot of “heartburn” about the roles of the Advisory Committee and 
the general public in the process. Schultz wrote several editorials defending the agency’s 
approach before and after the formation of the Advisory Committee. Schultz also faced 
internal strife, further discussed below, from DNRC staff who did not agree with his decision 
to endorse the community’s proposal for a Committee. 
 
Through her association with the DNRC, Janet Cornish received negative local press for her 
involvement in the planning effort.179 None of the Committee members, on the other hand, 
recall receiving external criticism for their involvement in the process. Committee member 
Sheila Bowen, however, faced internal criticism from her Chamber of Commerce Board 
when several members of the shadow group told Board members that Bowen was 
misrepresenting their development interests in the process. This criticism was upsetting for 
Bowen and other Committee members, not only because it potentially jeopardized her job, 
but also because Bowen was known for ensuring that everyone’s interests were accurately 
portrayed and genuinely considered throughout the process. While she eventually resolved 
the misunderstanding with her Board members, Bowen never rectified her relationship with 
Committee member Marshall Friedman and local landowner and process stakeholder John 




CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES  
 
The DNRC and Advisory Committee encountered significant challenges during this 18-
month neighborhood planning process. Several of these challenges were unique to the fact 
that this process addressed trust land management.  
 
Public’s Unfamiliarity with Trust Land and Ambiguity of the Montana Trust Mandate 
 
One source of struggle was the public’s unfamiliarity with trust land. Similar to most 
Montana communities, most people in Whitefish never realized that trust lands differed from 
public lands.181 This unfamiliarity was reflected in the Whitefish and Flathead County 
growth policies, which incorrectly regulated trust lands as if they were state or federal public 
lands. These policies consequently designated trust lands for open space and recreational use 
and presumably assumed that, like state and federal lands, the trust lands would remain as 
such indefinitely. Indeed, one of the DNRC’s goals in initiating a neighborhood planning 
process was to educate the local governments and greater public about the trust mandate.182 
Because of this lack of public awareness about trust land, the DNRC had to spend significant 
time before and after the formation of the Advisory Committee educating the public about 
these legal issues. This education process took up meeting time that could have been spent 
discussing substantive planning issues. Mistrust of the DNRC complicated and prolonged 
this education effort; the Committee was suspicious of the teacher and hence the lesson.  
 
An associated challenge that the process faced was perceived ambiguity in the Montana trust 
land mandate. This perceived legal uncertainty hindered the DNRC’s ability to develop a 
common understanding about trust land management because it provided Committee 
members with fodder for an opposing interpretation. The theories perpetuated by the 
Morrisons further fueled this opposition. As a result of this perceived ambiguity, Committee 
members were divided and a disconnect remained between the Committee and the DNRC for 
much of the planning process.183  
 
Time was key to overcoming the challenges of the public’s unfamiliarity with trust lands and 
the mandate’s perceived ambiguity. As the process wore on, many Committee members just 
grew to accept the legal constraints on trust land management. The replacement of Janet 
Cornish and DNRC Planner David Greer with Lisa Horowitz, a more well-received agency 
representative, also helped solidify this understanding. Moreover, the hiring of Marty Zeller 
resolved contention over this issue, since he was well-versed in trust lands and was viewed as 
a neutral party by most Committee members.184 Therefore, while some Committee members 
remain partial to a more flexible interpretation of the trust land mandate, most members now 
acknowledge that these lands differ from other public lands. 
 
Montana’s Bi-Level Trust Land Management Structure 
 
The Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process also struggled to operate within Montana’s 
bi-level trust land management structure. As discussed earlier, the State Land Board and 
DNRC share trust land management responsibilities. While the State Land Board has final 
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say about the care, management and disposition of these lands, the DNRC handles day-to-
day issues, including neighborhood planning. This decision-making framework has its 
strengths, but in Whitefish’s case it created significant challenges for the DNRC and the 
process. First, it enabled the Whitefish Ad Hoc Committee to bypass the DNRC when they 
were unsatisfied with the planning process and directly petition the State Land Board for a 
citizens’ advisory group. As a result, the agency was forced to switch directions midstream 
and adopt someone else’s process. The DNRC also lost some decision-making power, since 
the agency was forced to give up exclusive control of the process and become an Advisory 
Committee member. This transition inevitably intensified the tension between the agency and 
community.185 Second, because the State Land Board was comprised of elected officials 
some of whom had local ties and all of whom faced reelection in November 2004, the 
Advisory Committee was able to maintain a relationship with the Board throughout the 
process. According to Unit Manager Greg Poncin, “quite a few community members had 
these State Land Board members on their speed-dial. They had a very good working 
relationship.” The political nature of the State Land Board consequently compromised the 
effectiveness of the DNRC, which struggled to maintain a level of authority amidst 
empowered Committee members.186 Committee members recognized this struggle, taking 
advantage of the “schism between the State Land Board and DNRC.”187  
 
To overcome the challenge of Montana’s bi-level trust land management structure, the 
DNRC worked with the State Land Board to portray a united front as the process progressed. 
After the Advisory Committee successfully voted to protect specific parcels of trust land 
from development in July 2004, for instance, State Land Board staffer Kathy Bramer traveled 
to Whitefish to remind Committee members not only of the importance of working with the 
DNRC, but also that the Committee was not guaranteed State Land Board approval of the 
neighborhood plan.188 In retrospect, DNRC Unit Manager Greg Poncin credited the State 
Land Board with “not writing any checks that [the agency] couldn’t cash.”189 
 
Mixed Messages from DNRC 
 
The Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process also encountered challenges that were not 
necessarily unique to trust land management. As discussed earlier, the Advisory Committee 
struggled throughout the planning process with mixed messages from DNRC. Some of these 
inconsistencies were a consequence of the fact that the DNRC is inevitably a “many-headed 
beast”190 that, as TLMD Administrator Tom Schultz admitted, is “not without its faults and 
warts.”191 During the Whitefish process, though, many of these mixed messages were more a 
product of the agency’s simultaneous development of a Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement (PEIS) for its Real Estate Management Bureau than simply an inevitability of 
dealing with a large state agency. The agency’s concurrent involvement in the Whitefish 
Neighborhood Planning Process and the PEIS generated a tremendous amount of confusion 
within the Advisory Committee. While the PEIS officially was intended to provide the 
Bureau with “consistent policy, direction, and guidance in the selection and management of 
real estate activities”192 on trust lands, many on the Committee viewed the document as a 
certified development plan.193 Because Committee members were unclear about the 
relationship between the PEIS and the Neighborhood Plan, they would get upset when they 
read DNRC interviews in the newspaper that referenced the Whitefish plan within the 
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context of the PEIS. The fact that DNRC Planner David Greer was promoted from working 
on the Whitefish Neighborhood Plan to help complete the PEIS only added to the 
Committee’s confusion and suspicion.194  
  
Another source of inconsistency was the agency’s internal struggle over the direction of the 
planning process. Many within the agency did not agree with Administrator Schultz’s 
decision to support an Advisory Committee and this disagreement impaired the DNRC’s 
ability to present a united front. Schultz surmised that, “you could talk to a couple of our 
folks and they would feel that we gave away the farm.”195 Internally, the agency also was 
dealing with a mindset shift about trust land management, as non-traditional uses were 
becoming more common in the state. According to Unit Manager Bob Sandman, this internal 
struggle played out during the Whitefish process. Moreover, as is true in many state agencies, 
there was a disconnect between the local DNRC and Helena DNRC staff. This disconnect 
prevented the agency from speaking with a common voice. For a while, it also prevented the 
local DNRC staff from speaking at all, because they did not have decision-making authority. 
These various sources of agency inconsistency further contributed to confusion within the 
Advisory Committee regarding agency intentions and limited the DNRC’s effectiveness in 
the process because Committee members did not think that the agency was engaging in an 
honest process.196 
 
To overcome the challenges posed by DNRC’s mixed messages, the agency made personnel 
adjustments to ensure that those involved in the process were of one mindset. First, the 
agency replaced David Greer with Lisa Horowitz, which, according to Committee Chairman 
Alan Elm, improved the situation dramatically.197 Diane Conradi has called Horowitz a 
“breath of fresh air” for the Committee members.198 Next, TLMD Administrator Tom 
Schultz became more involved in the planning process instead of just watching from afar. 
While he only attended one Advisory Committee meeting, he made himself more accessible 
to Committee members to ensure that they could have access to necessary information.199 As 
a result, Committee members like Chairman Elm were able to meet with Schultz about the 
Neighborhood Plan. According to Elm, this meeting enabled him to dispel the myth in his 
own mind that DNRC staff in Helena was manipulating the process.200 Third, DNRC Unit 
Managers Bob Sandman and Greg Poncin became more involved in the process, attending 
nearly every Committee meeting, as well as holding lunch meetings when necessary to 
ensure that the Committee was receiving a complete and consistent message. At some point 
in the middle of the process, Sandman and Poncin also received decision-making authority 
from Helena to become fully effective in the process. 
 
Mutual Mistrust between the Advisory Committee and DNRC 
 
The DNRC’s mixed messages perpetuated the Advisory Committee’s fervent mistrust of the 
agency. From the outset of the process, many in the community viewed the DNRC as “the 
big bad wolf looming on the horizon.”201 According to Committee member Paul McKenzie, 
this suspicion “torpedoed the ability to do a good planning process. It took a lot of options 
away from the very beginning.”202 For example, the group spent many Committee meetings 
arguing over rumors and minute details like the order of policies instead of focusing on such 
substantive issues as the policies themselves. Whitefish Chamber of Commerce President 
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Sheila Bowen remembers spending hours debating the meaning of seemingly-benign 
words.203 In addition, the Committee’s mistrust of the DNRC hindered the group from 
coming to a consensus about important underlying issues like Montana’s trust mandate. As 
mentioned, the DNRC’s efforts to educate the Committee about trust land management were 
not well-received because the agency was viewed as biased and untrustworthy.  
 
To a certain extent this mistrust was mutual, as the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning 
Process also suffered from the DNRC’s mistrust of the Committee. Many within the agency 
did not support the creation of an Advisory Committee, since that unavoidably meant the 
abdication of some control over the process. This perspective coupled with the community’s 
strategic relationship with the State Land Board fueled agency suspicion of the Committee. 
Similar to the Committee’s suspicion of the DNRC, these feelings impaired the planning 
process.204  
 
The DNRC personnel changes helped overcome the mutual distrust between the Advisory 
Committee and the agency. Increased involvement of Lisa Horowitz, Tom Schultz, Bob 
Sandman and Greg Poncin helped improve agency transparency and dispel the conspiracy 
theories about DNRC intentions.  
 
Mistrust within the Advisory Committee  
 
In addition to mistrust between the Committee and the DNRC, mistrust infiltrated the 
Committee itself. Some Advisory Committee members were suspicious of those who were 
not native Montanans. While this suspicion of newcomers was not uncommon in the 
community, it often was bolstered by specific interactions during the process. For example, 
in describing the incident in which shadow group members attempted to discredit Committee 
member and Whitefish Chamber of Commerce President Sheila Bowen, former Flathead 
County Superintendent Donna Maddux accused these “imports” of heavy-handing others and 
bringing to the table “philosophies and tactics” that were contrary to the “Montanan way.”205 
According to Whitefish Chamber of Commerce President Sheila Bowen, some Committee 
members even distrusted those who, while born and raised in Montana, were not native to 
Whitefish. Unlike “Whitefishians” or “generation” people, these “newbies” were viewed as 
outsiders who did not belong in this local process.206 These labels and the mistrust they 
fueled hindered the Committee from working productively as a group. In fact, the group’s 
ongoing inability to come to consensus on minor issues, mentioned above, was as much a 
product of internal group mistrust as it was a result of the Committee’s mistrust of the 
DNRC.  
 
Time proved important to addressing the mistrust within the Advisory Committee. Group 
activities like the field trip to the local trust land sub-areas also probably helped the group 
overcome this challenge. Furthermore, the “Top of the Mountain” document, which focused 
on a common goal rather than individual efforts or ideas helped unite the Committee. While 
some Committee members remain suspicious of “imports” and “newbies,” participants say 
that the group was able to get past labels and build trust within the Advisory Committee.207 
According to Committee member Paul McKenzie, “we had enough opportunities to discuss 
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our differing points of view that … we realized that we weren’t quite so far apart on these 
things.”208 
 
Identification of Interests and Hidden Agendas  
 
Another challenge that the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process faced concerned 
identification of interests and hidden agendas. According to Janet Cornish, community and 
Committee members were not entirely honest about their interests in the 13,000 acres. In her 
opinion, many of the local concerns about development and the preservation of open space 
and recreational opportunities masked a strong “Not in My Backyard” attitude. Cornish 
believed that “some of their concern was being driven by a notion of protecting property 
values rather than by a notion of social or environmental justice.”209 Likewise, DNRC Unit 
Manager Greg Poncin observed that there were strong hidden agendas among Committee 
members, although he noted that it was difficult to keep those agendas hidden for very long: 
“everyone knew that Jeff [Gilman] and Marshall [Friedman] were all about protecting 
Spencer Mountain even though they never did come out and say that.”210 
 
Committee members also struggled with hidden agenda issues. As discussed, many believed 
that the DNRC was not honestly portraying its interest in the 13,000 acres. The fact that the 
agency was not forthcoming with information about the area only perpetuated this belief.211 
Some Committee members questioned the true intentions of each other, as well. This issue 
arose not only with Marshall Friedman and Jeff Gilman, as explained by Poncin, but also 
with former Flathead County Superintendent Donna Maddux. According to Maddux, she 
assumed the responsibility of representing the beneficiaries’ interests because the 
beneficiaries were not on the Committee.212 But, several Committee members mentioned that 
it often was not clear during the process whether Maddux was representing the beneficiaries’ 
interest in properly managing the trust or personal interests in land conservation.213  
 
The actual and perceived hidden agendas amongst group members perpetuated mistrust and 
prevented them from undergoing a fully transparent process. To a certain extent, the group 
overcame this challenge through regular meetings and interactions, which, as explained by 
Poncin, helped expose veiled intentions. It is not clear, though, whether the Committee ever 
tried to clarify what interests each member was representing. 
 
Inadequate Process Structure 
 
In addition to mixed messages, mistrust and hidden agendas, the planning process struggled 
because of inadequate process structure. The enactment of Roberts Rules of Order in July 
2004 exemplifies the significance of this challenge. Because the group never established a 
decision-making framework to guide the planning effort, shadow group members were able 
to strategically remove entire sub-areas from development talks and retain them in their 
traditional use. A shadow group member characterized this effort as a successful “high-
jacking” of the process. The group also neglected to establish a clear timeline and deadline at 
the outset. Without time objectives, the Advisory Committee often got bogged down in 
details and consequently could only hastily address more substantive issues. Committee 
member Paul McKenzie does not even remember getting a chance to review the final 
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Neighborhood Plan document before it was presented to the State Land Board. In 





The group’s failure to adequately structure the planning process at the outset can be 
attributed in part to problematic facilitation. The Advisory Committee’s distrust of the 
DNRC hindered Janet Cornish’s ability to facilitate the process. Many Committee members 
viewed Cornish as the “state stooge”215 and observed that “while her intentions may have 
been good, she was hamstrung from the beginning because she was hired by someone who 
wasn’t trusted.”216 The fact that two wealthy local landowners funded her contract further 
discredited her in the eyes of Committee members. The planning effort suffered because 
Cornish was an ineffective facilitator. For instance, because Cornish was unable to establish 
a consensus about the definition of a “neighborhood plan,” endless debate ensued about the 
specificity of the document. As with the Committee’s argument over inconsequential details, 
this debate distracted the group from the substantive issues at hand.217 Without an effective 
facilitator, the group also struggled to manage group dynamics. The Committee often fell 
victim to the vocal minority as the more dominant voices had the freedom to dominate 
discussions and overtake meetings. Committee members also were able to prolong debates 
about definitions and other details, which wasted meeting time and perpetuated internal 
disagreements.218 What is more, without a facilitator’s oversight, non-members reportedly 
were able to have a seat at the decision-making table at certain points in the planning process 
thereby compromising the breadth of stakeholders.219  
 
The arrival of Lisa Horowitz helped the group overcome these structural and facilitation 
challenges. Along with Chairman Elm, Horowitz ran the Committee meetings and provided 
some needed structure to discussions.220 She was too late, however, to address the 
participation problem mentioned earlier, since the Committee decided to do away with the 
distinction between regular and alternate members before Horowitz arrived. Hiring Marty 
Zeller of Conservation Partners also helped manage these facilitation problems. While Zeller 
did not explicitly assume a facilitation role, he provided the group with needed structure. For 
example, to help resolve internal squabbles about word definitions, Zeller assisted in the 
drafting of a glossary to ensure a common understanding going forward.221 Neither Zeller nor 
Horowitz ever established decision-making guidelines for the process.222  
 
Development of a “Shadow Group” 
 
A direct consequence of inadequate facilitation was the emergence of a “shadow group,” 
comprised of a subset of Advisory Committee members and other stakeholders. This faction 
also probably was a manifestation of mistrust. These members did not trust the DNRC, so 
they were unwilling to have faith in a process crafted by the agency, even after the creation 
of the Advisory Committee. Accordingly, the shadow group tried to control the process to 
their benefit. Those process challenges aside, some have said that this group was just a 




The shadow group posed a significant challenge to the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning 
Process by having important discussions and even making important decisions outside of the 
formal Advisory Committee meetings. These side conversations consequently were not 
harmless exchanges in which group members gossiped and casually chatted about issues. On 
the contrary, the shadow group interactions were strategic discussions concerning issues that 
should have been discussed in the open with the entire group. As such, the shadow group 
compromised the collaborative nature of the planning process, limiting the breadth of 
stakeholders involved in the process, the transparency of the process and the level of 
influence that the Advisory Committee had over decision making.  
 
Rather than stop the shadow group from meeting, DNRC staff and State Land Board 
members treated them as an inevitability of the process and attended their side meetings. Unit 
Manager Bob Sandman, for instance, described the shadow group development as “the nature 
of the process.”224 This acceptance legitimized the shadow group and hence, to a certain 
extent, preserved its role in the planning process.  
 
Marty Zeller tried to help the group deal with the power imbalance and shadow group that 
emerged, meeting with the “ringleaders” of this faction to try and reign in side 
conversations.225 Despite this effort, the shadow group endured until the end of the 
neighborhood planning process. Zeller’s involvement in the drafting of the Neighborhood 
Plan, however, helped counterbalance the shadow group’s impact on the outcome. Zeller 
brought innovative revenue-generating ideas to the table which helped the Advisory 
Committee and DNRC draft a plan that could satisfy the trust mandate despite the 
development constraints established as a result of the Roberts Rules of Order incident.  
 
Role of the General Public 
 
A final challenge that the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process encountered concerned 
the role of the general public. The Advisory Committee hosted two public hearings during 
the process to update the community on its progress and solicit comments to incorporate in 
the Neighborhood Plan. In addition, each Committee meeting allocated time for public 
comments. Nevertheless, the Committee and DNRC struggled to keep the public abreast of 
the issues. Committee members reported that they continually had to return to the basics 
when interacting with the public in these public meetings and other community forums 
because inevitably there were new citizens present at each session. Even at the public hearing 
in September 2004, after the plan was written and the process had endured for nearly 18 
months, the group came across community members who had yet to hear of the planning 
process. This interaction with the public was frustrating and difficult for the Advisory 
Committee and the DNRC.226  
 
To overcome this challenge, the DNRC would review trust lands 101 at each public session 
to ensure that the basics were covered. The group also made a concerted effort to keep the 
public informed of the Committee’s progress by providing meeting minutes at the Whitefish 
Public Library and posting informational flyers outside the Whitefish Chamber of 
Commerce.227 The DNRC and Committee members periodically wrote opinion editorial 






Reflecting on the above-identified benefits, costs and challenges reveals several “facilitating 
factors” that helped the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process persist and ultimately 
produce a document that three levels of government approved. 
 
DNRC Personnel Adjustments  
 
DNRC personnel adjustments were essential to overcoming the mixed messages and 
pervasive lack of trust that plagued the planning process. Replacing DNRC Planner David 
Greer with Lisa Horowitz was an important first step early in 2004. In Horowitz, the DNRC 
found someone who could manage the meetings and deliver the agency’s message in a non-
threatening way. According to local attorney and former Sonoran Institute representative 
Diane Conradi, “If [Horowitz] hadn’t come in on behalf of the agency, there is no way that 
the process would have gone forward. [DNRC] needed some talent – talent with land use 
planning and talent with dealing with people.”229  
 
Increasing the involvement of TLMD Administrator Tom Schultz and Unit Managers Bob 
Sandman and Greg Poncin also helped the process persevere. Schultz may have attended 
only one Committee meeting, but several Committee members and process stakeholders have 
said that he was instrumental to the completion of the planning process. State Land Board 
staffer Kathy Bramer said that “he is about the most accommodating, least-offensive 
bureaucrat I have ever met … he listens to people and he says ‘lemme see how we can get 
that done’ … He always comes at it from ‘I can do that, I can make that happen.’”230 
Likewise, Sandman and Poncin helped dispel community misperceptions about DNRC 
intentions. With these local DRNC managers gaining real decision-making authority midway 
through the process, they also were able to fulfill agreements made with the Advisory 
Committee, which increased the Committee’s confidence in the agency and the process. 
Sandman was especially effective in building trust with the Committee, because “in a group 
setting, he can deliver a really good pep talk.”231 Similar to Schultz, several Committee 





The effectiveness of Schultz, Sandman and Poncin also exemplifies the importance of 
leadership in the neighborhood planning process. Joining them in the role of “official” 
process leaders were Chairman Alan Elm and Marty Zeller. Several Advisory Committee 
members have credited Elm with helping calm the waters and keep Committee members at 
the decision-making table.232 Likewise, most participants have said that Zeller was 
instrumental to managing personalities and keeping the group focused on the end result – the 
drafting of a Neighborhood Plan. Zeller was well-received by most Committee members and 





Unofficial leaders also played a facilitating role in this process. Among those participants 
who were influential in the group was Committee member Marshall Friedman. An admitted 
member of the shadow group, Friedman was considered a vocal Committee member who 
dominated conversations, but also provided innovative suggestions and motivated people into 
action. In fact, Chairman Elm credited Friedman and others who had more “extreme” 
positions with being able to bring the group to a middle ground: “by being way over there, 
they did help us meet in the middle.”234 Accordingly, while Friedman’s leadership hindered 
the process to a certain extent by encouraging ex parte conversations, his enthusiasm and 
commitment to the issues also helped craft a Neighborhood Plan that most Committee 
members are happy with and the State Land Board, Flathead County and city of Whitefish 
approved. 
 
Community’s Decision-Making Power  
 
Providing the community with significant decision-making power also facilitated progress in 
this neighborhood planning process. Pursuant to the Advisory Committee Charter, Mayor 
Andy Feury and County Commissioner Gary Hall took control of soliciting applications and 
selecting the Committee members. This authority legitimized the process for the Whitefish 
community because their elected officials, not the DNRC, determined who would develop 
the Neighborhood Plan with the agency.235 Likewise, allowing the Advisory Committee to 
select and pay for Marty Zeller gained community buy-in.236 With this decision-making 
power, the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process changed from a DNRC-crafted process 
to a DNRC and community joint effort. This transition was crucial to overcoming mistrust 




Marty Zeller, himself, was a facilitating factor in this planning process. Familiar with 
collaborative planning and trust land management, Zeller brought needed leadership, 
structure and information to a group that had been stuck squabbling over details and rumors. 
While some Committee members questioned Zeller’s impartiality, most, like Whitefish 
Chamber of Commerce President Sheila Bowen, attested that “it wouldn’t have happened 
without him.”237 In addition to providing guidance, Zeller helped counterbalance the shadow 
group’s impact by attempting to reign in outside conversations and introducing the 
Committee to creative revenue-generating ideas. Moreover, Zeller was key in keeping 
Committee members at the table when calling upon political favors seemed most enticing. 
According to Mayor Feury, “Marty offered the hope of having a long-term solution, not just 
a short-term political solution. A short-term political solution is only good so long as the 
political winds are blowing in your favor.”238 
 
Community’s Relationship with State Land Board and Individual Political Connections  
 
That said, the Whitefish community’s ongoing relationship with the State Land Board and 
individual political connections were important to this planning process. Without access to 
State Land Board members like State Auditor John Morrison, the community never may have 
been able to reroute the process and develop an Advisory Committee. The community’s 
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perceived influence at the State Land Board also came into play during the drafting of the 
Neighborhood Plan. Many Committee members felt comfortable severely limiting 
development of the 13,000 acres because they thought their political connections increased 
the likelihood of State Land Board approval. Indeed, despite restricting development to four 
percent of the study area, the bipartisan State Land Board unanimously approved the 
Whitefish Neighborhood Plan in November 2004. These political relationships remain 
important as the Whitefish community transitions into the implementation phase of the 
process. According to one Committee member: 
 
We have a unique situation here right now. We have significant support at the 
land board. We have enormous influence at the Governor’s office. We have 
enormous influence with [State Auditor] Morrison and [Attorney General] 
McGrath. We have a local Senator and Congressman who are very 
sympathetic to the cause. We have control in the Senate. It’s a golden 
opportunity right now. And we have a Mayor who’s sharp as he can be and 
totally in favor of what we’re trying to do.239 
 
Montana’s Bi-Level Trust Land Management Structure 
 
In addition to these political connections and relationships, Montana’s bi-level trust land 
management structure was a facilitating factor in this process. This management structure 
provided the Whitefish community (through the Ad Hoc Committee) with an avenue to 
bypass the DNRC and petition for increased public participation in the planning process. 
Thus, even though this management structure was a challenge from the DNRC’s perspective, 
it also facilitated the process by enabling the creation of the Advisory Committee, which 
ultimately produced an accepted Whitefish Neighborhood Plan. 
 
The Whitefish Community  
 
Finally, the Whitefish community was a significant facilitating factor in this neighborhood 
planning process. As exemplified by the public outcry at the first DNRC public meeting back 
in May 2003, the citizens of Whitefish have a strong sense of community. According to 
Mayor Feury, “We are a community that does not like to take ‘no’ for an answer … people 
here know that they can make a difference.”240 This dedication was apparent throughout the 
18-month process, as Committee members and the public remained committed to drafting a 
Neighborhood Plan that would be good for their families and neighbors.  
 
Ironically, the community’s increasing affluence played an important role in the success of 
the planning process. Without the community’s fundraising capabilities, it would have been 
difficult for the group to afford Marty Zeller. In addition, the Committee drafted the 
Neighborhood Plan with their wealthy neighbors in mind, assuming that they will provide 
resources to employ some of the more ambitious and untraditional tools in the plan. Some 
have said that this planning process and Neighborhood Plan could only happen in Whitefish 
because of its wealth. According to State Land Board staffer Kathy Bramer, local affluence 
enabled people to propose policies in the plan that they otherwise could not have proposed.241 
Mayor Feury viewed the situation as a “weird symbiotic relationship.” While he admitted 
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that the plan leverages the community’s increasing affluence, he also noted that there 
probably would not have been a need for a neighborhood plan in the first place if these 




This assessment of the often-tumultuous Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process 
highlights a series of lessons about collaborative planning on state trust lands that can be 
applied to future efforts. 
 
1. The trust land agency should evaluate community involvement at the outset of a 
decision-making process to determine whether collaborative planning is an 
appropriate approach.  
 
To quote DNRC Unit Manager Bob Sandman, “there is not a one-size-fits-all process when 
dealing with these issues.” Before jumping into a collaborative process, an agency thus needs 
to assess whether and how the affected community wants to participate in the process. Here, 
a Whitefish School Trust Lands Advisory Committee made sense because that was the level 
of community involvement that Whitefish sought. Other communities may not have the time 
or the interest to participate in a stakeholders group for 18 months.243 TLMD Administrator 
Tom Schultz echoes Sandman’s position, stating “I am a firm believer that collaboration, 
when initiated from government, does not work. If it is going to work, it is going to be 
because the people want it.” 
 
Recognizing up front that an Advisory Committee is not appropriate for all agency decisions 
enables the DNRC to participate in such collaborative processes without worrying that they 
have completely abandoned more traditional decision-making procedures. That concern 
fueled much of the unrest within the DNRC when Schultz endorsed the Advisory Committee 
back in August 2003.244 Assessing the appropriate level of community involvement at the 
outset of an agency decision-making endeavor also helps deal with the problem of forcing the 
DNRC into someone else’s process, which inevitably generates frustration and mistrust. 
Several Committee members have said that if the DNRC had responded to community outcry 
about the public’s involvement in the process by proposing an Advisory Committee, the 
group would have gained agency and community buy-in and mutual mistrust would have 
been less of a problem.245  
 
Accordingly, collaboration is appropriate when the community not only expresses an interest 
in the underlying issues, but also demonstrates a willingness and ability to participate in the 
decision-making process. As discussed above, such participation can be costly and while it 
has its benefits, it also can impose significant challenges. The DNRC (or other trust land 
agency) and the community must consider these variables when determining whether 
collaborative planning is the appropriate approach. 
 





The Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process exemplified the benefit of having the leaders 
of the two planning jurisdictions select the Advisory Committee members. The final group 
represented a variety of interests and philosophies. On the other hand, this process also 
demonstrated the problem of not having all stakeholders at the decision-making table. As 
discussed earlier, some Committee members said that motorized vehicle and lakeshore 
representatives noticeably were absent from the planning process.246 It remains to be seen 
whether their absence resulted in a flawed plan. The implementation phase may reveal the 
error in the Committee’s ways. According to one Committee member, a fight is already 
brewing with motorized vehicle users regarding use of the planned recreational trail around 
Whitefish Lake.247  
 
On the other hand, the deliberate exclusion of the trust beneficiaries already has been 
challenging for the process, as it increased tension and mistrust between the DNRC and the 
Advisory Committee. While the State Land Board unanimously approved the Whitefish 
Neighborhood Plan over the objections of trust beneficiaries, these beneficiaries remain 
important players who could derail the process in the future through aggressive lobbying 
efforts and even litigation if they are not pleased with implementation.  
 
It is questionable, however, whether including beneficiary representative on the Advisory 
Committee from the outset, as requested, would have benefited the process. Some have 
argued that beneficiary participation would have quieted their concerns, gaining their buy-in 
to the process.248 Others have wondered whether the beneficiaries’ involvement would have 
derailed the process because they were so confrontational and abrasive at the January 2004 
Advisory Committee meeting.249 Either way, participants agree that the process would have 
benefited from a more deliberate consideration of the beneficiaries’ interests in the 
management of these 13,000 acres.  
 
To ensure a diverse advisory group, Janet Cornish and Administrator Schultz advised that the 
group’s creators not rely exclusively on a general call for participation. Instead, they should 
approach specific stakeholder groups and invite them to select a representative to participate 
in the process. This method ensures not only that members are truly representative of their 
stated interests, but also that quieter interests like affordable housing are represented in the 
group.250  
 
3. Once a stakeholders group is created, the group and trust land agency together 
must develop a framework for the process, clarifying scope and establishing time 
objectives, decision-making guidelines and overall transparency. 
 
If there is disagreement about the description and scope of the end product, as was the case in 
the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the advisory group and agency must resolve 
that difference of opinion before moving forward. The process also needs a clear timeline 
and deadline. TLMD Administrator Tom Schultz said that “collaboration without a timeline 
is doomed to fail.”251 According to Advisory Committee member Paul McKenzie, the 
Whitefish process lacked a timeline; it only had a deadline. Together, a timeline and deadline 
provide the process with structure, as well as an end goal.252 Unit Manager Greg Poncin 
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emphasized, though, that the stakeholders not be in a hurry, since this type of process is time-
consuming.253  
 
To establish the proper foundation for the process, the agency and advisory group need to 
develop decision-making guidelines, as well. Deciding up front whether the group will vote 
on issues or require unanimous consensus can help prepare the group for important decisions 
like those that were made when the shadow group enacted Roberts Rules of Order in July 
2004.254 Likewise, establishing ground rules for participant conduct during and outside of the 
meetings can help prevent the formation of a shadow group in the first place. Finally, to 
avoid unproductive debates about minute details, Whitefish Chamber of Commerce President 
Sheila Bowen recommended drafting a glossary at the outset of the process to ensure a 
common understanding of important words and issues.255 
 
4. The collaborative process needs a neutral facilitator to guide the process. 
 
Many Advisory Committee members acknowledged that Janet Cornish had the requisite 
knowledge about land use planning and trust land management to guide the process, but her 
perceived bias rendered her ineffective as a facilitator. Marty Zeller, by contrast, was much 
better received by the Committee because he was considered by most to be impartial. The 
Whitefish planning process would have benefited from having an effective (i.e. impartial) 
facilitator from the beginning. Neutral facilitation would have provided the structure and 
leadership necessary to gain a common understanding about key issues, clarify what interests 
were being represented and keep bad habits at bay.256 Committee member Paul McKenzie, 
however, disagreed with this conclusion, noting that “if the facilitator’s role is just to guide 
the process, then it doesn’t make a difference who the facilitator is working for. The 
facilitator shouldn’t be guiding the content.”257 
 
5. The trust land agency and process participants must recognize that the political 
context will affect the power dynamic. 
 
Politics played a key role in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process. As a body of 
elected officials, the State Land Board inevitably has to cater to its constituents. In the 
Whitefish case, many pointed to this reality as a reason why the Ad Hoc Committee gained 
access to State Auditor John Morrison and, in turn, the State Land Board to petition for 
decision-making power in the planning process. 258 In addition to legitimizing the 
community’s role in the planning process, this political access and perceived political support 
motivated a faction of the Advisory Committee to enact Roberts Rules of Order. Being more 
aware of this political access, as well as the potential manipulation of that access, perhaps 
could have prevented such a takeover. Indeed, after that event, the State Land Board and the 
DNRC made a concerted effort to present a more united front to prevent future strategic 
moves.259 
 
While the bi-level trust land management structure and political nature of the State Land 
Board is not common to all states, politics will play a role in most, if not all, collaborative 
planning efforts on state trust lands. Trust land management raises constitutional and 
legislative issues which bring with them political considerations. Moreover, these planning 
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efforts often pose jurisdictional challenges as state and local governmental entities work to 
manage trust land parcels. Acknowledging the political context of these collaborative efforts 
and being aware of the effect politics can have on the process is thus important for all 
collaborative processes on state trust lands in order to prevent strategic manipulation of the 
politics to the detriment of the process.  
 
6. The trust land agency and process participants must resist the temptation to control 
the process. 
 
The Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, and in particular the shadow group, 
exemplifies the danger of giving in to the temptation to control the process. Many accused 
this group of preventing the Advisory Committee and DNRC from being fully functional. 
And, a shadow group member admited that the group high-jacked the process. DNRC Unit 
Manager Greg Poncin explained that this desire for control is common when a process deals 
with issues that invoke strong feelings like the future planning of Whitefish. To overcome 
this temptation, he advised that participants maintain faith in the process and not focus on 
how they get to the final outcome.260 Moreover, establishing a proper foundation and hiring a 
neutral facilitator probably can reduce this desire for control. 
 
7. The trust land agency and process participants must anticipate end-runs and take 
proactive measures to prevent them. 
 
While it is important that the trust land agency and process participants resist controlling the 
process, they must also anticipate end-runs around the process and take proactive measures to 
prevent them. In the Whitefish case, the shadow group epitomized a process end-run. For all 
of the reasons discussed above, allowing this faction to form and persist hindered the 
collaborative effort by compromising the breadth of stakeholders involved in decision 
making, the transparency of the process and the level of influence over decision making. The 
group’s side conversations were not harmless banter, but instead strategic discussions that 
should have been held in the open with the entire Advisory Committee.  
 
Establishing a common understanding at the outset about the destructiveness of end-runs can 
help prevent the formation of such a faction. To accomplish this common understanding, the 
group can develop ground rules during the structuring part of the planning process which 
prohibit ex parte conversations and meetings and encourage transparent discussions. Hiring 
an impartial facilitator to lead the meetings and manage group dynamics also can thwart end-
run efforts. Furthermore, taking the time to build trust between the trust land agency and 
participants, as well as amongst participants, can lessen the likelihood that a faction of the 
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his research project examined eight cases of collaborative planning on state trust lands in 
the American West. For each case, researchers conducted in-depth interviews with 
participants and developed case studies describing the events that occurred and analyzing the 
benefits, costs, challenges, facilitating factors and lessons that can be extrapolated from each 
collaborative planning experience.  
 
Looking across these eight cases reveals several critical issues that influenced the dynamics 
of each collaborative process and ultimately affected its outcome. The common themes 
affecting the processes include: 
 
• Elements for motivating and maintaining participation 
• How groups dealt with legal constraints 
• The influence of agency structure and politics 
• The effects of the collaborative process design 
• How issues of leadership and interpersonal dynamics affected processes 
• How groups obtained and incorporated scientific information in the process 
 
Understanding the unique nature of state trust lands and the challenges and opportunities that 
arise when diverse parties work together, it is not surprising to see similar themes among the 
cases. However, each case is unique in how these issues played out and how the collaborative 
group managed them. 
 
The following chapters explore how each of these themes affected the collaborative 
processes and their final outcomes. The purpose of the cross case analysis is to draw out the 
common lessons from the cases to inform future efforts to pursue collaborative strategies on 
state trust lands. From these lessons we can identify best management practices for 
collaborative planning and a set of broader policy recommendations to further enable 
effective collaborative efforts on state trust lands in the future. The discussion of these best 
management practices and policy recommendations follows the cross case analysis in 








WHAT MAKES A PLANNING PROCESS 
COLLABORATIVE? 
 
o measure the degree to which the eight cases were collaborative, the research team 
identified three central characteristics of collaboration: breadth of stakeholders, 
transparency of the process and shared influence on decision making. The collaborative 
processes examined in this report each contain elements of these characteristics. This chapter 
explores the three characteristics of collaboration, comparing and analyzing the presence and 
importance of each in the cases.  
 
 
DEFINING COLLABORATION  
 
Scholars of collaboration define collaboration in a variety of ways, but all share the common 
theme of people working together to achieve a goal. Gray describes collaboration as “The 
pooling of appreciations and/or tangible resources … by two or more stakeholders … to 
solve a set of problems which neither can solve individually.”1 Other scholars emphasize the 
element of shared authority by describing collaboration as “a joint decision-making approach 
to problem resolution where power is shared and stakeholders take collective responsibility 
for their actions and subsequent outcomes from those outcomes.”2  
 
Drawing on these and other definitions in the literature, the research team developed the 
following definition of collaboration to inform our research on collaborative planning 
processes on state trust land:  
 
Collaboration is a process whereby individuals or organizations, often with 
widely varied interests, work together to share knowledge and resources to 
achieve mutually beneficial goals. 
 
From this definition, the research team identified major characteristics of collaboration as:  
 
• Breadth of stakeholders  
• Transparency of the process 
• Shared influence in decision making 
 
Breadth of stakeholders refers to the meaningful involvement of a diverse set of stakeholders 
such that all key interests are represented. Effective collaborative processes also require 
transparent communication among participants in the process, through meetings, agreements 
and decisions. Collaboration also calls for at least some degree of influence on decision 
making for all participants. Influence differs from authority. Agencies alone must exercise 
their statutory obligation to make management choices, but other parties can be given power 
to influence these choices through involvement in a meaningful problem solving process that 




This chapter explores these three characteristics of collaboration, as found in each of the 
eight cases, and the effect that each had on different aspects of the process.  
BREADTH OF STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Finding an effective balance of interests is important for the success of collaborative 
processes. Having too few interests represented may make implementation of the final 
decision more challenging because of an inadequate amount of support built within the 
group. However, sometimes having too many interests represented can overwhelm the 
process and make it less effective. In the Castle Valley Planning Process, Castle Valley 
Mayor Bruce Keeler noted the importance of this balance: “You’ve got to know that your 
collaborative group is representative of the overall community, because you could go through 
all the collaborative efforts you want, but if the group representing the community is not 
accepted, then it’s all for nothing.”3 
 
Representation, or “breadth of stakeholders,” varied across the cases (Table 12-1). The 
breadth of stakeholders involved in each of the eight cases was evaluated according to the 
following scale: 
  
• Low: Too many or too few interests were represented. Several interested parties 
either chose not to participate in the collaborative planning process or were actively 
excluded. The progress of the process was significantly affected. 
• Medium: One or two parties were under- or over-represented. One or two interested 
parties did not or could not participate in the collaborative planning process. The 
progress of the process was minimally affected. 
• High: There was a balance of interests represented in the process. No important 
parties were precluded from participating in the collaborative planning process. The 
process did not suffer from problems relating to representation. 
 
Table 12-1: Breadth of Stakeholders 
CASE Breadth of Stakeholders 
Castle Valley Planning Process Medium –  
Elliott State Forest Planning Process Medium 
Emerald Mountain Planning Process Medium – 
Houghton Area Master Plan Process High 
Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process Medium 
Mesa del Sol Planning Process Medium + 
Southeast New Mexico Working Group Medium + 
Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process Medium 
 
 
The Houghton Area Master Planning Process is a clear example of a process with a broad 
and inclusive breadth of stakeholders. All of the participants interviewed thought the City of 
Tucson’s Department of Urban Planning and Design did a good job identifying the range of 
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interests to be included in the process and that the Citizens Review Committee had balanced 
representation from among these interests.  
 
In contrast, the limited breadth of stakeholders represented in the Emerald Mountain 
Partnership created some challenges for the planning process. At the outset of the Emerald 
Mountain planning process, a diverse set of representatives from grazing, recreation, wildlife 
and open space interests worked together to try to come up with ways to enable the State 
Land Board to achieve revenue from Emerald Mountain without development. However, 
when the solution of a large-scale land exchange became the focus of the Emerald Mountain 
Partnership’s (the Partnership) planning efforts in 2002, the group neglected to reach out 
beyond the Steamboat Springs community to bring county-based stakeholders into the 
Partnership’s membership. Yet the project’s scope had shifted from a city conservation effort 
to a county-wide land exchange. The Partnership had attempted to create this balance in their 
original bylaws by establishing two appointed membership positions for both the Routt 
County Commissioners and the Steamboat Springs City Council. However, the County 
appointees in 2002 happened to be residents of Steamboat Springs. This narrow geographic 
representation made some county residents resent the Steamboat Springs-based group selling 
off Bureau of Land Management land to create a “playground” in their backyard. Had the 
county had clearer representation on the Partnership, it is unclear whether they would have 





One factor that influences representation is the way that participants are selected and 
recruited to be involved. In the eight cases, participants were chosen in a variety of ways: 
using a pre-determined set of criteria to make up the group, recruiting participants based on 
potential interest, providing an open invitation to join the group and allowing membership to 
evolve throughout the process (Table 12-2). 
 
Among the eight cases, the ways that participants were selected varied greatly between 
processes. The Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process was the only case where the 
make-up of the group was pre-defined, as the process was legislatively created. Five cases 
had a structured recruitment process to fill seats at the table, though the final make-up was 
not completely pre-defined. This left room for permitting interested parties to join the 
process, but also gave the state trust land agency the power to permit or deny some interested 
parties. Leaders of the Elliott State Forest Planning Process were explicit in selecting only 
parties with an economic interest in the forest’s management. The Department of State Lands 
and Oregon Department of Forestry recruited several state forest and wildlife experts, a 
county government official, and later, a local beneficiary representative. Though they could 
not participate directly in Steering Committee meetings, the public, environmental and 
timber lobbying groups could give input on the process during public meetings and submit 
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Two of the cases included an open invitation to participation in the collaborative effort, and 
there was no pre-defined group structure. For example, in the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, 
the State Land Office worked closely with the beneficiary on the development of the plan, 
but welcomed the participation and input of other interested groups. In the Whitefish 
Neighborhood Planning Process, newspaper and email advertisements were used to solicit 
participants from the community for the Advisory Committee. Mayor Andy Feury and 
Flathead County Commissioner Gary Hall, the two community leaders tasked with 
determining Committee membership, received approximately 45 responses to these 
advertisements. The Whitefish Advisory Committee Charter, which was jointly developed by 
several community members and the Montana Department of Natural Resources and 
Conservation, outlined the Advisory Committee’s purpose and listed an initial set of interest 
groups who should be represented. Using this Charter as a guide, Mayor Feury and 
Commissioner Hall selected approximately 12 members and two alternates to sit on the 
Advisory Committee.  
 
This final group did not include representatives of the trust land beneficiaries, motorized 
vehicle users, or Whitefish lakeshore residents. It remains to be seen if the absence of the 
latter two groups resulted in a flawed plan, however conflict already has arisen over 
Table 12-2: When and How Participants Were Chosen to be Involved 
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motorized vehicle use on the planned recreational trail around Whitefish Lake.4 In contrast, 
the exclusion of a beneficiary representative from the planning process fueled existing 
tension and mistrust between the DNRC and the Advisory Committee during the planning 
process. Once the Whitefish Neighborhood Plan was complete, beneficiary groups lobbied 
the State Land Board to reject it and these groups may pose future challenges for the Plan 
through lobbying efforts or litigation.  
 
Three of the eight cases began with one set of representatives and concluded with a different 
set. The Emerald Mountain Planning Process invited a mix of community interests to 
participate in an informal Core Group at the outset, which then evolved over several years. 
This eventually resulted in the formation of the Emerald Mountain Partnership (the 
Partnership), a 501(c) (3) organization that included a Board of Directors with appointees 
from both the city of Steamboat Springs and Routt County, and a set of additional 
community members elected by those representatives. The Partnership also had an Advisory 
Council composed of non-voting parties with “a land ownership interest who would benefit 
from Emerald Mountain,” or possessed knowledge or expertise helpful to the process.5 The 
segregation of those with vested interests in the Emerald Mountain parcel into the Advisory 
Council disillusioned one stakeholder who had been involved with the planning process from 
the beginning. Rancher Jim Stanko describes how the shift left him disenfranchised: “When 
it comes down to actually making the decision, or coming up with something, I don’t have a 
say in it.”6 Perhaps the decision to distinguish between the two classes of stakeholders was 
necessary to maintain credibility, as was legally advised; however, it is unclear whether that 
benefit outweighed the cost of losing the participation and endorsement of such a critical 
stakeholder. Also, as mentioned above, Routt County representation in the Partnership 
eroded over time, leaving an organization comprised only of Steamboat Springs residents. 
This narrowing of stakeholder representation fueled the controversy and opposition that 
erupted when the Partnership proposed a land exchange, which benefited the City at the cost 




Trust beneficiaries receive revenue from state trust land activities and therefore have an 
interest in trust land management decisions. Whether beneficiaries are formally organized 
and how they are involved in state trust land agency decisions varies from state to state. For 
example, in many states, beneficiaries organize via the Children’s Land Alliance Supporting 
Schools (CLASS), a group that actively engages state trust land agencies regarding land 
management. In states like Arizona, however, beneficiaries are not formally organized. Trust 











Table 12-3: Beneficiary Involvement 
CASE 
Group participant Consulted/ 
informed of group’s 
progress, but not at the 
table 
Not involved 
Castle Valley Planning 
Process    
Elliott State Forest 
Planning Process    
Emerald Mountain 
Planning Process    
Houghton Area Master 
Plan Process    
Lake Whatcom Landscape 
Planning Process    
Mesa del Sol Planning 
Process    
Southeast New Mexico 
Working Group    
Whitefish Neighborhood 
Planning Process    
 
 
In three cases, representatives from beneficiary groups were directly involved in the 
collaborative group. The Steering Committee in the Elliott State Forest Planning Process did 
not originally include a beneficiary representative. However, three years into the planning 
process the Oregon Department of State Lands decided to bring a beneficiary representative 
into the Steering Committee to share their perspective. This move to include beneficiaries in 
the Elliott State Forest decision-making process was part of a state-wide movement in which 
the beneficiaries are becoming increasingly active in Common School Land management. 
While beneficiaries were not involved directly in the Castle Valley Planning Process, the 
Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA) Director and staff met 
regularly with Margaret Bird, the Beneficiary Representative for the Utah State Office of 
Education and one of the directors of the Children’s Land Alliance Supporting Schools 
(CLASS).7 This close contact helped ensure that SITLA honored the beneficiaries’ interests 
throughout the planning process.    
 
There are different perceptions of how beneficiary involvement in collaborative planning 
efforts affected the outcome. For example, Chuck Bennett, Director of Government Relations 
for the Confederation of Oregon School Administrators, a state-wide beneficiary lobbying 
group, mentioned the importance of “literally showing up at the meeting where the 
discussion is occurring … We have gotten more money because we have gotten more 
involved.”8 In the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, the beneficiary, the University of New 
Mexico, became involved when they sued the state over an auction they believed to have sold 
state trust land for below market values. The University’s lawsuit spurred close collaboration 





In four cases, the beneficiary was not involved, which also affected the outcome of the 
process in a variety of ways. In the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, for example, 
the Advisory Committee explicitly voted to exclude the beneficiary from the process. Some 
parties felt that the beneficiary’s interests already were represented on the Committee 
because the group included the former superintendent of Flathead County schools, as well as 
the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC). However, some people 
argued otherwise. In the end, beneficiary representatives spoke out against the Neighborhood 
Plan and requested that the State Land Board not approve it, believing the Plan may not 
generate the necessary revenue to satisfy the DNRC’s fiduciary responsibility. Though the 
State Land Board approved the Plan, it appears that active beneficiary involvement may have 
helped avoid the suspicions and discontent that arose when the beneficiary was excluded.  
 
Sometimes the beneficiary may not be directly involved in the planning process but can still 
influence the outcome. For example, in the Castle Valley Planning Process, the beneficiary 
did not actively participate, but nevertheless influenced the trust land agency’s position and 
actions through conversations outside the formal process. Additionally, in some states like 
Arizona, there are instances where there is no organized beneficiary group to get involved in 
the process. However, in the case of the Houghton Area Master Plan Process, this did not 




Transparency fosters trust and positive relationships among group members, and in some 
cases figured prominently in the success of a collaborative process. Increasing access to 
information for outside parties, the public and between group members promotes 
transparency. Transparency can also be built into the structure of a process.  For example, the 
Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process incorporated a ground rule that permitted 
dissenting voices to draft a report detailing their opposition to a proposed decision. This 
strategy encouraged consensus on all decisions and made it explicitly known why a party or 
parties disagreed with the majority. 
 
The eight cases of collaborative planning explored in this report varied as to how transparent 
they were (Table 12-4). The level of transparency in each of the cases was evaluated using 
the following definitions: 
 
• Low: Little information was shared among group participants. It was difficult or even 
impossible for the public to obtain information on the process. It was not unusual for 
actions to be taken without the entire group’s knowledge. 
 
• Medium: Most information was shared among group participants. Some effort was 
made to ensure public access to group information. Some actions may have been 
taken without the entire group’s knowledge. 
 
• High: All or nearly all information was shared among group participants. Public 
access to group information was not a problem or was even encouraged. The group 
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rarely, if ever, encountered problems with actions being taken without the entire 
group’s knowledge.  
 
Table 12-4: Level of Transparency 
CASE Level of Transparency 
Castle Valley Planning Process Medium – 
Elliott State Forest Planning Process Inside = High; Outside = Medium 
Emerald Mountain Planning Process High 
Houghton Area Master Plan Process Medium 
Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process High 
Mesa del Sol Planning Process Medium + 
Southeast New Mexico Working Group Medium + 
Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process Medium 
 
 
The variation in the degree of transparency in the processes is evidenced by the contrast 
between the Castle Valley Planning Process and the Emerald Mountain Planning Process. 
For the Castle Valley Planning Process, the level of transparency varied over the course of 
the project. While members of the Castle Rock Collaboration (CRC) tended to share 
information freely, the decision-making processes of participating organization such as the 
town of Castle Valley’s Planning and Zoning Commission were not always clear to other 
members of the group. Also, the CRC minimally shared information and progress with the 
Castle Valley community, which contributed to the disintegration of the planning process as 
it continued. In contrast, the Emerald Mountain Planning Process was highly transparent. To 
inform and include the public, the Emerald Mountain Partnership (the Partnership) advertised 
meetings in the paper, posted agendas, minutes, documents and plans on their website and 
allowed the public to attend and participate in all meetings. The Partnership also held public 
meetings in Steamboat Springs and several other towns in the county, joined by the State 
Land Board (SLB) and eventually the Bureau of Land Management, to gather input and share 
ideas, educate people about the land exchange and solicit public comment. The process was 
also highly transparent among the different and organizations and individuals involved. 
Between the Partnership and the SLB, former Director Charles Bedford described the process 
as “a constant stream of communication.”9 
 
Availability of Information  
 
Making information available to the public can alleviate feelings of mistrust. When outside 
groups and the general public enjoyed a high level of access to the collaborative process, less 
public scrutiny and controversy were evident. Groups accomplished public involvement 
through a variety of methods (Table 12-5). For example, opening meetings to the public can 
enable the public to understand how and why decisions were made. The Lake Whatcom 
Landscape Planning Process allowed the public and media to attend committee meetings, 




Table 12-5: Methods for Involving Parties Outside the Process 
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Five of the eight cases distributed information via newsletters, the Internet, or other public 
information outlets. Because the Castle Valley Planning Process group struggled with 
making its activities known to the general public, one resident published information in a 
local newspaper column, the Moab Times-Independent, entitled “The Castle Valley 
Comments.” This method of sharing information helped residents not involved in the process 
to better understand what was happening. 
 
Without a formal working group, the Mesa del Sol Planning Process relied heavily on a 
series of informal collaborative strategies. These strategies included an “open-door” policy 
instituted by Commissioner Ray Powell, permitting the public to come to the New Mexico 
State Land Office (SLO) and ask questions at any time. The SLO also attended many 
neighborhood meetings to promote and explain Mesa del Sol. These strategies were 
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successful in overcoming a widespread negative attitude in Albuquerque surrounding the 
Mesa del Sol project. 
 
By touring areas under study, facilitators helped the public build a connection to the land. In 
five cases, the public was invited to tour the affected state trust lands. In the Elliott State 
Forest Planning Process, the Oregon Department of Forestry led several tours of rare species 
habitat for members of the Steering Committee and public. This trip allowed the Steering 
Committee and others to make a visual connection between the planning process and the 
land. Likewise, members of the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process took periodic 
walks of the planning sites, which appeared to increase group awareness of the issues 
affecting the land. 
 
Insufficient transparency can sometimes cause problems, which can require restructuring a 
process. For example, the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process originally did not 
include an Advisory Committee. Instead, the Department of Natural Resources and 
Conservation (DNRC) initiated a series of public meetings and smaller focus groups to 
obtain public input. Consequently, while the DNRC solicited the public’s feedback on the 
neighborhood plan, decision making took place essentially behind closed doors. This 
approach upset Whitefish community members who petitioned the Montana State Board of 
Land Commissioners to create a more transparent process. The result of their efforts was a 
chartered Advisory Committee that gave the community and other stakeholders a formal seat 
at the table and thereby ensured that they would be involved in decision making.  
 
Sharing Information Within the Group 
 
Making information available to each member of the process by sharing scientific data, 
distributing meetings notes and being forthright with agreements and alliances can foster 
trust within a collaborative group. Though all eight cases made efforts to openly share 
information within the group, processes suffered when this rule was not followed. This 
disregard resulted in strained relationships and spurred the formation of coalitions within the 
larger group, resulting in varying degrees of mistrust. In the Whitefish Neighborhood 
Planning Process, for example, several Advisory Committee members formed an outside 
“shadow group” that met and made important decisions outside of the Advisory Committee. 
This faction created mistrust throughout the process and impaired progress. 
 
On the flip side, effective internal group transparency can foster better relationships and 
enable progress. The Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process Committee instituted a 
“No Surprises” rule prohibiting the release of information to the media before it was shared 
among all group members. The Committee also shared meeting minutes and other 
informational material among its members. These practices were aimed at ensuring that 
Committee members learned of information and decisions together at the table rather than 
indirectly through the press. This high level of communication within the Committee helped 
build trust among its members. As one participant noted, “There was more mutual 





SHARED INFLUENCE ON DECISION MAKING 
 
Collaborative processes take a different approach to decision making than traditional, top-
down approaches in that they assume a certain amount of joint decision making.11 This 
decision-making power describes a party’s ability to influence the final decision on an issue. 
It is important to clarify that the term “decision-making power” is different from “decision-
making authority,” or the ability to make the final decision. State trust land agencies cannot, 
nor should they abdicate their decision-making authority to outside parties. However, other 
parties can have a chance to influence decision making to create mutually satisfactory 
outcomes. 
 
The eight cases of collaborative planning explored in this report had varying degrees of 
influence on decision making (Table 12-6). This influence could affect decisions within the 
group as well as outside policy and implementation of management strategies. The degree of 
influence on decision making in each of the cases was evaluated using the following 
definitions: 
 
• Low: Decision-making influence was concentrated among one or few parties. The 
working group as a whole felt it had little or no influence on decision making. 
 
• Medium: Decision-making influence was shared to an extent, but was still somewhat 
concentrated. Some in the working group felt they did not have adequate influence on 
decision making. 
 
• High: Decision-making influence was shared to the maximum amount possible. The 
working group felt it had adequate influence on decision making.  
 
Table 12-6: Influence on Decision Making 
CASE Shared Influence on Decision-Making 
Castle Valley Planning Process Medium + 
Elliott State Forest Planning Process Low (Decision-making influence was diffused) 
Emerald Mountain Planning Process Medium 
Houghton Area Master Plan Process Medium 
Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process Medium 
Mesa del Sol Planning Process High 
Southeast New Mexico Working Group Medium +  
Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process High 
 
 
The Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process’s Advisory Committee had a large amount of 
influence on decision making. Members of the Committee shared decision-making power 
with the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation in crafting the 
Whitefish Area Neighborhood Plan, since both were participants at the table. This plan, 
which defines future uses for area trust lands and provides a framework for reviewing and 
evaluating future land use proposals, has been approved by the Montana State Board of Land 
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Commissioners, city of Whitefish and Flathead County. In contrast, the Elliott State Forest 
Planning Process afforded the Steering Committee and Core Planning Team members with a 
low level of decision-making influence. Due to the fact that multiple agencies were at the 
table and working within the confines of the federal Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) 
process, the Planning Process had to occur within a highly bureaucratic environment. Both 
plans had to be approved by separate Boards and the HCP had to also be signed off on by the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service. As the plan moved 
through these multiple rounds of consideration, the Committee had to work within an 
increasingly restricted space and ultimately had a diffused degree of influence on the 
decision-making process.   
 
Influence on Group Decision Making 
 
Seven of the eight cases were rated to have a medium or better level of shared influence on 
decision making within the collaborative group. This degree of influence was most often 
accomplished by establishing a set of rules or guidelines to ensure that most or all parties had 
an adequate say in decision making. State trust land agencies did not give up their ultimate 
decision-making authority, but rather allowed management strategies to be shaped by 
participant input. 
 
One method to promote shared decision making within a collaborative group was a 
consensus rule. For example, for its final conservation plan, the Southeast New Mexico 
Working Group conducted decision making with a simple “thumbs up or down” approach. 
One “thumbs down” could block the process, a rule that gave all parties a significant amount 
of influence on the final decision. 
 
Shared influence on decision making was also possible without a formal working group. In 
the Mesa del Sol Planning Process the New Mexico State Land Office met with the 
community to listen to concerned parties and made honest attempts to incorporate their 
suggestions where feasible. As a result of this informal collaborative strategy, several 
community-suggested design elements were incorporated into the final development plan, 
including a large open space buffer adjacent Sandia National Laboratories, water wells 
located away from the Isleta Pueblo and new urbanism design. By and large, this approach 
was successful in creating an atmosphere where most parties felt they had adequate 
opportunity to influence the development plan. 
 
Influence on Agency Decision Making and Implementation 
 
Collaborative processes can also impact agency management policy decisions. While 
agencies must retain decision-making authority, other parties can be given power to influence 
policy choices to all parties’ satisfaction. How the parties are able to influence the process is 
also dependent on how agencies participate. In seven of the eight cases the collaborative 
groups played an advisory role for the state trust land agencies. The Southeast New Mexico 
Working Group was the exception because the State Land Office (SLO) was a participant in 
a process convened to solicit options for a Bureau of Land Management Resource 
Management Plan Amendment Process. However, the SLO was not bound by the decisions 
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made in the Working Group but rather worked to create broader land management strategies 
and better coordination among agencies at the table. The Working Group approved its final 
conservation plan and is hopeful for its successful implementation. 
 
Unclear or misinterpreted levels of influence on decision making can be problematic in 
collaborative processes. In such cases, interactions became tense and participants felt 
confused and frustrated about their roles in the process. This dynamic required additional 
time spent addressing these issues and sometimes negatively affected relationships among 
participants. For example, in the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process there was 
disagreement between the Lake Whatcom Interjurisdictional Committee and the Department 
of Natural Resources (DNR) over how the Committee’s decision-making authority should be 
interpreted from the legislation requiring the collaborative effort. The issue centered over 
whether the DNR was a member of the Committee and thus shared decision-making 
authority among all participants, or whether the Committee was advisory to the DNR. After 
prolonged disagreement on the interpretation, the group asked for an official interpretation of 
the Committee’s decision-making authority from the Washington Attorney General’s Office. 
In officially clarifying the Committee’s decision-making authority, the Attorney General’s 
Office decided that the Committee was advisory to the DNR.12 Until this decision was made 
a year and a half into the process, the group’s progress had been considerably slowed.  
 
The Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP) Process highlights a slightly different aspect of the 
importance of having decision-making authority clearly defined in a collaborative process. It 
was clear that the Citizens Review Committee (CRC) for the HAMP and the City of Tucson 
were working in an advisory capacity to the Arizona State Land Department. However, some 
members of the CRC felt unclear as to how their suggestions on the HAMP were influencing 
the city’s final decisions on the plan. 13 This lack of clear communication, and some 
participants’ perceptions that their input was not influencing the final product, led to attrition 
within the Committee.  
 
 
IMPACT OF THE DEGREE OF COLLABORATION ON THE PROCESS 
 
While several of the cases in this report exhibit a high level of breadth of stakeholders, 
transparency or influence on decision making, none of them ranked consistently “high” in all 
of these areas. Similarly, no case was rated as “low” for all elements. As the three elements 
of collaboration define a multi-faceted collaborative “space,” each case in this report 
occupied a different region of this space. Thus, directly ranking or comparing processes as a 
whole is not possible. For instance, while the Emerald Mountain Partnership did not have a 
particularly broad stakeholder membership in relation to the scope of the issues it addressed, 
the Emerald Mountain Partnership had a medium degree of influence on decision making and 
the planning process was highly transparent. Many other collaborative efforts, such as the 
Elliott State Forest Planning Process, had broader stakeholder representation but less 
influence on decision making. The Elliott State Forest Planning Process further differed from 
other processes in its distinction between the high degree of transparency among group 
members and the low degree of transparency for those outside the group. Therefore, each 
case illuminates different elements of collaboration through the diverse and dynamic nature 
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of these processes. Overall, as is evidenced in later chapters, the three characteristics of 








WHAT MOTIVATES AND SUSTAINS A COLLABORATIVE 
PLANNING PROCESS? 
 
ollaboration is one of many decision-making models used to address natural resource 
management issues. There are a number of reasons the parties involved in the eight cases 
of collaborative planning on state trust land discussed in this report chose collaboration over 
other decision-making models. These cases also provide a range of reasons why the 
collaborative model was sustained throughout the decision-making process. The following 
topics inform what motivates and sustains a collaborative process:  
 
• Factors that motivate a collaborative decision-making model  
• Reasons parties join a collaborative effort 
• Barriers to collaboration 
• Factors that sustain collaboration 
• Reasons collaborative efforts conclude 
 
 
FACTORS THAT MOTIVATE A COLLABORATIVE DECISION-MAKING 
MODEL 
 
Scholars of collaborative processes have identified many reasons why parties choose a 
collaborative model as a method of decision-making. In some cases, collaboration is chosen 
because parties have become frustrated with the process and outcome of traditional decision-
making models, or have exhausted other options for making progress on resolving an issue.1 
In other cases, individuals and groups turn to collaboration because of the inclusive forum 
these processes create in which a range of interested parties can come together to work 
through issues together.2 In addition, parties often choose collaboration because of a shared 
sense of threat or a sense of place expressed as concern for the future of an area.3 Common 
goals, previous relationships between individuals involved in an issue and public pressure 
can also motivate the creation of a collaborative process.4 The nature of the collaborative 
model also offers the potential for parties to share resources and expertise.5 
 
The parties involved in the eight cases explored in this report chose a collaborative model of 
decision making for a range of reasons. These included a sense of a shared threat, a sense of 
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SENSE OF A COMMON THREAT 
 
The sense of a common threat can be a powerful motivating factor in collaborative processes. 
A common response to a perceived threat is to join together with others to address it.  
In six of the eight cases a collaborative planning process was convened in response to a sense 
of a threat. These threats included the potential of increased development in an area valued 
by local residents for scenic beauty, recreational opportunities or more traditional land uses 
like ranching; the perception that certain land management practices had the potential to 
negatively affect public safety; and the potential for restricted use and revenue production 
activities on state trust land because of the implications of potential endangered species 
issues.  
 
Following a sale of trust land by Utah’s School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration 
(SITLA) at the base of Parriott Mesa, a prominent natural feature in the desert surrounding 
Castle Valley, Utah, residents felt threatened by the possibility that more trust land in the 
area might be sold. Residents were concerned about the possibility of increased development 
in the area as a result of this and potential future sales. In response to this perceived threat, a 
series of events unfolded into the creation of the collaborative Castle Valley Planning 
Process. The community of Castle Valley reacted in two ways: a citizen group called the 
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Castle Rock Collaboration (CRC) formed to address concerns surrounding the land sale and 
the town of Castle Valley expressed interest in rezoning trust land within the boundaries of 
Castle Valley to much lower density which would discourage development of the land if it 
were sold in the future.6 SITLA expressed concern about the potential rezoning and 
recommended that the community and town engage with SITLA in a collaborative planning 
process instead of pursuing the rezoning effort. CRC members had similarly considered a 
collaborative planning process. Thus, the town, members of CRC and SITLA agreed to 
engage in the collaborative Castle Valley Planning Process that worked to explore options for 
further development and conservation in Castle Valley. According to John Andrews, 
Associate Director of Administration for SITLA, “It made more sense to talk than fight.”7  
 
Road widening actions taken by the Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in 
preparation for a timber sale near Lake Whatcom in Bellingham, Washington drew the 
attention of local community members living around the lake. Because of a destructive 
landslide in 1983 that many in the community perceived to have been exacerbated by 
decades-old logging practices in the area, community members felt that the DNR’s intended 
logging would threaten both their safety and the water quality of Lake Whatcom. In response 
to this threat, two residents, with the support of hundreds of others in the community, decided 
to try to work with state legislators to change the forest policy laws in their area. Their efforts 
ultimately resulted in a bill mandating that the DNR create a collaborative committee for the 
development of a landscape management plan for the area.8 
 
The Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) responded to 
increased development inquiries in Whitefish by initiating a neighborhood planning process. 
The purpose of the process was threefold: to develop a way to assess potential trust land uses 
in the area; to address the zoning, infrastructure and public services disparities between trust 
land and adjoining private property; and to educate local government and members of the 
public about state trust lands. Some community members felt that the potential development 
would threaten the traditional timber uses of the land and limit or destroy recreational access 
to this trust land area. Motivated by these perceived threats, community members persuaded 
the Montana State Board of Land Commissioners to charter a Whitefish School Trust Lands 
Advisory Committee to work collaboratively with the DNRC on a neighborhood plan for the 
area.  
 
In response to rising real estate prices in Steamboat Springs, Colorado, the Colorado State 
Land Board (SLB) began to consider the possibility of selling a large parcel of state trust land 
in the area - which happened to comprise a large portion of scenic Emerald Mountain- for 
development purposes. The area traditionally had been used for grazing and appreciated for 
its open space and some residents of Steamboat Springs, concerned about increased 
development already occurring in the area, felt that the potential development of Emerald 
Mountain further threatened the community’s agricultural heritage and scenic views. Many 
also valued the area as open space and for the recreational opportunities it could provide, 
however recreation was prohibited on all Colorado state trust lands. In response to these 
concerns, the community and the SLB began a collaborative process to develop options for 




Both the Elliott State Forest Planning Process and the Southeast New Mexico Working 
Group cases are examples of a collaborative process convened to alleviate the threats of a 
wildlife species being listed as federally threatened or endangered species. There would be 
significant negative financial repercussions for the state trust land management agencies 
were this listing to occur. In the case of the Elliott State Forest Planning Process the two 
agencies that manage the forest, the Oregon Departments of State Lands and Forestry, 
decided to convene a collaborative planning process to draft a multi-species Habitat 
Conservation Plan (HCP) for the area. Instead of revising the existing HCP, the agencies 
decided that developing a plan that included species that might become listed as endangered 
or threatened would provide them with more long term management certainty. In New 
Mexico, the State Land Office, the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish, the Bureau 
of Land Management, conservationists and many in the oil and gas and ranching 
communities recognized that there was a threat of “tremendous economic fallout” should the 
prairie chicken and sand dune lizard be listed under the Endangered Species Act,9 coupled 
with an opportunity for conservation. In response to this threat and in pursuit of this 
opportunity, these interests convened to address prairie chicken and sand dune lizard 
conservation in southeast New Mexico. 
 
SENSE OF PLACE 
 
A sense of place can be a very important element in why collaborative efforts begin. The 
term is often used to refer to the connection that humans have with their natural 
surroundings. Places which “display three primary characteristics: a landscape setting, a set 
of associated activities, and a significance to people.”10 In three of the eight cases community 
members’ sense of place played a major role in the initiation of the collaborative planning 
process. In each of these cases local residents appreciated the state trust land in their 
community for its beauty, the activities it supported and the meaning its present and future 
condition held for them.  
 
The residents of Steamboat Springs, Colorado involved in the Emerald Mountain Planning 
Process were concerned about preserving Routt County’s agricultural heritage and open 
space. The valued the state trust land on Emerald Mountain for its scenic beauty, rangeland, 
wildlife habitat and the potential recreational opportunities it could provide. Many felt that 
the possible sale and development of this land would threaten these elements of the area they 
cherished. Residents’ mutual concern for the fate of the Emerald Mountain parcel inspired 
them to begin meeting together to brainstorm potential solutions that could meet the needs of 
grazing lessees, recreators and adjacent landowners – user groups who had at times been in 
conflict with one another. This mutual concern and a sense of place was one of the factors 
that initiated the collaborative Emerald Mountain Planning Process. 
 
The sense of place felt by members of Whitefish, Montana for the state trust land in their area 
was very similar to that of the residents of Steamboat Springs, Colorado. The beauty, 
recreational opportunities and traditional timber uses of the land were significant for 
residents in the Whitefish area. Their interest in conserving the land and in preserving this 
connection with the landscape was one of the major reasons why the community lobbied the 
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State Land Board for the creation of an Advisory Committee and hence a more inclusive 
process.  
 
The small town of Castle Valley, Utah is surrounded by vast amounts of strikingly beautiful 
open space. Many of the town’s residents describe themselves as “urban runaways” or 
“renegades” and have a sense of place that comes from the solitude and natural beauty 
offered by such a landscape.11 The potential for increased development in the area, 
highlighted by the sale of trust land at the edge of town, motivated many residents to come 
together to seek a collaborative solution to deal with issues that would negatively affect their 




The presence of a shared goal or goals also can be a strong motivating factor in the initiation 
of collaborative processes. Just as people band together in the face of a threat, it is equally 
natural for people working toward a common goal to seek each other out. In four of the eight 
cases the recognition and pursuit of a common goal was also a major factor in the creation of 
the collaborative planning effort.  
 
As part of a comprehensive growth strategy, the City of Tucson’s Department of Urban 
Planning and Design decided to develop the Houghton Area Master Plan in order to guide the 
development of a large, mostly undeveloped area on the southeast edge of town. The city 
recognized that its goal of developing the area was shared by that of the majority landowner 
in the area, the Arizona State Land Department, and that many local residents also had an 
interest in helping define how the land could be developed. The city’s creation of the 
Citizen’s Review Committee provided a collaborative forum within which all interested 
parties could explore this common goal together.  
 
The common goal pursued in the Mesa del Sol Planning Process was to develop a plan for a 
large tract of state trust land on the outskirts of Albuquerque, New Mexico that minimized 
sprawl and maximized revenue for the State Land Office (SLO). Although there was no 
formal collaborative process followed by the three New Mexico SLO Commissioners who 
were most involved in the development of the plan, they did pursue an ongoing effort to 
solicit and encourage input from interested parties.  
 
The overarching reason for the initiation of both the Southeast New Mexico Working Group 
and the Elliott State Forest Planning Process was to create a plan to help provide long-term 
management and revenue generation certainty from the uses of the land. In both cases 
potential restrictions related to federally threatened or endangered species were creating a 
sense of land management uncertainty for various parties. In both cases the collaborative 
processes were initiated because of a shared goal to eliminate potential management 
restrictions by developing plans that either attempted to prevent the need for listing of a 
species, as with the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, or to mitigate the effects of such 







Collaborative processes also are often initiated as the result of public pressure to do so. In 
four of the eight cases the public’s interest in being involved in a decision-making process 
concerning state trust land led to the initiation of a collaborative planning process.  
 
In the case of the Houghton Area Master Plan Process, the City of Tucson’s Department of 
Urban Planning and Design convened a collaborative planning process in part as a response 
to two sources of public pressure. One was a more general sense of pressure to use a 
collaborative model because of the way the city perceived the community expected to be 
engaged.12 The other source of pressure was residents of the southeastern part of town. 
Council Member Shirley Scott who represents Ward Four, of which the Houghton Road area 
is a part, had previously convened a citizen-based collaborative group to address planning 
concerns in the area. The existence of this group and the citizen interest it represented also 
affected the city’s decision to initiate a collaborative planning process. 
 
The Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process was a direct result of public and political 
pressure on the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to convene a collaborative group to 
address planning issues on state trust land in the Lake Whatcom watershed. Two citizens in 
particular worked with state legislators to have their concerns, and those of hundreds of other 
area residents, heard and addressed. The result of their efforts was a bill requiring the DNR to 
initiate a collaborative process to develop a management plan for the area.  
 
In an effort to become more involved in a neighborhood plan for 13,000 acres of state trust 
lands in the Whitefish, Montana area, residents of Whitefish lobbied the State Land Board to 
convene a stakeholders group to work collaboratively with the Department of Natural 
Resources and Conservation (DNRC). In response, the State Land Board chartered the 
Whitefish School Trust Lands Advisory Committee as a venue for interested stakeholders to 
participate in the decision-making process with the DNRC. 
 
 
REASONS PARTIES JOIN A COLLABORATIVE EFFORT  
 
Participants in collaborative processes have an interest in the outcome of the process and are 
motivated to join by different reasons.  An analysis of the eight cases reveals a number of 
reasons why participants in those collaborative planning processes got involved (Table 13-2). 
These reasons include having a financial stake in the outcome and a personal interest or 












Table 13-2: Reasons Parties Chose to Join the Collaborative Process 
 
CASE Financial Stake Professional Interest 
Personal Interest 
 
Castle Valley Planning 
Process    
Elliott State Forest  
Planning Process    
Emerald Mountain  
Planning Process    
Houghton Area  
Master Plan Process    
Lake Whatcom Landscape 
Planning Process    
Mesa del Sol Planning 
Process    
Southeast New Mexico 
Working Group    
Whitefish Neighborhood 





Although the subject of all eight of the cases examined in this report was state trust land, the 
state trust land agencies were not the only parties at the table with a financial stake in the 
outcome of the process. In four of the eight cases, interested parties joined the collaborative 
process because of an interest in helping shape a decision that would affect them financially.  
 
Many of the ranchers and oil and gas industry professionals involved in the Southeast New 
Mexico Working group joined the effort to develop a conservation plan for the prairie 
chicken and sand dune lizard out of concern for how their livelihoods could be negatively 
affected if the two species were listed as endangered. Were the species to be listed, oil and 
gas drilling and grazing activities would be greatly restricted and revenues from these 
activities would fall. Similarly, in Steamboat Spring, Colorado, longtime state trust land 
grazing lessee Jim Stanko also had a financial stake in the outcome of the collaborative 
Emerald Mountain Planning Process. Had the area been developed, he would have lost 
access to a significant amount of land his family had ranched for three generations. 
Additionally, a trust beneficiary representative joined both the Elliott State Forest Planning 
Process and the Mesa del Sol Planning Process because of the direct financial effect 





The inclusive nature of the collaborative decision-making model encourages parties with an 
interest in the benefits of the process and the outcome to get involved. In all of the eight 
cases there were participants who joined the collaborative process because of a professional 
 
 406
interest in the benefits of the process or the outcome. Many of them represented a 
constituency of people involved in conservation, resource regulation, resource extraction, 
recreation, planning or development.  
 
Joining the collaborative effort provided a way to give their professional interests a voice in 
the decision-making process and to have their concerns addressed. For example, Bill 
McCourt, a representative from the city of Bellingham and a water quality specialist, got 
involved in the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process out of an interest in aligning 
Department of Natural Resources forest practices with water quality initiatives for Lake 
Whatcom he’d worked on in the past.13 
 
Many participants also joined a collaborative process because being involved would give 
them the opportunity to further inform their professional work. For example, Linda Morales, 
an urban planning consultant in Tucson, Arizona had a professional interest in being involved 
in the Houghton Area Master Plan Process because knowing what kinds of planning were 





In five of the eight cases participants joined the collaborative processes because of a personal 
interest in either the area that would be affected by the decision, or how the decision would 
affect them personally. All of the cases that were initiated because of a perceived threat to 
community members’ sense of place – the Castle Valley Planning Process, the Emerald 
Mountain Planning Process and the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process – included 
participants with a personal interest in how the outcome would affect the undeveloped nature 
of the state trust land in the future. In addition, urban planning consultant Linda Morales 
noted that in addition to her professional interest in being involved in the Houghton Area 
Master Plan Process, she also had a personal interest in being involved in how Tucson 
developed because of the attachment she felt to the city as her home.15 In the Lake Whatcom 
Landscape Planning Process the reason Linda Marrom, one of the citizen representatives on 
the committee, got involved was because of the perception that state trust land management 
activities in the area had the potential to endanger her safety and those of her neighbors.16  
 
 
BARRIERS TO COLLABORATION 
 
Barriers to collaboration can be either reasons parties could not join a collaborative effort, or 
reasons they discontinued their participation in a collaborative effort. As Yaffee notes, 
barriers to collaboration can fall within four main categories including attitudes about the 
process, particular process elements, technical factors and the institutional context in which 
the collaborative effort occurs.17 Some participants in all eight cases examined in this report 
experienced different kinds of barriers to participating or continuing to participate in the 
collaborative planning efforts (Table 13-3). The reasons fall under this basic framework and 
include interpersonal differences like personality conflicts or feelings of alienation from the 
group, the perception of an ineffective process, limited financial resources or time, 
 
 407
conflicting goals, restrictions of the process structure such as a limited group size and 




Interpersonal barriers to continued collaboration were mentioned in only one of the eight 
cases in this report. Steamboat Springs, Colorado rancher Jim Stanko decided to leave the 
Emerald Mountain Planning Process after losing his lease on state trust land in the area as 
part of a land exchange with the Bureau of Land Management. Once his connection with the 
land being discussed by the group was severed, he felt alienated from the group.  
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In two of the eight cases there was some attrition from the collaborative group because of 
frustrations with the process itself. One of the participants representing environmental 
interests on the Southeast New Mexico Working Group eventually left the group out of 
frustration over the length of time the process was taking and his perception of “endless 
talk”.18 A number of Citizens Review Committee participants left the Houghton Area Master 
Plan Process out of frustration over the length of time the process was taking and the 




Some participants in the Mesa del Sol Planning Process and the Southeast New Mexico 
Working Group had to leave the collaborative process because of a lack of adequate 
resources. For example, in the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, the length of the process made 
it difficult for the Sierra Club and other environmental groups to maintain a steady level of 
participation because of the limited staff resources the group could devote to involvement. 
Also, some parties interested in the Southeast New Mexico Working Group were unable to 
participate because meetings were held during the workweek for usually two days in a row, 
which was not a convenient time for those who were not professionally involved in the group 




Participants in three of the eight cases decided to leave the collaborative process after 
realizing that they had either a conflict of interest or difference of vision with the rest of the 
group. The representatives from the town of Castle Valley withdrew from the Castle Valley 
Planning Process in their formal capacity because of a perception that they had legal conflict 
of interest in being there. This conflict stemmed from the fact that while the town was in the 
process of updating its land use ordinances, it did not want to be involved in collaboratively 
developing a plan with School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, a landowner and 
potential developer.21 Steamboat Springs resident Bob Enever left the Emerald Mountain 
Planning Process because of his realization that the group was not ready to discuss the kinds 
of development options he was skilled in and interested in exploring for the area and he felt 
that his continued participation would not be useful.22 Janet Cornish, the original facilitator in 
the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, left the group after realizing that over the 
course of a year the project had changed significantly from the one she had originally agreed 
to facilitate. Not comfortable with the role of increased decision-making power that the 
Advisory Committee had assumed, Cornish resigned from the process. 23 
 
PROCESS STRUCTURE RESTRICTIONS 
 
Four of the eight cases exhibited barriers to collaboration related to process structure 
restrictions. For example, there were more people interested in participating in the Whitefish 
Neighborhood Planning Process than allowed for under the Advisory Committee Charter. As 
a result, not all people originally interested in participating were able to do so.24 
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Representatives from the forestry industry were not represented in the Lake Whatcom 
Landscape Planning because of a decision by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) 
not include them.25 It was assumed that the DNR would be able to adequately represent their 
interests during the process, but in hindsight the DNR felt the forestry industry should have 
had a more formal presence at the table.26 Those involved in convening the Elliott State 
Forest Planning Process decided to limit the representation on the Steering Committee to 
participants who had a financial interest in the way the Forest was managed. However, this 
made some interested parties who did not have a financial stake in the outcome feel left out 
of the process.27 Some participants in the Emerald Mountain Planning Process felt that the 
group’s policy allowing the City and County to elect representatives, who then selected other 
members, inadvertently led to an under-representation of county interests and a barrier to 




In seven of the eight cases participants in the collaborative efforts had to leave the process 
because of a change in their professional capacity that no longer allowed for their continued 
participation. Some participants in the Elliott State Forest Planning Process, the Emerald 
Mountain Planning Process, the Houghton Area Master Plan Process, the Lake Whatcom 
Landscape Planning Process, the Southeast New Mexico Working Group and the Whitefish 
Neighborhood Planning Process left the process either because they took a new job or job 




FACTORS THAT SUSTAIN COLLABORATION 
 
Many of the reasons parties either initiate or join a collaborative process are the same reasons 
they continue to participate until a conclusion is reached. There are, however, a few 
additional factors that can arise during a collaborative process that motivate people to 
continue participating (Table 13-4). These factors include the presence of a leader or a 
committed personality who inspired others to continue, the amount of time and effort already 
invested in the process, the lack of attractive alternatives if the collaboration failed and 
















Table 13-4: Factors that Sustained Collaboration 
 
CASE Leadership Investment in process 




Castle Valley Planning 
Process     
Elliott State Forest  
Planning Process     
Emerald Mountain  
Planning Process     
Houghton Area  




    
Mesa del Sol  
Planning Process     
Southeast New Mexico 









Leaders can be officially recognized or they may emerge informally from among 
collaborative process group members, as further discussed in Chapter 18. For example, the 
Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process had several different kinds of leaders that helped 
maintain the collaborative process. The combination of the committed Department of Natural 
Resources and Conservation officials and staff involved in the project, an effective facilitator 
and Advisory Committee Chairman kept the process moving toward consensus on a plan that 
was well-received by most involved. Commissioner Ray Powell’s vision of how the Mesa del 
Sol area in Albuquerque, New Mexico could be developed in a comprehensive way and his 
commitment to obtaining community buy-in for the development kept the project alive over 
the many years in which it unfolded.29 Bellingham, Washington resident Linda Marrom’s 
commitment to and emotional investment in the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process 
was recognized by some participants as inspiring others to stay at the table to reach 
consensus.30 Many participants in the Emerald Mountain Planning Process noted that 
Emerald Mountain Partnership Chairman, Ben Beall’s commitment and dedication to the 
process and persistence of participation helped the group achieve its goals.31 In the Castle 
Valley Planning Process participants recognized that the leadership, dedication and stamina 
of the representatives from the School and Institutional Trust Land Agency and Utah Open 






INVESTMENT IN PROCESS 
 
All eight of the cases were sustained to some degree by participants’ commitment to seeing 
the process through to some level of completion after investing personal and professional 
time and often significant amounts of work into the process. Shawn Knox, a participant in the 
Southeast New Mexico Working Group, noted that a common question among group 
members was “Do we want two years to go down the drain?” 33  
 
LACK OF ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVES 
 
Participants in all eight of the cases mentioned that another reason they persisted through the 
process was because of the unattractiveness of the potential alternate outcomes that could 
result without a collaborative process. For example, in the four cases that involved potential 
development on state trust land, there was concern that without the process either unchecked 
or unplanned development would occur. The threat of having the prairie chicken and sand 
dune lizard listed as threatened species, and the subsequent restrictions imposed by the 
Endangered Species Act, motivated many members of the Southeast New Mexico Working 
Group to continue participating in the collaborative process to develop a conservation plan 
for the species.34 Similarly, participants in the Elliott State Forest Planning Process 
recognized that should new species in the area become listed as endangered there would be 
even more significant restrictions on their logging activities without a comprehensive Habitat 
Conservation Plan in place. The Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR) 
recognized that if it did not continue to participate in the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning 
Process it faced both the possibility of additional legislation requiring it to continue and 
lawsuits challenging its actions in the watershed. For Linda Marrom, one of the citizen 
participants in the process, the unattractive alternative to collaboration was having DNR 
activities in the area that she felt threatened her continued safety. Also, Castle Valley 
residents recognized that the alternative to participating in the Castle Valley Planning Process 
may have been to have increased development in their community. In light of this 
unfavorable alternative, many residents persisted in the process. Similarly, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA) perceived that community outrage in 
response to agency actions was not preferable. Therefore, SITLA’s engagement with the 




In all eight cases the state trust land agency had a certain amount of financial incentive to 
continue participating in the collaborative planning processes. For example, in the Castle 
Valley Planning Process, the Emerald Mountain Planning Process, the Lake Whatcom 
Landscape Planning Process and the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the state 
trust land agency involved had to temporarily either suspend or keep static some kind of 
revenue generating management activity or exploration of development options while the 
concerns about those activities or a change in activity were addressed through the 
collaborative process. The state trust land agencies had an incentive to continue participating 
in the collaborative efforts in order to either continue or modify their management activities 
without continued resistance from the communities. The financial incentives for continued 
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state trust land agency personnel in the Southeast New Mexico Working Group involved the 
potential for financial loss were wildlife species in the area listed under the Endangered 
Species Act. For state trust land agency personnel involved in the Elliott State Forest 
Planning Process, both the potential for financial loss were additional species in the area 
listed in the area without a mitigation plan in place and the opportunity to increase harvest 
levels through the plan provided incentive to sustain the collaborative process. In the 
Houghton Area Master Plan Process and the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, the financial 
incentive for state trust land agency personnel to stay involved in the collaborative process 
included the potential for an increase in revenue for the trust if the areas were planned for 
development in a comprehensive way.  
 
 
REASONS COLLABORATIVE PROCESSES CONCLUDE 
 
There are two main reasons that the processes in the eight cases concluded (Table 13-5). The 
first reason was that the goals of the process were achieved and the second was the 
imposition of an external deadline on the process. 
 
 
Table 13-5: Factors that Bring Collaborative Processes to a Close 
CASE Goals of Process Achieved 
Externally Imposed 
Deadline 
Castle Valley Planning Process   
Elliott State Forest Planning Process *   
Emerald Mountain Planning Process *   
Houghton Area Master Plan Process   
Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process   
Mesa del Sol Planning Process   
Southeast New Mexico Working Group   
Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process   





In six of the eight cases, the collaborative process was concluded because the group achieved 
the goal they were working toward together. For the Houghton Area Master Plan Process, the 
Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process and the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning 
Process this meant the completion of a land use plan for the area in question.  
 
The creation of an option for an exchange of state trust land with Bureau of Land 
Management land will potentially satisfy the goals of the Emerald Mountain Planning 
Process and the Castle Valley Planning Process pending the success of the transactions. For 
the Mesa del Sol Planning Process the goal of the process was achieved when a private 
company signed a lease to develop the area consistent with guidelines developed through the 






With the involvement of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the processes 
surrounding the protection of threatened species, the Southeast New Mexico Working Group 
concluded because of an external BLM deadline that forced the parties to come up with a 
final agreement. While many feel the goals of the process were also met in the end, others 
felt that the external deadline sped up the decision-making process such that the final plan 
will not be durable.35 Regardless, Rand French of the BLM was confident that meetings 








WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF 
COLLABORATIVE PLANNING? 
 
his chapter identifies the main benefits and costs of collaboration observed in the eight 
cases. A survey of the literature on collaborative planning identifies five major 
categories of benefits: (1) better communication, (2) improved group dynamics and 
relationships, (3) greater resource sharing, (4) increased adaptability and (5) more effective 
outcomes.1 On the other hand, scholars of collaborative planning acknowledge that there are 
costs associated with engaging in collaboration. The main costs identified in the literature 
include extra time, staffing costs, financial costs for volunteer participants and environmental 
costs.2 
 
The benefits and costs examined in this chapter are described in the unique context of state 
trust land management and from the viewpoint of the participants involved. Looking at the 
benefits and costs in this light allows one to identify those outcomes that are most relevant 
and common to state trust land issues. In addition, given that this report aims to inform and 
assist state trust land agencies, several of the outcomes are framed by the interests of state 
trust land managers.  
 
The benefits and costs discussed in this chapter often were seen in several of the cases. Some 
of the benefits and costs were witnessed in only one or two of the cases, yet they provided 
good examples of outcomes in the context of those cases. For example, better coordination 
between federal and state agencies is an outcome that can only be observed in cases 
involving those agencies. Regardless of frequency, for each benefit and cost noted, evidence 
of how collaborative planning contributed to that outcome is presented. 
 
Of the several benefits identified across the eight cases, two distinct categories emerged: 
primary and secondary. Primary benefits are those that were directly related to the project’s 
goals and relate to outcomes of the process. These included: 
 
• An increase in the value of the trust, as a result of actual or expected increases in 
revenues or in the value of the land parcel, or reductions in management costs 
• An improvement in the natural environment in terms of habitat protection and 
environmental quality 
• An improvement in the urban environment in terms of provisions for infrastructure, 
density, mixed-use development and open space 
• A higher quality solution in terms of durability, creativity, and incorporation of 
science and the knowledge of a wide range of experts 
 
Secondary benefits are those that were not set as goals but are seen nonetheless as process 
benefits by the researchers and the participants. Often secondary benefits support primary 
benefits but are still important in their own right. For example, in several cases collaborative 




desired outcomes, but they are also expected to be beneficial in future collaborations. The 
secondary benefits identified across the cases included: 
• New and improved relationships 
• Greater understanding and public awareness of state trust lands 
• An increase in institutional capacity of state land offices and other government 
entities 
• Positive public relations during and as a result of the process 
• Successful models of land management for other areas of land in the west 
• Better state and federal agency coordination 
 
The costs encountered in the cases fell into the following categories:  
 
• A reduction in the value of the trust asset  
• A loss of environmental protection 
• Direct costs, arising from conducting the process 
• Opportunity costs, defined as the activities of value that groups or individuals gave up 
by participating in the process 
• Personal and emotional costs 
• Bad public relations 
 
An overview of each of the categories of benefits and costs and the cases in which they were 



















Increased Value of the Trust * * * 7 88%
by reducing business risk for future developers * n.a. n.a. * n.a. n.a. 3 75%
by facilitating closing the deal * 3 38%
by establishing adjacent open space n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 40%
by meeting laws and extraction goals more effectively n.a. * n.a. n.a. n.a. 3 75%
by including beneficiary groups in the process * 2 25%
Improved the Natural Environment * 6 75%
by protecting wildlife habitat * 5 63%
by improving environmental quality 3 38%
Improved the Urban Environment * n.a. * n.a. n.a. 4 80%
by planning for infrastructure and municipal services n.a. n.a. n.a. 4 80%
by increasing development density n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 40%
by requiring mixed use n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 40%
by establishing open space n.a. n.a. n.a. 4 80%
Produced Higher Quality Solutions * 8 100%
by producing an innovative solution 7 88%
by producing a more informed solution 5 63%
by producing a longer lasting solution * * 5 63%
Other Primary Benefits
Improved Public Safety 1 13%
Protected Cultural Heritage/Resources 2 25%
Provided Access to Recreation 3 38%
SECONDARY BENEFITS
Created New and Improved Relationships 8 100%
Educated Public About  State Trust Lands 8 100%
Increased Institutional Capacity 4 50%
Resulted in Positive Public Relations 5 63%
Provided Successful Model of Land Management 4 50%
Improved State and Federal Agency Coordination n.a. n.a. 3 50%
COSTS
Reduced the Value of the Trust 1 13%
Reduced Environmental Protection * 1 13%
Brought About Direct Planning Costs 8 100%
Brought About Opportunity Costs of Time Spent 8 100%
Brought About Emotional/Personal Costs 6 75%
Brought About Bad Publicity 3 38%
= outcome noted by interviewee
*= outcome noted by interviewee but with contingency (i.e., Emerald Mountain and Castle Valley contingent on land exchange, 
         Elliot and HAMP contingent on approval of plan developed by collaborative group)












This section discusses the common primary benefits observed across the eight cases. While 
all of the benefits in this section may likely result in an increase in the value of the trust, 
those that were identified by participants directly of having this effect are discussed first. The 
outcomes that led to an improvement in the natural or urban environment are discussed next 
and the ways in which collaborative planning led to higher quality solutions conclude this 
section.  
 
INCREASED THE VALUE OF THE TRUST 
 
In six of the eight cases, the state trust land agency reported that the process increased the 
value of the trust for beneficiaries by creating higher revenues from the land parcel at hand, 
increasing the market value of the land parcel or reducing management costs of the property. 
Most often, collaborative planning contributed to the increase in value by reducing conflict 
over pending sales and by creating broad community support for future urban development 
or natural resource extraction activities on the land. Reduced conflict and broader stakeholder 
support are benefits of collaboration that are consistently found in the literature on 
collaborative planning.3 
  
Reduced Business Risk for Future Developers  
 
In three of the four cases that involved future residential or commercial development, the 
Castle Valley Planning Process, the Houghton Area Master Plan Process and the Mesa del 
Sol Planning Process, state trust land officials claimed that the value of the trust land under 
their management increased because the collaborative planning process helped create land 
use plans that reduced uncertainty over future restrictions on development. Uncertainties for 
future owners arise over questions about future zoning restrictions, about the provisioning of 
infrastructure such as water and sewer and about the likelihood of community opposition to 
the development. Strong community opposition may scare away buyers because of the 
potential for legal actions against the buyer or seller or for a damaged reputation of the buyer, 
who often intends to do more business in the community. 
 
While traditional urban planning can address zoning and infrastructure issues, collaborative 
planning is effective at building community support for development activities and often 
reduces conflicts that may be hindering productive urban planning. In the Castle Valley 
Planning Process, for example, Ric McBrier, the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration (SITLA) manager responsible for urban development activities in Utah, 
observed that future developers will benefit from community support and a completed 
development plan. Although the development plan in the Castle Valley Planning Process was 
never finalized, McBrier commented, “The plan will probably still create value for the trust 
in the exchange with the federal government because there has been planning done for the 
property.”4 SITLA’s initial parcel sale in Castle Valley resulted in community opposition. 
SITLA later worked with the Castle Rock Collaboration, a community group, which led to 
the development of a planning contract for the area and a potential land exchange with the 
Bureau of Land Management. Similarly, the Arizona State Land Department (ASLD) 
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participated with numerous stakeholders in the Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP) Process 
for a large parcel of undeveloped land near Tucson, Arizona. The process reduced 
uncertainty over how state trust land may be developed by establishing a consensus based 
land use plan that the ASLD can choose to follow when it begins disposing of property in the 
area. Finally, in New Mexico, where the State Land Office (SLO) is forbidden by law to 
make leasehold improvements, the Mesa del Sol collaborative project fostered a public-
private partnership between the SLO and a private developer. The partnership has made 
investments in planning that resulted in a master plan and development vision for 12,900 
acres of land near Albuquerque, New Mexico, the state’s largest city. SLO managers believe 
that because of this investment in planning and the attractiveness of the new urbanism 
development chosen, the land will yield higher revenue from future land leases and sales. A 
former New Mexico Land Commissioner noted that with the collaborative partnership, “you 
can help the developer succeed, and the more the developer succeeds, the more the school 
kids succeed.”5 
 
Facilitated Closing the Deal by Reducing Conflict 
 
By quelling local opposition to land sales, collaborative planning can help state land agencies 
close deals that otherwise would be too politically controversial. In three of the eight cases, 
state trust land managers credited collaborative planning with the successful closing of 
controversial land deals. For example, in the Emerald Mountain Planning Process, the 
development company interested in the State Land Board (SLB) parcel near Steamboat 
Springs, Colorado retracted its $17 million offer upon learning of the community’s 
opposition to development on Emerald Mountain and of the Emerald Mountain Partnership’s 
bid on the parcel to come up with a way to preserve the land. However, the SLB now has 
community support for a land exchange with the BLM at the current market value. In the 
Castle Valley case, Utah’s School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA) 
ultimately received support from the community for the sale of two parcels of land by 
entering into a negotiated land sale with a conservation-oriented land trust, Utah Open Lands. 
SITLA's first land sale at the base of Parriott Mesa in Castle Valley had angered the 
community.  
 
Reducing conflict and building community support also helped facilitate the closing of 
natural resource based transactions. Near the city of Bellingham, Washington, the 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) reported that it received approval from a local 
review committee for the DNR’s first timber sale in the Lake Whatcom watershed since 
legislation halted timber activity in the area in 1999. The timber sale approval came after the 
Board of Natural Resources approved a Landscape Plan that had been four years in the 
making by DNR officials and an advisory group of state and local officials, tribes and public 
citizens. Upon completion of the plan, the editorial board of the Bellingham Herald wrote, 
“Citizens have to step up too and accept that logging around the lake is not only a reality, but 
also a preferred land use … everyone in this county should back the careful logging plans 
that were ironed out over four hard years for the Lake Whatcom Watershed.”6 This type of 
community support represented a major shift in attitude towards the DNR and its activities in 
the watershed compared to the public firestorm that was set off by logging activity in 
watershed six years earlier. 
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Increased Land Value by Establishing Adjacent Open Space 
 
In two cases, the state trust land office reported that the value of its real estate holdings in 
one area increased because open space adjacent to the parcel was established as a result of 
the collaborative planning effort. Many land buyers pay a premium for property bordering or 
nearby protected land because of scenic, recreational and habit values. Because collaborative 
planning processes often engage experts in land planning and locals that understand the value 
of open space in their communities, more opportunities are identified for setting aside 
conservation lands. In the Castle Valley Planning Process case, state trust land officials 
reported that its remaining trust land had increased in value because it is now borders 
conserved land. In the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, the planning team established a buffer 
of open space around Sandia Labs and Kirtland AFB. The establishment of this protected 
area allowed the planners to increase development densities on the rest of the land, 
permitting more structures and therefore more revenue for beneficiaries. 
 
Met Regulations and Extraction Goals More Effectively 
 
Often collaborative planning can help state trust land departments achieve compliance with 
environmental regulations and extraction goals more effectively by engaging experts in 
environmental policy. In the Elliott State Forest Planning Process, where timber harvesting 
benefits the Common School Fund, initial compliance with the Endangered Species Act 
resulted in a drastic reduction of timber revenues. However, by working in a collaborative 
process with multiple stakeholders including officials from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service and National Marine Fisheries Service, the Oregon Division of State Lands and the 
Oregon Department of Forestry were able to develop a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) that 
will more effectively comply with the law and generate higher revenues for the public school 
system. If the HCP is approved, it is expected to increase the value of the state forest land by 
as much as $100 million or 35% over the current value of the land. Similarly, the Landscape 
Plan for the Lake Whatcom watershed brought the Department of Natural Resources into 
compliance with legislation passed to protect water quality and public safety, while allowing 
the area to be harvested for timber revenue. While the annual harvest has been reduced 
significantly compared to pre-legislation levels, it represents an improvement over the 
moratorium on logging that had been in place since 1999. 
 
In some cases, a collaborative planning effort can mobilize the resources necessary to help 
state trust land owners achieve preemptive, voluntary compliance with environmental laws, 
allowing agencies to better meet their resource extraction goals. In New Mexico, the State 
Land Office developed a management plan with the help of federal and state agencies and 
representatives from industry and environmental groups, which is expected to prevent the 
listing of the lesser prairie chicken and sand dune lizard under the Endangered Species Act. 
One official estimated that the bird’s listing alone would have cost the trust hundreds of 
millions of dollars if it had prohibited all oil and gas production in the area. Similarly, state 
land mangers of the Elliott State Forest hope that their proposed Habitat Conservation Plan 
(HCP) will help shield them from the listing of any new endangered species by protecting 




Increased Revenue because Beneficiary Groups have Greater Say in the Process 
 
Because collaborative processes seek to include all who have a stake in the process, 
beneficiary representatives are frequently invited to join a collaborative process. By 
participating and making their voices heard on behalf of the public school systems, 
beneficiaries can more effectively align the outcome with their goals. A lobbyist for the 
Confederation of Oregon School Administrators (COSA) who was involved in selecting the 
beneficiary representative to participate in the Elliott State Forest Planning Process stated 
that by having beneficiaries “show up at the meeting where the discussion is occurring… 
[beneficiaries] have gotten more money because [they] have gotten more involved.”7 Rick 
Howell, Superintendent of the South Coast Educational Service District, a member of COSA, 
was chosen to be the “man on the ground” representative for the beneficiaries.8 The process 
also included a local county commissioner who advocated strongly for increased revenue 
because his county was a beneficiary of the trust. In the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, the 
University of New Mexico, the primary beneficiary to the land under consideration, worked 
with the SLO after an initial auction failed to produce acceptable offers for the land. The 
beneficiaries involvement helped guide the planning process that resulted in the public-
private partnership that is believed to have significantly increased the value of the land by 
making investments in land use planning for the area. 
 
IMPROVED THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
In five of the eight cases, participants reported positive environmental outcomes in terms of 
greater protection of wildlife habitat and higher environmental quality. A collaborative 
process helps achieve improved environmental protection because, in many cases, 
environmental advocates are asked to join the process, and because the process harnesses the 
expertise of scientists who are best equipped to identify opportunities for environmental 
improvement.9 In some cases, an environmental improvement is achieved because a 
compromise is forged. The compromise represents an improvement over the “do nothing” 
alternative that persists because the conflict is held up by litigation or political conflict.10 The 
different ways positive environmental outcomes were achieved are described below. 
 
Protected Wildlife Habitat 
 
In five of the cases, wildlife habitat was protected as a result of the collaborative process. In 
the Castle Valley Planning Process, critical wildlife habitat for the la sal mule deer was 
established when Utah’s School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration entered into a 
negotiated sale with a conservation buyer as a result of the planning process. Similarly, in the 
Emerald Mountain Planning Process, elk calving grounds on Emerald Mountain are likely to 
be protected if the land exchange between the BLM and the State Land Board is completed. 
In the Elliott State Forest Planning Process, the Department of Forestry and Division of State 
Lands partnered with local and federal officials to develop a Habitat Conservation Plan 
(HCP) that will help protect habitat for the threatened northern spotted owl and marbled 
murrelet. However, an environmental group involved in the process felt that the proposed 
HCP would actually provide less protection of wildlife habitat in the forest. Similarly, an 
alternative for a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Resource Management Plan (RMP) 
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Amendment for a large area of land in Southeast New Mexico was developed through the 
Southeast New Mexico Working Group that included representatives of the BLM, the New 
Mexico Department of Game and Fish, the State Land Office (SLO), USFWS, the ranching 
industry, the oil and gas industry, and conservation organizations. The RMP Amendment will 
help protect habitat for the lesser prairie chicken and sand dune lizard to prevent their listing 
under the Endangered Species Act. In the Houghton Area Master Plan Process, Mesa del Sol 
Planning Process and the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, three cases that dealt 
with urban development, wildlife habitat was protected through the potential establishment of 
open space. 
 
Improved Environmental Quality 
 
In some of the cases, the collaborative process ushered in improvements in the quality of air, 
land or water by reducing pollution. For example, the Lake Whatcom Landscape Plan 
included management strategies to improve water quality. Specifically, by establishing 
stream buffers and a road abandonment plan and by eliminating fertilizers, herbicides and 
harvesting on unstable slopes, the plan will result in fewer non-point source pollutants, 
improving the quality of drinking water for the city of Bellingham. The Landscape Plan was 
devised by Department of Natural Resource foresters who collaborated with other state 
agencies, local officials and representatives from the public. In the Castle Valley Planning 
Process, the development plan negotiated between the community and School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA) is expected to protect the Castle Valley 
aquifer, the town’s main source of drinking water, by reducing development density on the 
remaining state trust land in the area. While the town and SITLA never signed the agreement, 
future owners of the land are expected to abide by the recommendations in the water analysis 
done for the area. Improvements in environmental quality were also achieved in cases that 
established open space and in those that resulted in forms of new urbanism that reduce 
pollution. These types of improvements in the urban environment are discussed below. 
 
IMPROVED THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 
 
In all of the cases that included an urban planning element, participants reported that the 
collaborative process contributed to the development of a land use plan that would bring 
about an improvement in urban form. For the purposes of this analysis, improved urban form 
was achieved when the land use plan included better planning for infrastructure and 
municipal services, increased development density, mixed use objectives and areas of open 
space. 
 
Better Planning for Infrastructure and Municipal Services  
 
In four of the cases, participants reported better planning for infrastructure and municipal 
services. For example, in the Castle Valley Planning Process, the development contract 
negotiated by the Castle Rock Collaboration and the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration reduced the number of potential development units on the trust land from 
approximately 884 to 207 without decreasing the value of the land. This reduction in 
development units addressed concerns identified by a study that revealed that the town’s 
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aquifer would not be able to support the original number of planned home sites. Although the 
development plan was never officially signed, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management is 
expected to benefit from the development plan and the natural resources and water analysis. 
Better planning for infrastructure was also identified as a benefit in the Houghton Area 
Master Plan and Mesa del Sol processes. In the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, 
the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation was able to address the disparity 
between trust lands and adjoining private property regarding zoning, infrastructure and other 
public services by securing entitlements for trust lands that were comparable to those of 
neighboring land. 
 
Increased Development Density 
 
While reducing development density in certain areas was important in the Castle Valley 
process because of water constraints, the planners in the Mesa del Sol Planning Process 
included an increase in development density in their land use plans.11 Increased development 
density reduces urban sprawl and makes cities more livable by keeping commercial areas, 
work places and residential areas in closer proximity to one another. In contrast, in the 
Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the Neighborhood Plan preserves the Flathead 
County zoning density of one home per 20 acres, which may hinder more environmentally-
friendly development.12 
 
Required Mixed Use Development 
 
In both Houghton Area Master Plan Process and the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, land use 
plans emerged that had provisions for mixed use development. Mixed use is one of the tenets 
of new urbanism that holds that residential and commercial properties should be mixed 
together instead of in separate parts of town. Mixed use reduces car trips and puts work and 
shopping closer to home. In the Mesa del Sol case, a planner for the city of Albuquerque and 
former State Land Office employee, compared previous development to mixed use, saying: 
 
The West Side of Albuquerque has a lot of problems … typically it hasn’t 
developed the way it should have. All of the employment is on the east side; 
all of the housing is on the west side. Outside of the city is where the 
development is happening and it is not the most quality development. So Mesa 
del Sol is happening. I think it’s very good. It’s exactly what the city needs.13 
 
Established Open Space 
 
Four of the cases, the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the Mesa del Sol Planning 
Process, the Emerald Mountain Planning Process and the Houghton Area Master Process 
developed land use plans that provided for areas of open space. In some cases, such as the 
Whitefish Planning Process, open space was large continuous tracts of land. In others, such 
as the Houghton Area Master Plan Process, open space was areas set aside for city parks in 
an urban area. As discussed above, open space may increase the value of surrounding land. 
Residents near conserved lands enjoy scenic views, access to recreation if permitted and 
wildlife viewing. For example, in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the 
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Neighborhood Plan aims to preserve 96 percent of the 13,000-acre area for open space and 
recreation. The Plan also makes use of such tools as conservation easements and land 
exchanges to limit the local impact of trust land development. However, four percent of the 
land remains available for development and this is expected to enable the Department of 
Natural Resources and Conservation to meet its fiduciary responsibility. 
 
HIGHER QUALITY SOLUTIONS 
 
Overall, many of the participants in the eight cases felt that the agreement reached was more 
innovative, more informed or more durable than anything that could have been developed by 
a single party. Generally speaking, these characteristics speak to the superior quality of the 
solution achieved. Examples of creative, well informed and durable solutions are discussed 
below. 
 
Produced an Innovative Solution 
 
In seven of the eight cases, interviewees reported that collaborative planning brought about 
an innovative or creative solution. Collaborative planning fosters creativity by providing a 
“forum for dialogue” that encourages new ideas that meet the needs of multiple 
stakeholders.14 Such a venue existed in the Emerald Mountain Planning Process. The 
Emerald Mountain Partnership had been struggling to come up with solutions to conserve a 
parcel of state trust land near the town of Steamboat Springs in a way that provided adequate 
revenue for the State Land Board (SLB). At the same time, the SLB knew that a land sale to 
a traditional developer would be difficult considering the town’s desire to protect the land for 
agricultural uses, recreation and wildlife habitat. A local U.S. Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) official suggested that the SLB consider a land exchange with the BLM. The land 
exchange ultimately became the SLB’s and the community’s preferred outcome. It 
represented a unique solution because it involved hundreds of parcels of BLM land around 
Routt County and multiple stakeholders and met the SLB’s need to dispose of the parcel at 
market value. The land exchange also met the BLM’s desire to streamline the management of 
its land holdings in Routt County and the interests of the Partnership to preserve open space, 
agriculture and recreational access on the parcel. Without the collaborative process, an 
auction process would have virtually eliminated the possibility of a land exchange because of 
the extensive time required to put a land exchange together.  
 
Similarly, the Castle Valley Planning Process ultimately resulted in a proposal for a land 
exchange that provided a unique solution that could satisfy the interests of all stakeholders 
involved. The Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process was considered innovative by many 
participants for its creative agreement that allows the community to come up with ways to 
generate revenues from the trust land over a 20-year period. According to Department of 
Natural Resources and Conservation Unit Manager Bob Sandman, this timeline structure is 
one of the reasons why the Neighborhood Plan is “revolutionary.”15 
 
The Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process demonstrated creativity because it helped 
find a solution to an issue that had not been raised by the architects of the planning process. 
During one of the advisory Committee’s meetings, a representative of the Lummi Nation, a 
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local tribe, noted the need to protect resources in the watershed that were important to the 
tribe’s culture, history and spiritual activities. The group later devised strategies to help 
protect the cultural resources identified in the watershed. One of the members of the process 
concluded that this aspect of the process was unique, saying: 
 
For me the most significant element that came out was the tribal involvement 
as a government entity. There was a total new element introduced: the cultural 
resources. Spots for ceremonies and purity bathing were identified. They did 
not have to tell us exactly where they were. Instead the entire area would 
come out of the mix. The tribal participation was very unique. The status quo 
is that tribes review timber sales. This made a recognition of tribal resources 
more prominent than usual.16 
 
Produced a More Informed Solution 
 
In five of the eight cases studies participants believed that the product of their work was 
better informed because the process brought additional information and resources to the 
process. This additional information provided for better decision. In Collaboration: A Guide 
for Environmental Advocates, Dukes and Firehock found that collaboration brings together 
sufficient resources to accomplish what cannot be accomplished by any one single party or 
smaller coalition.17  
 
The Houghton Area Master Plan Process benefited from two outside studies that provided 
market acceptance and readiness research, and the process was better informed by having 
professional developers and planners on the Citizen’s Review Committee. In the Castle 
Valley Planning Process, several different types of financial resources were brought in to pay 
for the activities. The most noteworthy was perhaps the utilization of funds from the Utah 
Division of Wildlife Resources to help pay for the la sal mule deer critical range habitat. In 
the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, the State Land Office and other participants 
were able to work together effectively on land use planning as a result of sharing information 
regarding leased areas and locations of prairie chicken habitat. 
 
In the Lake Whatcom case, in a report to the legislature, the Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) stated that the process brought forth “the best available information to 
make forest management decisions.”18 Bill Wallace, the DNR’s Norwest Regional Manager, 
said, “there was a lot of information shared. We learned from each other … as we got input, 
ultimately, the recommendations from the Committee were as informed as they could be over 
this period of time.”19 
 
In the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the Advisory Committee brought financial 
resources, time and expertise to the decision-making process, which otherwise may not have 
been available to the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC). One of 
the main contributions of Committee members was the dedication of time to completing the 
Neighborhood Plan. Montana DNRC Unit Manager Greg Poncin recognized this time 
commitment: “It’s not that common that you find members of a community who are so 
passionate that they would dedicate hundreds, if not thousands, of hours of their time to 
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something as specific as this with no compensation. The state of Montana owes them a huge 
debt of gratitude.”20  
 
Produced a Longer Lasting Solution 
 
Because collaborative planning helps create buy-in from stakeholders, the processes can 
produce more durable solutions. Land use decisions that are made unilaterally in areas where 
many people feel they have a stake in the outcome are often challenged by interest groups 
after the fact. By giving stakeholders a chance to participate, collaborative planning creates 
ownership in the process.21 In addition, by helping achieve solutions that meet the interests of 
multiple-parties, collaborative planning helps creates buy-in to the outcome.22 Ownership in 
the process is also achieved because the experience tends to empower the community.  
 
In the eight cases, many of these benefits were evident. For example, the Whitefish 
Neighborhood Planning Process has mobilized stakeholders. Before the process, land 
conservation was a peripheral issue, but today at least two interests groups have emerged that 
are focused on implementation of the Neighborhood Plan. In the Elliott State Forest Planning 
Process, having more stakeholders represented in the Steering Committee and Core Planning 
Team benefited the process by increasing the level of buy-in from all parties involved. One 
participant observed, “there is more buy-in from stakeholders. This is particularly true, I 
believe, of Coos County and the local school superintendent … we have their support in a 
‘bottom line’ in our negotiations.”23 Participants in the Elliott State Forest Planning Process 
also believe that by including representatives from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the 
National Marine Fisheries Service in the planning process, the draft Habitat Conservation 
Plan stands a better chance of being approved. 
 
Other Primary Benefits 
 
In addition to habitat protection and improved environmental quality, other primary benefits 
included the designation of recreational areas, increased public safety and the protection of 
cultural and archeological resources. In the Castle Valley Planning Process, the School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA) worked with the community to protect 
land at the base of Castleton Tower, which provided recreational access to a popular 
climbing venue. Through the Castleton Tower Preservation Initiative, which was initiated as 
a result of the Planning Process, the land at the base of the Tower was purchased for 
conservation and recreational access. In the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, one 
of the main motivations for the process was threatened recreational access. After the 
completion of the Neighborhood Plan, one of the first implementation efforts has been to 
create a recreation trail that circles Whitefish Lake.  
 
In Steamboat Springs, Colorado, the Emerald Mountain Partnership developed a 
management plan for the Emerald Mountain state trust land parcel, which includes 
recreational areas and protection of the town’s ranching heritage. This plan is now one of 
four alternatives the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is considering in their 
Environmental Assessment for the parcel. As part of the proposed land exchange, the BLM 
will amend its Resource Management Plan for the area to include the Emerald Mountain 
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parcel and adopt a multiple-use management plan, which would include recreational access 
for mountain bikers, hikers and cross-country skiers, as well as wildlife management and 
some grazing. The new recreational access on Emerald Mountain may reduce the 
environmental impact on other undeveloped areas in the surrounding region. The 
community’s plan, if adopted, would also include recommendations regarding the 
preservation of ranching on the land to preserve Routt County’s ranching heritage, a feature 
that is unique among the many mountain resort towns in the Rockies. Cultural resource 
protection also resulted from the Landscape Plan for Lake Whatcom, where strategies to 
protect tribal petroglyphs, sacred bathing areas and burial sites were established. In addition, 
the Landscape Plan included management strategies that would improve public safety by 





Many of the cases resulted in secondary benefits. Secondary benefits are those that were not 
set as goals by process participants but were recognized nonetheless as process benefits by 
the participants and the researchers. The secondary benefits identified in the cases and 
discussed in this section include new and improved relationships, greater understanding and 
public awareness of state trust lands, an increase in institutional capacity of state land offices 
and other government entities, positive public relations during and as a result of the process, 
successful models of land management for other areas of land in the west and better state and 
federal agency coordination. 
 
NEW AND IMPROVED RELATIONSHIPS 
 
In all of the cases, participants reported that they established new relationships and/or 
improved existing relationships. This outcome is consistent with findings in the literature on 
collaborative planning. In Making Collaboration Work, Wondolleck and Yaffee argue that 
collaboration can enable parties to build new and improved relationships.24 Good personal 
relationships benefit a process by increasing trust, building respect, facilitating professional 
interaction and creating a more productive atmosphere, all of which help groups achieve their 
primary objectives. Relationships are established or improved because of the time spent 
together, which allows for people to talk through their differences. 
 
In the Castle Valley Planning Process, personal and professional relationships were noted 
between the community and the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration 
(SITLA). The trust land official involved commented, “The opportunity to get to know 
communities, to engage the communities and to make a difference in the communities is a 
large part of what has kept me working [at SITLA].”25 Relationships helped achieve creative 
solutions, according to the group’s facilitator who said that the process “has produced a lot of 
relationships that led to some creative deals that made things happen that wouldn’t have 
happened otherwise.”26 In the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, it was observed that 
relationships built greater trust and understanding. During an open meeting in southeast New 
Mexico, one rancher, who had previously voiced his mistrust of conservation interest at the 
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table, reprimanded a community member for disrespecting the group’s major conservation 
representative. 
 
By building relationships, collaborative processes help lay the ground work for working 
together in the future. In the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, Advisory Committee 
members predicted that their relationships with local Department of Natural Resources and 
Conservation staff will facilitate implementation of the Neighborhood Plan. Similarly, in the 
Houghton Area Master Plan Process, officials from the Arizona State Land Department 
(ASLD) and the City of Tucson noted that the experience of working together during the 
Houghton Area Master Plan Process will make future interactions much easier. In addition to 
land in the Houghton Road area, the ASLD also owns a significant amount of land to the 
south of Tucson. The working relationships established during the Houghton Area Master 
Plan Process will likely help if and when the ASLD decides to develop or sell any of that 
land. The ASLD also recently opened a Southern Arizona office in Tucson. Their presence in 
the area should also help facilitate the development of working relationships. 
 
GREATER UNDERSTANDING AND PUBLIC AWARENESS OF STATE TRUST LANDS 
 
In all of the cases, participants noted that the process contributed to greater understanding 
and public awareness of state trust lands. Many participants learned for the first time during 
these processes what trust lands are, how they came into existence and how and for whom 
they are managed. In the Castle Valley Planning Process, participants observed that the 
community learned about the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration’s (SITLA) 
mandate to generate revenue for the beneficiaries and generally about the nature of trust 
lands in Utah. SITLA’s Director, Kevin Carter, noted that those who “were involved in the 
collaboration certainly understand who we [SITLA] are better.”27 As a result, parties 
understood each other in a more meaningful way, which allowed for better collaboration 
because by understanding the needs and interests of each party, one is more willing to engage 
in productive discussions.  
 
According to the State Land Board official responsible for the Steamboat Springs region, the 
Emerald Mountain Planning Process increased the visibility of both the agency and the state 
trust lands themselves. The process specifically educated the public about the obligation of 
the state trust land offices to manage their land holdings to generate income for trust 
beneficiaries. According to State Land Board Northwest District Manager Beverly Rave, “I 
think that whole community has a much better understanding of what state trust lands are, 
and why we have to manage those lands in the manner in which we do. There were more 
public meetings about Emerald Mountain than any other property the State Land Board owns 
in Colorado.”28  
 
Likewise, in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, it was noted that the process 
enhanced understanding of trust land management. Although not everyone agreed with the 
interpretation of the state trust land mandate, everyone learned to recognize that state trust 
lands are different from national parks and other multi-use lands. According to State Land 
Board staffer Kathy Bramer, “everybody who has been engaged in [this process] now 
fundamentally understands that state trust lands are not parks. There is a mandate that they 
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operate within and we’re not trying to be mean and we’re not trying to be greedy. It is what 
the law requires.”29 
 
In some cases, local participants involved in the collaboration, in addition to the state trust 
land officials, took on the responsibility of educating the community about the legal 
obligations associated with state trust land management. This situation occurred in the 
Emerald Mountain Planning Process when the Partnership informed the community about 
how trust lands worked in Colorado. According to State Land Board Northwest District 
Manager Beverly Rave, the majority of public outreach was accomplished by the Emerald 
Mountain Partnership, “They wanted to make sure people were really informed about what it 
was they were trying to accomplish, and at the same time, make it clear to people what our 
mission was. What our expectations had to be for that property.”30 Also, the publicity itself of 
the conflict around Emerald Mountain meant that people statewide were learning about trust 
lands. In the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, members of the Advisory 
Committee explained the trust obligation to their neighbors at the final public hearing. 
 
INCREASED INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
 
In four of the eight cases, participants reported that going through the process helped build 
institutional capacity for the organizations they represented. Collaborative planning builds 
institutional capacity because for some participants it requires them to develop new skills. 
For example, participants in the Southeast New Mexico Working Group noted that they are 
now better trained in multi-stakeholder collaborative processes, which will enable them to 
more effectively participate in similar processes in the future.  
 
Other institutions build capacity because they engage in a planning process that is unfamiliar 
to them but the process becomes important to carrying out future duties. The Castle Valley 
Planning Process illustrates this secondary benefit because without the impetus of the 
collaborative planning process, the town of Castle Valley would not have been forced to go 
through a zoning process. During the process, the town increased the sophistication of their 
land use ordinances and their general procedures for addressing development. In the 
Houghton Area Master Plan Process, the City of Tucson became more able to tackle 
development challenges that involve large tracks of undeveloped land. In the Mesa del Sol 
Planning Process, the State Land Office (SLO) gained experience in establishing public-
private partnerships and a partner to turn to in the future, Forest City Covington, LLC, who 
entered into the deal with the SLO.  
 
RESULTED IN POSITIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS 
 
Some processes benefit participants and organizations involved because they result in 
positive public relations. For state trust land agencies, good public relations from a 
collaborative planning process may serve as a good example of community involvement and 
can create goodwill with the community. Utah’s School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration (SITLA) described the Castle Valley Planning Process as an example of 
superior community involvement in their 10th Anniversary Report and several of their annual 
reports. In the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, the process was a source of positive 
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public relations for the State Land Office (SLO) because it demonstrated that they can 
generate income for schools in a sustainable way. Shawn Knox, a biologist at the SLO, cited 
this as a major benefit of the working group, noting that the SLO would be “seen in a light 
that [the SLO] can develop their resources, support public schools, and do it in a sustainable 
way.”31 
 
While the Lake Whatcom Planning Process was turbulent at times, the local Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) official earned praise from several members of the Committee for 
his professionalism and dedication to the process. In addition, by the end of the process, the 
editorial board of the Bellingham Herald argued for strong support of the DNR’s Landscape 
Plan, representing a major shift in public opinion from the beginning of the process. 
 
PROVIDED SUCCESSFUL MODEL OF LAND MANAGEMENT 
 
In the Castle Valley, Southeast New Mexico Working Group and Mesa del Sol cases, 
participants involved believed the processes could provide a successful model of land 
management for other western land issues. In the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, 
facilitator Toby Herlzich noted, “If there’s a way to help ‘unstick’ some of those [western 
land] issues and work together to find new understanding and solve the problem, then that 
would be an overall contribution to all the work in the west on natural resources.”32 Learning 
from the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, Ray Powell, the former Commissioner of the State 
Land Office (SLO), hopes Mesa del Sol will “set the standard for how you live in an arid 
environment, while making a whole lot more for the school kids.”33 The current 
Commissioner says the agency will collaborate with private sector partners and the 
community to design a master plan for an upcoming project in Las Cruces, but will give the 
developers even more responsibility to decrease the SLO’s time investment in the process.34 
 
IMPROVED STATE AND FEDERAL AGENCY COORDINATION 
 
In three of the four cases involving federal agencies, participants reported that going through 
the process has improved coordination between their agency and the federal agency involved. 
The Southeast New Mexico Working Group created consistent policies in response to a need 
for agencies to work across jurisdictional boundaries and to create more consistent land use 
plans across all types of land. Both the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the New 
Mexico State Land Office indicated that the process resulted in consistent policies that have 
ultimately facilitated management for all agencies involved. The participants in the Elliot 
State Forest Planning Process believed that they will be able to work with the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service more effectively in the future 





The literature on collaboration reveals several costs, including time, staff costs, financial 
costs, and environmental costs. In Making Collaboration Work: Lessons from Innovation in 
Natural Resource Management, Wondolleck and Yaffee found that agencies, nonprofit 
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organizations and volunteers endure significant time costs when participating in collaborative 
processes.35 Agencies and organizations also face financial costs in the form of staff 
salaries.36 Some environmental groups oppose collaborative processes because they view the 
processes as being environmentally costly. To these critics, collaboration turns legal and 
regulatory standards into “bargaining chips.” 37 They also argue that collaborative processes 
emphasize local economic and social values at the expense of natural resources, giving a 
“small group of private individuals undue influence over public goods.”38 
 
In this study’s cases of collaboration involving state trust lands participants identified a 
number of costs. These costs include direct planning costs, opportunity costs due to time 
spent devoted to the process and, in some cases, costs arising from poor public relations, 
emotional and personal costs and a loss to either trust value or environmental protection.  
 
REDUCED THE VALUE OF TRUST ASSETS 
 
In the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, the Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR) estimated that because of logging restrictions in the Landscape Plan, the area will 
generate about half the revenue that would have been generated without the plan. The plan’s 
requirements beyond current rules and regulations resulted in an increase in land taken out of 
commercial forest management, causing a reduction of 35 percent in the planning area’s asset 
value based on future earnings from logging.39 The Final Environmental Impact Statement 
reported lost revenue to trust beneficiaries as follows: 
 
The projected revenues generated through implementation of the FEIS 
Preferred Alternative would be significantly lower than those estimated for the 
No Action Alternative. For the entire 200-year modeled planning period it is 
estimated that revenues under the Preferred Alternative would total 
$177,210,000, a reduction of $160,182,000 from the anticipated revenues of 
$337,392,000 under the No Action Alternative.40 
 
Critics of the DNR’s analysis noted that the financial estimates of the loss of revenue varied 
widely during the process and that a base case for comparison that more accurately reflected 
the current situation should have been chosen. That is, the base case for comparison could 
have been the no logging alternative that was in effect due to the moratorium on logging 
rather than the No Action Alternative that represented the logging practices that resulted in 
the moratorium on logging. Had a no logging base case been applied, the harvesting activity 
resulting from the Landscape Plan would have been described as an increase of $177 million 
to the trust rather than a $160 million loss. 
 
LOSS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
 
Environmental groups involved in the Elliott State Forest Planning Process have stated that 
the Oregon Department of State Lands and the Oregon Department of Forestry have 
proposed a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) that will in fact reduce habitat protection for the 
spotted owl and marbled murrelet. Many of the challenges faced by the Steering Committee 
and Core Planning Team highlight some of the faults of HCP process and HCPs themselves 
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as effective means of protecting threatened species. In 1998, a survey of spotted owls 
conducted on the Elliott State Forest revealed that the number of owls remaining had fallen 
from 69 in 1993 to 23 in 1998, which was much lower than the number of owls that should 
have remained given the number of owl takes permitted in the incidental take permit in the 
HCP. 41 
 
DIRECT PLANNING COSTS 
 
All of the processes examined in this study incurred direct planning costs. In many cases, the 
most significant direct planning costs derived from wages for participants who participated 
on behalf of government agencies or private companies and were therefore being paid for 
their time involved in the process. Public citizens that volunteered in the process often gave 
up wages (discussed below as opportunity costs. Other direct planning costs included those 
incurred to hold group and public meetings and to facilitate the exchange of information for 
items such as printing materials. Planning costs also included the costs of facilitation services 
and expert studies. 
 
Of the eight cases, cost data was best documented in the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning 
Process. The Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR) reported that preparing 
the Environmental Impact Statement and the Lake Whatcom Management Plan cost the 
agency approximately $800,000.42 This estimate does not include wages for participants on 
the payroll of other state agencies or local governments. According to DNR officials, the 
costs incurred by the DNR will be borne by all state trust land beneficiaries. The $800,000 
was deducted from the DNR’s general management account, which means that all 
beneficiaries, not just those whose trust land is contained in the planning area, incur the 
plan’s development costs.43 While cost figures were not available for the Elliott State Forest 
Process, state trust land officials also noted that the costs of the process would be borne by 
beneficiaries statewide. 
 
According to estimates obtained by researchers, the Castle Valley Planning Process cost the 
town of Castle Valley significantly, the School and Institutional Trust Land Administration 
more than $100,000, and Utah Open Lands $50,000 per year in salary and other expenses. In 
addition, some personal costs were not reimbursed. Prior to the planning process’ formal 
beginning, several community members from Castle Valley personally paid for much of the 
pre-planning activities, such as initial maps, without being reimbursed.44 However, some 
costs of the process were offset by grants from Sonoran Institute, Patagonia and Tides 
Foundation. Finally, in the Emerald Mountain Planning Process, the Partnership paid for a 
planning lease with the State Land Board that cost $28,000 and raised money to pay for 
advertising, consulting fees for survey data, a land appraisal, website hosting and postage. 
 
OPPORTUNITY COSTS ARISING FROM TIME SPENT DEVOTED TO THE PROCESS 
 
Opportunity costs include anything of value that was given up by participating in the process. 
For members of the public who participated on a voluntary basis, the largest opportunity 
costs included foregone wages. As many of the processes consumed a great deal of the 
participants’ time, opportunity costs should not be underestimated. In addition to time spent 
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in actual meetings, significant time is spent preparing and traveling for meetings. In the Lake 
Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, the Committee met 37 times, not including the public 
hearings they attended. Assuming an average of ten hours per meeting (five hours of 
preparation and five hours of actual meeting time – some meetings lasted all day and were 
convened during work hours) and that all nine members of the Committee were in attendance 
at every meeting, the process required 3,330 hours of the Committee’s time. In the Castle 
Valley Planning Process, travel time was required for meetings that were held in Castle 
Valley, Salt Lake City, Boulder and Denver. In the same process, Castle Rock Collaboration 
board members met once or twice a month for a period of two or three years during the 
planning process, during which board members opened their houses to hold the meetings.45 
The time devoted to organize was estimated by the group’s organizers to be at least 20 hours 
per week throughout the process and often much more.46 Finally, one member of the Emerald 
Mountain Partnership estimated that the process consumed 1,500 hours of his time over 12 
years, which detracted from time for family, recreation and relaxation. 
 
EMOTIONAL AND/OR PERSONAL COSTS 
 
In six of the eight cases, participants noted that they suffered emotional distress or personal 
costs arising from time away from family and leisure and from stress or damaged 
relationships. In the Lake Whatcom Planning Process, the process was emotionally and 
personally draining for several participants. The Department of Natural Resources official 
responsible commented, “You’ve got folks that are yelling at you from all directions. It’s 
tough on staff.”47 He added that the process took an “enormous personal toll on staff, me 
included.”48 Similarly, in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, Department of 
Natural Resources and Conservation Trust Lands Management Division Administrator Tom 
Schultz faced internal strife from agency staff who did not agree with his decision to endorse 
the community’s proposal for a Committee. In the Emerald Mountain Planning Process, a 
rancher reported losing time devoted to family and leisure activity and felt his relationship 
with the city of Steamboat Springs was severely damaged. In the Houghton Area Master Plan 
Process, one of the participants mentioned members gave up personal time and time with 
family. 
 
In some cases relationships were damaged. In the Castle Valley Planning Process, “There 
were some friendships at least strained and maybe in some instances ruined or severely 
stressed …and that’s not a success.”49 Another participant echoed this saying, “You get 
personally involved. It can be emotional, and it can be draining, and you make friends, you 
lose friends.”50 In the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, Advisory Committee 
member and Whitefish Chamber of Commerce President Sheila Bowen’s job was 
jeopardized by controversy surrounding the planning process. 
 
BAD PUBLIC RELATIONS 
 
In the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the Department of Natural Resources and 
Conservation (DNRC) experienced some bad publicity and damage to its reputation because 
of its involvement in the planning effort. Whitefish community members and trust 
beneficiaries criticized the DNRC during the process for its approach to neighborhood 
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planning. Administrator Tom Schultz recalls the local newspaper, The Whitefish Pilot, having 
a lot of “heartburn” about the roles of the Advisory Committee and the general public in the 
process. Indeed, Schultz wrote several editorials defending the agency’s approach before and 
after the formation of the Advisory Committee. 
 
In the Emerald Mountain Planning Process, by appearing to support a controversial land 
exchange, the Division of Wildlife (DOW) was critized by opponents of the deal. The 
situation also put a magnifying glass on those agency employees who were involved with the 
process. Libbie Miller remembers, 
 
We might have taken some hard knocks from the opposition, being 
perceived as a supporter. People wanted to know “How could we possibly 
be supporting this, particularly since losing these lands is going to hurt the 
economy of our local towns through the loss of hunting!” There are 
probably some people who feel a little bit negative about the Division or 
myself, with our position on the exchange.51 
 
While participants remember the DOW receiving criticism for supporting the exchange, they 
also recall DOW under fire for raising concerns about the exchange at one Partnership 
meeting. The process exposed possible conflicts of interests because the Department of 
Natural Resources houses both the DOW, whose mission is to protect wildlife, and the State 
Land Board, whose mission is to generate revenue. This conflict, along with other land use 
issues and controversies occurring around that time, prompted the DOW to redesign their 
inter-agency land use commenting procedures. 
 
 
COMPARING BENEFITS TO COSTS 
 
A discussion of the benefits and costs naturally leads to the question: how do the benefits and 
costs compare? Do the benefits outweigh the costs? Are the costs greater than the benefits? 
There are at least two reasons why such a comparison is difficult in this report. First, at the 
aggregate level looking across the eight cases, a comparison of cost and benefits would be ill-
advised because net benefits at the aggregate level would not justify an individual process 
that resulted in net costs. Second, even at the individual case level, comparing the benefits to 
the costs is not possible without first putting benefits and costs into a common unit, such as 
dollars, which would allow one to arrive at the net present value of the process as a whole to 
society. While several methods exist in the field of economics to value benefits of non-
market goods, the scope of this study did not include an economic valuation of each of the 
benefits and costs discussed.* In addition, the valuation of many of the secondary benefits 
discussed, such as improved relationships, may not be possible at all. 
 
Despite the absence of valuation data for each benefit and cost, the data collected during the 
case study interviews suggests that had such a valuation for each case been conducted, the 
benefits would outweigh the costs in most cases. The fact that the number of benefits 
                                                 
* The most common economic techniques for valuing non-market goods and non-use values of natural resources 
include contingent valuation, hedonic pricing, travel costs and option valuation. 
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identified in each case greatly outnumbered the number of costs identified by interviewees 
suggests that benefits outweigh costs. For example, in the Castle Valley Planning Process, 
the researchers identified ten categories of benefits compared to three categories of costs. 
Five of the benefits identified were considered primary benefits, including an increase in the 
value of the trust, an improvement in the natural environment, an improvement in the urban 
environment, a higher quality solution and the establishment of recreational access. While 
not related to the participants’ original goals, five additional secondary benefits were 
identified, including new and improved relationships, public education about state trust lands, 
increased institutional capacity of the Castle Valley town government, positive public 
relations for the state trust land agency and a successful model of land management for other 
land use processes. Table 14-1 shows that for all of the cases of collaborative planning on 
state trust land in this report, the number of benefits identified in each case by interviewees 
far outnumbered the number of costs identified. 
 
The participants’ views about whether the process as a whole was successful and whether 
they would be willing to participate in a collaborative process again in the future further 
suggest that the benefits outweighed the costs in most cases. Both inquiries were included in 
the set of interview questions asked off all participants. The first question, “Was the process 
successful?” zeroes in on whether the participant thought the benefits outweighed the costs of 
the process overall. The second question, “Would you collaborate again in the future?” which 
included the follow-up question, “Was this a value-added activity?” focuses on whether the 
benefits outweighed the costs for the individual.†  
 
Eighty percent of interviewees (or 71 out of 89) believed the process was successful when 
asked directly whether they thought the process was successful or whether they would 
collaborate again in the future. Twenty-eight of the 117 interviewees did not answer either of 
these questions and several of the participants in the ongoing processes conditioned their 
answers on implementation of the final outcome.  Table 14-2 shows the responses to these 
interview questions summed up for each case study and the sums as a percent of the total 
interviewees who responded. 
 
Table 14-2: Weighing Benefits and Costs: Responses to Interview Questions #4 and #4F 
CASE STUDIES
Response to Interview Question #4 "Was the 
Process Successful?" or Interview Question #4F 













Affirmative 10 9 9 11 5 4 15 8 71
Negative 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 5
Mixed Response 3 1 2 0 1 2 0 4 13
Total Interviewees Who Responded 15 11 11 11 6 7 16 12 89
Total Interviewees Who Did Not Respond 0 0 2 5 8 6 2 5 28
Total Interviewees 15 11 13 16 14 13 18 17 117
Affirmative 67% 82% 82% 100% 83% 57% 94% 67% 80%
Negative 13% 9% 0% 0% 0% 14% 6% 0% 6%
Mixed Response 20% 9% 18% 0% 17% 29% 0% 33% 15%
Total Interviewees Who Responded 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  
                                                 




At the individual case level, the majority of participants in each case believed the process 
was successful when asked directly whether they thought the process was successful or 
whether they would collaborate again in the future. The majorities ranged from 57 percent of 
those who answered the questions in the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process to 100 
percent of those who answered the questions in the Houghton Area Master Plan Process. 
Despite the qualitative and quantitative evidence identified in this report that shows that 
collaborative planning on state trust lands appears to result in overall net benefits, a full 
benefits-costs analysis by an economist of these, or other, cases is an important opportunity 












HOW DO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LEGAL 
CONSTRAINTS INFLUENCE A COLLABORATIVE 
PLANNING PROCESS? 
 
 study of collaborative planning on state trust lands is not complete without examining 
how the law affects both the collaborative process and its outcome. Because state trust 
land managers must adhere to a constitutional mandate, all collaborative planning efforts on 
state trust lands inevitably must operate within a legally-defined space. In addition to these 
“internal” legal constraints, collaborative planning on state trust lands must occur within 
“external” legal boundaries because trust land management implicates larger land 
management and natural resource issues. These external legal boundaries include a range of 
federal, state and local laws and policies. 
 
Both agency and non-agency representatives must consider legal issues when engaging in 
collaboration. Agency representatives must find a way to collaborate within their existing 
legal framework and educate other participants about the decision space in which the process 
may occur. Non-agency participants, in turn, must accept and become comfortable with the 
leeway provided. According to the Bureau of Land Management and Sonoran Institute 
Desktop Reference Guide to Collaborative, Community-Based Planning, this acclimation 
process can be challenging for all parties because of the important, but subtle difference 
between decision-making responsibility and power, which should be shared by all 
participants, and decision-making authority which an agency legally cannot abdicate. “There 
is a fine line between empowering the group and making sure that the [legal] sideboards are 
clearly specified.”1 
 
The eight cases of collaborative planning on state trust lands examined in this report reveal 
how internal and external legal constraints vary across states, posing challenges for some 
while serving as key facilitating factors for others (Table 15-1). This chapter will explore the 
following themes that emerge from an analysis of the eight cases: 
 
• The effect of preexisting legal constraints on the collaborative process and outcome 
• The effect of discovering legal issues during collaboration on the process and 
outcome 
• The strategic use of the law to influence the process and outcome  











     Table 15-1: Legal Constraints that Affected the Collaborative Process / Outcome across the Eight Cases 
 
* Other than trust mandate  
** And corresponding regulations  
*** E.g., Memorandum of Agreement  
 
 
EFFECT OF PREEXISTING LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON PROCESS AND 
OUTCOME 
 
All collaborative planning efforts, regardless of focus, must operate within certain 
preexisting legal constraints. Some of these legal issues are known to the participants upon 
engaging in a collaborative process, whereas others are discovered along the way. This first 
section explores the effect the former situation can have on the collaborative process and 
outcome, as exemplified by the cases. 
 
INTERNAL LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
Collaborative planning on state trust lands must take place within the confines of a state’s 
trust mandate. As discussed in Chapter 3, this legal mandate varies in substance and clarity 


















Mandate         8 
State 
Constitution*         1 
Clean Water 
Act         1 
Endangered 










        2 
Safe Drinking 




        3 
Legal  





        1 
Courts 
(Litigation)         3 
 
 439
across states as a consequence of history, as well as agency and court interpretation.2 While 
the cases do not provide enough data to explore the intricacies of constitutional language 
across states, they highlight how the existence of a legal mandate influences the process and 
outcome. The cases also shed light on how variations in mandate clarity and flexibility affect 
the collaboration. 
 
Effect of Trust Mandate on Process 
 
The presence of a legal mandate can play a role in determining participant involvement in a 
collaborative process. In the Elliott State Forest Planning Process in Oregon, the mandate 
was a factor in limiting membership composition of the Steering Committee, as neither the 
Bureau of Land Management nor the U.S. Forest Service was invited to participate on the 
Steering Committee, despite having a stake in the process. This decision was justified on the 
ground that their federal mandates were too different from the State Land Board’s mandate. 
Oregon Department of Forestry Southern Area Director Dan Shults explained: 
 
We consciously did not include the federal land management agencies. The 
constitutional mandate for the Elliott State Forest is far different from the 
mission on federal lands in Oregon. We felt that there would be little value 
added to the process and likely an increase in the time it would take to 
develop the plan ….3 
 
In the Mesa del Sol Planning Process in New Mexico, the mandate also was a factor in 
determining participant involvement. While the Mesa del Sol case did not involve a formal 
collaborative working group, it involved a number of specific parties, including the 
University of New Mexico (UNM). A beneficiary of the Mesa del Sol trust lands, UNM 
perceived that they had a right to be involved in the planning process because of the trust 
mandate. In fact, the University Board of Regents sued Commissioner of Public Lands Jim 
Baca early in the process to block the sale of Mesa del Sol property, claiming the sale did not 
generate enough revenue for the trust. Following that lawsuit, UNM became an active 
participant with the State Land Office throughout the 20-year planning process. 
 
A state’s legal mandate also can determine the stakeholder group’s level of decision-making 
power. Unlike decision-making authority, which a trust land manager cannot legally 
relinquish, decision-making power can and should be shared with non-agency participants. 
Perhaps paradoxically, the trust mandate can facilitate this allocation of power, providing a 
stakeholder group with a means to gain influence over trust land management decisions. For 
example, in the Emerald Mountain Planning Process in Colorado, the trust land mandate 
became an important facilitating factor. It has been said that the Partnership was able to 
successfully influence State Land Board decision making because it embraced the legal 
constraints imposed by the mandate. Instead of resisting the Board’s legal interpretation, the 
Emerald Mountain Partnership embraced it and focused on helping the Board achieve its goal 
of revenue generation. The Partnership recognized the Board’s need to only accept a trust 




Likewise, in the Castle Valley Planning Process in Utah, the trust mandate was a source of 
power for the Castle Rock Collaboration (CRC). Pursuant to Utah’s trust mandate, the 
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA) must obtain “fair market 
value” for trust land parcels. At first, the CRC viewed this legal obligation as a significant 
obstacle because the group equated revenue generation with development, which was 
contrary to CRC goals. However, with the realization that SITLA could satisfy its mandate 
without pursuing development in the area, the CRC was able to identify conservation 
initiatives that served both parties’ interests and hence increased the likelihood of SITLA 
approval.5  
 
While the trust mandate can empower a stakeholder group, it also can create a division 
between the trust land agency and other stakeholders. This rift can perpetuate mistrust and 
hinder progress. Participants in four of the eight cases recounted struggling with this 
dynamic. In the Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP) Process in Arizona, for instance, the 
Arizona State Land Department (ASLD) reportedly was unable to make certain concessions 
because of its mandate. This limitation frustrated many members of the Citizens Review 
Committee who viewed the ASLD as distancing itself from the group and collaborative 
process.6 Similarly, the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process in Montana struggled to 
bridge the gap between the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) and 
the Whitefish School Trust Lands Advisory Committee. This disconnect emerged because of 
disagreement about mandate interpretation. As discussed further below, the DNRC and 
Advisory Committee endlessly debated the correct interpretation of the agency’s 
constitutional obligations. Unable to develop a common understanding, the Committee and 
DNRC remained at odds for much of the planning effort, to the detriment of the collaborative 
process.7 The Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process in Washington and the Emerald 
Mountain Planning Process were two additional cases that encountered this challenge at 
some point. 
 
Effect of Mandate Clarity on Process 
 
The cases of collaborative planning on state trust lands reveal that trust mandates vary in 
clarity across states. Comparing the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process with the 
HAMP Process illustrates how this variation can influence collaboration. 
 
Mandate clarity can determine the level of agency involvement in the collaborative process 
and thereby affect the working relationship between a trust land agency and stakeholders. 
The HAMP Process is a case that struggled to foster a high degree of collaboration between 
these two groups. Along with New Mexico, Arizona has the most restrictive trust mandate in 
the continental United States; the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act is the only one to 
explicitly require that the land granted be held “in trust.” As discussed in Chapter 3, this 
language imposes a specific legal responsibility, known as a fiduciary duty, on the state to 
manage the land for the “beneficiaries” of the land grant and thus limits the state’s 
management discretion.8 This unequivocal obligation limited the Arizona State Land 
Department’s (ASLD) ability to work collaboratively with the Citizens Review Committee 
(CRC) and other stakeholders in the HAMP process. The most obvious consequence was the 
ASLD’s decision to distance itself from the collaborative group and participate in a resource 
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capacity, instead of as a CRC member. According to ASLD Planning Section Manager 
Gordon Taylor, serving as a resource helped ensure that the agency would not be held to a 
final outcome that it legally or philosophically could not support: 
 
We get involved with committees, but it’s as a resource person. We’ve found 
that if we get put onto a committee … we’re listed as one of the people who 
has supported [the final document] even though we may be in objection to 
certain elements of it … by virtue of our association with the committee then 
there’s … tacitly the buy-in … and that could conceivably be used by the 
community to leverage the Department on various land issues.9 
 
This limited agency willingness to commit frustrated and confused CRC participants. CRC 
member Phil Swaim noted that it was “difficult with the State Land Department sort of 
sitting back and saying we’ll wait and see what you come up with and see if we support it or 
not.”10 
 
In contrast, the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process created an Advisory Committee 
that included the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) as another 
group member. This greater level of agency participation may be attributable to the fact that 
Montana’s legal mandate was perceived as more ambiguous than Arizona’s trust obligation 
and hence gave the agency more leeway to join stakeholders at a decision-making table. 
Pursuant to Montana’s Constitution, the state has a fiduciary duty to trust land beneficiaries, 
as well as a responsibility to “maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in 
Montana for present and future generations.”11 These dual constitutional obligations have led 
many Whitefish participants and stakeholders to view the fiduciary duty created by 
Montana’s trust mandate as less clear-cut than those of other states. 
 
By determining the level of agency involvement in a process, mandate clarity also can 
influence the allocation of decision-making power. In the Whitefish case, Advisory 
Committee members became equal decision makers with the DNRC because they were 
sitting at the same negotiating table. Citizens Review Committee (CRC) members in the 
HAMP case, on the other hand, struggled throughout the process to determine how much 
influence they had over the Arizona State Land Department’s (ASLD) final decision because 
the agency distanced itself from the rest of the group.12 
 
Variation in mandate clarity can shape the collaborative process by influencing the public’s 
understanding and acceptance of the trust mandate. Without a solid grasp of the mandate, a 
collaborative process often must dedicate considerable time to educating process participants 
and outside stakeholders about the legal constraints inherent in trust land management. This 
education process takes away time and focus from substantive issues. The Whitefish 
Neighborhood Planning Process exemplifies that challenge. During that collaborative 
process, the DNRC’s dual constitutional obligations fueled an ongoing debate over whether 
the state had to maximize short-term revenue production, or adopt a more long-term 
management approach that protected its natural assets. Indeed, the DNRC and Advisory 
Committee spent hours debating the merits of the parties’ legal arguments because some 
believed there was room for interpretation. These discussions took up meeting time that 
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could have been spent discussing substantive planning issues. They also prolonged the 
process.13 Alternatively, the HAMP Process did not have to dedicate much time to 
stakeholder education. All interviewed participants had a clear understanding of Arizona’s 
trust mandate and accepted the legal limitations within which they were working. This 
difference could be attributed to the perceived clarity of Arizona’s mandate. Citizens Review 
Committee members did not have the legal space to push against the Arizona State Land 
Department’s (ASLD) interpretation. Accordingly, after minimal education by the ASLD, it 
did not become an issue. 
 
Effect of Mandate Flexibility on Process and Outcome 
 
In addition to mandate clarity, variation in mandate flexibility across states can influence the 
collaborative process. Comparing the Castle Valley Planning Process with the HAMP 
Process illustrates this effect. 
 
The cases show that mandate flexibility can influence group dynamics. In the Castle Valley 
Planning Process, the flexibility inherent in Utah’s mandate helped the Castle Rock 
Collaboration (CRC) and School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA) 
overcome mistrust and build a productive working relationship. While Utah’s mandate 
requires SITLA obtain “fair market value” for trust land parcels, as discussed earlier, it 
nevertheless places few restrictions in the minimum sale or lease price of trust lands, in 
comparison to other Western states. This flexibility enabled SITLA to engage in a negotiated 
trust land sale, offering parcels to the Castle Valley community for purchase for conservation 
purposes. This offer demonstrated SITLA’s openness to engaging in conservation 
transactions with the community and consequently helped the parties build trust. According 
to CRC leader Laura Kamala: 
 
I see all the conservation initiatives we did with SITLA as part of the process, 
because it was key in our growing relationship with them, in proving that 
there was a conservation market here for SITLA, and it’s viable. We could 
show up with the money and do what we said we were going to do, even with 
a better record than a lot of the developers they were working with at the 
time.14 
 
On the other hand, the HAMP Process struggled a bit with group dynamics. Unlike Utah, 
Arizona’s trust mandate explicitly requires that the land only be sold or leased “to the highest 
and best bidder at a public auction” for no less than its appraised value.15 This provision has 
been legally interpreted to limit the Arizona State Land Department’s (ASLD) flexibility, 
prohibiting the agency from privately negotiating the terms of a sale or lease with a potential 
buyer, even if the purchaser is a city.16 Such rigidity frustrated members of the Citizens 
Review Committee (CRC) who viewed the ASLD as a difficult partner to work with at 
times.17 
 
The flexibility of a trust mandate also can determine what options are available to the group. 
For the Castle Valley Planning Process, the Utah mandate’s flexibility enabled the Castle 
Rock Collaboration and SITLA to explore creative ways, like a conservation sale, to achieve 
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both the revenue needs of SITLA and the open space interests of the community. The 
Citizens Review Committee in the HAMP Process did not enjoy the same creative freedom 
because of the strict legal obligations in the Arizona trust mandate. 
 
Effect of Trust Mandate on Outcome  
 
As the above contrast between the Castle Valley Planning Process and HAMP Process 
demonstrates, a state’s trust mandate can influence the outcome of collaborative planning. 
Three additional cases illustrate how this legal constraint can play a role in determining the 
substance of a final product. For example, in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, 
perceived ambiguity surrounding the state’s mandate provided the Whitefish Advisory 
Committee with the latitude to push for more trust land conservation. In the end, the 
Whitefish Neighborhood Plan allowed for development on only four percent of the 13,000-
acre area.18 On the other hand, the Emerald Mountain Planning Process and Elliott State 
Forest Planning Process had to be more sensitive to their trust land agencies’ revenue 
generation obligations, tailoring their final plans to explicitly meet revenue goals. Indeed, the 
Steamboat Springs community spent years developing various proposals for Emerald 
Mountain in hopes of generating the necessary revenue to receive State Land Board approval 
before finally suggesting a BLM land exchange.19 
 
EXTERNAL LEGAL CONSTRAINTS  
 
Because state trust land management involves larger land management and natural resource 
issues, collaborative planning on state trust lands must occur within “external” legal 
constraints, in addition to the boundaries delineated by the trust mandate. 
 
Effect on Collaborative Process 
 
Several of the major federal environmental and natural resource laws come into play in the 
examples of collaborative planning on state trust lands examined in this report. Indeed, in the 
Elliott State Forest Planning Process and Southeast New Mexico Working Group, federal law 
played as significant a legal role as the trust mandate. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
was the impetus for a collaborative planning process in both cases: the Elliott Steering 
Committee was formed to develop a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) for the federally-listed 
spotted owl, marbled murrelet and Coho salmon while the Southeast New Mexico Working 
Group was formed to create a Resource Management Plan (RMP) Amendment for the BLM 
and a conservation plan to prevent the need to federally list the lesser prairie chicken and 
sand dune lizard. Both collaborative processes consequently had to address ESA constraints.  
 
An external legal sideboard like the ESA can be challenging for a collaborative process, 
which has to adapt to additional timelines and constraints imposed by the federal law. For 
instance, in the Elliott State Forest Planning Process, compliance with the HCP regulations 
prolonged and complicated the collaborative effort. The group had to take the time to ensure 
that officials at each decision-making level retained their authority to assess the process. 
According to John Lilly, Assistant Director for Policy and Planning at the Department for 




The Elliott is a different creature because you are trying to get a federal 
permit at the same time so you have to sequence all this stuff out. How do 
you leave decision space for the policymaker – that is the Land Board – in a 
way that doesn’t lock them down before the USFWS has tipped their hand as 
to what they will accept as an HCP? You’ve got to leave all that decision 
space mushy so that you’re not taking away your policymaker’s 
prerogatives.20  
 
While federal law can pose a challenge for some collaborative processes, it can serve as a 
key facilitating factor for others like the Southeast New Mexico Working Group. In that 
process, the threat of either the prairie chicken or the sand dune lizard being federally listed 
kept many people at the negotiating table, despite different agendas and difficult issues. 
According to State Land Office and later U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service wildlife biologist 
Jennifer Parody, the risk of ESA listing was too great to be ignored.21 This distinction 
between the effect of the ESA in the Elliott State Forest Planning Process and Southeast New 
Mexico Working Group may be attributable to the fact that the species were already listed in 
the former case, whereas federal regulation was still uncertain in the latter case. As such, the 
Southeast New Mexico Working Group had more flexibility than the Elliott Steering 
Committee in determining the extent of the ESA legal constraints, which became a 
significant motivation. 
 
In addition to the ESA, other federal laws can determine the working space in which 
collaborative planning occurs and can affect the process and outcome. These external 
constraints include: (1) the Clean Water Act, as seen in the Lake Whatcom Landscape 
Planning Process, (2) the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), as seen in the Elliott 
State Forest Planning Process and (3) the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act, as seen 
in the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, Castle Valley Planning Process and Emerald 
Mountain Planning Process. 
 
Often, external legal constraints can hinder collaboration by imposing requirements that must 
be fulfilled concurrently with the collaborative process. This situation can lead to 
inconsistent messages and generate mistrust among participants. In the cases studied for this 
report, this challenge emerged in the context of state law. Both the Whitefish Neighborhood 
Planning Process and Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process struggled with the 
simultaneous development of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) pursuant to the 
Montana Environmental Policy Act and State Environmental Policy Act, respectively. In the 
Whitefish case, these parallel processes resulted in mixed messages from the Department of 
Natural Resources and Conservation, which fostered confusion and perpetuated mistrust 
between the Advisory Committee and agency.22 Likewise, participants in the Lake Whatcom 
case were suspicious of the EIS process, viewing it as a stall tactic or an attempt to weaken 
the influence of the Interjurisdictional Committee because it was initiated late in the process 
and after a new, more conservative Commissioner was elected.23 It also has been said, 
however, that the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process benefited from an increased 




Effect on Outcome  
 
External legal issues can affect the outcome of a collaborative process by constraining 
implementation. For example, Montana law provides that neighborhood plans are to be 
advisory tools for the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation and State Land 
Board rather than regulatory documents.25 Similarly, in Arizona, the Arizona State Land 
Department is not legally obligated to implement the HAMP or require that state trust land 
buyers act within the Plan’s parameters.26 These legal constraints not only hindered the 
process in the Whitefish and HAMP cases by limiting the public’s decision-making power, 
but also raise questions about the future implementation of the planning documents. In both 
cases, many participants remain in wait-and-see mode, watching how implementation efforts 
unfold in the future.27 
 
 
EFFECT OF DISCOVERING LEGAL ISSUES DURING COLLABORATION  
 
Legal constraints may exist at the outset of a collaborative process, but that does not 
guarantee that participants are aware of them. The Castle Valley Planning Process 
exemplifies how collaboration can be affected by discovering preexisting legal sideboards 
during the process. 
 
The town of Castle Valley engaged in collaborative planning with the Utah School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA) without understanding the legal space in 
which the process could unfold. Specifically, at the beginning of the process the town was 
unaware that Utah law requires all local governments to (1) approve planning activities prior 
to initiating development and (2) maintain updated ordinances.28 Upon learning of these 
pertinent preexisting constraints, the town grew concerned about potential conflicts of 
interest and shifted its focus to what it considered more pressing obligations. The town 
consequently distanced itself from the collaborative process and ultimately refused to sign 
the final planning agreement. 
 
EFFECT ON PROCESS 
 
Discovering legal constraints while engaged in collaboration can hinder the process. As was 
the case in the Castle Valley Planning Process, this discovery can force an important 
stakeholder to abruptly restrict its involvement, which can hurt group dynamics. According 
to Castle Rock Collaboration (CRC) member Dave Erley, once the town distanced itself from 
the collaborative process, the atmosphere “became much more tense and sometimes 
adversarial.”29 The town’s relationships with the community and SITLA also suffered. Some 
questioned the town’s good faith, while others viewed the ordinance revisions with 
skepticism, seeing them as a stalling technique more than a necessity.30 Furthermore, 
communications between the town and SITLA broke down, as the agency believed that the 





The mid-process discovery of legal issues can reveal complexities that require reevaluation 
and even revision of agreements and products. This review involves time and resources and 
can jeopardize certainty. For example, in the Castle Valley case the town learned late in the 
process that its records for proving the town’s water rights were deficient and hence not in 
compliance with Utah law. This realization complicated the planning process because the 
CRC and SITLA had been developing a planning contract assuming that a developer could 
use the town’s water. The emergence of this new legal constraint left less room for that 
assumption.32 Moreover, the town’s realization that the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency had designated Castle Valley’s aquifer as a “sole source aquifer” pursuant to the Safe 
Drinking Water Act forced late revision of parts of the plan.33 
 
EFFECT ON OUTCOME  
 
Discovering legal constraints during the collaborative process can influence the final 
outcome by forcing the group to reevaluate how to achieve its desired end result. This 
reassessment can result in a comparable, if not better, final outcome. Yet, by choosing a new 
path midway through the process, the group may also have to sacrifice certainty. These 
outcome tradeoffs emerged in the Castle Valley Planning Process. As mentioned, the town of 
Castle Valley declined to sign the planning contract with SITLA upon learning that it was not 
in the town’s best legal interest to participate in the collaborative effort.34 The CRC 
consequently had to look to other options to achieve its trust land conservation goal, 
ultimately pursuing a land exchange with the BLM. While this avenue may help the group 
achieve its objective, the future remains unclear. Securing a signed planning contract 




STRATEGIC USE OF THE LAW TO AFFECT THE PROCESS AND OUTCOME 
 
 While the law can pose significant challenges to a collaborative process, the cases reveal that 
in some situations legal constraints can serve as a key facilitating factor (Table 15-2). Many 
of the cases consequently involved a strategic use of the law to initiate or influence the 












Table 15-2: Strategic Use of the Law across the Eight Cases 
 
 
INITIATING THE PROCESS 
 
Stakeholders can use the law to define a space for collaborative planning to take place. The 
Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process exemplifies this tactical approach. Unlike the 
other seven cases examined in this report, the Lake Whatcom Process arose in response to a 
state legislative mandate for which concerned community members lobbied. The law that 
created the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process required the Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) to collaborate with a stakeholder group. The legislation also specified 
minimum stakeholder involvement.35 These legal constraints thus enabled alarmed residents 
and other stakeholders to participate with the trust land agency in the review of DNR forest 
management plans within the Lake Whatcom watershed. 
 
Some have questioned, however, whether the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process 
truly was collaborative because of its legislative mandate. According to Bellingham, 
Washington representative Bill McCourt, “it wasn’t a group getting together because they all 
had a common interest. DNR had a gun to their head.”36 The legislative mandate has also 
been attributed to perpetual mistrust between the DNR and other stakeholders. Yet, these 
challenges are not are not unique to the legal circumstances surrounding the Lake Whatcom 
case. During the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, many within the Department of 
Natural Resources and Conservation similarly felt forced into the collaborative effort as 
Whitefish residents petitioned the State Land Board for a more inclusive process. Indeed, 
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Advisory Committee facilitator Janet Cornish has resisted calling the Whitefish process 
collaborative because she felt that the agency was “strong-armed” out of its role by the 
Whitefish community.37 Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 19, mistrust between trust land 
agencies and the public characterized many of the cases examined in this report. 
 
It thus remains unclear from the cases whether a legislatively-mandated collaborative process 
is a contradiction in terms, or if it simply provides another avenue to collaboratively manage 
trust lands. 
 
INFLUENCING THE PROCESS  
 
There are a variety of ways in which stakeholders can strategically employ the law to 
influence a collaborative process. The legal mechanisms used in the cases to sway the 
process included: (1) incorporation as an Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 501(c) (3) 
organization, (2) drafting a Memorandum of Agreement, (3) legislative change and (4) 
litigation.  
 
Incorporation as an IRC § 501(c) (3) “charitable organization” secures a group tax-exempt 
status and enables the group to accept contributions in exchange for tax deductions.38 The 
legal personality acquired through incorporation enables groups to fundraise and thereby gain 
influence over the decision-making process. Both the Emerald Mountain Partnership and the 
Castle Rock Collaboration (CRC) secured 501(c) (3) benefits during the Emerald Mountain 
Planning Process and Castle Valley Planning Process, respectively. The Emerald Mountain 
Partnership independently incorporated as a charitable organization, whereas the CRC 
became a branch of the nonprofit group Utah Open Lands to use their 501(c) (3) status. With 
this fundraising capability, both the Partnership and CRC were able to build some support for 
their respective efforts. Incorporation as or partnership with a 501(c) (3) organization also 
probably enabled them to gain some influence over the decision-making process because 
revenue generation was a key objective in both cases.39 This incorporation also likely enabled 
the Partnership to enter into contracts such as the Memorandum of Agreement while 
avoiding any personal liability for individual participants. 
 
Developing a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) is another way stakeholders can tactically 
use the law to influence collaborative planning. While not necessarily a formal legal 
constraint, an MOA is a contractual agreement within which a collaborative process must 
operate. This instrument can increase the credibility of a party not only because of its 
contractual nature, but also because it allows for the drafting of a very specific agreement. In 
the Emerald Mountain Planning Process, the Emerald Mountain Partnership used an MOA to 
influence the planning effort. Specifically, the Partnership submitted a detailed MOA that 
provided that the Partnership would purchase the trust land parcel at market value within five 
years based on a current appraisal. Bidding on the parcel with an MOA was a key facilitating 
factor for the Emerald Mountain process. It greatly increased the Partnership’s influence on 
decision making by demonstrating to the State Land Board that the group was a serious 




Legislative change is a third legal strategy to influence the collaborative process. The 
Emerald Mountain Planning Process illustrates this approach, as Colorado Governor Roy 
Romer proposed and was able to pass a ballot initiative to amend the state constitution. 
“Amendment 16” requires the State Land Board to work with local governments and comply 
with local land use regulations and plans. By creating a Stewardship Trust, the amendment 
was misunderstood by some to provide the Partnership with a way to protect trust land 
parcels in perpetuity. While this perception was mistaken (because the Stewardship Trust in 
fact holds land parcels for eventual sale), Amendment 16 and its focus on cooperation with 
local communities nonetheless helped foster collaboration between the Partnership and State 
Land Board.40 
 
Likewise, the town of Castle Valley considered legislative change just prior to the initiation 
of the Castle Valley Planning Process. Fearing that the trust lands within its municipal limits 
would be sold and developed, the town proposed amending its zoning ordinance to rezone 
trust land parcels from one unit per five acres to one unit per 40 acres, which would decrease 
the allowable density and thereby stymie additional development.41 This legislative proposal 
troubled the Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA), which had 
legal objections to the lack of notice provided, as well as the town’s authority to engage in 
trust land rezoning. SITLA also saw the amendment as contrary to the spirit of the pending 
collaborative process.42 Despite this negative reaction, the proposal probably helped motivate 
the town and SITLA to ultimately come together to collaborate on the proper management of 
the local trust lands. 
 
Finally, stakeholders can strategically influence the collaborative process by threatening or 
carrying out legal action. Potential or actual litigation can benefit the process by motivating 
parties to stay at the table and even realizing substantive objectives. Yet, it also can pose 
significant challenges, straining relationships and jeopardizing the durability of the group. 
The Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process exemplifies the tradeoffs associated with 
legal action. In an effort to force the Board of Natural Resources’ approval of the final 
Landscape Plan, Interjurisdictional Committee members threatened to sue the agency. 
Likewise, the city of Bellingham, Whatcom County and the water district filed a lawsuit to 
force the Board to adopt the plan. While the lawsuit eventually was dropped because the 
Board soon approved the plan, this legal recourse motivated the Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) to stick with and complete the planning process. On the other hand, the 
threat of lawsuits also put the DNR on the defensive and perpetuated mistrust between the 
agency and other stakeholders. 
 
Concurrent with the inception of the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, several 
environmental groups similarly threatened legal action (in the form of a 60 day notice-with-
intention to file Area of Critical Environmental Concern petition) with the BLM. Similar to 
the Lake Whatcom legal action, the environmental groups agreed to drop the petition until 
the Working Group had time to work out a plan. While it brought trust land and prairie 
chicken management issues more to the forefront of agencies’ agendas, this notice also left 




Litigation also played a role in the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, as briefly mentioned 
earlier. Seeking higher compensation from the early auction of Mesa del Sol property, the 
University of New Mexico Board of Regents sued Commissioner of Public Lands Jim Baca 
to block the sale. This strategic use of the law gained the Board a greater percentage of the 
sale. Moreover, this legal action motivated the State Land Office (SLO) to devise a final 
development plan that would satisfy the beneficiary. However, the litigation also posed 
significant challenges for the collaborative process moving forward. It strained relationships, 
generated negative press for the SLO and created a level of uncertainty within the private 
sector as to whether Mesa del Sol was a safe investment. 
 
DEFINING THE ISSUES 
 
Collaborative planning participants can turn to the law to define issues and thereby enable the 
process to move forward. The Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process illustrates this use 
of legal constraints. In an effort to prevent further criticism of forest practices and additional 
logging restrictions in the Lake Whatcom watershed, Commissioner of Public Lands Doug 
Sutherland sought formal opinions from the Department of Health and Department of 
Ecology regarding the degree to which Department of Natural Resources (DNR) forestry 
practices contributed to pollution in the lake. The opinions affirmed the sufficiency of 
existing state forest rules, including the provisions of the 2000 Lake Whatcom bill, and 
thereby provided the certainty necessary to focus the Interjurisdictional Committee’s energy 
on other pertinent issues. 
 
Similarly, the citizen members of the Interjurisdictional Committee sought legal clarification 
via an Attorney General opinion when the group became bogged down in a debate over the 
appropriate relationship between the DNR and Committee. The opinion held that the 
Committee was to have an advisory role, which clarified the process boundaries and enabled 




A fourth trend that emerges from the cases concerns using the law to create options. 
Ironically, introducing new legal constraints can provide stakeholders with the flexibility to 
realize their trust land management goals. Both the Castle Valley Planning Process and 
Emerald Mountain Planning Process used this tactic by initiating a land exchange with the 
BLM. These potential land exchanges forced the Castle Valley Planning Process group and 
Emerald Mountain Partnership to work within the boundaries of a federal land agency’s 
mandate, as well as the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act and corresponding 
regulations, which guide BLM land exchanges.44 For the Castle Rock Collaboration (CRC) 
and School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, the land exchange provided a way 
to complete the planning effort, since the town of Castle Valley had distanced itself from the 
original planning contract. Many predict that this proposal will enable all participants to 
achieve their original goals, as explained by CRC leader Laura Kamala: “I’m very grateful 
that everything we did evolved into this wonderful opportunity for the land exchange … that 




Whereas the CRC pursued the BLM land exchange on its own initiative, a local BLM 
employee first suggested the option to the Emerald Mountain Partnership. Nevertheless, upon 
learning of this option, the Partnership proactively petitioned the State Land Board for its 
“blessing.”46 This land exchange proposal and accompanying legal constraints triggered 
fervent opposition from some residents outside of Steamboat Springs who did not want to 
lose nearby BLM lands. Most participants, however, share the enthusiasm of Castle Valley 
participants – they think the exchange will be a creative way to achieve both the multiple-use 
management vision for the Emerald Mountain parcel and State Land Board’s revenue 
goals.47 
 
SHAPING OR REALIZING THE OUTCOME 
 
Finally, participants in collaborative planning on state trust lands often create or need to 
create legal constraints to shape or realize the outcome. For example, legal action continues 
in the Lake Whatcom case, as Skagit County and the Mount Baker School District filed suit 
against the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) challenging the legality of the Lake 
Whatcom Landscape Plan. The pending lawsuit alleges that the original state legislation, 
which mandated the formation of the Interjurisdictional Committee, as well as the DNR’s 
Landscape Plan, benefited the local community at the expense of trust beneficiaries 
elsewhere in the state. Time will tell whether the development of these additional legal 
constraints will influence the final outcome of the planning process. For now, the DNR is 
moving forward with implementation of the Landscape Plan, enjoys greater community 
support than before and had its first timber sale approved since the 1999 legislation. 
 
Unlike the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process where litigation threatens future 
implementation, new legal boundaries need to be defined to realize both the Whitefish 
Neighborhood Plan and the HAMP. For the Whitefish Neighborhood Plan, a legislative 
change is needed to explicitly allow the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation 
(DNRC) to issue conservation easements to third parties like private property owners. Such 
an amendment is necessary because conservation easements are a key tool identified in the 
Neighborhood Plan to help the community and DNRC conserve local trust land parcels while 
still generating money for the trust.48 Currently, many argue that state law limits conservation 
easements to agreements between the DNRC and the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, 
as well as two specified nonprofits.49 The DNRC pushed for this legislation in April 2005, 
but the bill failed to gain the necessary support. The agency plans to push for similar 
legislation in the future.50 
 
Likewise, to implement the HAMP, the City of Tucson must amend its Land Use Code to 
establish a Planned Community District zone. This new zoning classification would allow for 
the implementation of the new planning concepts identified in the HAMP. The City expects 








LEGAL FLEXIBILITY OF STATE TRUST LAND MANAGEMENT  
 
As explored in the previous sections, collaborative planning on state trust lands inevitably 
implicates a variety of legal issues. Several case study participants mentioned, however, that 
collaboration is actually easier in the state trust land context than other natural resource 
contexts because trust land agencies are afforded greater legal flexibility than other state and 
federal agencies. Indeed, other studies of collaborative environmental problem-solving have 
found that laws like the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) tend to be inflexible, emphasizing agency control and 
locking agency and non-agency participants into set methods of participation. These legal 
constraints consequently can hinder the creativity necessary for collaboration.52 Moreover, 
they can limit who is invited to participate in the process, as was seen in the Elliott State 
Forest Planning Process in the context of the Endangered Species Act. 
 
For example, former Colorado Land Commissioner and Emerald Mountain Planning Process 
participant Charles Bedford has said that his agency had much more flexibility than federal 
agencies in choosing to collaborate with local communities: “State governments have so 
much more flexibility and leeway, even within the fiduciary mandate. I mean, every time you 
convene a group on the federal level, you have to go through the FACA process, which … 
makes for a very stiff kind of meeting.”53 Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration (SITLA) Assistant Director of Planning and Development and Castle Valley 
Planning Process participant Ric McBrier agreed and said that SITLA “absolutely” is more 
flexible and able to collaborate more easily with local communities than federal agencies.54 
According to McBrier, “if a professional manager [at SITLA] can see that [a collaborative 
approach] is in the beneficiaries’ best interest … then theoretically we should be free to do 
it.”55 
 
On the other hand, some participants of the Mesa del Sol process sought additional legal 
structure, like a NEPA process, to make the public input process easier and more comfortable 
for public interest groups.56 This desire for more clearly defined legal boundaries and 
organization could stem from the fact that the Mesa del Sol case did not involve an official 





HOW DO AGENCY STRUCTURE, CULTURE  
AND POLITICS INFLUENCE A COLLABORATIVE 
PLANNING PROCESS? 
 
State trust land agencies are unique among local, state and federal agencies because of their 
mandate and fiduciary responsibility. Despite the similarities in mandates and responsibilities 
across the seven Western states examined in this report, the institutional structure of trust 
land agencies in each state is different. While diversity is one commonality across agencies, 
the effect of institutional structure, culture and politics on collaborative processes that have 
occurred within the trust land agency environments share many similarities.  
 
The institutional structure of trust land agencies can also create avenues for access by 
communities and other interest groups that in many cases has served to initiate a 
collaborative process. Similarly, institutional culture can also create an unreceptive 
environment to collaboration or an inviting one. While agency culture is not easy to identify 
nor pin down, the history, institutional structure and an identity inextricably tied to the trust 
mandate inform the ways in which the trust land agency interacts with and responds to 
communities and other agencies. The seven trust land agencies examined in this report 
demonstrate some level of cultural adaptation to engage in collaborative processes. 
 
While the institutional structure and agency culture can be accounted for and the process can 
be molded to work within agency constraints, the effects of politics is difficult to quantify 
and account for. According to Souder and Fairfax, “we have been unable to demonstrate – or 
even to suggest enticingly – that whether the land commissioner is elected or appointed in 
tied to a discernable pattern of policy outcomes or priorities.”1 Through their research, 
Souder and Fairfax found that the political context of trust land management suggests that the 
political structure and setting of state decisions does not significantly influence the 
outcomes.2 Meaning, whether or not the commissioner is elected or appointed or the 
composition of the Land Board does not affect policy or management outcomes. This 
conclusion can also be applied to collaborative planning, because in its essence collaborative 
planning still comes down to an agency decision, albeit one with a more stakeholder input. In 
addition to the examples from the cases and Souder and Fairfax’s findings it is apparent that 
state trust land agency structure and culture can easily be adapted to participate in 
collaborative planning. 
 
The eight cases of collaborative planning on state trust land analyzed in this report 
demonstrate how state trust land institutional structure, culture, and political factors can 
affect collaborative planning processes. This chapter will elucidate the following themes that 
emerge from an analysis of the eight cases:  
 
• The effect of institutional structure on a collaborative process 
• The effect of state trust land agency culture on the process and outcome 




EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE ON COLLABORATIVE PROCESS  
 
There is wide variation in how state trust land agencies are organized. Souder and Fairfax 
described three administrative patterns into which all western trust land agencies fall: (1) the 
state land office is totally independent of other agencies; (2) the state land office is 
independent but is administratively overseen by a larger agency; or (3) the state land office is 
functionally integrated into another agency, sharing facilities and staff.3 New Mexico, Utah 
and Arizona are examples of the first category, with their highly autonomous land agencies. 
The Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR), who manages state trust land at 
the behest of the State Land Board, falls into the third category. The models developed by 
Souder and Fairfax are a useful framework for understanding the basic differences in 









Though Souder and Fairfax have not been able to conclusively relate patterns of management 
decisions to particular institutional arrangements on a broad scale, the institutional make-up 
of the seven trust land agencies examined in this report suggest that collaborative planning 
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Figure 16-1: Institutional Relationships in State Land Office Organization 
Note:  The organization of Colorado’s state land office changed per Amendment 16 in 1995. 
Source: Adapted from Jon A. Souder and Sally K. Fairfax, State Trust Lands: History, 
Management, & Sustainable Use (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 41. 
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processes are affected by the individual agency structure.4 The primary ways in which 
institutional structure affected the collaborative processes examined herein were access to the 
State Land Board, changes in agency structure, and term limits for elected officials. 
 
ACCESS TO THE STATE LAND BOARD 
 
Montana’s bi-level agency structure directly influenced the Whitefish Neighborhood 
Planning Process because it afforded community members access to the Montana State Board 
of Land Commissioners (State Land Board), thereby initiating the collaborative process. In 
Montana, the State Land Board is made up of the state’s five top elected officials: Governor 
(chair), Superintendent of Public Instruction, State Auditor, Secretary of State, and Attorney 
General. While the State Land Board provides oversight and has ultimate authority on trust 
land management, the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) is 
responsible for day-to-day management.5 In the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, a 
group of Whitefish community members formed an “Ad Hoc Committee” during the 
beginning months of the DNRC’s planning process to petition the State Land Board and 
express their concerns about the process. Participants have attributed the State Land Board’s 
support for the community to a number of reasons, including personal ties to the Whitefish 
area, similar liberal political leanings and the political inevitability of having to cater towards 
their constituents’ interests. Because the State Land Board fulfilled the community’s request 
and charted an Advisory Committee, the DNRC was forced to adopt a process outside the 
realm of what they initially had envisioned. The DNRC also lost some of its decision-making 
power, because the agency was forced to give up exclusive control of the process and 
become an Advisory Committee member.6 Not surprisingly, this change caused tension 
between agency staff and the community.7  
 
The trust land agency institutional structure in Washington is unique from other states 
examined in this research project because the agency is integrated into another agency – the 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR). The superstructure is such that the State 
Legislature acts as trustee by enacting laws that protect trust assets while the DNR serves as 
trust manager. The DNR management activities are controlled by the Board of Natural 
Resources, which sets overall policy objectives. The 6-member board consists of: 
Commissioner of Public Lands, Governor or governor’s designee, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, Dean of University of Washington College of Forest Resources, Dean of 
Washington State University College of Agriculture and Home Economics, a County 
Commissioner from a county that contains Forest Board trust land. The Commissioner 
appoints the Supervisor and both run day-to-day management of the trust. The Board’s 
involvement is confined mainly to approval of land transactions.8 Despite the fact that the 
DNR acts as trust manager for the Board, it has less autonomy within the Washington 
institutional structure.  
 
With the State Legislature acting as trustee, the Washington trust land institutional structure 
is accessible to constituents and interest groups. Prior to the establishment of the formal Lake 
Whatcom Landscape Planning Process Bellingham-area residents Linda Marrom and Jamie 
Berg, concerned about logging above their homes, contacted their local state legislators. 
Senator Harriet Spanel was responsive to the issues raised by Berg and Marrom and 
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eventually sponsored the State Senate bill that mandated the Lake Whatcom Landscape 
Planning Process. The legislative mandate created an underlying tension within the 
collaborative process between the DNR and community representatives that was highlighted 
when Doug Sutherland was elected Commissioner, replacing Jennifer Belcher, the previous 
Commissioner who was more supportive of the process. Richard Rodriguez, the Department 
of Health representative on the Lake Whatcom DNR Landscape Planning Committee, noted 
that “it would not have happened in my mind if there was not a legislative mandate to do it.”9 
Bill McCourt, the city of Bellingham’s representative, put it more frankly, “It wasn’t a group 
getting together because they all had a common interest. DNR had a gun to their head.”10 The 
DNR viewed membership in the Committee as ceding some of its decision making authority, 
something it wished to avoid, and felt relinquishing decision-making authority was 
inconsistent with the language in the bill passed in 2000. While not stated explicitly, it 
appeared there were negative feelings created by the legislative mandate that affected the 
collaborative process by creating an atmosphere of mistrust between the Committee and 
DNR. This in turn led could have contributed to the dispute over decision making authority 
of the Committee. However, despite these challenges, the process did have several benefits 
including shared expertise, more informed decisions, local support for the Landscape Plan, 
more protective resource management strategies and greater local acceptance of DNR 
activities. 
 
Oregon’s Department of State Lands (DSL) operates under a similar management structure 
as Washington, albeit with a simpler hierarchical superstructure. The State Land Board 
(SLB) oversees and sets the direction of policy and management for Oregon trust lands. It is 
comprised of the three highest executive elected officials in the state, the Governor, Secretary 
of State and State Treasurer. The DSL is responsible for day-to-day management of trust 
lands; however the department contracts with the Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) to 
manage forest lands. The DSL agency head, the Director, is appointed by the SLB. Because 
of the bi-level structure of the DSL and Land Board, both the Elliott Forest Management Plan 
(FMP) and Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) must go through two levels of approval once it 
is completed by the staff at the ODF – one for DSL approval and the second for Land Board 
approval. With the Land Board composed of elected officials with a bevy of other 
responsibilities, the members have a limited amount of time they can spend on trust land 
issues. Steve Thomas, Assistant State Forester and member of the Steering Committee, sums 
up his feelings: 
 
The Land Board is made of people you just don’t get at meetings to talk about 
things. When at official board meetings you get an hour, it’s like manna from 
heaven, and it’s like nirvana. Usually you get 10 minutes. Typically you end 
up talking to them through their assistants.11  
 
While the final decision-makers are less accessible because of their other duties, in the past 
they have been supportive of DSL management style. Despite the assurance of past support, 
the Steering Committee has decided to be conservative in increasing the timber harvest on 
the forest to ensure that the HCP will be approved by the federal government and at the same 
time leaving room for the Land Board to make policy decisions. Since this process is still 
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unfolding it is difficult to ascertain how the bi-level structure will affect the process until it is 
complete, or rather until the final versions of both the FMP and HCP go before the SLB. 
 
CHANGE IN INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE  
 
The institutional structure of Colorado’s trust land agency was altered during the Emerald 
Mountain Planning Process, ushering in a new agency that was designed to be more receptive 
to community input. At the outset of the collaborative process the State Land Board (SLB) 
was comprised of three full-time salaried commissioners appointed by the governor. This 
SLB was characterized as being reactionary and planned for short term. It operated under the 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) with six district offices throughout the state. Post 
Amendment 16, the structure of the SLB was transformed, replacing the traditional structure 
with a five-member volunteer board that had broader geographical representation, expertise, 
and constituencies. The SLB maintains some restrictions on collaboration in that it cannot 
legally provide an indirect benefit to parties who are not formal beneficiaries.12 However, 
according to Beverly Rave, the northwest representative for the SLB, once this constraint is 
factored into the process the agency has “plenty of flexibility within that.”13 The hierarchical 
structure of the Colorado SLB proved to be a frustration for members of the Emerald 
Mountain Partnership Advisory Council. Beverly Rave, a representative of the SLB, had to 
frequently consult the Denver office on issues that came up during the process, such as 
extending the Memorandum of Agreement.14 Despite these frustrations, having Rave as a 
regional representative for the SLB made it more possible to have a viable local solution. 
Furthermore it enabled and empowered the process because, as a local representative Rave 
served as an important liaison to improve communication between the Emerald Mountain 
Partnership and the SLB. 
 
TERM LIMITATIONS  
 
Similar to Arizona and Utah, the New Mexico State Land Office (SLO) enjoys a fair amount 
of self-determination. The elected Commissioner of Public Lands has final “unchecked” 
decision-making authority - unchecked meaning no board oversight and an independent 
agency.15 The Commissioner is advised by the Office of the General Council and the State 
Land Trusts. According to the Enabling Act, the Commissioner can only serve a maximum of 
two consecutive four year terms. This has been a limiting factor in the Mesa del Sol 
collaborative process because Commissioners Baca and Powell were not able to see this 
process through during their tenures in office, thus Powell had to hand over Mesa to the 
current Commissioner, Patrick Lyons. Changes in administration caused the process to be 
delayed on numerous occasions. In additions to delays the uncertainty of the interests and 
political agendas of the incoming Commissioners in the future were also apparent in the 
Mesa del Sol Planning Process. Bill Elliott Communications Director for the Albuquerque 
National Dragway located on Mesa del Sol was worried about the Dragway’s long-term 
future: “It’s a little touchy subject and … who knows what’s going to happen. I know we 
don’t have problems with Patrick Lyons but the election is next year and he’s only got four 





HOW AGENCY CULTURE AFFECTS COLLABORATION 
 
State trust land agency culture is informed by the interpretation of the constitutional mandate, 
fiduciary responsibility, agency history, state history and politics, and types of land managed. 
This amalgam of historical, political and economic responsibilities creates the context in 
which trust land agencies operate on a day-to-day basis. The context often determines how 
the trust land agency interacts with other agencies and the public. These interactions have 
changed remarkably since the 1960s and early 1970s when pivotal legislation on state and 
federal levels refocused managers’ attention on their trust obligations to the beneficiary. Prior 
to this point, trust land programs, as described by Souder and Fairfax, were, “rather cozy 
undertakings directed primarily at meeting the needs of the lessees.”17 Other trends and 
strategies have also emerged to affect the general culture of trust land agencies; these include 
but are not limited to attention from the environmental community advocating resource 
protection and recreational access; urban expansion; and perhaps most importantly the 
economic growth and social climate of the western United States.  
 
In addition to affecting the relationships an agencies has with those outside of it, institutional 
culture is also the lens through which trust land agencies see the world. Therefore, it can have 
a significant impact on a collaborative planning process. Institutional culture can be an 
impediment or a facilitating factor to engaging in a collaborative process. According to Culp 
et al, on a broader level, state trust land managers share many of the same barriers to 
collaboration as public agencies including resource constraints and institutional norms that 
prevent or discourage them from engaging in collaborative processes.18 Some observers have 
noted that agencies have a significant amount of bureaucratic inertia and resist change, 
making it difficult to engage in nontraditional types of processes.19 According to Wondolleck 
and Yaffee, working within a pre-existing institutional framework can affect organizational 
structure and norms in the sense that participation in collaborative processes often requires 
organizations and institutions to reexamine and revise their traditional management styles.20  
 
The amorphous nature of culture does not lend itself to be easily defined nor its affects easily 
observed. That being said, the influence of agency culture on collaborative efforts observed 
in the eight cases ran the gamut from direct to indirect affects. The cases where culture 
influenced the process drew on themes including: (1) concern about abdicating all or part of 
decision-making power as a result of being part of a collaborative process; (2) uncertainty 
about accepting help from outside sources; (3) trust land agency interaction with 
communities and other agencies; (4) perception of trust land agencies; and (5) integration of 
collaboration within trust land agency operating procedures 
 
Dealing with institutional challenges and culture can pose one of the more significant barriers 
for trust land agencies to engage in collaborative processes. Wondolleck and Yaffee state 
that, rather than abandoning traditional styles altogether, groups can work to find balance 
between collaboration and traditional management style.21 For instance, agencies can take 
advantage of their expertise to retain ultimate decision-making authority, but do so in a way 
that is conducive to collaboration. Because participants typically face limited resources, 
agency expertise is often welcomed by the process group.22 The perceived inability for state 
trust land management agencies to make concessions – bound by mandate – not necessarily a 
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limiting factor but a challenge nonetheless. For example the Colorado State Land Board 
(SLB) cannot legally provide indirect benefits to parties who are not formal beneficiaries. 
What ever solution reached has to be in the best interest of the trust. While this was 
frustrating for some participants once this limitation was acknowledged it ceased to become a 
limiting factor to the forward movement of the process. Additionally, the change in the SLB 
structure as a result of Amendment 16 required the new SLB to comply with local land use 
regulations and plans. This further opened the door for collaborative work with the local 
communities and the new regional representation also facilitates collaboration as well.  
 
AUTONOMY TO COLLABORATE  
 
While bureaucratic barriers to collaboration do exist, all of the trust land agencies featured in 
this research project have demonstrated an ability to adapt their agency’s mandate to engage 
in collaborative planning. The most challenging aspect of the adaptations has been working 
within the confines of their constitutional mandate and allowing outside parties to contribute 
to a planning process that normally would occur solely inside the agency. Utah’s School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA) is a notable example of this adaptation. By 
all accounts SITLA is more flexible and able to collaborate with communities, more so than 
federal government agencies, for example. SITLA is afforded this level of flexibility because 
the Utah State Legislature set up the rules governing it to allow the agency a significant 
amount of autonomy. Because of its freedom and clarity of mandate, SITLA is often 
described by Assistant Director of Planning and Development, Ric McBrier, as a “quasi-
private” agency.23 The agency is self-funded and experiences the full support of the Utah 
State Legislature. In many respects SITLA has the most freedom, compared to the other trust 
land agencies discussed, to engage in a collaborative effort, albeit contingent on the support 
of the State Land Board. McBrier stated that SITLA is “absolutely” more flexible and able to 
collaborate with local communities than federal agencies.24 McBrier went on to state that, “If 
a professional manager [at SITLA] can see that [a collaborative approach] is in the 
beneficiaries’ best interest, and how do you figure that out without probing into it, then 
theoretically we should be free to do it.”25 However, that being said, SITLA and McBrier 
also have the freedom to walk away from the process if they feel that the process is no longer 
in the best interest of the trust. SITLA Director Kevin Carter described the unilateral power 
held by SITLA: “If it’s too much hassle to deal with the local community, I’ll just sell the 
land and walk away from it. It’s always a valid question, ‘Is what I could potentially get out 
of a collaborative process worth the effort?’”26 SITLA’s culture, in many ways grounded in 
their autonomy as an agency, was a key ingredient to the agency’s participation in the Castle 




The Arizona State Land Department (ASLD) has a somewhat similar structure to SITLA, in 
that the ASLD can act autonomously or they can work with outside interests in a 
collaborative process. However the culture of the agency has been informed by a different 
context, history and leadership. The ASLD had historically focused on natural resource 
management, however as a result of The Urban Lands Act, Growing Smarter and Growing 
Smarter Plus Legislation, The Arizona Preservation Initiative, and the location of trust land 
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in developing urban areas has made the agency more focused on urban growth issues, real 
estate sales, and land use planning. Despite the shift in focus, the ASLD had frequently 
worked with local communities and agencies on management issues, often serving in a 
resource role. According to Commissioner Mark Winkleman, he was: 
 
Personally always a proponent of trying to work with people and accomplish 
something. While we can sit back and say, “Well, we’re the state and we’re 
not going to listen to your plan and if you don’t like our plan we’re going to 
take our ball and go home,” that really doesn’t further our mission of 
generating revenue.27  
 
The culture of the agency enabled the Land Commissioner to make that decision on the level 
of agency participation and the capacity of the interaction with local communities. The 
Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP) Process differed slightly from other cases examined in 
this report because the Process was convened by the City of Tucson and as the major 
landowner in the area, the ASLD was invited to participate on the Citizens Review 
Committee (CRC). The HAMP Process was perceived as the City’s project rather than 
ASLD’s project. Additionally, the ASLD believed that in order to engage in collaborative 
planning it must also make sure it was protecting its interests and potential benefits for the 
trust, requiring it to find a balance between participating and maintaining its authority. As 
stated by the ASLD’s Gordon Taylor: 
 
We’ve found that if we get put on a committee, like a general planning 
committee … and then they craft their document and we’re listed as one of 
the people that supported it – even though we may object to certain elements 
of it – by virtue of our association … there’s tacitly the buy in … and that 
could be conceivably used by the community to leverage the Department on 
various land issues.28 
 
Adds Commissioner Winkleman, “The challenge for us is accepting help and accomplishing 
something, but not having somebody undermine our goals and satisfy their own to the 
detriment of the beneficiaries and us … that is the tension that always goes with these 
processes.”29 The desire to be cautious and strategic about who they partnered with was 
evident in the fact that the ASLD chose to participate advisory role throughout the HAMP 
process. This decision was also derived from the agency’s efforts to balance maintaining 
authority and asking for help. Commissioner Winkleman further elaborated on the ASLD’s 
efforts to strategically balance these elements when engaging in a collaborative planning 
process: 
  
We don’t have enough people and we don’t have the money to do an adequate 
job. One of the things I’ve stressed since I’ve been here is we’re going to 
accept the help and embrace the help as much as we can … but if someone 
can truly help us, let them help us because we can’t adequately help ourselves 
… so the challenge for us is accepting help and accomplishing something, but 
not having somebody undermine our goals and satisfy their own to the 




Having the ASLD participating in an advisory role was also a source of frustration for the 
CRC members because it created uncertainty whether or not the ASLD would use the HAMP 
as a guide since they were under no legal obligation to follow it. The strategy employed by 
the ASLD about receiving help in development and land use planning in addition not 
maintaining the role as the absolute decision-maker has colored the way the agency had 
participated in the HAMP Process.  
 
The culture of the City of Tucson also played a role in the formation and CRC representation 
in the HAMP Process. The City of Tucson decided to employ a collaborative process largely 
because the existing culture of the city is such that residents expect to be engaged. The City 
has maintained a long tradition of involving broad segments of representation from the 
community in land use and urban planning processes. Albert Elias, Director of Tucson’s 
Department of Urban Planning and Design stated that public involvement and collaboration 
is “the expectation of the community and the expectation of our elected officials.”31 
 
PERCEPTION OF AGENCY  
 
For an agency with a clear mandate and strong sense of identity participating in a 
collaborative process can sometimes create a feeling that the trust land agency is losing a 
degree control in how they are perceived by the public at-large. While participating in the 
Southeast New Mexico Working Group, New Mexico’s State Land Office (SLO) considered 
the risks associated with participating as related to public perception of the organization and 
its mission. David Coss, Director of Field Operations at the SLO, voiced a concern that the 
SLO would be misconstrued as a “mini BLM.” He continued:  
 
We don’t want to be confused with the Bureau of Land Management. I think 
that was one of our biggest issues of keeping our separateness of a state trust 
with trust responsibilities that is not a federal land management agency. 
We’re in a different category. And we didn’t want that to get blurred. The oil 
people and the ranchers know that. But the general public doesn’t know 
that.32  
 
The concerns expressed by Coss were largely alleviated by the end of the process. However, 
clearly the culture of the agency is deeply rooted in desire to be seen as a distinct entity and 
not as a smaller part of a larger land management agency. Though this concern could exist 
when a trust land agency or other city, county, state or federal agency engages in a 
collaborative process, the experience of the SLO in the Southeast New Mexico Working 
Group indicates that this fear can be assuaged through education within the process as to the 
role of the agency. 
 
PRE-EXISTING INCORPORATION OF COLLABORATION  
 
The culture of the Oregon’s Department of State Lands (DSL) has evolved in the past six 
years to more actively involve a wider array of stakeholders in Common School Land 
management. The impetus for this shift was derived from Director of State Lands Ann 
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Hanus’ desire to increase beneficiary involvement in DSL activities and to allow them to 
provide input on land and revenue management. For example, she organized a large group of 
representatives from the Oregon teacher’s union, school administrators and Parent Teacher 
Associations and other education interest groups to become involved in Children’s Land 
Alliance Supporting Schools (CLASS), a west wide beneficiary organization. The wider 
array of stakeholders invited to participate in the Elliott State Forest Planning Process, 
outside of traditional agency personnel, also demonstrate the agencies shift to a more 
inclusive management style. The nontraditional stakeholders that participated in the Planning 
Process Steering Committee included Coos County Commissioner John Griffith and the 
Superintendent of the South Coast Educational Service District, Rick Howell. Griffith served 
as a representative of local area County Commissioners while Howell represented the 
beneficiaries.  
 
In addition to the Elliott Planning Process, in the last six years the DSL has used 
collaboration more widely to manage other types of land. For example, the Rangeland 
Advisory Committees invite beneficiary representatives, environmentalists, ranchers and 
scientists in determining the best long term management plans for rangeland leasing. This 
decision also highlights the increasing inclusion of outside interest groups in state-wide 
Common School Land management. 
 
HOW CHANGING CULTURE DURING COLLABORATION AFFECTS THE PROCESS  
 
Once a trust land agency becomes involved in a collaborative planning process, its culture 
often adapts to allow it to further engage in the process and to facilitate a better outcome. 
Change can result from dealing with process challenges, that once overcome shape the 
manner in which the agency interacts with the public and other agencies in the future. 
 
The overhaul of the Colorado State Land Board (SLB) as a result of Amendment 16 also 
fostered the development of an institutional culture that better able to interact with regional 
communities. The amendment required the SLB to comply with local land use regulations 
and created a Board with a broader geographical representation.33 The new culture of the 
SLB was one of many factors that allowed it to issue the five-year planning lease and the 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to the Emerald Mountain Partnership. The MOA and 
the lease gave the group legitimacy and an incentive to see the process through. The MOA 
specified that the Partnership would purchase the Emerald Mountain parcel at market value 
within five years, based on a current appraisal. With the MOA in place, the SLB could not 
consider any other offers for the parcel for the term of the agreement. While this empowered 
the Partnership and bound the SLB for a period of time, there was also a balancing act at 
play. Charles Bedford, former Land Commissioner, stated that: 
 
The risk was creating expectations that the plan – whatever plan they came up 
with – was going to be accepted … You have to balance it because they have 
to believe that something that they are doing is going to be meaningful, and 




Bedford also acknowledged that giving the community an opportunity to develop a plan for 
trust land management also requires a certain amount of faith from the SLB. He added, “You 
have to in your heart believe that what they’re going to come up with is going to be 
something you can work with.”35 
 
The mindset shift within the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation  
(DNRC), as non-traditional uses of land were becoming more common in Montana, resulted  
in mixed messages from the DNRC during the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process. 
The disconnect between the local DNRC and the Helena DNRC staff created multiple 
sources of agency inconsistency that contributed to confusion among the Advisory 
Committee regarding the agency’s intentions and effectiveness. As a result, the Committee 
members felt that the DNRC was not engaging in an honest process. 36 In an effort to remedy 
the situation, the DNRC made some personnel adjustments to ensure that the staff involved 
in the process was of a similar mindset and could convey a more consistent message. The 
change improved DNRC involvement in the Planning Process and resulted in greater access 
to information for the Advisory Committee. According to Alan Elm, Chairman of the 
Advisory Committee, meetings with DNRC Trust Lands Management Division 
Administrator, Tom Schultz, enabled him to dispel his concerns that DNRC staff in Helena 
was manipulating the process. 37 The personnel changes within the DNRC went a long way in 
dispelling the mistrust that had built up between the agency and the Advisory Committee. 
 
 
HOW POLITICS AFFECT COLLABORATIVE PROCESSES 
 
Political factors can be brought into a collaborative process when participants are elected 
officials. For example, politics can affect collaborative processes in any number of ways. 
Politics can be the initiator of a collaborative process, as in the case of the Lake Whatcom 
Landscape Planning Process, or politics can pose significant barriers to the process as seen in 
the Mesa del Sol Planning Process. Politics are related to agency structure in that the 
institutional structure can allow for either increased or fewer avenues for collaboration or 
dissention. The involvement of elected officials can also lend a sense of legitimacy and 
accountability to the process and they can levy resources. The affect of politics varies from 
case to case. It is not something that can be accounted for or planned for in future 
collaborations. Those looking at engaging in collaborative processes should be aware that 
politics can serve as both a facilitating factor and an impediment to the process. 
 
The way in which state trust land agencies fit into the broader framework of state politics can 
influence the collaborative planning process, both directly and indirectly. Souder and Fairfax 
state that, “the relative power of the land office in state policy decisions compared to other 
state agencies is important. Total independence, while it allows focus on trust goals, may 
weaken the trustee politically.”38 Though it is arguable whether or not the near 20-year delay 
of the Mesa del Sol Planning Process was the result of State Land Office (SLO) being unable 
to influence policy decisions outside its traditional realm of land management, the series of 
Commissioners that attempted to get the development through Albuquerque city government 
were limited by the city’s approval of the plan. The SLO also had to deal with obstructions 
put in place by the University of New Mexico (UNM) Board of Regents, who was seeking 
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greater profits from the development plan. The Mesa del Sol parcel is located on the 
Southeast side of Albuquerque, the opposite side of the city where many political leaders in 
the city and the State Legislature have development interests. 
 
USING POLITICS TO GAIN INFLUENCE OVER DECISION-MAKING  
 
Agency structure and politics can allow avenues for constituents to gain influence over 
decision making. This influence can serve as the impetus for the creation of the collaborative 
process or it can broader the scope of the process to include a wider array of stakeholder 
representation. 
 
Trust land agencies with elected Land Commissioners and Land Boards can make a 
collaborative process more subject to local, regional and state-wide politics than agencies in 
which the Commissioner is appointed, for example. Elected Commissioners and Land Boards 
have a dual obligation to best serve the interests of the trust and constituents. Collaborative 
processes can be managed with those obligations in mind, with the added benefit of likely 
producing good public relations between the trust land agency and the public. However, the 
Commissioner’s responsibility to his or her constituency can make collaborative processes 
more political, as the Commissioner attempts to balance public interests than can impede a 
collaborative process. Conversely, the State Land Boards often have less direct political 
accountability with respect to the management of the trust. In the case of the Whitefish 
Neighborhood Planning Process, the fact that most of the elected members of the Montana 
State Land Board shared the same political affiliation as many local residents created the 
perception that the Whitefish community consequently was able to garner significant support 
for their interests. Because the structure of the State Land Board is inextricably tied politics, 
it compromised the effectiveness of the DNRC, which struggled to maintain its authority 
while serving on the Advisory Committee. Other committee members were able to use the 
schism between the two entities to get more of their interests heard during the process.39 The 
State Land Board and DNRC eventually recognized that this disconnect hindered the 
effectiveness of the planning process. They were able to overcome the challenges inherent in 
this bi-level management structure by committing to work as a united front to ensure that the 
State Land Board did not put the agency in a compromising position. 
 
Though New Mexico Land Commissioner Lyons enjoys nearly complete autonomy within 
the State Land Office (SLO), as an elected Commissioner he also has a responsibility to his 
constituents. For example, after narrowly winning his election in 2002, Bill Elliott, 
Communications Director from the Dragway that leases a section of the Mesa del Sol parcel, 
made a call to Lyons the day after his victory. Lyons had been declared victorious by a 
margin of 8,000 votes and the Dragway had strongly supported his campaign. Elliott 
remembers what he said during the conversation, “Patrick, congratulations and I want you to 
know that there’s exactly 8,000 drag racers in the state of New Mexico.”40 Soon after taking 
office, Lyons, re-issued the Dragway’s five-year lease.41 While the managers of the Dragway 
still harbor fears that it will not be included in the development of Mesa del Sol, it and other 
drag racing interests have vowed to campaign heavily for the re-election of Commissioner 
Lyons in 2006.42 Therefore, in many cases constituent interests and access to politicians can 
put issues on the table that might have otherwise been discarded. For example, having a 
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dragway on the same block of land as a multiple-use planned community is not something 
one would typically see in other urban development projects.  
 
One of the prime motivations for Commissioner Lyons to become engaged in the Southeast 
New Mexico Working Group was to look out for his constituents’ interests in addition to the 
interests of the trust. Arguably chief among these interests was preventing economic fallout 
for oil and gas leasing were the lesser prairie chicken listed as a federally threatened species. 
States Commissioner Lyons: 
 
If the prairie chicken was listed as endangered, there would be an economic 
fallout in NM, a tremendous economic fallout. If you couldn’t produce oil and 
gas down there, then you could lose millions and millions of dollars. Probably 
a couple hundred million dollars.43 
 
It is likely that the protection of habitat for the lesser prairie chicken would not have an 
important priority for Lyons and the SLO had it not had such large potential impact on oil 
and gas leasing. Lyons also recognized that it was in the interest of the trust to have 
consistent land management across different agencies’ land to make future management 
easier. He also had to recognize and be responsive to the needs of rural communities in New 
Mexico and how they would be affected if the prairie chicken was listed as a federally 
threatened species.44 The issues at play within the Working Group were highly political thus 
allowing unlikely outcomes such as the conservation of potentially threatened species to 
occur along with those serving more traditional oil and gas industry interests. 
 
USING POLITICS TO IMPEDE THE COLLABORATIVE PROCESS  
 
Politics and by extent, politicians, can use their influence, access to resources and legitimacy 
to hinder a collaborative process. Impediments can occur for a number of reasons, primarily 
when the process represents interests that are diametrically opposed to politician’s interests, 
or because the politician perceives the process as a threat to his or her power.  
 
The succession of Commissioners that pushed the Mesa del Sol Planning Process along were 
continually subject to the need to balance constituency interests and play politics. While the 
New Mexico Commissioner is sometimes considered as powerful as the Governor for 
example, his or her power only resides within the confines of trust land management. 
Additionally, the Commissioner is also susceptible, as any elected official is, to the approval 
of his or her constituents and the ability to garner public support for State Land Office (SLO) 
projects. The SLO was also vulnerable to the political pressures exerted by the University of 
New Mexico (UNM) despite the fact that they were technically outside of the process. The 
UNM had little authority to design the details of the Mesa del Sol development. However, 
they were successful in putting up roadblocks to stall or maneuver the process to further their 
beneficiary interests of gaining a higher percentage of the profits from the development. The 
UNM used political power to influence the city of Albuquerque to stall development on the 
Mesa del Sol parcel when they were not fully satisfied with the plan. These tactics served to 
both stall and prolong the process outside of the collaborative relationship and sometimes 
created a significant amount of mistrust between the UNM Board of Regents and the SLO. 
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The SLO was forced to wait for times in which relationships with the UNM Board of 
Regents was more productive to continue the Mesa del Sol Planning Process.45  
 
The Mesa del Sol Planning Process was also susceptible to local government political 
interests. When the land was annexed to the city of Albuquerque, the forward momentum of 
the collaborative process depended in part on the support of local area politicians. This 
highly political environment forced the SLO and a series of Land Commissioners to rely on 
“political windows of opportunity.”46 However there were many “closed windows” and 
barriers along the way. One such barrier was Albuquerque Mayor Martin Chavez who stalled 
the annexation of Mesa del Sol because he saw it as competition for west-side development 
interests. Chavez had also just come off a term serving as State Senator for Albuquerque’s 
west side and their development interests and was suspected to have personal investments in 
west side development.47 
 
Elections can affect the way a trust land agency is managed, and as a result affect a 
collaborative planning process. The November 2000 election of Doug Sutherland as 
Commissioner of Public Lands had a deleterious effect on the Lake Whatcom Landscape 
Planning Process. Many committee participants acknowledged that that with Commissioner 
Sutherland’s arrival, the DNR returned to its more traditional, timber production and focused 
policies.48 It was also noted that there was a philosophical difference between the 
management styles and priorities of the two commissioners. The previous Commissioner, 
Jennifer Belcher was remembered as a strong environmentalist. Commissioner Sutherland, 
on the other hand, was noted for his strong record of fiscal management.49 This change in 
philosophies resulted greater participation from DNR employees from the Olympia office, 
who by some accounts were predisposed to the new Commissioner’s mindset.50 Ultimately, 
outside facilitation team was called in to regain balance in meetings. Later on many thought 
that the Commissioner stalled the approval of the FEIS because he did not want to approve 
the plan.  
 
Local politics can impact a collaborative process because they can exacerbate problems 
between people and interests that exist already. The Castle Valley Planning Process is a case 
in point. The local politics in the small town of Castle Valley were highly contentious before 
the planning process; however, the uncertainties surrounding the role and responsibilities of 
the town government and the Planning and Zoning Commission created a schism that 
ultimately broke down the process. The town’s role as a government entity was not well 
established, creating obstacles to the process as well as confusion. For example, Mayor Bruce 
Keeler was involved with the Castle Rock Collaboration (CRC) at the beginning of the 
process, but was eventually advised to separate himself from the organization and planning 
process less he comprise his role as an elected official of the town. Additionally, the 
members of the Planning and Zoning Commission felt that they could not incorporate the 
work that had been done during the planning process into the new town ordinances. This 
feeling was derived from at least one individual who felt that the CRC did not represent the 
entire town and that SITLA was acting disingenuously within the scope of the process. In this 





POLITICS AS A FACILITATING FACTOR TO COLLABORATION  
 
Politics also can help move along a collaborative process. This facilitation can come in the 
form of a committed political leader or one who can use his or her party affiliation to garner 
support from interests that would not normally participate. Political support for a 
collaborative process can move the process forward in a more expedient manner. It also 
draws attention to the process, create legitimacy and accountability and allow for things to 
occur that might not have otherwise. 
 
Politicians can lend legitimacy to a collaborative process simply by participating and being 
able to bridge a divide between diametrically opposed stakeholder groups. They can also 
provide resources and a greater sense of accountability to a process. Routt County 
Commissioner, Ben Beall, was able to lend his legitimacy as a political and well-respected 
figure to the Emerald Mountain Planning Process. Beall had spearheaded the local Emerald 
Mountain planning effort from its inception and immediately following the formalization of 
the process, he was elected chairman of the Emerald Mountain Partnership. The Steamboat 
Springs City Council also lent legitimacy to the process by participating in the Partnership. In 
addition to creating legitimacy within the process, the Partnership was able to leverage a 
greater sense of accountability and high level political support in the proposed land exchange 
with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). A local BLM staffer had broached the idea 
with the Partnership that they explore a land exchange with the agency. This was a turning 
point in the process because the exchange would meet the interests of both the local 
community and the Colorado State Land Board. When the land exchange was being 
considered by the legislature, the members of the Partnership met with Governor Owens and 
state senators to get letters of support and ultimately garnered extensive political support for 
the land exchange. 
 
The Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, while it had its share of political 
roadblocks, duly benefited from committed political leader State Senator Harriet Spanel. 
Senator Spanel spearheaded the passage of the legislation that mandated the process after 
being approached by the Bellingham community members. Her motivation in playing such 
an active role was to be responsive to her constituents and a broader concern for 
environmental issues. Senator Spanel’s district includes Lake Whatcom and she has long 
been involved in issues pertaining to natural resources, and had served as a member of 
several natural resource and environment-related committees. She was interested in these 
issues before she was approached by Linda Marrom and Jamie Berg to support the legislation 
that eventually mandated the collaborative process. Senator Spanel sponsored Bill 5536 and 
was able to pass its scaled back version (including only the Lake Whatcom area) with 
unanimous support on July 25, 1999.51 
 
The Mesa del Sol process also benefited from a committed politician. Former Commissioner 
Ray Powell worked diligently to get the lease for the Mesa del Sol development in place as a 
legacy to his tenure as Commissioner. The lease for Mesa del Sol was signed on the last day 
of his term in office. This was a critical moment in the process because the incoming 
Commissioner, Patrick Lyons, said he would not have used a single private sector partner - 
Forest City Covington (FCC) LLP - or as much state-organized collaboration with other 
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stakeholders. Because the FCC had already signed the lease contract, it was more attractive 
for Commissioner Lyons to continue the Mesa del Sol project.52  
 
Commissioners in New Mexico serve a maximum of two consecutive four-year terms, thus 
each new commissioner can enter office with an entirely new set of beliefs and policies.53 
This lack of continuity can disable a collaborative process. It was fortunate that 
Commissioner Lyons was willing to continue with the process. Powell was successfully able 
to set the stage such that the Mesa del Sol development was able to continue. The Mesa del 
Sol Planning Process was defined by the both Commissioners’ ability to persevere and utilize 
key political windows of opportunity.  
 
HOW DID INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICS AFFECT PROCESS OUTCOMES? 
 
Clearly, the institutional structure of the state trust land agencies and politics affected the 
collaborative planning processes. Souder and Fairfax also note that the trust mandate is not 
an “antidote to political reality: the trust mandate does not insulate trust managers from 
political pressure or prevent them from making politically expedient responses to such 
pressure.”54 The affect of the combination of both structure and politics can be seen in the 
outcomes of these processes. In general, the outcomes ended up being more “creative” than 
typical agency land management decisions. For example, perceived political support from the 
State Land Board empowered the Whitefish Advisory Committee to push for only four 
percent development in the final Neighborhood Plan. Had the Department of Natural 
Resources and Conservation completed the Plan alone or had more control over its substance, 
it is likely that they would have included more development than is currently proposed in the 
Plan. Similarly, the Southeast New Mexico Working Group was able to remove some state 
trust lands from oil and gas leasing as a result of Commissioner Lyon’s ability to catalyze 
support from the oil and gas industries, which normally would not have supported such an 
endeavor. 
 
Conversely, politics and institutional structure served to delay other collaborative processes. 
The Mesa del Sol Planning Process has already taken more than 20 years to complete. This 
can also be attributed to the fact that the process was largely informal; however much of the 
delays were the result of political moves to stall the plan. The Lake Whatcom Planning 
Process also experience delays. These occurred when the DNR decided to conduct an 
Environmental Impact Statement that the Committee members felt was unnecessary. The 









HOW IS A COLLABORATIVE PLANNING PROCESS 
STRUCTURED TO BE EFFECTIVE?  
 
The collaborative planning literature reveals that a process should be designed and managed 
well. The eight cases explored in this report each reveal important lessons about process 
structure and provide examples of both effective and ineffective process structure planning. 
 
Creating an effective process structure is important to increasing the group’s sense of 
ownership over the process and key to ensuring that individual stakeholder goals are met 
through the process. Bill Wallace, the Northwest Regional Manager of the Washington 
Department of Natural Resources, participated in the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning 
Process. Wallace commented that it is important to “get some of the key stakeholders 
together to decide what the process should be, so that there is some ownership of what the 
process will be.”1 
 
Asking questions about the group’s objectives, timeframe and methods of representation is a 
crucial step in setting up any collaborative process. Wallace recommended that any 
collaborative planning group ask themselves, “What kind of outcome do we want? What kind 
of a timeframe do we want? Who should be represented on the committee? What are some 
processes that we have some experience with?”2  
 
Several structural elements emerge as important components to consider when deciding on 
the structure of a collaborative process including how the process is organized and structured, 
how the process deals with decision making and how the process is managed. All of these 
important structural elements are considered in the following analysis, using examples found 
in the eight cases in this report. These elements include: 
 
How the process is organized and structured: 
 
• Creating an initial process design 
• Dealing with issues of representation and participation 
• Defining stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities 
• Organizing subcommittees or task forces 
 
How the process deals with decision making: 
 
• Establishing ground rules 
• Establishing decision rules 
 
How the process is managed: 
 
• Agreeing upon and setting objectives 
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• Setting timelines and deadlines 
• Building understanding among process participants 
• Deciding whether to have open or closed meetings 
• Addressing hidden agendas and attrition 
• Dealing with external state or federal processes 
 
 
HOW THE PROCESS IS ORGANIZED AND STRUCTURED 
 
INITIAL PROCESS DESIGN 
 
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to organizing a successful structure for a collaborative 
planning process. Instead, the design of the process should be tailored to the specific context 
in which it exists. Some successful structural elements that can be helpful to collaborative 
planning processes include creating a charter, bylaws and a leadership structure and 
incorporating as or partnering with a 501(c) (3) non-profit organization. However, sometimes 
collaborative planning processes benefit from being more informal, with little formal design 
or structure involved. 
 
Some collaborative planning processes may benefit from writing a formal charter at the 
outset of the process. For instance, in the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, the 
Interjurisdictional Committee that worked directly on the planning efforts was directed by a 
Committee Charter written by Department of Natural Resources (DNR) Commissioner 
Jennifer Belcher. Though brief, the Charter specified the group’s activities and role in the 
Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process and guided the Interjurisdictional Committee as 
it engaged in planning. The Charter also summarized the legislature’s recommendations for 
the Landscape Plan, broadly defined interactions between the Washington DNR and the 
Committee and gave the planning group direction so that it could move forward effectively in 
dealing with substantive issues.  
 
The Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process also benefited from the development of an 
Advisory Committee Charter. Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation 
(DNRC) Planner David Greer and Unit Manager Greg Poncin and members of the Whitefish 
“Ad Hoc Committee” authored the Advisory Committee Charter, which described how 
members of the planning group would be selected, provided a timeline for the planning 
process and outlined the roles and responsibilities of the five major stakeholders in the case. 
In particular, the Charter indicated that the DNRC would direct the neighborhood planning 
process but would cooperate with the Advisory Committee in the formulation of the plan. 
DNRC Trust Land Management Division Administrator Tom Schultz described the 
importance of having a charter in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process. “The 
Charter was a way to legitimize the process, identify roles and responsibilities and identify 
the end product that we wanted.”3 Although the charters in the Lake Whatcom and Whitefish 
processes were not exhaustive in describing every detail of the process, they still provided 
well-specified guidelines that directed the process in a beneficial way by guiding planning 




Other collaborative planning processes create bylaws or a formal leadership structure to 
guide interactions among process participants. In the Emerald Mountain Planning Process, 
the Emerald Mountain Partnership initially created a seven-member Board of Directors 
(which could be adjusted to between five and fifteen members) to lead the organization and 
developed a set of bylaws and a strategic plan to govern its activities. These structural 
elements provided organization for the process. The Interjurisdictional Committee in the 
Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process also created a formal leadership structure in 
which an elected Chair would develop the agenda and guide the Committee in its planning 
activities. In both cases, having bylaws and a formal leadership structure from the outset of 
the process increased the efficiency of planning efforts. 
 
Some collaborative groups decide to incorporate as or partner with 501(c) (3) non-profit 
organizations in order to gain credibility and legitimacy, to create a vehicle for raising funds 
with tax incentives and to set up an effective structure. The Emerald Mountain Partnership 
took this approach. The Partnership resulted from efforts by the Steamboat Springs 
community to influence trust land decisions in the area. Having 501(c) (3) status enabled the 
group to gain legitimacy with the city of Steamboat Springs, Routt County and the State 
Land Board; to receive tax-deductible donations to fund their planning and outreach efforts 
and possibly fund the purchase of the Emerald Mountain land parcel; to establish legal 
liability protection and to open a small business bank account to keep track of expenses and 
make payments on behalf of the Partnership. 
 
The Castle Rock Collaboration (CRC) partnered with a 501(c) (3) organization in the Castle 
Valley Planning Process in southeastern Utah. In this case, CRC decided that it needed to 
engage in fundraising to purchase land at the base of Parriott Mesa and Castleton Tower. In 
order to do so, CRC became a branch of Utah Open Lands, a land trust with 501(c) (3) status. 
While CRC did not itself incorporate as a 501(c) (3) non-profit, its activities were funneled 
through Utah Open Lands that did have non-profit status. 
 
While many collaborative efforts benefit from having a formal structure from the outset, 
some processes are more successful when the structure is more informal. For example, in the 
Mesa del Sol Planning Process, the New Mexico State Land Office (SLO) instituted an 
informal method of collaboration whereby they reached out to various stakeholders at 
different periods of time with an open door policy for receiving feedback on the Mesa del Sol 
plan. Because of the prolonged timeframe for the Mesa del Sol process and the inherently 
confidential nature of information from the Kirtland Air Force Base and the Isleta Pueblo 
whose land abutted the Mesa del Sol property, the informal process proved to be an asset. 
Without being constrained by a set of procedures for the process, the SLO garnered 
community involvement in the Mesa del Sol plan in a non-intimidating way and built support 
for the project among the various stakeholder groups.  
 
Despite the success of the informal method of Mesa del Sol planning, some stakeholders 
such as the Dragway representatives would have welcomed a more formal venue for their 
concerns. Dragway representatives often felt that they were often ignored in the process. 
Having a more formal structure may have provided them with a more assured method of 
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interaction with the SLO rather than depending on informal conversations with the SLO 
Commissioner.  
 
REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION 
 
Representation and levels of participation in a collaborative planning process can greatly 
influence the success of the process. These factors include: 
 
• How participants are selected 
• How group size is managed 




Careful participant selection appears to be important to ensure adequate representation and 
participation in a collaborative process. When members of a collaborative process are 
appointed, who appoints them can influence the process. In the Lake Whatcom Landscape 
Planning Process Interjurisdictional Committee, the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) 
Commissioner appointed the public representatives and other members as needed, while state 
agencies and local authorities were given discretion regarding who they would appoint to the 
Committee. This appointment scenario worked well for the Interjurisdictional Committee, 
but appointing members for the Implementation Committee was more controversial. It was 
not clear whether the DNR would appoint Implementation Committee members from 
nominees made by the county, city and water district or if the county, city and water district 
would appoint their own members. This confusion led to controversy that could have been 
avoided if the appointment method for the Implementation Committee had been clearly 
specified from the beginning. 
 
Some collaborative planning processes employ a self-selection method of representation 
where potential participants in a collaborative process identify themselves and choose to 
participate rather than being appointed. However, self-selection may still benefit from 
knowledgeable guidance. For example, in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, 
Mayor Andy Feury and Flathead County Commissioner Gary Hall were responsible for 
selecting participants for the Whitefish School Trust Lands Advisory Committee in a manner 
that was as self-selecting as possible. The public perceived Mayor Feury and Commissioner 
Hall as impartial and thus trusted them to help select the participants. To do so, Mayor Feury 
and Commissioner Hall published a notice in the newspaper and sent out emails soliciting 
letters of interest. However, due to the fact that the Committee’s Charter limited participation 
to 20 individuals, Mayor Feury and Commissioner Hall used Charter guidelines and their 
own visions for an effective citizens group to narrow the pool of 45 respondents to 
approximately 15. 
 
Some collaborative processes distinguish between categories of representation. Such a 
scenario can prove problematic if the distinctions are not agreed upon by all participants and 
made clear. Again, the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process illustrates this point. In the 
beginning, there was a separation between regular and alternate members of the Advisory 
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Committee. Although the membership structure was used to limit the size and increase the 
efficiency of the group, participant distinctions were never clarified to the Committee as a 
whole. Since many of the more outspoken members of the group were alternates, the 
Committee spent valuable time debating who should be at the table rather than discussing 
substantive issues. Eventually, the group disposed of the distinction between regular and 
alternate membership, which allowed the group to transition into dealing with substantive 
issues. 
 
At the beginning of a collaborative planning process, it is a good idea to clarify whether 
representatives will act on behalf of themselves or the interests of a stakeholder group. 
Typically, clarifying that participants will represent a stakeholder group rather than their 
personal interests results in clearer communication among participants. In both the Mesa del 
Sol Planning Process and the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, representation based 
on defined stakeholder groups facilitated discussion of the issues. For example, the Southeast 
New Mexico Working Group was comprised of four stakeholder groups: relevant agencies, 
the oil and gas industry, ranching interests and conservationists. Because the process 
structure made these stakeholder groups very apparent from the outset, it was clear to all 
participants that everyone would act on behalf of the interests of their stakeholder group. 
 
Despite the potential benefits of identifying stakeholder groups rather than individual 
interests, sometimes those with a personal stake in the issue are more likely to persist in the 
process. In the Emerald Mountain Planning Process, for example, participants with direct, 
personal interests in the outcome tended to be more invested in the process. In this case, it 
seemed that participants whose livelihoods were tied to the parcel of trust land in question 
were more likely to persevere in the process than those who merely had a tangential interest 
in using it. Therefore, having a personal stake in a collaborative process may be a facilitating 
factor. 
 
Managing Group Size 
 
Managing the size of a collaborative group is a difficult but essential task, because group size 
influences the range of stakeholders that can be involved and how productive discussions 
will be. Because of the dynamic nature of many collaborative processes, representation may 
need to expand after the original members are selected. For example, the Emerald Mountain 
Partnership was designed with a seven-member Board of Directors. However, due to high 
level of interest and commitment of old and new members, the Board was expanded to 
include a greater number of stakeholders. Having flexibility written into their bylaws to add 
new members proved to be effective for the Partnership. 
 
However, too large of a group may be cumbersome and should be winnowed down. As such, 
a collaborative group may need to narrow itself to a feasible size. Nearly 80 individuals 
attended the first meeting of the Southeast New Mexico Working Group. Because the sheer 
size of the group proved too formidable, the group narrowed its range of participants to 30 to 
40 members by identifying groups of stakeholder interests and having those groups elect 
representatives to participate in the collaborative group. This method of winnowing group 
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size was effective because all interested stakeholders were able to participate in selecting the 
final membership of the Working Group. 
 
Another way of reducing the number of participants is to follow the group’s charter, if 
available. In deciding on the representation of the Whitefish School Trust Lands Advisory 
Committee, Mayor Feury and Commissioner Hall used the guidelines provided in the 
Committee’s Charter to determine who should and should not participate. Having a solid 
foundation for making decisions regarding representation can help narrow a group’s size and 
provide justification for membership selection decisions. 
 
Balancing Stakeholder Groups’ Interests and Individuals’ Interests 
 
Spending time at the beginning of a collaborative planning process identifying and involving 
all pertinent stakeholders is a good way to help increase the likelihood of success. For 
example, in the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, the New Mexico State Land Office (SLO) 
was effective in ensuring that all interests were represented in their decisions related to the 
planning effort. The SLO also actively visited the community to gain public input in the 
process. The SLO’s effectiveness in identifying and reaching out to all relevant stakeholder 
groups increased the breadth and meaningful involvement of stakeholder groups, most of 
whom feel that their involvement has been beneficial. 
 
Sometimes stakeholder groups are intentionally left out of the process, which may be 
strategic but can lead to problems later down the road. The Elliott State Forest Planning 
Process provides a clear illustration of this point. According to Committee members, 
participation in the group’s Steering Committee was limited to those with a key interest in 
the financial outcome of the Elliott State Forest. This criterion precluded involvement from 
timber interests or environmental groups. In fact, timber and environmental interests and 
adjacent landowners including the Bureau of Land Management, the U.S. Forest Service and 
Weyerhaeuser were intentionally excluded from the Steering Committee because the 
planning group did not perceive that they had a key interest in the forest’s management. 
Because there was an intentional imbalance of stakeholders in the Steering Committee, an 
“us-versus-them” dynamic emerged between the Committee and environmental groups. 
Comments from the environmental community, and to some extent from timber interests, 
were discounted due to the perception that they were extremist viewpoints. Participants from 
the Committee and environmental and timber interests conceded that the lack of involvement 
from the environmental and timber communities was a shortcoming of the process. 
 
In order to maintain the appropriate balance of stakeholders’ interests, a collaborative group 
should consider the timing and location of meetings. Southeast New Mexico Working Group 
meetings were primarily held once a month for two days at a time during the work week and 
were located in southeastern New Mexico. While this location was convenient for many of 
the ranching and oil and gas industry representatives who worked or lived in the area, it was 
less convenient for agency representatives and conservationists from the northern part of the 
state. Holding the meetings for two days at a time during the work week was acceptable for 
those participating as a function of their jobs, but for others such as conservationists who 
were participating on their own personal time and funding, having meetings during the work 
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week prohibited consistent involvement. Because of these limitations, the conservationist 
stakeholder group often was represented by only one participant and sportsmen were not 
represented at all. The lack of balance of conservation interests and the absence of sportsmen 
interests proved a shortcoming in the process, as the full range of perspectives was not 
consistently shared with the Working Group. 
 
Process participants often realize that certain stakeholders or stakeholder groups are not 
adequately represented during the process or after its completion. For example, in the Lake 
Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, the Department of Natural Resources realized that 
several stakeholder groups should have been included only after the process was completed. 
These interests included the timber industry, local school districts, homeowner groups and 
recreational groups. It is often more effective to try to identify and include all stakeholder 
groups from the beginning of a collaborative planning process. However, this task is very 
difficult and requires careful planning for process structure. 
 
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
At the beginning of a collaborative planning process, it is essential for participants to clearly 
define the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders involved. Often, a clear definition of 
the participants’ roles and responsibilities requires a formal discussion of the issue at the 
beginning of the process. In other contexts, stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities must be 
revisited and revised along the way. In most cases, however, it is essential that the issue of 
roles and responsibilities be addressed explicitly within the process structure to avoid future 
complications in the process. 
 
When roles and responsibilities are well-defined, participants have a sense of clear division 
of labor among participants, feel as though they are having an impact on the process and 
avoid unnecessary replication of work. The Elliott State Forest Planning Process provides an 
example of a process with clearly defined roles. The Steering Committee in this case 
unambiguously designated participants’ roles and responsibilities within its structure by 
appointing a Chair and a Project Leader who would lead the process and specifically 
describing the role that each individual participant would play. The Elliott State Forest 
Planning Process also made a clear distinction between the policy function the Steering 
Committee would fill and the scientific function the Core Planning Team would fill. Having 
such well-structured roles in the process increased the efficiency of the process, but also 
provided some constraints on its flexibility. However, the tradeoff between efficiency and 
flexibility was worth it from the participants’ perspectives. 
 
When there is confusion regarding various stakeholders’ roles, the process can become 
difficult. The Castle Valley Planning Process provides an example of a case where the roles 
of process participants were ill-defined from the beginning. In this case, the collaborative 
process emerged quickly from a sense of perceived crisis, because the School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Administration sold trust land at the base of a beloved red rock 
mesa in Castle Valley. As a result of the process’ quick start, the roles of the town 
government of Castle Valley and the citizens who comprised the Castle Rock Collaboration 
group were not distinctly separated. The failure of the process to separate these stakeholders’ 
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roles led to confusion and eventually a stalemate in the process when the town pursued 
mechanisms outside of the collaborative process to achieve their goals.  
 
The Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP) Process provides another example of a 
collaborative process without clear definition of stakeholder responsibilities. In this case, 
process participants did not clearly define the roles of the three main parties involved: the 
City of Tucson, the Arizona State Land Department (ASLD) and the Citizens Review 
Committee (CRC). As a result, it was unclear what degree of influence the HAMP would 
have on the ASLD as it made land management decisions in the area. Also, some CRC 
members felt at times that they merely represented a “rubber stamp” of approval on the plan, 
rather than being able to provide meaningful input to the city on the plan’s outcome.4 
 
Often, discussions surrounding stakeholders’ roles in the process deal with the issue of 
decision-making authority, particularly when addressing the role of the trust land agency in 
determining the outcome of the process. In most cases, trust land agencies have the ultimate 
authority over the outcome of collaborative planning processes addressing state trust land. 
Because of this fact, the roles and responsibilities of the state trust land agency in relation to 
the rest of the collaborative group should be clarified early on in order to avoid 
miscommunication and the development of mistrust.  
 
In the HAMP Process, the City of Tucson made the final decision on the content of the plan, 
but the Arizona State Land Department (ASLD) had the ultimate authority over deciding 
how its land in the Houghton Area would be developed. The ASLD is not required to 
implement the HAMP, but an ASLD representative attended CRC meetings in order to serve 
as a resource on ASLD-related issues that arose during the development of the plan. The 
ASLD representative made clear to the committee from the outset how the agency’s mandate 
informed its land use decisions and limitations. Although the agency attempted to make this 
role clear, some CRC members expressed frustration at the uncertainty at the end of the 
process due to not knowing if the plan would ultimately be implemented by the ASLD. 
 
In some cases, the trust land agency is a member of the stakeholder group, and in other cases 
the collaborative group is advisory to the trust land agency. This distinction is important to 
make when dealing with roles and responsibilities surrounding decision-making authority. 
The role of the respective trust land agencies in the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning 
Process and the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process provide an interesting contrast in 
this regard. 
 
In the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, the role of the Interjurisdictional 
Committee and its relationship to the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), the trust land 
management agency, was not clear. Some participants felt that the DNR should be a member 
of the Committee thus precluding further authorization of the plan once the Committee 
agreed to it. However, other participants including DNR representatives who did not want to 
cede decision-making power felt that the Committee was advisory to the DNR and believed 
that was what the original legislation that mandated the process intended. The Committee 
eventually sought the Attorney General’s opinion on the issue. The Attorney General 
determined that the Committee was advisory to the DNR, thus clarifying the relationship 
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between the Committee and the DNR. Prior to the Attorney General’s decision, the 
collaborative process was stymied by arguments over roles and responsibilities. After having 
the issue decided for them by an outside arbiter, process participants were able to proceed 
with the drafting of the Landscape Plan, a year and a half after the process began. 
 
By contrast, in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the Department of Natural 
Resources and Conservation (DNRC) was a member of the Advisory Committee rather than 
an outside entity. This membership composition increased the non-agency participants’ 
relative level of decision-making power in crafting the neighborhood plan, despite the fact 
that the plan was technically an advisory rather than a regulatory document. Having the 
DNRC at the table with the rest of the Advisory Committee members enabled the Whitefish 
community to move past being a sounding board for ideas to become an active participant in 
the creation of the neighborhood plan. 
 
SUBCOMMITTEES AND TASK FORCES 
 
The use of subcommittees or task forces can facilitate or undermine a collaborative planning 
process, depending on who initiates the subcommittee or task force, when it is initiated, its 
level of perceived legitimacy and its effect on the process. Processes employed a variety of 
different subcommittees and task forces that assumed different roles in the process (Table 17-
1). 
 
The Tucson Department of Urban Planning and Design successfully used citizen committees 
in the HAMP Process. To facilitate an effective process structure, the city created a Citizens 
Review Committee (CRC) and a Technical Advisory Team (TAT) at the beginning of the 
HAMP Planning Process. The CRC provided a public participation element to the plan and 
created a mechanism for feedback from the public. The TAT advised the city on the technical 
aspects of providing services to future development within the HAMP. The TAT and the 
CRC dealt with different elements of the planning process in a way that allowed for effective 
division of labor and provided areas of specialization that fostered progress. Both the TAT 
and the CRC communicated their findings to city representatives who then combined both 
sources of information into their decision making. 
 
The Elliott State Forest Planning Process also employed a bi-level structure comprised of a 
Steering Committee and a Core Planning Team. The Steering Committee guided the overall 
process of drafting the Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) and Forest Management Plan 
(FMP), articulated overarching policy issues and involved stakeholders at the policy level. 
The Core Planning Team dealt with the technical components of the planning efforts such as 
assembling the scientific data to support the resulting HCP and FMP. Process participants 
Jim Young and Mike Schnee served as liaisons between the two groups. Having a structure 
where liaisons bridged the Steering Committee’s focus on policy issues and the Core 
Planning Team’s emphasis on scientific issues facilitated effective communication 






Table 17-1: Type and Role of Subcommittees and Task Forces 





• Planning Process Steering 
Committee 
 Guided the overall planning process 
Elliott State Forest 
Planning Process 
• Steering Committee 
 
• Core Planning Team 
 Focused on policy applications of the 
process 
 Focused on the scientific/technical 
aspects of the process 
Emerald Mountain 
Planning Process 





• Parcel Subcommittee 
 Developed a “community 
management plan” for the Emerald 
Mountain Parcel, which serves as one of 
four alternatives that the BLM is 
considering in their Environmental 
Assessment 
 Developed the parcel selection 
criteria to determine which parcels 
would be eligible for inclusion in the 





• Citizens Review Committee (CRC) 
 
• Technical Advisory Team (TAT) 
 Focused on public participation 
aspects of the process 
 Focused on the scientific/ technical 




• Facilitator Selection Subcommittee Drew up a Request for Proposal and 
reviewed applications from professional 
facilitators 






• Oil and Gas Recommendation 
Stakeholder Groups 
• Oil and Gas Technical 
Subcommittee 
 Focused on developing oil and gas 
technical solutions 
 Focused on developing oil and gas 
technical solutions, more successfully 





• Task Forces 
 
• “Shadow Group” 
 Researched issues such as wildlife, 
fire, economics, land use, recreation and 
water 
 Group that emerged due to 




While subcommittees can be used to efficiently divide labor and create ownership in a 
collaborative planning process, sometimes this approach can be problematic. The Southeast 
New Mexico Working Group is an example of a collaborative group that included 
subcommittees that improved group interactions and ones that did not. During the Working 
Group’s efforts to draft a plan for managing lesser prairie chicken habitat, difficulty emerged 
surrounding the details of oil and gas development requirements. The Working Group’s 
facilitators suggested that participants break into stakeholder-specific subcommittees to 
independently come up with a draft management plan. The three stakeholder groups included 
one for the oil and gas industry, one for conservationists and one for agencies. Not 
 
479 
surprisingly, each of the groups came up with very different draft plans that only highlighted 
differences between the stakeholder groups rather than illustrating areas of commonality. 
 
Despite the somewhat unsuccessful nature of the small subcommittee exercise, an Oil and 
Gas Technical Subcommittee later emerged to address the same difficulties surrounding oil 
and gas technical stipulations. The Subcommittee included one representative from each of 
the main stakeholder groups and used the major issues that were drawn from the small 
subcommittees’ recommendations. The Subcommittee was successful in reaching 
compromises and crafting creative solutions for addressing the oil and gas elements of the 
draft management plan. Each representative of the Subcommittee was responsible for 
ensuring that the remainder of his or her constituents was in agreement with the compromises 
that the Subcommittee made, which resulted in greater transparency in the process and more 
cohesiveness in the Working Group as a whole. The intimate setting provided by the 
Subcommittee enabled participants to share their interests freely and to create trust that was 
needed to make progress on the issue. This Subcommittee differed from the three stakeholder 
groups because it included representatives from the range of stakeholder groups, whereas the 
three stakeholder groups were each comprised of members from the same stakeholder group. 
 
Sometimes, illegitimate or destructive subcommittees result from ineffective process 
structure. For instance, as a result of ineffective process design that created and perpetuated 
mistrust, a “shadow group” surfaced in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process that 
compromised the collaborative nature of the process. Several Advisory Committee members 
noticed the shadow group developing behind the scenes; however, the Advisory Committee 
never formally acknowledged the shadow group. As a result, the faction was able to meet 
separately from the planning process and made decisions without the full involvement of the 
Advisory Committee. These ex parte conversations limited the breadth of stakeholders 
involved in the process, the transparency of the process and the group’s overall influence 
over decision making. 
 
 




Instituting a set of agreed-upon and legitimate ground rules at the beginning of a 
collaborative process is another way to articulate the group’s common objectives and goals. 
Developing and sticking to ground rules also defines the process structure in which the group 
will function and sets forth standards of interaction among participants. Recalling ground 
rules when the group gets off track can also help bring participants back to productive 
discussion. 
 
Formal ground rules can help provide the foundation for a collaborative planning process. 
The Elliott State Forest Planning Process illustrates the importance and effectiveness of well-
defined ground rules. In this planning process, the participants jointly discussed and agreed 
upon ground rules, which were originally called “planning principles” and then “guiding 
principles” (Table 17-2). The guiding principles were essential in articulating the forest 
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vision, management goals and monitoring assumptions inherent in the process. They also 
recognized various requirements to which the process had to adhere such as Endangered 
Species Act requirements, the State Land Board’s mandate to provide revenue for the 
Common School Fund and the Board of Forestry’s statutory responsibilities. Process 
participants referred to the guiding principles as “the compass that guides our navigation,” 
and the Core Planning Team often referred to the guiding principles as decision-making 
criteria.5 Overall, the guiding principles gave the Elliott State Forest Planning Process goals, 
objectives and direction that participants referenced throughout the process, particularly 
when making difficult decisions. 
 
 
Table 17-2: Elliott State Forest Planning Process Guiding Principles 
 
Elliott State Forest Planning Process  
Guiding Principles 
• The plan will recognize that the goal for the Common School Forest Lands is the maximization of 
revenue to the Common School Fund over the long term. The goal for the BOF lands is to secure the 
greatest permanent value to the citizens of Oregon by providing healthy, productive and sustainable 
forest ecosystems, that over time and across the landscape provide a full range of social, economic and 
environmental benefits to the people of Oregon. 
• The plan will be developed within the context of the Elliott State Forest as a managed forest. 
• The plan will recognize that the forest is intended to be an important contributor to timber supply for 
present and future generations. 
• The plan will be a comprehensive, integrated forest management plan taking into account a wide range 
of forest values. 
• Lands will be identified and managed for long-term revenue production while providing for a 
sustained contribution to biological capability and social values. The plan will recognize that there will 
be trade-offs between revenue producing activities and non-revenue producing activities. 
• The plan will examine opportunities to achieve goals through cooperative efforts with other agencies, 
user groups or organizations. 
• The plan will be developed through a collaborative and cooperative process involving the State Land 
Board, the BOF, the public, local and tribal governments and other resource management agencies 
including the federal services. 
• The plan will be goal-driven. 
• The plan will view the Elliott State Forest in both a local and regional context. 
• The plan will consider the overall biological diversity of state forest lands, including the variety of life 
and accompanying ecological processes. 
• The forest will be managed to meet the state and federal Endangered Species Acts (ESA) while 
fulfilling the State Land Board’s responsibilities under the Oregon Constitution and the BOF’s 
statutory responsibilities. 
Source: “Purpose, Planning and History: Executive Summary,” Draft Elliott State Forest Management Plan, 
August 2005, Oregon Department of Forestry, available at http://www.oregon.gov/ODF/index.shtml. 
 
Often, having a collaborative group work on ground rules together at the beginning of the 
process can be a good way to build trust and a common understanding of the process 
constraints. In the Castle Valley Planning Process, one of the first activities in which the 
group engaged was the formation of ground rules, or principles for success. The planning 
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group jointly worked on the principles, which went through multiple iterations until the 
group reached consensus on the content of the principles (Table 17-3). The principles 
addressed the participants’ divergent interests and emphasized that they were not mutually 
exclusive. They also guided the process, set forth standards for group member interactions 
and established outcomes by which success in the process could be measured, all of which 
helped to establish trust among participants. 
 
 
Table 17-3: Castle Valley Planning Process Principles for Success 
Castle Valley Planning Process  
Principles for Success 
1. Open and Collaborative Process. The aim of this planning process is to define both a conservation 
and real estate product for the parcel of Utah School Trust Lands (the “Trust”) identified on the 
attached map. This process should meet the primary objectives of the Town, the Trust and the Castle 
Rock Collaboration (CRC). All parties recognize that they are starting with very different objectives 
but that the risks of not exploring creative alternatives in a collaborative fashion far outweigh the 
consequences of typical disposition and conventional development of these properties. In order to 
arrive at an acceptable plan, all parties must be willing to openly explore alternatives without 
commitment to preconceived solutions. There is mutual risk taking. All parties desire to maximize 
benefits and minimize potential losses through this joint planning process. All parties enter this 
process with constructive, open and flexible attitudes. 
2. State Trust Objectives. The primary objective of the Trust is to realize an economic return from the 
disposition/use of these lands for the benefit of the state school trust, which is comparable to the fair 
value of these lands at the time of disposition. In addition, the Trust desires to explore strategies that 
add value to its properties, including timing or phasing approaches and to work cooperatively with 
the Town of Castle Valley and CRC so that the conservation and real estate products produce public 
benefits far greater than simple disposition of these properties. 
3. Castle Valley Community Objectives. The primary objective of the Town of Castle Valley and 
CRC is to see that the lands that have important conservation values on the Trust properties are 
protected to retain those characteristics for the benefit of the Town and County residents, the State of 
Utah and the national and international visitors who annually experience the valley. When the Town, 
CRC and their partners acquire lands, or interests in lands, in order to protect conservation values, 
they expect to pay fair value for these interests. In the event that neither the Town, CRC or their 
partners are able to acquire lands for conservation purposes, and to the extent that real estate 
development is indicated on theses properties in order to generate economic value for the Trust, new 
development should respond to the preferences and interests of the Town and CRC so that the 
development both fits in the landscape and responds to input from the local community. 
4. Conservation and Development Opportunities, Constraints and Strategies. All of the Trust 
parcels should be analyzed for their conservation and development potential and value. The objective 
of this exercise is to define those parcels that have high conservation values, high opportunities for 
development or a mix of conservation and development products that are appropriate for these areas 
but also strategies to achieve the Trust’s financial objectives and the Town’s and CRC’s community 








Castle Valley Planning Process 
Principles for Success Continued 
5. Real Estate Products. In defining the types of potential real estate products, preferences shall be 
given to those kinds of development which fit in and blend with the natural landscape, which meet 
the Town identified needs, which meet economic objectives and  
which minimize the amount and area of disturbance. The Town, CRC and the Trust desire that the 
development product be accessible to a diverse range of potential buyers. In exploring alternative real 
estate products, a diversity of locations and product types should be considered. The Town expects 
that new development will pay its own way, that the Town will not be subsidizing the costs of new 
development and that the pace of development will occur at a rate that does not overwhelm Town 
services. The Town, CRC and the Trust will have to identify the types of development which are 
desirable from their different perspectives. 
6. Conservation and Development Plan and Time Table. The ultimate plan should identify the 
conservation and development program for each of the Trust parcels. In this fashion, the parties will 
have the assurance that the maximum allowable level of development for each of the parcels has been 
defined. In addition, the planning process should explore the concept of developing a time frame for 
disposition of the parcels. This time frame would identify the minimum amount of time prior to the 
development or marketing of each of the parcels. No parcel would be disposed of prior to the date 
identified in the proposed timetable. The objective of this time table concept is twofold: (i) to give 
the Town of Castle Valley, CRC and their partners reasonable time to develop alternative acquisition 
or protection strategies which might lessen the impact of development or lead to greater conservation 
benefit and; (ii) to identify a set time frame for the Trust which would allow reasonable disposal of 
the individual parcels, with the assurance that the Town will support such development. In 
conjunction with the time table, the planning process should explore the strategies and structures for 
granting the Town, CRC and their conservation partners, the opportunity to acquire certain lands or 
interests in lands. 
7. Valuation. The Trust will ascertain through analysis or appraisal that the plan developed through this 
process has comparable value to open market disposition, minus any retained interests. This valuation 
should occur throughout the planning process so that they process may respond creatively to 
information generated through these analyses. The valuation process should be done in a manner that 
enhances the credibility of the conservation and development products. 
8. Implementation. The Town, CRC and the Trust understand that various agreements will need to be 
approved by the governing boards of the implementing parties. All parties agree to a good faith 
commitment to seek any reasonable means to achieve the stated objectives of the parties. 
Source: “Castle Valley Planning Study: Principles or Criteria for Success,” Castle Rock Collaboration 
http://www.castlerockcollaboration.org/initiative.html (website not currently available). 
 
Despite the benefits of agreeing upon a set of formal ground rules, when the collaborative 
planning group does not stick to its ground rules, the process can become increasingly 
lengthy and frustrating for participants. For example, several participants in the Southeast 
New Mexico Working Group felt that the group did not adhere to its ground rules. In 
particular, some participants recognized that the ground rule that “debate would only be 
acceptable on legitimate arguments” was often disregarded and that all comments were 
treated as acceptable debate. According to these participants, the process took more time and 
became very frustrating. 
 
As with many elements of process structure, the context of the collaborative planning process 
will determine which types of ground rules are appropriate. However, some collaborative 
processes have used particularly effective ground rules that may be useful in many contexts. 
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The “No Surprises Rule,” the “Cooling Off Period” and majority and minority reports were 
ground rules that facilitated progress in the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process. The 
“No Surprises Rule” prohibited members from leaking new information to the press before 
providing that information to the group. This ground rule was mostly effective in increasing 
transparency and communication among group members and limiting potentially damaging 
press leaks. To handle issues where the participants did not reach consensus, the Committee 
enacted a “Cooling Off Period.” According to the “Cooling Off Period,” the group would 
table discussion on a controversial issue for one week, at which time the participants would 
vote on the issue again. A majority report and minority report were required to document 
points of disagreement. The minority report writing requirement discouraged anything but 
substantive disagreements. By creating this requirement, the group hoped to encourage only 
constructive dissent instead of disagreement for the sake of disagreeing. In this way, the 
“Cooling Off Period” allowed participants to reassess their interests and priorities and 




When the collaborative planning group jointly decides on a formal set of decision-making 
rules that define how the group will make decisions, confusing and frustrating decisions can 
become easier to handle. As discussed earlier, the guiding principles for the Elliott State 
Forest Planning Process provided a decision rule for the group. Members of the Core 
Planning Team revisited the principles throughout the process in order to ensure that they 
made decisions that were consistent with the agreements and constraints that were identified 
at the beginning of the process. Without having firm guiding principles that laid out a 
decision-making process, the group might have had more difficulty making challenging 
decisions. 
 
Defining a Decision Rule 
 
When a group fails to decide upon a decision rule from the outset, the process and 
participants can suffer. The Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process illustrates what can 
happen when a collaborative group fails to establish a formal decision-making process. 
While Janet Cornish, the original facilitator for the Whitefish School Trust Lands Advisory 
Committee, created a formal discussion structure for the group (e.g., by developing group 
goals and objectives), she never facilitated the creation of a decision-making structure. As a 
result, the group never discussed how to make decisions going forward. Instead, they quickly 
transitioned into talks about the substantive issues. 
 
As a result of the Committee’s failure to create a decision rule, shadow group members had 
the flexibility to enact “Roberts Rules of Order” in an Advisory Committee meeting. A 
method of making motions for majority voting, Roberts Rules of Order allowed the shadow 
group to call for several votes to protect various parcels of trust land within the 13,000-acre 
study area. Because the Committee had not considered making a decision rule, there was no 
procedure to address the proposed decision-making approach. While the proposal received 
enough votes to pass, they were not unanimously supported. As such, the decisions did not 






Consensus, if used as a decision rule in a collaborative planning process, should be clearly 
defined and agreed upon by all participants before engaging in discussion surrounding 
substantive issues. The concept of consensus often means different things to different people. 
Some participants may believe consensus requires unanimity, merely a majority or the 
greatest number of participants in agreement as possible. Because of these potentially 
varying perceptions, a collaborative planning group should explicitly address the issue at the 
beginning of the process. In at least four of the eight cases in this report, the issue of 
consensus was addressed in some way. For example, the Interjurisdictional Committee in the 
Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process defined consensus as 100 percent in favor and 
developed ground rules about how it would reach consensus and deal with non-consensus 
situations. These ground rules, discussed above, included the “Cooling Off Period” and the 
majority and minority reports that were required if consensus was not reached.  
 
The HAMP Process and the Elliott State Forest Planning Process decided to make decisions 
based on a definition of consensus that required a majority in agreement; yet both processes 
allowed for exceptions to the consensus agreement. In the HAMP Process, votes could occur 
on specific elements of proposals rather than a consensus-based decision on the entire 
proposal. In the Elliott State Forest Planning Process, the Steering Committee and the Core 
Planning Team typically made decisions based on consensus but would defer to the ultimate 
authority of the Chairman when consensus could not be reached. In these cases, having a 
decision rule for consensus allowed for flexibility in the process structure that fostered 
progress in the group and enabled the group to address conflicts and make decisions more 
efficiently. 
 
On the other hand, the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process did not make a decision 
rule about consensus. As discussed above, because the group did not establish a clear 
decision rule or decision-making process, it was not clear how decisions would be made by 
the group. Had the participants agreed to a definition of consensus and a decision rule, the 




Specifying voting procedures prior to engaging in substantive discussions is also helpful. 
Like the issue of consensus, voting procedures are often defined in a decision rule. Typically, 
a collaborative planning group will benefit from creating a decision rule that describes 
whether and how voting will be used in the process. 
 
Voting can become acrimonious if voting rights are given to some, but not to all of the 
participants. For example, participants in the Emerald Mountain Planning Process established 
a clear voting procedure at the outset in their bylaws, which made a distinction between the 
Board of Directors and the Advisory Group, which was comprised of individuals who may 
have a personal stake in the management or disposition of the Emerald Mountain land parcel. 
While members of both groups could participate in discussions, only the Board of Directors 
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members had voting privileges. While some participants saw this decision-making design as 
a way to increase stakeholder involvement without bogging down decision making, many 
Advisory Group members were frustrated with not having a vote in group decisions. The 
voting decision became problematic and resulted in feelings of alienation for some 
stakeholders. 
 
When voting procedures are not clearly defined and agreed upon by everyone involved in the 
process, votes also can be used to manipulate outcomes. The use of Roberts Rules of Order 
by the shadow group in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process exemplifies a 
consequence of unclear voting procedures. Because the Advisory Committee did not specify 
a decision rule for voting at the beginning of the process, the shadow group was able to 
initiate voting on an issue to their strategic advantage. In this case, participants lacked a 
formal voting mechanism to evaluate the shadow group’s proposals. 
 
Minority Reports and Decision Matrices 
 
In addition to having a firmly established decision rule, there are many other ways to 
creatively overcome the challenges inherent in making tough decisions in a collaborative 
setting. Among these are using minority reports and decision matrices. The use of minority 
reports or statements can help address the concerns of those with dissenting opinions and can 
encourage obstructionists to reconsider their level of dissatisfaction with a proposal. Both the 
HAMP Process and the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process used reports to 
document minority opinions and encourage the group to come to a decision. In the Lake 
Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, the group required minority and majority reports 
when consensus could not be reached.  
 
The minority report requirement occasionally served to dissuade individuals from opposing 
an issue because of the effort it entailed. Often, participants who did not strongly oppose 
would change their vote and live with a decision. Steve Hood, the representative from the 
Department of Ecology, described the effect of the rule: 
When it came down to a vote where we knew we wouldn’t have consensus, 
we knew someone would have to write the minority report opinion. If no one 
was willing to represent the minority, then why bother taking the vote if you 
are not going to put your minority opinion in there. If you don’t care enough 
to state why you are against it, why can’t you just say you can live with it? 
People would often say, “I guess I could.”7 
A decision matrix that goes through multiple iterations also can assist a collaborative 
planning group in making sense of a complex decision. The Core Planning Team in the 
Elliott State Forest Planning Process developed such a Decision Matrix to guide the team’s 
decision about which forest model to use in their plan. In the Decision Matrix scenario, each 
member individually ranked eight possible models on a scale of one to five. The average of 
the rankings was presented to the Steering Committee, who revised the Decision Matrix 
accordingly. The Core Planning Team then re-ranked the models on the revised Matrix 










Having well-defined objectives from the outset of a collaborative planning process can help 
guide the process and increase participants’ chances of successfully achieving those 
objectives. Objectives can take the form of a mission or vision statement, guiding principles, 
shared goals or a shared understanding of the problem and the reason for jointly working on 
that problem. 
 
In the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, the individual stakeholders involved had 
very different goals. However, the Department of Natural Resources official involved 
claimed that the group was able to agree that a mutually acceptable solution would be one 
that balanced three central objectives: (1) fiduciary – revenue generation for trust 
beneficiaries, (2) social – public safety and (3) environmental – water quality. Having agreed 
on these three shared objectives was particularly helpful in moving the process forward. 
 
Prior to working on a management plan for lesser prairie chicken and sand dune lizard 
habitat in southeastern New Mexico, the Southeast New Mexico Working Group jointly 
developed a guiding statement. The guiding statement was: 
 
To create a conservation strategy for the management of shinnery oak and 
sand sage-grassland communities in southeastern and east-central New 
Mexico, recommending a range of specific actions to enhance and secure 
populations of Lesser Prairie-Chickens and Sand Dune Lizards, so that 
federal or state listing of these species is not needed, while protecting other 
uses of the land. 
 
The statement was specific and kept all stakeholders focused on the same overarching goal 
throughout the process; yet it still acknowledged the complexity of the issue and took into 
account the stakeholders’ divergent individual goals. Often, if all participants jointly 
articulate the goals of a planning process, group members are more likely to perceive the 
goals as legitimate, to have ownership over them and to use them for problem-solving during 
the process. 
 
A collaborative effort may also suffer from the lack of clear goals and objectives. The HAMP 
Process illustrates what can occur when clear objectives are not articulated at the beginning 
and throughout a collaborative planning process. Citizens Review Committee (CRC) 
members became frustrated when they realized that the City of Tucson lacked a clear vision 
for the HAMP process. CRC member Ken Abrahams expressed his discontent with the fact 
that the city did not clearly define its goals from the outset of the planning process. “They 






TIMELINES AND DEADLINES 
 
The role of timelines and deadlines in a collaborative planning process is very important. 
Timelines provide the ongoing structure and goals during the process and deadlines provide 
the end goal for the process, marking its completion. However, setting and sticking to 
realistic timelines and deadlines are very difficult tasks for participants of a collaborative 
process. Prolonged timelines can result in participant frustration and group attrition. 
 
Sometimes collaborative planning processes do not set realistic timelines and occasionally do 
not set them at all. For example, in the Castle Valley Planning Process, participants did not 
set exact timelines or a deadline for the process. As a result, the process continued for several 
years, and only ended when the funds for paying the facilitator ran out, which became an 
imposed but not planned deadline. 
 
Even when collaborative planning groups set timelines, it can be difficult to stick to them. 
None of the cases in this project that set strict deadlines were able to complete the process by 
those original deadlines. For example, the HAMP Process was projected to last one year but 
lasted for two years; the Southeast New Mexico Working Group extended their original six 
to nine month timeframe to two and a half years; and the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning 
Process that was slated to last one year grew to 18 months. Although collaborative planning 
processes vary to the extent that they are able to finish close to their original deadline, the 
trend is that such processes typically take longer than participants originally expect. 
In light of the fact that collaborative planning processes typically exceed their original 
timelines, many participants recognize the importance and difficulty of choosing and sticking 
to realistic deadlines. Participants of the Southeast New Mexico Working Group 
acknowledged the need for realistic deadlines in order to avoid attrition and maintain process 
momentum, especially in time-consuming processes. On the other hand, the group also 
recognized that had an accurate timeframe been given at the outset, many participants may 
have been unwilling to participate in such a lengthy process. That said, the Whitefish 
Neighborhood Planning Process participants stressed the need for clear deadlines, as well as 
a comprehensive timeline to ensure enough time for substantive issues and prevent the 
collaborative process from becoming mired in details. 
 
Given the fact that collaborative planning groups rarely achieve their own self-imposed, 
internal deadlines, some groups have turned to external deadlines provided by others outside 
the collaborative process to regain momentum and finish the process. In fact, in many cases 
external deadlines can be as or more effective than internal timelines in moving a 
collaborative planning process forward. For the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, an 
external deadline provided the necessary impetus to come to agreement. The Bureau of Land 
Management deadline for alternatives to be considered in the Resource Management Plan 
(RMP) Amendment was the catalyst that increased stakeholders’ willingness to compromise, 
as the Working Group’s goal was to have their recommendations included in the RMP 
Amendment process. Without this deadline, many participants felt that the process would 




Despite their effectiveness in accelerating a slow process, external deadlines can prove to be 
a double-edged sword. Some participants in the Southeast New Mexico Working Group 
indicated that while they are glad the Working Group developed a conservation plan prior to 
the RMP Amendment deadline, they are concerned that the quality of the plan was 
compromised to meet the deadline. In particular, participants are concerned that the 
concessions made by stakeholders during the final push for agreement might not be durable 
or truly effective in conserving lesser prairie chickens and sand dune lizards, which was the 
original intent of the plan. For example, oil and gas industry representative and Southeast 
New Mexico Working Group participant Dan Girand stated, “We didn’t get the species 
listed, but I don’t think we helped it.”9 
 
When a collaborative planning group sets contractually binding deadlines, the group may be 
more likely to adhere to those deadlines. The Emerald Mountain Planning Process is an 
example of an effective, contractually binding deadline that facilitated progress in the 
process. In this planning process, the State Land Board and the Emerald Mountain 
Partnership agreed to a five-year planning lease and a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 
that gave the Partnership legitimacy, illustrated a sense of commitment to the process and 
provided a defined window of opportunity during which a range of strategies could be 
explored. Due to the protracted nature of the federal land exchange process, this deadline had 
to be revised via an amended MOA that added one year to the agreement and set a new 
deadline of March 15, 2006. The contractually binding nature of the deadline, although a 
balancing act between multiple interests, was particularly effective in this case. 
 
Although prolonged timelines and revised deadlines may lead to frustration and participant 
attrition, occasionally they can allow for better outcomes. For example, the prolonged 
timeframe for the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, which has lasted for more than two 
decades, was a key facilitating factor that enabled the appropriate political climate for 
approval. If the timeframe had been truncated and a decision made earlier, the outcome may 
not have been as positive. 
 
Regardless of whether a prolonged timeframe is a hindrance or facilitating factor for success, 
those entering into a collaborative planning process should be willing and able to devote a 
large amount of time to the process. 
 
ACTIVITIES THAT BUILD UNDERSTANDING 
 
Collaborative planning groups build understanding in several ways, such as engaging in 
team-building activities, taking joint field trips, sharing informal time together and engaging 
in joint fact-finding. Such activities can help increase the effectiveness of group 
communications, uncover hidden agendas and provide an overarching sense of group 
identity. 
 
Some groups engage in team-building exercises in order to build participants’ 
communication skills, personal relationships, trust and shared knowledge. For example, in 
the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, the group’s facilitators led the participants in 
team-building exercises at the outset of the process in order to build a sense of cooperation 
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among participants. Although the facilitators wished that more time was spent on team-
building, what little team-building occurred was helpful in forming a coherent group identity. 
 
In collaborative planning processes involving decisions about state trust land, field trips to 
the area of interest can be helpful for developing a common understanding among all process 
participants. In at least four of the cases, collaborative planning groups took joint field trips 
to state trust land areas. In the HAMP Process, for example, the City of Tucson organized a 
field trip to the Houghton Road area to encourage a shared understanding of the land. Similar 
site visits were taken in the Emerald Mountain Planning Process, the Castle Valley Planning 
Process, the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process and the Whitefish Neighborhood 
Planning Process.  
 
Other periods of informal interactions also helped facilitate group solidarity and growing 
understanding. For instance, participants in the Southeast New Mexico Working Group 
routinely engaged in informal interactions such as carpooling to meetings and interacting 
between meeting sessions. These less formal activities were essential for developing 
relationships between participants, encouraging participants to take the perspective of their 
fellow group members and building understanding of the various stakeholders’ constraints 
and capacities. 
 
Engaging in joint fact-finding often helps increase trust, communication and understanding 
among collaborative planning process participants. Joint fact-finding was a key component of 
the Castle Valley Planning Process. One of the first activities in which the planning group 
engaged was examining a series of maps created by the facilitator that illustrated the natural 
resources and development potential of Castle Valley. Jointly working from the same fact 
base helped the group to develop a coherent, shared understanding of the resources and 
limitations of the land in Castle Valley. By developing a shared information base, the 
planning group built understanding about the issues they were jointly addressing. 
Joint information sharing was also a key component in the Southeast New Mexico Working 
Group. A lack of scientific data and mapping for prairie chicken habitat limited the process 
early on. However, once the group was able to produce maps that participants could view 
during meetings, the process benefited. Exploring scientific data through a set of shared maps 
helped to create joint understanding of the land and provided an impetus for negotiations. 
 
PUBLIC MEETINGS AND MEDIA INVOLVEMENT 
 
Often, a collaborative planning group will hold a combination of meetings that are open to 
the general public and those that only include the process participants. In fact, at least five 
out of the eight cases had a combination of open and closed meetings. Open and closed 
meetings serve different purposes in a collaborative process and can have positive and 
negative effects, depending on the context of the process. 
 
Holding open, public meetings is a way to gather information from the community, to get 
buy-in from the community and to convey conclusions and decisions reached through the 
collaborative process. For example, in the Castle Valley Planning Process, the planning 
group held an initial charrette in the community of Castle Valley to gather community input 
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on the range of issues being discussed in the planning group. The planning group also held 
open houses in Castle Valley that were open to the public. During the first open house, the 
facilitators presented a series of maps and overlay data illustrating the natural features of the 
Valley as well as preliminary development options based on the data. After compiling 
community input and convening a series of closed meetings with only planning process 
participants present, the facilitators held a second open house in which a more final plan was 
presented to the community for feedback. The open, public meetings were particularly 
effective in helping the planning group ascertain public opinion and create community buy-in 
for the decisions, increasing chances that the decisions would be implemented with less 
resistance. 
Despite the many benefits of holding open meetings, this level of public involvement can 
have negative effects as well, such as providing an opportunity for dissenters to disrupt a 
collaborative process in an unproductive way. The Emerald Mountain Planning Process 
illustrates this point. In this case, the Emerald Mountain Partnership held semi-monthly 
meetings that were advertised regularly in the local newspaper and the Partnership’s website 
and open to the public. Although the meetings were effective at helping the collaborative 
group gather public input and increase the transparency of the process, they also provided an 
avenue for disruption. In particular, a dissenting group called Citizens to Save Our Public 
Lands often attended the meetings to challenge the Partnership’s land exchange proposal. 
While they did not oppose protecting Emerald Mountain, they disagreed with selling public 
lands in other towns to achieve this goal. Colorado Division of Wildlife District Wildlife 
Manager Libbie Miller thought the Partnership was ill-prepared to work with this conflicting 
perspective. “[The Partnership] might have done a better job handling these [concerns], if we 
had thought how we were going to address them ahead of time.”10  
 
Open meetings can also be frustrating if participation levels are lower than expected, despite 
conscientious public outreach. Several of the cases illustrated the fact that despite intentional 
efforts to include the public, sometimes public outreach proved ineffective. This challenge 
was particularly salient in the Elliott State Forest Planning Process, where the planning 
group’s public meetings rarely were well-attended. Both the Steering Committee and the 
Core Planning Team worked tirelessly to involve the public by publishing and mailing an 
informational newsletter, holding public meetings and forest tours and posting information 
on the Oregon Department of Forestry website where individuals could submit comments.  
 
Despite the planning groups’ efforts to include public input, members of the general public 
often struggled to find accurate and timely information on the website, and it was not always 
clear whether the public’s involvement influenced the process. Some participants indicated 
that the top-down nature of the public input process might have prohibited meaningful 
involvement from some sectors of the public. This example highlights both the difficulty and 
importance of reaching out the public in a collaborative process. A collaborative process 
should be structured in a way to encourage public involvement. 
 
While open meetings can provide many benefits, closed meetings that include only the 
process stakeholders also can provide productive opportunities for candor about substantive 
issues and allow the group to make substantial progress in decision making. Having a group 
of consistent participants who develop relationships, shared understanding of the issues and 
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ownership over the process can foster progress in a collaborative process. The Castle Valley 
Planning Process provides an example of the importance of having closed meetings. In this 
case, the planning group was able to make significant strides toward addressing substantive 
issues and finding areas for compromise when the group met separately from the general 
community. Having a small group of stakeholders working together can foster trust and build 
shared understanding among participants and can allow for greater risk-taking, creativity and 
compromise because participants do not fear public backlash. 
 
ATTRITION AND HIDDEN AGENDAS AND INTERESTS 
 
Attrition can occur because of a long process with extended timelines, frustration with the 
process, financial constraints or staff turnover. Attrition and other changes in participation 
can have a negative effect on a collaborative process as it can decrease the effectiveness of 
the process because communication is lost, trust is diminished and forged relationships are no 
longer available. At least four of the eight cases faced attrition. 
 
The Mesa del Sol Planning Process spanned more than two decades, and as such it provides 
an example of discontinuity of stakeholder involvement. Throughout the long process, 
leadership of stakeholder groups changed significantly, which made communication difficult 
at points and occasionally stalled the collaborative process. Similar problems with participant 
attrition occurred in the HAMP Process and the Elliott State Forest Planning Process. The 
attrition experienced in these cases was due in part to staff turnover throughout a prolonged 
process timeline. Some participants dropped out in frustration during the research phase of 
the HAMP Process because it took longer than expected. 
 
Sometimes participants drop out of a process because of financial, as well as time constraints. 
The Southeast New Mexico Working Group illustrates how these kinds of constraints can 
result in attrition and can decrease stakeholder representation. Because of the financial and 
time commitments required for participation in the Working Group meetings, many 
stakeholder representatives had to significantly reduce their participation levels or drop out 
entirely. Stakeholder groups that faced such constraints included conservationists, sportsmen 
and agencies such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Department of Energy and the 
Natural Resources Conservation Service. Participants of the Working Group recognized that 
without these perspectives, the group lost valuable insights into potential solutions to the 
problem at hand. 
 
As illustrated in the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, attrition can result in an 
imbalance of stakeholder interests represented in the group. The Emerald Mountain Planning 
Process is another instance where attrition caused the collaborative process to suffer. 
Although Routt County interests were originally included in the discussions, the process lost 
formal representation from the County along the way. As a result, county-based opposition to 
the collaborative group’s land exchange proposal emerged, posing a challenge to the 
intended process outcome. 
 
Because of the reality and difficulties that attrition can cause, a collaborative process should 
be structured to deal with such attrition. A process should address the issue of potential 
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attrition from the outset and decide as a group what method will be used to deal with the 
issue if and as it emerges. For example, a collaborative group could come up with a 
contingency plan for substituting a stakeholder representative if one can no longer attend the 
meetings. Also, comprehensive meeting notes should be given to any and all new participants 
to ensure a common base of information. 
 
Hidden agendas and interests can be present in any collaborative planning process. In order 
to ensure that such hidden interests and agendas do not stifle progress, a collaborative 
process should be structured to deal effectively with unspoken interests. 
 
Sometimes hidden agendas are a byproduct of stakeholders’ legal constraints or personal 
characteristics. For example, in the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, the New Mexico State 
Land Office (SLO) found it difficult to understand the true interests of the Kirtland Air Force 
Base (Sandia National Laboratories) because of the confidentiality of military information 
and national security concerns. The SLO also had a hard time interpreting the underlying 
interests of the Isleta Pueblo because SLO representatives were only authorized to speak with 
the Isleta Governor, who is the head political official but not necessarily the most influential 
decision maker among tribal members. The inherently secretive nature of the Kirtland Air 
Force Base and Isleta Pueblo stakeholders made obtaining feedback regarding concerns 
about the Mesa del Sol plan very difficult. In cases such as these, a collaborative process 
should have a process for making decisions in the absence of complete information. 
 
Occasionally, ineffective process structure also can foster hidden agendas that may strain a 
collaborative process. The Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process provides an illustration 
of process structure that ineffectively dealt with stakeholders’ hidden interests. Janet Cornish, 
the original facilitator for the Whitefish School Trust Lands Advisory Committee, believed 
that some community stakeholders masked their “Not in My Backyard” attitudes with 
concern for open space protection. Some committee members similarly questioned each 
others’ true interests. Because the Committee never forthrightly attempted to clarify the 
interests that each of its members represented, mistrust grew within the group. Although 
regular meetings and interactions ameliorated this mistrust somewhat, participants may have 
been better served by identifying their true interests at the beginning of the process. 
 
INTERACTION WITH OTHER STATE OR FEDERAL PROCESSES 
 
Collaborative planning processes often interact with other state or federal processes that can 
influence the collaborative process structure in both positive and negative ways. 
Simultaneous state and federal processes can help initiate and motivate the formation of a 
budding collaborative planning process, provide necessary external deadlines and create 
options for problem solving. However, they can also provide a set of strict regulations and 
requirements that can hinder creative thinking, decrease public involvement and frustrate 
process participants. 
 
A collaborative process may be initiated because of a state or federal process that requires 
action. For example, the impetus for the creation of the Southeast New Mexico Working 
Group stemmed from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision to designate the lesser 
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prairie chicken and the sand dune lizard as candidates for federal listing as threatened species 
under the Endangered Species Act. Without the fear induced by the risk of federal regulation 
on the threatened species’ habitats, the collaborative group might not have coalesced. 
 
State or federal processes can also help motivate a process that has reached a stalemate. The 
Emerald Mountain Planning Process provides an illustration of the motivating force of 
federal processes. In this case, the Emerald Mountain Partnership’s Board of Directors 
struggled for the first two years of its existence to acquire adequate funding or find a 
conservation buyer for the Emerald Mountain state trust land parcel. However, in time the 
opportunity of a land exchange with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) enabled the 
group to move past a period that some described as “floundering.”11 
 
Mandatory compliance with outside state or federal processes can provide the needed 
incentives for a collaborative planning group to meet deadlines. The BLM Resource 
Management Plan Amendment process provided the necessary deadlines for the Southeast 
New Mexico Working Group. Since the Working Group wanted their conservation strategy 
to be included in the Amendment process, they were forced to comply with the external 
deadline provided by the federal process. This deadline allowed the group to finish a long, 
protracted debate and come up with a cohesive conservation strategy. 
 
Sometimes looking to other state or federal processes can enable a collaborative group to 
invent options to achieve their interests, particularly when the group has reached impasse. In 
the Castle Valley Planning Process, a federally legislated land exchange with the BLM 
enabled the process to move past a stalemate. When the planning group could not agree to 
the planning process contract, looking to a land exchange option offered another path for the 
participants to achieve their goals. 
 
Despite some of the benefits of having an outside process to motivate, provide deadlines or 
create options in a collaborative effort, the strict regulations and requirements they entail can 
hinder creative thinking among process participants. For example, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) process bound the Elliott State Forest Planning 
Process within an institutional framework inherent in the federal planning process. This 
limitation posed challenges in being able to think creatively about the process and outcomes. 
 
Members of the general public who are interested in a collaborative planning process may be 
deterred due to the unwieldy nature of some state and federal planning process 
documentation. In the Elliott State Forest Planning Process, the general public did not have 
the time or ability to read through the cumbersome HCP planning documents, a factor that 
limited public involvement, and according to some, the success of the process. 
 
The rigid structure of state and federal planning processes can also frustrate process 
participants and create distrust in some cases. In the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning 
Process, the Department of Natural Resource’s decision to initiate an Environmental Impact 
Statement in compliance with the State Environmental Policy Act was perceived by some 
participants to be a stall tactic or the manifestation of a power struggle. This situation 
highlights the fact that when a collaborative process dovetails with other state or federal 
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processes, the limitations of those processes and legal reasons for initiating them must be 





WHAT IS THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP AND 
FACILITATION IN A COLLABORATIVE PLANNING 
PROCESS? 
 
eaders and facilitators guided each of the eight collaborative planning processes on state 
trust lands examined in this report. While in some cases a single individual fulfilled both 
leadership and facilitation roles, these two functions assist a group in different ways. 
Facilitators can either emerge from within a group or be hired externally to impartially assist 
the group in running meetings, communicating and making decisions. Leaders serve in both 
formal and informal roles to guide, inspire, or represent others. Most simply, leaders are 
those that others follow.  
This chapter will explore how different kinds of facilitators and leaders impacted the 
collaborative processes in which they served. This section explores the following the 
facilitation and leadership issues: 
• Dynamics of third-party and internal facilitators 
• Sources and impacts of facilitator neutrality  
• How different facilitation techniques helped or impeded the process 
• Key benefits and challenges of facilitation in collaborative planning.  
• Role of official leaders 
• Role of unofficial leaders 
• Role of agency and municipal leaders 





Facilitators help collaborative groups organize a process and navigate through conflict. In 
some cases, third party facilitators are brought in as neutral, non-partisan mediators. In 
others, individuals from within the collaborative group or state trust land management 
agency staff may fill the facilitation role. Regardless, facilitators can fill an important 
organizational role for any group by setting agendas, maintaining the momentum of meetings 
and helping the group clarify and focus on issues.1 But they also fill a conciliation role, 
mediating between conflicting opinions, personalities and political dynamics to enable the 
group to make progress towards an agreement.2 While facilitators are not a panacea that will 
ensure a group’s success, effective facilitators can help groups overcome barriers and make 
progress toward their goals. 
 
According to mediation scholar Chris Moore, mediators and facilitators can take on a variety 
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table. These roles can include opening communication channels by initiating or facilitating 
communication, drawing out quiet parties and keeping dominant voices in check. These 
individuals also lead the process forward by providing a procedure and procedural tools and 
can train participants in how to effectively represent their interests. They can also help the 
group explore problems, often by enabling participants to examine a problem from different 
viewpoints, assisting in defining issues and interests and looking for mutually satisfactory 
outcomes.3 In some cases, facilitators can legitimize the process and its outcomes by 
imparting fairness and neutrality. Finally, in many situations facilitators can help expand 
resources to provide procedural assistance to parties or link them with outside resources or 
experts, with the aim of enlarging the overall range of options.4 
 
The eight cases of collaborative planning on state trust lands examined in this report reveal 
important lessons about how different kinds of facilitation affect a collaborative process. This 
section explores the following the facilitation issues: 
 
• Dynamics of third-party and internal facilitators 
• Sources and impacts of facilitator neutrality  
• How different facilitation techniques helped or impeded the process 





TYPES OF FACILITATORS 
 
Of the eight cases researched, five used professional facilitators from outside the group at 
some point in the process while five used group members to fill this role at some time (Table 
18-1). As these numbers imply, many cases employed multiple facilitators at different times 
in the process.  
 
The distinction between internal and third-party facilitators is critical, because individuals in 
these roles have differing responsibilities and expectations placed upon them by the group. 
Third-party facilitators have no authoritative decision-making power, but help participants 
educate each other on the issues and reconcile their competing interests.5 These neutral 
parties help ensure that a consensus decision can be reached, especially in conflicts with 
interpersonal tension and widespread distrust. For example, some members of the Southeast 
New Mexico Working Group felt that professional facilitators were essential for their 
planning process. New Mexico Department of Fish Game staffer Bill Dunn describes, “if I’d 
gotten up there, then okay, there’s a slant toward wildlife. If Jeff Harvard got up there, a slant 
towards oil and gas. If John Clemmons, a slant toward ranching. With [third-party 
facilitators] Toby and Ric, there was no slant. That’s what’s key about having a neutral 
facilitator.”6 
 
In three of the cases examined in this report, effective facilitators emerged from within the 
collaborative group, itself. These group members were able to look past their own interests 
and serve in a more neutral role to help their peers make progress toward a joint decision or 
plan. While these individuals are clearly not impartial, they can play an effective facilitation 
role if all others in the group perceive them as legitimate and fair conveners.7 For example, 
soon after the Advisory Committee formed in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, 
the Committee elected local realtor and Committee member Alan Elm to chair the group. For 
a while, Elm and professional facilitator Janet Cornish ran the Committee meetings. When 
Cornish left the process, the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation assigned 
planner Lisa Horowitz to staff the project.8 Together, Horowitz and Elm facilitated the 
Committee meetings, while Committee member and Whitefish Chamber of Commerce 
President Sheila Bowen picked up meeting coordination tasks such as setting up venues and 
overseeing meeting minutes.9 Emerging naturally from the group, these facilitators were 
more effective than Cornish because their fellow Advisory Committee members perceived 




One of the most critical issues influencing the effectiveness of facilitators, especially when 
they are third parties, is that the group perceives them as neutral, with no predisposition 
towards certain outcomes. Even if the chosen facilitator feels he or she is unbiased, 
participants may feel differently. Several underlying elements affect whether a facilitator 
appears neutral. First, a facilitator who is an employee of one of the interested parties, or 
contracted by an interested party, can be assumed by participants to be partial to that group’s 
interests. In many of the cases examined, facilitators appeared more legitimate when they 
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were hired and paid jointly by diverse interests, rather than directly contracted and paid 
through an agency or a donor.  
 
In the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the Advisory Committee felt that because 
facilitator Janet Cornish had been hired by the Montana Department of Natural Resources 
and Conservation (DNRC) to run their neighborhood planning process, she was biased 
towards their interests. Furthermore, the fact that the DNRC declined to reveal its source of 
funding for the process raised suspicions among community members. These suspicions were 
confirmed when the group discovered that the funds were donated by two local private 
landowners and Cornish lost all credibility in the eyes of participants. In the Castle Valley 
Planning Process, participants trusted facilitator Marty Zeller’s guidance of the process 
because he was jointly hired and paid by all stakeholder groups. However, when one 
stakeholder group, the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA), 
contracted him as a consultant on other concurrent projects, community members began to 
question whether his other standing arrangements with SITLA created a conflict of interest. 
These concerns increased when Zeller’s costs for the Castle Valley process exceeded the 
original bid amount by $6,000 and SITLA covered these additional expenses despite a prior 
agreement that SITLA and the community would split Zeller’s contract. This extra financial 
contribution from the state trust land agency made some community members feel that Zeller 
was “taking a side.”10 In contrast, in the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, the 
Washington Department of Natural Resources paid for the facilitation services after the 
members of the Advisory Committee jointly searched for and selected their preferred 
facilitation team.  
 
How a facilitator was selected also impacted his or her perceived neutrality. If several parties 
worked together to jointly find and decide on a third party facilitator, they likely perceived 
him or her as credible and trustworthy. In the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, 
the Committee spent months debating what their level of decision-making authority should 
be. Responding to this tension and anticipating challenging negotiations ahead, the group 
decided to search for a third-party facilitator. Hiring a facilitator helped alleviate concerns 
that the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) had too much control over meetings and 
allowed the Chairperson to devote more time to representing his organization’s interests.11 
Once the DNR and the Committee agreed on a facilitation team, Committee members found 
that the group’s relationships and efficiency improved. As mentioned above, while the DNR 
funded the facilitators, the joint selection process seems to have provided adequate credibility 
to the team. 
 
How a facilitator operated also determined whether he or she was perceived as neutral. Third 
parties must be constantly aware of how their words and actions might be perceived to the 
diverse parties in the group. In the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, both of the two 
facilitators were accused of having biases toward either the oil and gas industry and the 
ranchers or the conservationists. While the facilitators noted that they would occasionally 
play off one another to help expedite the process, both the conservationists and the oil and 
gas industry representatives construed these tactics as preferential treatment for the opposing 
interests.12 For some members of the Working Group, perceived biases made it difficult for 






Facilitators employ different intervention strategies to help manage collaborative processes. 
Several variables influence the kinds of interventions they use: the level of conflict, the 
capability of participants to resolve their own differences, power balances, procedures in 
place, the complexity of the issues at hand and the expressed facilitation needs of the group.13 
In addition, the stage at which a facilitator enters a process determines the strategies they use 
to help the group. If a facilitator enters a process early on and the emotional intensity is low, 
the group may need different kinds of assistance than if parties have become more polarized 
and tensions are high.14  
 
Some facilitators meet with the individual interests prior to the first group meeting to learn 
more about the issues, interests and personalities at play in the conflict. In the Southeast New 
Mexico Working Group, Toby Herzlich and Ric Richardson conducted private interviews 
with each participant to understand their concerns, interests and fears about the collaborative 
process in hopes of increasing their credibility as facilitators and of the process itself. These 
early interviews also contributed to the facilitators’ greater understanding of the issues the 
working group would address as neither facilitator had significant prior knowledge about the 
problem at stake.  
 
When a facilitator perceives that some members of the group are not contributing to the 
discussion, he or she can draw out quiet voices to ensure their interests and ideas are heard. 
This function helps ensure all members contribute to a final agreement by enabling 
individuals who are shy, uncomfortable interrupting, or feel outnumbered to share their point 
of view and help move the process forward. Not only does this additional participation 
increase the range of ideas and options on the table, it also helps ensure the durability of any 
final agreement reached because all participants played a hand in crafting the solution. In the 
Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, the facilitators work included always, “making 
sure there was a flow of communication, making sure no one could hide and not participate 
and, conversely, that no one dominated discussion, preventing other people from talking.”15 
Similarly, in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, where a few dominant voices 
often monopolized the Advisory Committee discussions, Marty Zeller effectively drew 
quieter parties into the group discussion, enabling everyone to express their perspective at 
some point.16  
 
While some groups need facilitators to run highly organized meetings to help structure the 
discussion, others need more freedom to let the group develop its own dynamic and energy. 
In the Houghton Area Master Planning (HAMP) Process, facilitator Freda Johnson followed 
the City of Tucson’s instructions and ran “an amazingly structured meeting” that always “got 
out on time,” but in doing so would cut short discussions that some members of the group felt 
were necessary to fuel the creative process.17 This strategy was therefore a stumbling block 





Some facilitators were effective at reminding individuals of what would happen if they did 
not reach agreement. In the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process facilitator Mary 
Dumas used this strategy to remind participants why they were involved in the collaborative 
process in the first place. This technique was especially useful given the situation after the 
Attorney General rendered his opinion that the Committee was advisory in nature and 
therefore did not have decision-making authority, which may have caused some participants 
to consider leaving the table. According to Dumas, the question of “what it would mean if 
they did not come to an agreement” helped individuals remember what their alternatives 
were to a collaborative decision and motivated them to persevere with the process.  
 
BENEFITS OF FACILITATION 
 
Facilitation can be extremely beneficial to a collaborative process. Such benefits include 
finding common ground from which the group can create options and find solutions, 
designing and directing meetings for effective communication and keeping participants at the 
table to ensure parties continue to work towards a durable final product.  
 
When coming to the table, diverse interest groups often struggle to identify common goals. 
Facilitators can help stakeholders discover common ground on which to focus their planning 
efforts and construct shared principles for success. The Castle Valley Planning Process 
planning group developed a set of shared principles that acknowledged participants’ diverse 
interests, but established that these interests were not mutually exclusive. According to 
Facilitator Marty Zeller: 
 
The principles basically were an exercise at the beginning of the process to 
get [the participants] to start talking to each other, to define some areas of 
common ground and to create an initial focus for the planning effort. [The 
principles] got them engaged constructively as opposed to destructively in the 
process.18 
 
This process encouraged members of the fledgling collaborative group to interact 
constructively with each other, abandon preconceived notions and open their minds to new 
ideas.19 
 
Facilitators can design and direct meetings to be venues for open and productive 
communication. In the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, the facilitators enabled 
such communication by organizing agendas, meeting venues and minutes. Some members of 
the Southeast New Mexico Working Group felt that Toby Herzlich and Ric Richardson 
created highly effective meetings by keeping the group on track and encouraging 
compromises.20 
 
Effective facilitators also keep participants at the table by reminding them of why they chose 
to pursue a collaborative solution. In the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, Marty 
Zeller worked to reign in group members who held meetings about the planning process 
outside of the regular Advisory Committee sessions. Zeller also helped convince Committee 




Facilitators can also contribute knowledge to a collaborative process. Montana’s Department 
of Natural Resources and Conservation staff involved in the Whitefish Neighborhood 
Planning Process found that facilitator Marty Zeller’s understanding of state trust land 
mandates and legal constraints enabled him to articulate the agency’s interests to the group. 
Due to Zeller’s background knowledge as well as his neutral status in the group, the 
stakeholders were more receptive to his trust land explanations than they had been when the 
agency was expressing them.22 
 
CHALLENGES OF FACILITATION 
 
Some participants felt that facilitation increased the length of a process. Jeff Harvard of the 
Southeast New Mexico Working Group felt that stakeholders could have identified their own 
set of goals and developed a conservation plan more efficiently without professional 
facilitation. He described the facilitation as “counterproductive,” dragging out a process that 
was “probably a year longer than it should have been.”23  
 
In one case, a facilitator focused so much on emphasizing common ground that group 
members felt unable to negotiate about key differences. The facilitators of the Southeast New 
Mexico Working Group asked the oil and gas representatives, conservationists and the 
agency representatives to each come up with their own proposals for the conservation plan. 
The science writer in the group, Scott Noris, then created a matrix of their three proposals to 
“lay them side-by-side” so the group could see the major issues and differences each 
highlighted.24 Several participants recalled large differences between these texts but recalled 
that facilitator Toby Herzlich insisted that the group only focus on the commonalities. 
According to participant Jennifer Parody, Herzlich felt that “by highlighting the differences, 
we were just highlighting our disagreements and that we needed to focus on what was 
common. And in my opinion, that prevented us from getting to the meat of the problem and 
actually hashing out solutions. When we finally sat down and talked about our differences in 
the small group, that's when we made progress.”25 The group ultimately took the major 
categories of issues highlighted in the matrix and convened a small working group of one 
representative from each major stakeholder group to hammer out a plausible agreement for 
all parties. Neither facilitator was present for these subcommittee meetings.  
 
In a few cases, uninformed facilitators impeded a process. Participants found that facilitators 
need to familiarize themselves with the issues at play in a conflict prior to the first meeting. 
Some of the Castle Valley Planning Process’s town government officials wondered why 
facilitator Marty Zeller had not been aware that the planning process had to be implemented 
through town ordinances via the town Planning and Zoning Commission.26 A participant in 
the Southeast New Mexico Working Group noted that their facilitators had inadequate 
understanding of prairie chicken biology and the regulatory constraints under which the 
committee was operating.27 However, some participants would argue that these issues were 
not the responsibility of the facilitator, but were the domain of those who set up the 




Participants rely on facilitators to sort out rhetoric from legitimate debate. Jennifer Parody of 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service noted that while the Southeast New Mexico Working 
Group had established a ground rule that debate was only acceptable on legitimate 
arguments, the facilitators “treated everything like it was debatable.”29 She continued:  
 
So when people would say things like, “There’s no science to show that” or 
“Prairie chickens like oil pads” or something, I wanted the facilitators to call 
bullshit and say “we've covered this ground, can we just agree on the basic 
biological data and agree that there are some things that should just not be on 
the table.” I thought we wasted a lot of time because they wouldn't sort 
through what was just rhetoric and what was actually legitimate debate.30  
 
This inability to enforce a key ground rule extended the length of the planning process and 





Leadership can take many forms in collaborative processes. Some efforts are mobilized by a 
single, charismatic leader.31 In other cases, dedicated individuals step forward later in the 
process to help maintain energy and commitment.32 Many groups chose to elect an official 
leader to serve as a chairperson, while others are led by a designated agency official. The 
literature on collaboration reveals that regardless of the structure of a collaborative process, 
certain dedicated and energetic individuals tend to stand out as leaders.  
 
According to Wondolleck and Yaffee, effective collaborative efforts often have one or two 
participants who enthusiastically model a “we’re all in this together” attitude that breaks 
through adversarial dynamics and sets a tone for the rest of the group.33 In some cases, this 
individual is an agency official who may be taking a dramatic step away from conventional 
agency approaches.34 In others, it is the “movers and shakers” in the community who 
catalyze a joint-problem solving effort and garner community support for taking a 
collaborative approach to a problem.35 These “local champions” can be dedicated community 
members, elected officials, project leaders or landowners who rally activity and drive the 
process forward.36  
 
Participants in the eight cases of collaborative planning on state trust lands identified many 
different qualities and functions of “leaders:” those who were deeply committed to the 
process, motivated others, kept the group focused on its objective, or provided new ideas that 
galvanized support for the process from both within and outside the group. Laura Kamala, a 
participant in the Castle Valley Planning Process emphasized the importance of strong 
leadership in this way, “You have to have some leaders that really care, to the point where 
they’re willing to go through hell and keep showing up. That’s the only way you can have 
success, ultimately.”37 Overall, the mosaic of leadership functions was filled by a number of 
notable individuals who served the process in different ways. These leaders fill both formal 
and informal roles in the group and lead both by making deliberate choices and influencing 






Four of the eight collaborative processes involved planning groups that elected a chairperson 
to lead the process and meetings. Chairpersons were chosen for a variety of reasons, 
including legitimacy, committee experience, interest and dedication. In the Elliot State Forest 
Planning Process, the Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) Director of the Southern Area 
district was chosen as chair. As the most senior ODF official in charge of the Elliot State 
Forest, he was at the top of the chain of command and thus an obvious choice for 
Chairperson. In the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the Advisory Committee 
selected local realtor and Committee member Alan Elm to chair the group not only for his 
several years of experience as Vice Chairman of the City/County Planning Board, but also 
for his interest in helping the group expedite their work.38 Similarly, in the Emerald 
Mountain Planning Process, Ben Beall was elected Chair of the Emerald Mountain 
Partnership because he had already been leading the process since its inception as a County 
Commissioner. Ultimately, it was Beall’s dedication to protect Emerald Mountain that 
pushed this project to completion. In Lake Whatcom, Steve Hood was elected chair because 
group members perceived him as being capable of keeping the group on track and, most 
likely, because he had experience working on environmental issues pertaining to Lake 
Whatcom as a staff member of the Department of Ecology. 
 
The roles of chairpersons varied, but ranged from facilitating meetings, reaching out to the 
media, representing the group to trust land management agencies, or even making final 
decisions when consensus could not be reached. Because these individuals were elected by 
process participants, they were trusted to wield their extra power responsibly and represent 
group interests fairly. In all cases, most participants felt that their elected chairpersons 
fulfilled these expectations. 
 
A particularly critical function of official leaders was to help stakeholders with opposing 
views at the table and smooth interpersonal dynamics. This function was especially critical 
when, in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, some individuals jeopardized 
Chamber of Commerce President Sheila Bowen’s job by telling the Chamber’s Board of 
Directors that Bowen was misrepresenting their development interests in the process. 
Participants in the Whitefish case credited Chairman Alan Elm with calming the waters when 
trying situations like these arose and persuading Committee members to stick with the 
process despite personal challenges.39  
 
Official leaders also tended to serve as a bridge between multiple parties, maintaining critical 
communication flows and fostering relationships outside of meetings. Often, the chairperson 
in the Emerald Mountain Planning Process, Chairman Ben Beall served as the primary 
liaison with the State Land Board.40 Charles Bedford observed that when Beall met with him 
about the Partnership’s progress, he was “very respectful of others involved” when there was 





Similarly, chairpersons also reached out to the broader community to galvanize political and 
financial support via partnerships, fundraising opportunities and the media. The Castle 
Valley Planning Process’s Dave Erley spearheaded many fundraising efforts and engaged the 
outdoor industry and climbing community. Through his outreach to the climbing community, 
Erley garnered advertisements in big climbing magazines like Rock and Ice. The Castle 
Valley cause also got the attention of world-renowned climbers who gave talks about the 
need to preserve Castleton Tower. This publicity brought the issue into the mainstream 
climbing community, and fueled further fundraising.  
 
In some cases, chairpersons were chosen based on an individual’s track record of persistence 
and determination that had already driven the process forward over several years. This 
perseverance was key in the Emerald Mountain Planning Process, where Chairman Ben Beall 
painstakingly cultivated the planning process and individually liaised between the 
community and the State Land Board for twelve years. According to many, Beall “is just 




Many individuals who did not serve in formal leadership positions often played key, 
unofficial leadership roles. In many cases, these participants were recognized as having 
facilitated important progress or offered creative solutions and resources. In the Lake 
Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, Linda Marrom’s emotional commitment and passion 
for the project helped the group push through the process. 43 The city of Bellingham’s Bill 
McCourt observed that that citizens such as Marrom are better positioned to affect change 
than agency insiders:  
I worked for 31 years for the city of Bellingham, and I have watched how 
things work within the agencies. For the most part, we seem to work to protect 
the status quo. We do not do a very good job with leadership. We really owe 
most of what happens in situations like this to people like Linda Marrom and 
Jamie Berg, people that are on the outside of the organization who somehow 
get this idea burning in their mind that they are willing to do what it takes and 
stick it out and challenge the professionals and the status quo. It’s amazing 
how much impact they can have. They are the ones that affect change. The 
rest of us are just protecting our turf.44 
In the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, Mack Energy Corporation’s Dan Girand 
played a key role in Oil and Gas Technical Subcommittee by finding opportunities for his oil 
and gas industry constituents to make compromises. By understanding the perspective of oil 
and gas representatives and proactively identifying opportunities for mutual concessions as 
well as options that were not feasible, Girand helped this group hammer out the key oil and 
gas components of a conservation plan. In the same case, participants noted that retired 
biologist Jim Bailey brought a wide range of creative options to the table and was extremely 
reasonable and thoughtful in his comments and ideas. As the sole representative conservation 




Unofficial leaders were motivated by fervent emotional commitment to the cause, or 
naturally strong personalities. The Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process’ Linda 
Marrom was passionately committed to the process because any additional landslides put her 
house and family at risk. At the same time, because she was the first to rally public support, 
along with her neighbor Jamie Berg, others viewed her as the community’s leader in the 
process; therefore she naturally filled this role and met their expectations.  
 
Some group members were particularly influential in ways that both facilitated progress and 
rallied others around them. However, in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, this 
kind of leadership sacrificed group input. Advisory Committee member Marshall Friedman’s 
innovative suggestions motivated others into action and his enthusiasm and commitment 
helped the group craft a plan that satisfied most Committee members. Advisory Committee 
Chairman Alan Elm has credited Friedman and others who had more “extreme” positions 
with being able to bring the group to a middle ground: “by being way over there, they did 
help us meet in the middle.”45 Yet, his involvement in the “shadow group’s” ex parte 
conversations hindered the process from fairly incorporating diverse input.  
 
AGENCY AND MUNICIPAL LEADERS 
 
Agency and municipal leaders often assumed active leadership roles that created, supported, 
or promoted the collaborative planning processes. In some cases, however, the mere presence 
of these officials enhanced the credibility of the process and support for it.  
  
Agency leaders assumed a unique role in the collaborative planning cases. Often, one or a 
few leaders within an agency set the tone of the agency’s response to a conflict and designed 
its role in the collaborative process. In the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the 
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) Trust Lands Management 
Division Administrator Tom Shultz was instrumental to completion of the process. Schultz 
coached his DNRC staffers through their work with the Whitefish Advisory Committee and 
worked hard within his agency to enable staff to respond to the local community’s interests, a 
relatively new role for the agency.46 New Mexico Commissioner of Public Lands, Patrick 
Lyons sent a powerful agency message to the Southeast New Mexico Working Group by 
removing a portion of trust lands in prairie chicken habitat from oil and gas leasing. This act 
also gave the Working Group a large portion of trust land now off-limits to leasing with 
which to work into their overall conservation scheme. Given the autonomy of the State Land 
Office (SLO), this was a symbolic and purely voluntary act by Lyons that assured the 
Working Group that the SLO supported the Working Group’s goals.47 
 
Several of the collaborative planning processes researched in this study were catalyzed by 
one or two proactive individuals who tried a new approach to planning. Indeed, Wondolleck 
and Yaffee have found that many effective collaborative resource management partnerships 
have been initiated by a few entrepreneurial individuals who saw joint problem-solving as a 
desirable alternative to traditional, adversarial approaches to resolving conflict.48 In the 
Castle Valley Planning Process, Mayor Bruce Keeler initiated a conversation with Utah’s 
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration Assistant Director Ric McBrier about 
working together to find a “win-win” solution instead of pursuing further rezoning, litigation 
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and land sales. This initial contact and other early conversations between McBrier and Castle 
Valley resident Brooke Williams led both groups to drop their activities and convene a joint 
planning effort for trust land in Castle Valley.49 The Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning 
Process’s Bill Wallace, the Northwest Regional Manager for the Washington Department of 
Natural Resources, is another example of an agency leader, especially because of his 
commitment to the process during two different commissioners. Despite having a new 
Commissioner that was less supportive of the process, Wallace adapted to the new 
commissioner’s style and never faulted in the face of the Committee, even when group 
members believed the new Commissioner did not support the plan the group was developing. 
One member of the Committee commented, “Bill Wallace was terrific. Overall, I am 
impressed with the DNR.”50 
 
Participants also noted that effective leaders created and reinforced an overarching vision for 
the project. In New Mexico, many participants of the Mesa del Sol Planning Process credited 
former Commissioner Ray Powell with creating and marketing the vision for the project. 
Powell had an ability to translate his ideas to other parties to fuel a collaborative process 
around a shared vision.51 As he describes it, “At the end of the meetings they were right there 
with us. That was their project.”52 This shared vision helped keep parties involved in the 
collaborative process and facilitated progress in planning. 
 
In several cases, agency leaders also espoused the collaborative planning process early on. In 
the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, Commissioner Ray Powell chose to open the New 
Mexico State Land Office’s (SLO) doors to the public and personally visited with 
neighborhood groups, businesses and other stakeholders in the process to bring them on-
board with the planned development. Because the Commissioner himself went to meet 
stakeholders, these meetings helped to build trust and respect between the SLO and the 
community in ways that may not have occurred without Powell’s commitment and 
involvement. In the Castle Valley Planning Process, School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration (SITLA) Assistant Director Ric McBrier championed the collaborative 
process and represented the process to the SITLA Board of Trustees. The agency had never 
undertaken a similar process and McBrier’s willingness to work with the community enabled 
new relationships and trust to be built. 
 
Agency leaders dispelled misperceptions about government plans and activities and built a 
foundation of trust with the stakeholders. The Department of Natural Resources and 
Conservation’s (DNRC) Unit Manager Bob Sandman assumed this role during the Whitefish 
Neighborhood Planning Process. After a previous staff member had inspired mistrust among 
community members by failing to share information, Sandman took a more active role in the 
process to prove the agency’s willingness to provide real answers to the Committee’s 
questions and concerns. His willingness to collaborate and his inspiring and energetic “pep 
talk[s]” in Committee meetings bolstered community confidence in the DNRC.53 At the same 
time, the DNRC’s Trust Land Management Division Administrator Tom Schultz became 
more involved in the planning process by making himself more accessible to Committee 
members to ensure they had access to all necessary information. This new approach helped 
dispel the community’s impression that the agency was an inconsistent, “many-headed 
beast”54 or “the big bad wolf looming on the horizon.”55 The increased involvement and 
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openness of both Bob Sandman and Tom Schultz improved the transparency of agency 
activities and helped dismiss conspiracy theories about the DNRC’s intentions. 
 
In some situations, the mere presence and involvement of public officials boosted the 
legitimacy of a convened group, making both participants and outside parties take the process 
more seriously, and perhaps more amenable the outcome. In the Lake Whatcom Landscape 
Planning Process, the presence of elected officials “elevated the stature” of the Committee, 
making participants feel that the process was “being taken seriously.” This increased 
legitimacy in turn boosted participants’ own level of emotional commitment to the process 
and kept them at the table working together.56 
 
Agency officials, especially those who were elected to their offices, also catalyzed support of 
parties who may have otherwise been skeptical of a collaborative process. Many participants 
in the Southeast New Mexico Working Group laud Commissioner Patrick Lyons’ ability to 
gain support and buy-in from other stakeholders. As a Republican in a high-level government 
position, Lyons was “at a better place to catalyze support of some of the industry that 
typically is Republican in nature, both the agricultural and oil and gas industries.”57  
 
TRANSITIONS IN OFFICIAL LEADERSHIP 
 
Leadership transitions can either enhance or impede collaborative efforts, depending on the 
context. In some cases, changes in process leaders hindered progress by causing the group to 
lose momentum and commitment. In the Houghton Area Master Planning (HAMP) Process, 
the city’s project leader retired only a few months into the process. Michael Wyneken, the 
new planner assigned to lead the Citizen’s Review Committee (CRC) and manage the 
process felt that the project “got dumped” on him and was frustrated by having to work 
within the parameters set by the previous manager.58 This change in leadership, combined 
with delays, lack of data and confusion over the various parties’ roles in the process, caused 
CRC attendance and participation to decline.59  
 
In the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, changeover in State Land Commissioners required 
participants to adapt to new policies and visions for the process. In some cases, the different 
beliefs of a new Commissioner derailed projects begun in previous administrations. When 
Commissioner Ray Powell began his first term, he experienced some backlash when he tried 
to institute more planning and collaboration into the State Land Office’s land management 
activities. According to Powell, “folks wanted [the old policies] to continue, including Mr. 
Baca.”60 Conversely, when Commissioner Patrick Lyons came into office, he chose to 
continue Powell’s collaborative strategy for Mesa del Sol even though he has a markedly 
different business philosophy. While Lyons may prefer to minimize the State Land Office’s 
role and require the private developer to manage the collaborative process, he chose to honor 
the precedent already set and continue to invest agency resources into the collaborative 
process. According to Commissioner Lyons, “We’re supportive of [Mesa del Sol] … We’d 








HOW DO INTERPERSONAL AND POWER DYNAMICS 
INFLUENCE A COLLABORATIVE PLANNING PROCESS? 
 
ach of the eight cases examined in this report illustrate how relationships, trust and the 
power shared among participants of a collaborative process can affect the dynamics of a 
process and influence its outcome. This chapter focuses on the following five main aspects of 
interpersonal relationships in collaborative processes:  
 
• How relationships between parties influence the collaborative process 
• How the collaborative process influences relationships among parties 
• How relationships influence future interactions among parties 
• Elements that give parties power  
• How distribution of power affects the collaborative process 
 
The very nature of collaborative processes indicates that many participants enter a process 
with preexisting relationships with other parties. Preexisting relationships may result from 
living in the same community, sharing interests, competing for resources, or other 
interactions. Such relationships are not static, however, and throughout the collaborative 
process they continue to change as participants work together, create a shared understanding 
of problems and solutions and ultimately create a final plan. Along the way, positive 
relationships serve to facilitate progress while poor relationships often hinder it. The 
relationships of process participants with outside parties can also influence the process 
direction and efficiency.  
 
While relationships have a significant impact on a collaborative process, there are many ways 
in which the process itself also influences relationships. Process structure can have a large 
impact on relationships from the outset of the process. Process structure elements like ground 
rules, group principles, subcommittees, methods of addressing problems and the timeframe 
for the process can all be influential. As these elements change, whether through membership 
or influence changes, so too do relationships. In addition, there are more informal ways 
through which relationships are changed. These can include group hikes, song and prayer 
activities and informal meetings at local gathering places. All of these methods for altering 
relationships can be used strategically in the process to help foster positive relationships that 













Table 19-1: Relationships across the Eight Cases and Actions for Improvement 
 






state land agency 
 
Developing principles of 
success; group hikes 
Better working 
relationships, particularly 





City Department of 
Urban Planning and 
Design engaged 
community in process 
 
Group field trip* 
 
Working relationships; 
increased City and ASLD 
communication 
Elliott State Forest 
Planning Process 
Participants shared a 
common goal 
 
Laid issues on the table and 
talked them through, tours 
of the forest, felt 
comfortable airing an 
grievances  
Better understanding of 
the Habitat Conservation 
Plan process; more buy-in 









Political support via letter-
writing; subcommittee 






established or increased 
Mesa del Sol 
Planning Process 
Beneficiary sued SLO  
Beneficiary brought into 
process; personal meetings 
with neighborhood groups, 





Public partnership with 





Community and tribes 
distrust DNR 
 
Forest walks; tribal song 
and prayer before meetings 
 
Trust between community 
and DNR eroded when it 
appeared that the Board 





Mistrust among oil and 
gas, ranchers, & 
conservationists; 




Long hours working 
















Community mistrust of 
state land agency; 
Community 
connections to State 
Land Board officials 
 
Met at informal gathering 
places outside of process; 
lunch meetings; change in 
personnel 
Improved relationships 






* While this was a group-building exercise in the process, none of the HAMP interviewees for his report attended 
the field trip. Therefore, they could not comment on its possible contribution to relationship-building. 
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Relationships created during participation in collaborative processes can also influence the 
parties’ ability to implement the final plan or to work together in other capacities. 
Participants in the eight cases examined in this report also commonly mentioned that the 
positive relationships formed during the collaborative processes was a major benefit of the 
process.  
 
Finally, the cooperative nature of collaborative processes also assumes a certain amount of 
power sharing.1 The power that participants in collaborative processes have to influence each 
other and the outcome, whether real or perceived is a complex variable. The eight cases of 
collaborative planning on state trust land revealed a number of interesting examples of how a 
process is affected by who has power and why they have that power, as well as how groups 
work to reduce power imbalances among participants.  
 
 
RELATIONSHIPS INFLUENCE THE PROCESS 
 
Relationships among collaborative process participants and relationships between 
participants and outside parties can significantly affect collaborative processes. For instance, 
internal group relationships can help initiate a collaborative process, bring in additional 
membership, change the path of planning, help the group overcome impasses or create those 
impasses, improve understanding and motivate members to continue to participate. 
Meanwhile, relationships of participants with outside parties can facilitate or stifle processes, 
influence participants’ actions within the group and create options through partnerships. 
Interpersonal relationships surrounding collaborative processes thus have a large impact on 
the direction of the process.  
 
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG GROUP PARTICIPANTS 
 
Many collaborative processes are bred out of existing relationships among parties, be those 
positive or negative. In the cases examined in this report, relationships played a role in the 
very issue or conflict that necessitated the collaborative process.  
 
Good working relationships among parties can lead to the formation of a collaborative 
process. The Houghton Area Master Plan (HAMP) Process illustrates how preexisting 
working relationships between the City of Tucson and Tucson residents helped initiate a 
collaborative process. Recognizing and respecting the community’s desire and expectation to 
be engaged in planning processes, the City of Tucson’s Department of Urban Planning and 
Design invited neighborhood groups from the Houghton Road area and local land use 
planning and development professions to join the newly formed Citizen’s Review Committee 
to provide input on the HAMP.  
 
Strong positive relationships and a sense of community also acted as a catalyst for the Castle 
Valley Planning Process and the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process. In the Castle 
Valley, Utah, an informal community phone tree provided a mechanism for increasing 
residents’ awareness of the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration’s (SITLA) 
pending land development plans. This awareness prompted members to form the Castle Rock 
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Collaboration as a forum in which to engage SITLA collaboratively. Similarly, in Whitefish, 
Montana, some members of the Whitefish School Trust Lands Advisory Committee had 
connections to the Montana State Board of Land Commissioners. These connections helped 
them secure more decision-making power in the Department of Natural Resources and 
Conservation’s neighborhood planning process.  
 
Despite many of the positive relationships that helped launch collaborative processes, 
according to Wondolleck and Yaffee, conflict, particularly protracted conflict, often provides 
the impetus for collaborative processes. With this conflict frequently comes a lack of trust 
due to stereotypes and experiences during past interactions, which can breed poor 
relationships between incoming process participants.2   
 
In many of the cases of collaborative planning examined in this report, community members 
entered the collaborative processes with a significant mistrust of the state trust land agency. 
In the Castle Valley Planning Process, the town of Castle Valley distrusted the School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA) based on their previous negative 
perceptions of SITLA’s sale of land at the base of Parriott Mesa. In the Lake Whatcom 
Landscape Planning Process, the community distrusted the Washington Department of 
Natural Resources because many in the community attributed the destructive effects of a 
landslide in 1986 to the agency’s forest management practices in the area. In the Mesa del 
Sol Planning Process, the beneficiary, the University of New Mexico, distrusted the New 
Mexico State Land Office, because it had previously sued the agency over its attempts to 
make a land deal of which the University disapproved. 
 
The Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process also illustrates how such rooted mistrust 
impacts the collaborative process. The Whitefish community’s initial mistrust arose out of its 
fear that the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) would 
develop the Whitefish trust lands as they had in nearby Kalispell, Montana a few years 
earlier. This fear was compounded by the community’s inherent mistrust of the government. 
Facilitator Janet Cornish noted that the community was “preset to believe that [the DNRC 
was] there to screw them. Plain and simple.”3 This mistrust motivated citizens of Whitefish 
to lobby the State Land Board to modify the DNRC’s public meeting decision-making 
approach to make it more collaborative and thereby give the community more influence on 
decision making. 
 
When poor relationships mired in distrust persist, they can bog down the process and inhibit 
progress. Deeply rooted stereotypes and distrust held by the stakeholders was a major cause 
of these poor relationships in the cases examined. While it is common for people to associate 
others with particular characteristics, this tendency “polarizes participants, setting up us-
versus-them dynamics that undermine the desire to collaborate.”4 Moreover, stereotypes and 
the resulting polarized dynamic remain a threat to the collaborative process even if the 
stakeholders decide to collaborate. These misperceptions tend to result in emotional name 
calling sessions rather than productive meetings. Mistrust and stakeholder stereotypes create 
an atmosphere of hostility and suspicion.5 According to Wondolleck and Yaffee, a lack of 
trust can stall and even destroy a collaborative process by promoting and perpetuating 
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suspicion about others’ motives, methods, and data. 6 This situation occurred in many of the 
cases examined in this report. 
 
The Castle Valley Planning Process exemplifies how poor initial relationships between 
organizations and communities can influence a process in this way. In this case, the town of 
Castle Valley distrusted the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA) 
because they perceived that the agency had failed to work effectively with communities in 
the past. As the Chair of the citizens group, Castle Rock Collaboration (CRC), Laura Kamala 
noted, “There was a basic distrust of SITLA. That was a big problem and a baseline that we 
started from.”7 As the process moved forward, the town continued to hear about other 
communities’ negative experiences, which further contributed to this distrust. Castle Valley 
Mayor Bruce Keeler noted that communities asked him, “What are you dealing with [SITLA] 
for? You can’t trust them. You can’t do business with them. They’re going to screw you in 
the end.” 8 Such statements helped to exacerbate the town’s mistrust for SITLA, which 
slowed the ability of the CRC and SITLA to work effectively together at the start of the 
process.  
 
Problematic stereotyping was certainly embedded in the Southeast New Mexico Working 
Group, particularly for representatives of conservation and the oil and gas industry. Oil and 
gas industry representative Dan Girand recalls that he felt that the group sometimes 
marginalized his opinion based on such stereotyping. He recalled, “Regulators and industry 
after a while tend to say, ‘Well that’s just old Dan. He’s a radical redneck.’”9 This 
stereotyping made it difficult for group members to feel respected and heard. 
 
Much like the stereotypical conflict between oil and gas and conservation, the Elliott State 
Forest Planning Process involved stereotyping between logging and conservation interests. In 
this process, two bird species, the spotted owl and marbled murrelet, became famous in the 
early 1990s when they were listed as federally threatened species. These species became 
figureheads in the ideological war between the timber industry and environmentalists, a 
conflict that is based on the perception of fundamentally different value systems and 
contributed to the mistrust and stereotyping that surrounded these groups in the Elliott 
process. In addition, the environmentalists did not trust the Steering Committee to push for 
strong enough species protection. Again, this mistrust surrounded the group throughout the 
process.  
 
Where positive relationships existed, such improved relationships in the group helped 
facilitate greater progress towards ultimately developing durable solutions. For instance, 
good working relationships helped groups get through impasses. In the Elliott State Forest 
Planning Process, participant Steve Denney noted that by knowing the other members of the 
group well, the Steering Committee was a “relaxed bunch.” He added that committee 
participants were “comfortable enough to joke with each other and jab each other in a good 
manner.”10 The relaxed nature of the group fostered by strong relationships allowed for the 
Steering Committee to prevent impasses and work efficiently. 
 
Strong personal relationships in collaborative groups also provided an incentive for members 
to continue to participate in the process. For instance, in the Emerald Mountain Planning 
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Process, participant Libbie Miller of the Colorado Department of Wildlife was particularly 
enthusiastic about the process because of the relationships she was able to foster and later 
benefit from in her work. She noted:  
 
As an enforcement officer, I think the more interaction you are able to have 
with your community the better. People see you in a different light and they 
see the agency in a different light. When you interact on a different level 
instead of just strictly writing tickets to people or taking them to jail, you have 
a whole different kind of involvement.11 
 
For Miller, these new relationships increased the value of her involvement in the Emerald 
Mountain Partnership. She commented further: 
 
It was a huge benefit for me, because I got to meet a lot of people who I 
would not necessarily. It is likely I would have gotten to meet them over time. 
However, when you work with somebody on a monthly basis, you certainly 
develop professional relationships that you wouldn’t get in any other 
scenarios.12 
 
In some cases the collaborative planning process helped increase participants’ respect for one 
another as they gained a greater understanding of the issues with which different interest 
groups grappled. This dynamic was especially important in the cases examined in this report 
because of the state trust land mandate. When participants came to understand the state land 
agency’s legal constraints, they had a greater appreciation for agency motivations and respect 
for their point of view. For instance, in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, there 
was significant disagreement at the beginning of the process regarding the trust land 
management capabilities of the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation 
(DNRC). Through an extended education process, however, many members of the Advisory 
Committee came to accept the DNRC’s interpretation of the mandate and even educated their 
fellow neighbors about the constraints inherent in trust land management at a later public 
meeting. In this way, such improved relationships and understanding can also serve as 
positive public relations for participants and the process.  
 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OUTSIDE PARTIES 
 
In addition to the ongoing relationships of participants within collaborative processes, a 
number of relationships existed outside of a group’s core membership that had significant 
impacts on the process and its members. For state trust land agencies, the agency’s 
relationship with the trust beneficiary sometimes influenced how the agency could do 
business and how it felt it could participate in collaborative processes. In the Mesa del Sol 
Planning Process, the relationship between the New Mexico State Land Office (SLO) and the 
beneficiary, UNM impacted the process early on. While Commissioner Baca was close to the 
UNM president, a relationship that facilitated progress for the SLO’s land development and 
auction plans, Baca’s relationship with the UNM Board of Regents was decidedly 
unproductive.13 Thus, when Baca pushed for the first auction of the Mesa del Sol property, 
UNM sued the SLO and greatly delayed future collaborative planning. While UNM could be 
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considered an “outside” party to the process prior to this interaction, the lawsuit resulted in 
UNM becoming an active party in the Mesa del Sol Process and essentially joining the 
collaborative process.  
 
Relationships formed via partnerships between collaborative groups and outside 
organizations often increased the group’s capacity and broadened their range of possible 
solutions. For the Elliott State Forest Planning Process, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
and National Marine Fisheries Service offered helpful partnerships to the collaborative 
process, sharing information and answering questions for the group about species habitat 
requirements and creating buy-in with federal agencies. One participant noted, “Another 
[way to deal with endangered species] is to develop an HCP where you work with the 
services, in this case [U.S.] Fish and Wildlife, to come up with a method on the ground that 
will both protect the owls and improve your ability to continue your activities there.”14 
 
Similarly, in the Emerald Mountain Planning Process, pursuing a joint solution with the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) provided options for the process to continue to move 
forward in an otherwise plodding effort. In the Emerald Mountain case, work through the 
State Land Board and the BLM led to a federal land exchange process. If successful, this 
exchange will respond to the local need for a multiple-use management approach on the 
parcel and generate roughly $17.2 million, the full market value of the land. 
 
While many of these outside relationships facilitated the ability for groups to make progress 
towards a solution, groups did not always respond positively to outside input. In the Elliott 
State Forest Planning Process, the Steering Committee was unresponsive to critical public 
comment originating from environmentalists. This was largely due to the fact that the 
environmentalists’ comments were seen as extreme view points when compared to the mild 
criticism from timber interests. As a result, the perception of an “us” versus “them” dynamic 
arose between the Steering Committee and the environmental groups. 
 
 
THE PROCESS INFLUENCES RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Just as relationships among different parties in, and peripheral to, a collaborative process 
influence the process, so too do collaborative processes affect the relationships. One of the 
greatest relationship outcomes of collaborative processes cited in literature is typically 
increased trust among participants. In A Desktop Reference Guide to Collaboration and 
Community-based Planning, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Sonoran 
Institute found that collaboration led to increased trust between BLM land managers and the 
public.15 In addition, Yaffee et al. found that trust can decrease adversarial relationships, 
enabling stakeholders to jointly address and solve conflicts.16 
 
HOW COLLABORATIVE PROCESSES IMPACTED RELATIONSHIPS AMONG GROUP 
PARTICIPANTS  
 
There are a number of ways by which collaborative processes can improve relationships 
among group members. As examined in the cases investigated in this report, there are two 
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main categories of methods for improved relationships: collaborative structure and activities. 
Also, while relationships often improved over the course of the collaborative process, in 




The structure of the collaborative process can have immediate and long-term impacts on 
group members’ relationships. Often, elements of structure are established at the outset of the 
process. These include ground rules, means for participant interaction, methods by which the 
group will deal with problems, unique elements to meetings and the sheer time of the 
process. In addition, some structural elements can inadvertently serve to sour relationships 
among participants, particularly when roles are not clearly defined and when participants do 
not feel heard and feel incapable of influencing the process. Finally, when structural elements 
change, they also affect participant relationships. 
 
Ground rules establish methods of interacting and provide an outline for a collaborative 
process that impacts relationships between members. When participants enter a collaborative 
process with preexisting tensions and distrust, establishing a set of ground rules can help 
govern and guide their interactions to foster healthy working relationships.  
 
For the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, such ground rules proved to be a 
valuable tool in facilitating the collaborative process. Whatcom ground rules included: 
respect each other and “no surprises” in issues pertaining to the group. The Lake Whatcom 
Process also had structured field trips to the land to help create a shared understanding of the 
problem.  
 
The Castle Valley Planning Process similarly established guiding principles for success with 
the help of facilitator Marty Zeller. The principles outlined ground rules for participant 
interactions and established goals that served as benchmarks to help the group measure 
success. These principles for success helped to address participants’ different interests as 
well as tackle the significant distrust between the community and the School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Administration that plagued the group from the outset. 17 Zeller noted: 
 
The principles basically were an exercise at the beginning of the process to 
get [the participants] to start talking to each other, to define some areas of 
common ground and to create an initial focus for the planning effort. [The 
principles] got them engaged constructively as opposed to destructively in the 
process.18 
 
The Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process formalized a common goal for the 
group through the “Top of the Mountain” document. Having common goals in a 
single document helped the group focus on the process effort as opposed to individual 
ideas. This focus helped unite the Advisory Committee, which struggled early on with 
mutual mistrust between the Montana Department of Natural Resources and 




The means by which input from different group members was solicited could also help foster 
relationships in processes. In the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, Commissioner Ray 
Powell’s personal meetings with Mesa del Sol neighbors, municipalities, and potential 
partners helped foster a sense of ownership for the project within the community and was a 
sign of Powell’s commitment to the process. As Jacqueline Dubose Christensen of the 
Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce commented, Powell often went out to the community 
himself. She added, “He put enormous time and resources into this notion of developing 
Mesa del Sol and he worked people to sell it. He was actively out there. He didn’t send his 
team; he went out to sell it.”20 
 
The structure of the Elliott State Forest Planning Process helped maintain good relationships 
by dealing with conflict in the group immediately and upfront. One participant commented 
that whenever issues came up that created conflict, the group would lay the issue on the table 
and work it through until the problem was solved. For the Elliott process, this method may 
have helped prevent major issues from festering and creating further conflict.  
 
In addition, some processes included particularly structural elements unique to the process 
situation that also helped foster positive relationships among participants. For the Lake 
Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, each meeting began with a tribal song and prayer, a 
result of the Lummi Nation’s participation in the process. Process participant and member of 
the Lummi Nation Tom Edwards recalled: 
 
When we first started a meeting, we started with a prayer and a song. That 
really cleaned out the atmosphere of our meetings. Each meeting I went to 
there they asked me to open up with a prayer and a song. That just cleans 
out the air. Before I wasn't doing that the atmosphere was just heavy in 
there. People arguing this way and that way. I stood up and said, “Can I 
sing a song and offer a prayer?” They said “yeah” and boom, it just cleans up 
the air. Everyone felt good about that, even the [Department of Natural 
Resources] folks.21  
 
Finally, the amount of time allotted for a collaborative process can help to eventually 
foster positive relationships. For the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, time 
ultimately helped the group address its underlying mistrust as participants continued 
to work together and build a shared understanding. Committee member Paul 
McKenzie notes, “We had enough opportunities to discuss our differing points of 
view that . . . we realized that we weren’t quite so far apart on these things.”22 
 
While many elements help to improve relationships, some aspects of process structure can 
undermine relationships. In some cases, these strained relationships arose due to either 
unclear roles in the process, or because decision-making power was unevenly distributed in 
the group or in subgroups. For the Houghton Area Master Plan Process, members of the 
Citizen’s Review Committee (CRC) were frustrated by the advisory role they played for the 
City of Tucson. Many felt they had taken on a role in which “it felt like we were there just to 
kind of rubber stamp.”23 Frustration and resulting strained relationships occurred throughout 
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the plan development process because CRC and city representatives had different perceptions 
and expectations of the CRC’s responsibilities. 
 
In the Emerald Mountain Planning Process, which involved both the Emerald Mountain 
Partnership Board of Directors and the Advisory Council, similar troubles regarding 
participant role definition created tension and alienated some stakeholders. When the 
Partnership formed, individuals who had played major roles in the earlier Core Group 
planning process, but had vested interests in the Emerald Mountain parcel, were relegated to 
having non-voting status in the Advisory Committee. This change in roles was seen a 
demotion by some participants and created frustration and distrust of the Partnership. 
Advisory member and rancher Jim Stanko commented on this feeling of alienation: 
 
You’re told you can’t be part of it anymore because you’ve got a conflict of 
interest, and a person that’s trying to get a bicycle trail through the thing is 
appointed, and they don’t have a conflict of interest? … Now it’s the 
Partnership off doing something and the rest of us may or may not know what 
they are doing, even though I’m supposed to be on the Advisory Group.24 
 
In some processes, unofficial subgroups also contributed to problematic relationships. In the 
Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, a “shadow group” comprised of a subset of 
Advisory Committee members and stakeholders met outside regular Committee meetings to 
discuss substantive issues related to the process. Through this group, shadow group members 
worked to influence the proceedings of the official Advisory Committee. These ex parte 
conversations, and the eventual end-run in which the group instituted Roberts Rules of Order 
to remove trust land parcels from development talks, inspired mistrust and resentment among 
many other Advisory Committee members who felt frustrated and ultimately betrayed by the 
side-dealings and lack of transparency of outside proceedings. 
 
Just as structure has a large impact on relationships, changes in this structure also influence 
participants’ relationships with one another. The continuity of the membership of a 
collaborative process can alter the relationships and interpersonal dynamics of those involved 
in the process. For the Mesa del Sol Planning Process, this change in membership was 
primarily felt after the election of new Commissioners of Public Lands. Over the last two 
decades, this project has seen four different land commissioners, each with a slightly 
different vision for the development and each with different assets and liabilities in their 
approach to working with the community and stakeholders. The three most prominent 
commissioners, Jim Baca, Ray Powell, and current Commissioner Patrick Lyons, have each 
altered the relationships within the process significantly. Under Jim Baca, the University of 
New Mexico (UNM) Board of Reagents sued the State Land Office (SLO) over what UNM 
perceived to be a poor land deal resulting in UNM’s significant distrust for the SLO and 
motivating the university reagents to become more involved in the planning process. In 
contrast, Ray Powell’s proactive approach to meeting with stakeholders and involving them 
in the planning process helped foster trust and positive relationships with interested parties. 
Most recently, Patrick Lyons has regained the trust and support of the Albuquerque National 
Dragway who had felt marginalized by the Powell administration. However, the Dragway is 
nervous about the future of its lease on the Mesa del Sol parcel when a new land 
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commissioner is elected and the dynamics of the SLO and its relationships change once 
again.  
 
Group Activities  
 
Informal experiences and group activities can also significantly influence group relationships 
as individuals get to know one another personally, not based on stereotypes. 
 
Informal activities like hikes helped to improve group relationships. In the Castle Valley 
Planning Process, a hiking experience for Castle Rock Collaboration (CRC) leader Dave 
Erley with CRC member Eddie Morandi, School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration Assistant Director Ric McBrier and McBrier’s wife and dog helped these 
individuals with different interests get to know one another away from the table. The 
experience fostered trust and friendship.25 According to McBrier, hiking trips and other such 
shared activities outside the planning process helped create long-lasting positive 
relationships.26 
 
For the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, member relationships also benefited from 
informal interactions. Working Group participant Bill Dunn of the New Mexico Department 
of Game and Fish recalled that carpooling to meetings with oil and gas representatives 
allowed him to get to know other members of the group as people. This helped increase a 
sense of trust and cooperation within the group.  
 
HOW COLLABORATIVE PROCESSES IMPACT ED RELATIONSHIPS WITH OUTSIDE PARTIES 
 
One of the most cited methods for building and maintaining positive relationships between 
collaborative groups and outside parties was through communication and process 
transparency. The Emerald Mountain Planning Process incorporated semi-monthly meetings 
that were open to the public in its collaborative process structure, and also held larger public 
meetings to present projects, provide information and gather input. In these ways, the group 
maintained relationships with the larger community. The Partnership also posted agendas, 
meeting minutes and planning documents on a website for community perusal. Due to such 
outreach by the Emerald Mountain Partnership (and the planning groups that preceded it), 
and the State Land Board (SLB), former State Land Board Director Charles Bedford 
describes the process as “a constant stream of communication.”27 This communication kept 
the public informed about the activities and goals of the collaborative process while allowing 
outside groups a voice. Communication helped address opposition to the process and 
maintained working relationships between the Partnership and SLB and outside 
communities. 
 
The Castle Valley Planning Process provides an example of the dangers of failing to 
effectively reach out to the greater community. Despite diligent attempts at community 
outreach, the process’ lack of transparency may have contributed to the breakdown of the 
planning process over the long-term. Castle Rock Committee (CRC) member Cris Coffey 
recognized that CRC’s efforts to communicate with the broader community were not always 
successful. She noted, “We tried hard to keep the community abreast of what was going on. 
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And some people had a vast interest in what we were doing, and others, I don’t know that 
they really realized what was going on. And I think that’s often the case in communities like 
this.”28 Thus, despite CRC’s attempts at outreach, the community remained unaware of the 
activities of the collaborative process. 
 
 
RELATIONSHIPS INFLUENCE FUTURE INTERACTIONS 
 
Relationships established during a collaborative process lay a foundation for future 
cooperative work among participants. In fact, researches McKinney and Field found that 
relationships are often considered a valuable outcome of collaborative processes, and that 
often participants noted that working relationships and quality of the process were more 
important than the tangible process outcomes.29  
 
The benefit of collaborative process participant relationships is often two-fold. First, good 
relationships between participants often indicate greater dedication to the implementation of 
the resulting process plan. Second, strong working relationships and even friendships among 
participants can be useful tools in future conflicts or simply daily work. Thus, the 
relationships formed in collaborative processes extend beyond the life of the process to 
influence future interactions among participants.  
 
FACILITATING IMPLEMENTATION OF PROCESS PLAN 
 
For the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the Mesa del Sol Planning Process and 
the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, strong working relationships will be essential to 
meet the challenges of implementation of groups’ resulting plans. Particularly for the Mesa 
del Sol Planning Process, positive relationships among stakeholders are necessary for the 
ultimate success of the development and its long-term viability. At this point, commercial 
buy-in from the Chamber of Commerce, local businesses and developer Forest City 
Covington are essential for the long-term planning of the development. However, the Mesa 
del Sol development also relies on the continued support of its neighbors including Kirtland 
Air Force Base, the Isleta Pueblos and the City Council and mayor, any combination of 
whom could potentially knock the development off course and spoil decades of planning and 
increasing cooperation.  
 
For the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the Montana Department of Natural 
Resources and Conservation and the city of Whitefish already are working together to 
implement the Neighborhood Plan, starting with a recreation trail that will encircle Whitefish 
Lake. Many participants have said that the professional relationship that fuels this 
implementation is possible only because of the process. 
 
IMPACTING FUTURE INTERACTION AND CONFLICT 
 
Not only will the relationships formed in the collaborative processes be useful in 
implementing the group’s final plan, they may also be beneficial in future work collaboration 
and in dealing with future conflicts. For members of the Castle Valley Planning Process, such 
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business relationships have already been integrated into participants’ work. In particular, the 
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA) has worked more effectively 
with other organizations and communities because of the relationships and increased 
understanding of the trust land mandate that occurred during the collaborative process. 
SITLA Director Kevin Carter noted: 
 
Some of the people that were involved in the collaboration certainly 
understand who we are better, they understand what our respective mandates, 
tasks and obligations are, and as a result of that, some of those individuals 
have been very helpful in unrelated activities that we’ve done. There was 
certainly an education process and some bridge-building that went on there.30 
 
Members of the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process noted that improved relationships 
resulting from the process also had a major benefit for the Whitefish community. Whitefish 
Chamber of Commerce President Sheila Bowen noted that these benefits ranged from hugs 
on the street to greater public involvement in community activities like City Council and 
local planning meetings.31 Several Committee members commented that “the community is 
better off because we went through this process.”32 
 
For the participants of the Emerald Mountain Planning Process, participants consider the 
strong relationships that resulted from the process to be a long-term benefit that will 
hopefully preempt future conflicts. Former State Land Board Director Charles Bedford noted 
that such relationships will likely also speed the process along in the future:  
 
Because you develop these relationships early on, so that essentially you never 
have to go through these processes anymore. You do this in more of an 
informal, ongoing fashion, this sort of ongoing collaborative process. 
Sometimes you’ll still have conflicts come up. But if you have the same guy 
that lives there for 10 to 15 years, that’s passionate about this place, that has to 
go to the same supermarket as the enviro goes to, and has a personality that 
allows for kind of problem-solving, then you’ve really created an incredibly 
powerful vehicle for going forward.33 
 
Professional relationships also developed through these collaborative processes that will 
continue to connect the parties involved. Rand French, a biologist for the BLM in the 
Southeast New Mexico working group, is now a wildlife biologist for one of the oil 
companies involved in the Working Group. This switch may aid in the implementation of the 
conservation plan, as French’s professional training may be integrated into the needs of the 
oil company and help them better meet their environmental obligations through the Working 
Group’s conservation plan and beyond.  
 
The Arizona State Land Department (ASLD) and the City of Tucson are similarly looking 
forward to improved relations as a result of the HAMP Process. ASLD Commissioner Mark 
Winkleman noted the historical significance of the relationship forged between the City of 
Tucson and the ASLD. He said, “It showed that we could sit down with city staff and work 
cooperatively … this is a much better position for us to be in with the City of Tucson than the 
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  Table 19-2: Elements that Give Parties Power 
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Land Department has ever been in before.”34 Winkleman also noted that such relationships 
will improve the professional interactions between the two entities in the future.  
 
 
ELEMENTS THAT GIVE PARTIES POWER  
 
In all of the eight cases, there was a perceived power imbalance within the collaborative 
group with some participants seemingly having more power than others. In some instances 
this power seemed static, while in others the power varied depending on the situation. 
Participants in the eight cases reported that having access to resources that others did not, 
personal demeanor, representing an interest that held symbolic value for the group, having 
veto power over decisions and using the media to express interests and draw attention to the 





Access to financial and political resources was a significant source of power for some 
participants in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process. According to Department of 
Natural Resources and Conservation Unit Manager Greg Poncin, “quite a few community 
members had these State Land Board members on their speed-dial. They had a very good 
working relationship.”35 In particular, members of the “shadow group,” a subset of the 
Advisory Committee, felt empowered throughout the process because they believed they had 
political support for their ideas and the ability the influence these connections. Indeed, 
shadow group members felt comfortable significantly limiting development of the 13,000-
acre area because they thought their political connections increased the likelihood of State 
Land Board approval. In the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process some participants 
were perceived to have power because they had particular expertise or knowledge. For 
example, the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) controlled the financial models of the 
timber harvesting in the area and some participants thought this gave them an advantage.  
 
In seven of the eight cases participants accrued power because of their personalities. Often, 
this accrual of power resulted from having a dominant personality, being perceived as being 
level headed, or through demonstrating leadership qualities. For example, some participants 
in the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process noted that citizen representative Linda 
Marrom’s dedicated personality and emotional investment in the process made her a 
powerful figure in the process. In the Mesa del Sol Planning Process some participants noted 
that Commissioner Powell’s open personality made groups responsive to working with him.  
One of the biggest motivating factors for the creation of the Emerald Mountain Planning 
Process was the community’s sense of place and attachment to the agricultural heritage and 
pastoral landscape of Steamboat Springs. This sense of place gave participants representing 
these interests power in the process and imbued them with a degree of symbolism. For 
example, some participants saw rancher and long-time Emerald Mountain grazing lessee Jim 
Stanko as a powerful representative for the agricultural values they hoped to preserve in the 
community. Stanko provided a critical voice for farmland in the overall debate over the 
future planning of Steamboat Springs. 
 
Routt County is unique, and Steamboat Springs is unique from the standpoint 
that while we do have tourism and skiing, agriculture is still a really important 
part of the community here. We value that and want to keep that. So, it was 
good to have somebody like Jim in there saying “hey, we can’t let this type of 
stuff go.”36  
 
In five of the eight cases, state trust land agency representatives participants had increased 
power because of their ability to veto options within the group. Because the agencies were 
the managers of the land being addressed in the planning process they were able to use their 
decision-making authority to influence decisions made by the group. For example, in the 
Houghton Area Master Plan Process, Greg Keller a planner from the Arizona State Land 
Department (ASLD) who attended Citizen’s Review Committee meetings was able to say 
whether or not certain options or ideas meshed with the ASLD’s management mandate. State 
Land Board Northwest District Manager Beverly Rave exercised similar power in the 
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Emerald Mountain Planning Process and was able to reject or dissuade proposals or ideas 
from the Committee if they didn’t meet acceptable levels of revenue generation. 
 
Participants in both the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process and the Mesa del Sol 
Planning Process were able to use the media to obtain power. In the Lake Whatcom 
Landscape Planning Process some participants would go to the press to express views or 
issues before they had been discussed or resolved in the context of the collaborative process 
despite a group agreement that discouraged this behavior. The visibility that this brought to 
their issues gave some participants more power. Representatives from the Albuquerque 
National Dragway on the Mesa del Sol parcel used the media as a way to both express and 
garner support for Patrick Lyons during his election campaign. Commissioner Powell, who 
preceded Commissioner Lyons had not renewed the Dragway’s lease because of what some 
perceived as an incompatibility between what Commissioner Powell envisioned for the area 
and what the Dragway did. Commissioner Lyons made a campaign promise to reopen the 
Dragway and the Dragway responded by mobilizing its resources to support his campaign. In 
the Emerald Mountain Planning Process the position of supporters of conserving the 
agricultural, wildlife and recreational values of the land was increased by the significant 
amount of media attention paid to the area during Governor Romer’s campaign to pass 
Amendment 16 which would allow for more flexible land management strategies that could 
include conservation.  
 
 
HOW DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AFFECTS THE PROCESS 
 
Much research has been done on reducing power imbalances in collaborative processes to 
increase the potential for a successful outcome. Barb Cestero notes that reducing power 
imbalances among stakeholders in a collaborative effort can ensure a “‘level playing field’” 
on which to interact.37 Wondolleck and Yaffee observe that more balanced power between 
participants in a collaborative process can create joint ownership of both the process and the 
outcome for all involved.38  
 
Reducing power imbalances entails giving stakeholders a higher degree of influence in the 
process decision making, and using decision rules such as consensus to build trust, 
commitment and equality.39 According to some practitioners, rotating leadership or 
facilitation roles can improve the distribution of power within the group.40 Closely related to 
the dispersion of power is the importance of a mutual recognition that the individuals and 
organizations involved in a collaborative process are interdependent.41 Recognizing 
interdependency can be achieved through developing group objectives or problem 
statements. 
 
Reducing power imbalances among participants in a collaborative effort can lead to greater 
satisfaction with the outcome of the process. In some of the cases highlighted in this report 
power was distributed in a more balanced way among members of the advisory groups than 
in others. Unbalanced power distribution can lead to tension and conflict. However, in some 




One of the ways these groups achieved an even distribution of power was to make decisions 
by consensus. Using this decision-making model created an equal investment among group 
members and allowed each interest an equal voice in expressing their opinions to the group 
and affecting the outcome of the process.  
 
In some instances, there was unequal power between members of the advisory group, or 
between the advisory group and other involved entities like cities. In most cases this did not 
ultimately hinder the group from developing a plan, except in the Castle Valley Planning 
Process where participants reached a stalemate prior to the possibility of a land exchange 
between the Bureau of Land Management and the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration (SITLA) as a method of conserving the land. However, in the Castle Valley 
case the imbalance of power also motivated and challenged the process. For example, the fact 
that SITLA possessed the majority of the power in the process enabled their participation and 
made it a more attractive option. This imbalance proved challenging for members of the 
Castle Rock Collaboration, but not crippling.  
 
Additionally, in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process there was originally 
confusion about the allocation of power between regular and alternate members of the 
Advisory Committee. Time spent discussing this membership distinction distracted the group 
and took time away from working on a plan. As a solution, the group ultimately decided to 
make all participants regular members. Similarly, some members of the Citizen’s Review 
Committee (CRC) in advising the City of Tucson on the Houghton Area Master Plan thought 
that there was unequal power between the CRC and the city. This perception caused some 
CRC members to become frustrated because it was unclear to them how their 
recommendations were being incorporated and used by the city. This lack of clarity also led 
them to question the importance of their involvement and could have contributed to some of 
the group attrition.  
 
The emergence of a “shadow group” during the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process 
significantly affected the balance of power in that process. The shadow group was able to 
make important decisions concerning the Neighborhood Plan without the input of the rest of 
the group. Official process leaders like consultant Marty Zeller tried to reduce this power 
imbalance by meeting with members of the shadow group individually and dissuading them 
from making decisions outside of the larger collaborative group forum. Likewise, State Land 
Board staffer Kathy Bramer attempted to address the perceived power imbalance between the 
Advisory Committee and Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC). This 
imbalance emerged because of the political access and financial resources, identified above, 
and led some Committee members to believe that they did not really have to work with the 
DNRC. To address this power imbalance, Bramer traveled to Whitefish to remind Advisory 
Committee members that they did not “have the State Land Board in its pocket” and that they 













HOW DO COLLABORATIVE PLANNING PROCESSES 
INCORPORATE SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION? 
 
and management decision making often requires collecting, analyzing, interpreting, and 
communicating complex scientific information about environmental quality, land use 
and wildlife populations and habitats. For seven of the eight cases of collaborative processes 
in this report, scientific information acted both as a major catalyst to the process and, in its 
absence, a major hindrance. This highlights the important role of scientific and technical 
information in collaborative processes and its importance to decision making.  
 
Several points regarding the role of scientific and technical information in the collaborative 
processes examined in this report stand out (Table 20-1):  
 
• The role of scientific and technical information in the process 
• Ways of obtaining scientific and technical information 
• The impact of scientific and technical information on the structure and function of the 
process 




THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN THE PROCESS 
 
Processes differed in the roles they assigned to scientific and technical information. For some 
cases, there was a clear mandate for science to be incorporated into the process, and indeed, 
the process was structured in such a way to maximize scientific input. In other processes, 
science and technical information were not explicit components at the outset, though they 
often became integral to the process later on. 
 
In some processes, participants recognize science as a major tool to inform policy and 
decision making. This was the case in the Elliott State Forest Planning Process. Here, with 
the approval of the Department of State Lands, the Oregon Department of Forestry created a 
Steering Committee to direct the scientific and policy inquiry necessary for the Habitat 
Conservation Plan (HCP) process. The HCP would then ultimately inform the overarching 
Forest Management Plan (FMP). Working in parallel with the Steering Committee was the 
Core Planning Team, a “technical planning group” that was responsible for assembling the 
science supporting both plans.1 Within the group, there was also formal recognition of the 
necessity of science. One of the “Guiding Principles” for the group was: “The plan will 
consider the overall biological diversity of state forest lands, including the variety of life and 







In some cases, there was not a defined role for scientific and technical information until 
participants recognized that such information was necessary. For example, participants in the 
Southeast New Mexico Working Group did not realize the urgent need for mapping, habitat 
data and leasing information until they began to struggle to make decisions without this 
information. Once the group started discussing what lands would be off-limits to oil and gas 
leasing, they realized how integral adequate maps of currently leased areas and prairie 
chicken habitat would be.  
 
For some groups, opposing expectations for scientific and technical information caused 
problems in the process. In the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the Department of 
Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) resisted paying to acquire new scientific 
information regarding wildlife habitat, floodplains and fire history because the agency felt 
such detailed information was not necessary for a more general, “landscape level” 
neighborhood plan. Meanwhile, the group envisioned a much more specific plan and thus 
considered the information integral. Ultimately, the Advisory Committee collected 
Table 20-1: Sources and Uses of Science 
 




Group fact-finding- hydrology and 
GIS 
Created maps to understand natural 





Separate Committee- Technical 
Advisory Team (TAT) 
Informed the city of Tucson on technical 
information regarding land development; 
separate from community collaborative 
group 
Elliott State Forest 
Planning Process 
Subcommittee- Core Planning 
Team 
Was responsible for assembling science 
supporting the Forest Management Plan 




Outside expertise- Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) 
 
Internal expertise- Colorado 
Division of Wildlife 
Conducted Environmental Assessment (EA) 
to select a management plan for the parcel as 
part of a land exchange between the BLM 
and the Colorado State Land Board 
Mesa del Sol 




Internal expertise- Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) 
 
Outside expertise- Department of 
Health; Department of Ecology 
Helped participants understand impacts of 
DNR forestry practices to inform the Lake 




Internal expertise- GIS mapping 
 
Outside expertise- prairie chicken 
and sand dune lizard ecology 
Helped participants understand the location 
of prairie chicken and sand dune lizard 





Task forces- wildlife habitat, 
floodplains and fire history 
 
Outside expertise- GIS 
Helped participants understand the 




information on its own and the DNRC’s lack of cooperation fueled the community’s mistrust 
of the agency.  
 
 
SOURCES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 
 
Ways that scientific and technical information were collected and assembled greatly 
influenced processes and decisions. In some cases, the group generated the necessary science 
through group fact finding and internal expertise, which promoted positive relationships and 
a sense of ownership for the information. In other cases, information was sought from outside 
experts in hope of finding unbiased information which drew on expertise the group did not 
have. These different methods of collecting information influenced the direction of the 
processes.  
 
GROUP-GENERATED SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION 
 
In several cases, participants organized needed information from within the collaborative 
group. Joint fact-finding, in which a collaborative group works together to collect and 
analyze data, can generate specialized information while simultaneously building 
understanding, trust and support. In the Castle Valley Planning Process, for example, joint 
fact-finding provided the necessary mapping information on environmental constraints and 
development potential in the area and facilitated improved group dynamics. Facilitator Marty 
Zeller recalled that this joint fact-finding effort helped the group overcome emotional barriers 
to progress and recognize what would be practical options to explore in the collaborative 
process. He noted: 
 
The biggest challenge was just getting people to sit down and interact and 
trust each other so they could discuss some options … I think that having 
people sitting down and interacting in an organized fashion, having everyone 
sitting at a table looking at maps together with the same information, helped 
build a level of trust about what was really going on with the land and what 
the options really were. That was probably the first key thing. The inventory 
and analysis of the site conditions helped both parties realize what you could 
do and what was probably not desirable to do.3 
 
Thus, group fact-finding resulted in a shared understanding of the area and a greater 
understanding of possible policy decisions. Participants in the Castle Valley Planning Process 
consider the group fact-finding exercise a technical success as well as a factor that facilitated 
future productive discussion on land management.  
 
In other cases, certain members of the collaborative group had expertise to produce necessary 
information. For example, in the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, the New Mexico 
State Land Office (SLO) produced mapping information on the location of oil and gas leases 
as well as prairie chicken habitat and breeding sites. Prior to this effort, the group struggled 
to make decisions on what lands to keep off limits to oil and gas without maps – a frustrating 
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and fruitless effort. By coming up with the necessary data and resulting maps, the SLO was 
seen as a leader in the Working Group process.  
 
Where expertise or information was unavailable, groups sometimes established task forces to 
gather necessary information. For the Advisory Committee in the Whitefish Neighborhood 
Planning Process, the group formed task forces to research wildlife habitat, floodplains and 
fire history after the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation resisted funding the 
research. 
 
In addition to these methods for obtaining science from within the group, some collaborative 
processes developed formal means for collecting scientific and technical information. This 
type of data gathering was prominent in the Elliott State Forest Planning Process and the 
Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process in which both used state and federally structured 
methods for data collection and analysis. For the Elliott group, a formal means to collect and 
analyze data was in the form of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s Habitat Conservation 
Plan (HCP) process in which the group required science to inform the conservation of the 
spotted owl and marbled murrelet. In the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, under 
the State Environmental Protection Act, data collection and analysis was directed by an 




Collaborative processes often brought in outside expertise. Outside experts contribute to the 
process in a number of ways, including bringing in knowledge unavailable to the group, 
increasing legitimacy of the information at hand and adding credibility to the process. 
Wondolleck and Yaffee note that information from outside experts is less likely to be 
perceived as biased.4 
 
Some groups seek third-party expertise to contribute to current group knowledge. For 
example, in the Whitefish Neighborhood Planning Process, the Advisory Committee sought 
third-party expertise to supplement information collected by its task forces. The Committee 
independently sought help from a Whitefish resident for geographic information system data 
and mapping. As a result, the group was able to gain a better understanding of the 13,000-
acre Whitefish study area than they could have achieved alone.  
 
Groups sometimes seek external review of group research to add legitimacy to such 
information in the group. In the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, in addition to 
the Environmental Impact Statement that was conducted “in house” at the Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR), Commissioner Doug Sutherland also solicited formal opinions 
from the heads of the Departments of Health and Ecology about the degree to which the 
DNR’s forestry practices contributed to pollution in Lake Whatcom. By doing so, Sutherland 
broadened the scientific input that would contribute to future recommendations for the Lake 
Whatcom Management Plan outside of his own agency. In addition, the external conclusions 
that forestry practices were minimal compared to residential impacts helped reign in efforts 




In addition to increasing legitimacy within the group, outside expertise can increase 
legitimacy of information for those outside the process. For example, in the Castle Valley 
Planning Process, third party information helped increase legitimacy with the community. 
The planning group held two open houses with the community during which time 
Conservation Partners, Inc., a third party organization, presented a series of maps and overlay 
data illustrating the various land use issues in the community. Conservation Partners also 
presented the group’s preliminary development options based on available hydrology and 
land use data and sought community input and reactions to the recommendations.5 
 
Given the importance of the decisions made at the table, process participants sometimes felt 
that information from outside experts would decrease the risk of biased information and thus 
result in more objective information on which to base decision making. To ensure the 
legitimacy of information brought to the table, groups sometimes created criteria by which 
information would be acceptable to influence discussion. For example, in the Southeast New 
Mexico Working Group, participants agreed that only peer-reviewed science would provide 
an acceptable basis for policy decisions. This criterion was a reaction to the large amounts of 
anecdotal evidence regarding prairie chicken biology that many felt was infused with 
emotion and personal interests. Instead, the group invited prairie chicken biologists to inform 
the group on current research. 
 
A lack of criteria for acceptable information can lead to problems in a collaborative process. 
For example, during the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, disagreements over 
expert review resulted in delays and mistrust between public members of the 
Interjurisdictional Committee and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). While the 
Committee agreed to have the DNR conduct and pay for the Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS), the group wanted to have a say over who would conduct peer review of the 
EIS in order for the scientific assessment documents to be rigorous and legitimate. While the 
outside peer review did not occur, outside technical review would have helped mitigate the 
potential for bias in the EIS, which relied heavily on DNR scientific assessments. 
Wondolleck and Yaffee note that outside technical reviews have become an increasing 
practice in collaborative processes that helps check the technical validity of science on which 
decisions are made.6 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON THE PROCESS 
 
Scientific and technical information can influence a collaborative process in several ways. As 
seen in the cases in this report, science can inform decisions, but it also can drain resources 
and delay the process due to uncertainty or the proprietary nature of some information. 
Information can also be used strategically, allowing some group members to take advantage 




Most frequently, processes used science as a tool for decision making. Wondolleck and 
Yaffee note that science can help groups by bounding the zone of possible decisions 
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available.7 Science also allows for groups to have a “fair playing field” outside of values and 
interests on which fair choices could be made.8 Understanding the realm of realistic available 
possibilities to the group as well as providing a fair principle on which to judge these 
possibilities can facilitate group decisions and agreement.  
 
Groups often use scientific and technical information to illustrate the outcomes of different 
land management strategies. In the Elliott State Forest Planning Process, participants saw 
modeling as a particularly helpful tool in the planning process. Through modeling, the 
Steering Committee saw the results of multiple management regime scenarios to help them 
make decisions on the preferred management strategy for the Elliott Forest. Assistant 
Director for Policy and Planning at the Department of State Lands John Lilly noted, “Once 
you can present to a policy maker a chart that on one page they can see what the harvest 
levels would be under various management regimes, then you have a very powerful tool to 
help them make informed decisions.”9 
 
Technical information and mapping can also help create a shared understanding of the issues 
facing the group. For the Southeast New Mexico Working Group, mapping and details of 
prairie chicken biology were helpful for the group to gain a shared understanding of lands that 
could be potentially off-limits to oil and gas leasing. Previous to the maps, the group did not 
understand those areas could be under consideration and those that were off the table. Given 
this shared understanding, the group could then move forward with more specific land use 
policies.  
 
Some of the collaborative processes in this report suffered significant delays while awaiting 
the development of needed science and technical information before moving forward. For 
example, in the Elliott State Forest Planning Process, the time it took to aggregate the sheer 
volume of information for land surveys and watershed analysis slowed the progress of the 
Steering Committee, adding several years before the group could move forward. 
 
Since some collaborative planning processes work in conjunction with other processes, delay 
in these concurrent processes can contribute to the collaborative process delay as well. This 
was the case in the Emerald Mountain Planning Process that currently awaits approval of a 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land exchange. The land exchange, in return, continues 
to await the results of appraisals of BLM and Emerald Mountain land as well as an 
Environmental Assessment (EA) before the agencies may move forward with the land 
exchange process. The Emerald Mountain Partnership developed a management plan for the 
Emerald Mountain parcel and submitted it to the BLM as one of four alternatives under 
consideration in the EA. 
 
For some processes, confusion can arise and delay the process when it is unclear how 
information gathered outside of the collaborative process will affect data collection directed 
through the collaborative process. In the Lake Whatcom Landscape Planning Process, there 
was uncertainty over how a scientific process required under the Clean Water Act would 
affect the collaborative process already underway for Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR) state forest lands in the watershed. When the Committee and DNR learned that the 
Department of Ecology would be conducting a Total Maximum Daily Load study for the 
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lake, there were questions about whether the Committee should wait until the study was 
completed before completing its plan. This uncertainty was one of the factors that resulted in 
the DNR missing its June 2001 deadline to complete the Lake Whatcom Landscape Plan. 
 
Finally, in some processes, the delay caused by obtaining science and technical information 
was a strategic move on the part of one or more of the parties. For example, in the Lake 
Whatcom Planning Process case, certain members of the Interjurisdictional Committee felt 
that the Department of Natural Resource’s (DNR) decision to conduct an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) was a stalling tactic used to delay the Committee’s progress and 
resist their influence in the process. Interjurisdictional Committee members felt the decision 
to conduct an EIS was a strategy for shifting the power balance in the planning process away 
from the Committee. Committee member and long-time advocate controlling DNR logging 
practices in the watershed, Linda Marrom commented, “[The DNR] decided to do an EIS. 
That threw everything off. They were running the whole process. It was so political.”10 In 
this case, a Committee member perceived science as serving a strategic purpose, increasing 
distrust of the DNR and further straining relationships.  
 
SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 
 
While science and technical information can be powerful in informing decisions, it can also 
complicate decision making due to uncertainty or restricted information. Uncertainty often is 
connected to the perceived legitimacy of the information involved. In the Elliott State Forest 
Planning Process, the Steering Committee had significant concerns regarding the validity of 
the scientific information presented by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National 
Marine Fisheries Service. Oregon Department of Forestry Southern Oregon Area Director 
Dan Shults noted, “You’d think good science is something everyone agrees on, but there’s a 
very fine line between what is scientifically proven and what scientific opinion is.”11 In the 
Elliott case, this distinction was especially relevant given that the research on spotted owls, 
marbled murrelets, and salmon only goes back about fifteen years. 
 
Scientific uncertainty can also make information vulnerable to criticism and contribute to 
further process delays. For example, in the Southeast New Mexico Working Group scientific 
uncertainty was problematic because it left the door open to criticism of information that was 
unpopular with different members of the group. Despite the fact that the Working Group had 
previously agreed on peer-review as a criterion for legitimacy, when such science threatened 
oil and gas leases, the oil and gas industry criticized it. As a result, the process was delayed 
by further discussion of additional science needed to inform the process.  
 
Proprietary information can also provide an obstacle in utilizing scientific and technical 
information in collaborative processes. In the cases examined in this report, proprietary 
information could be quite rich and therefore valuable to processes but was also restricted in 
its use by its very nature. For example, proprietary information regarding oil and gas and 
grazing leases played a key role in the Southeast New Mexico Working Group by stalling the 
process and later facilitating its progress. When the group realized it needed to see where 
land was currently in use as compared to where ideal prairie chicken and sand dune lizard 
habitat existed in order to make a decision on future leasing policies, it became clear that all 
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of this information was proprietary to the Bureau of Land Management and the State Land 
Office (SLO). As a result, the agencies were reluctant to release any of this information to a 
single party. Finally, the SLO took on the mapping role and the issue of propriety was solved 
by prohibiting dissemination of mapping materials beyond Working Group members and by 
only allowing members to view the information during meetings.  
 
THE COST OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION 
 
Regardless of the benefits of scientific and technical information in informing decision 
making, gathering and using scientific information also requires significant resources from 
the group including time, money, and staff hours. For the Elliott State Forest Planning 
Process, these costs were compounded by the fact that the multiple different pieces involved 
in getting a federal permit as well as completing the Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) had to 
be done in a specific sequence. John Lilly noted: 
 
We’ve always said that if the price of the HCP is too high, we won’t get one. 
How do you know if it’s too high, until you walk that road with the scoping, 
the draft [Environmental Impact Statement], the plan to present on the HCP to 
find out whether or not it’s going to be something that is acceptable to [U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service] and [the National Marine Fisheries Service] and we 





As groups began to collect and process science, the structure of the process often was 
changed to accommodate this need. Many groups charged a science or technical committee 
with assessing the validity and application of available and relevant science as well as 
advising the policy arm of the collaborative process. This sort of division of labor may 
facilitate the progress of both the technical group and the main working group by eliminating 
the burden of processing technical information for the main working group while allowing 
the technical subgroup to concentrate solely on such tasks.  
 
For some processes, separate groups created to handle technical information were not 
offshoots of the citizen group but rather informed the final decision maker. For example, in 
the Houghton Area Master Plan Process, the Technical Advisory Team (TAT) addressed 
technical aspects of providing services for any future development in the area covered by the 
Plan.13 The TAT, as the name suggests, was more technical in nature and did not contain the 
citizen element of the Citizens Review Committee (CRC). While the TAT and CRC had 
intermittent communication, they did not meet together. The TAT was considered by many 
in the Houghton Area Master Plan Process to be integral to the process overall but they were 







IMPACT OF THE PROCESS ON SCIENCE 
While science clearly affected collaborative processes in a variety of ways, processes in turn 
can affect the science. Such impact may be through the type of information collected or how 
that information is collected. Often, scientific and technical information are affected by the 
politics of a collaborative process. For example, in the Lake Whatcom Planning Process, 
strained relationships and mistrust between the Interjurisdictional Committee and the 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) influenced how the Environmental Impact 
Statement would be conducted. Because the Committee wished for peer review, the DNR 
decided to conduct a Preliminary Draft EIS to allow the public to comment on the scientific 
assessments that had been prepared by DNR staff.14 Thus, the relationships and dynamics of 
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BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 
he eight cases demonstrate that collaborative planning on state trust land is occurring in 
communities across the West in response to a variety of land management issues and in 
the face of a range of constraints. These examples of collaboration provide valuable data 
about the benefits, costs and challenges of this type of land management approach. 
Moreover, they highlight factors that are instrumental in facilitating a collaborative process, 
as well as general lessons learned from practical experience.  
 
From these rich cases emerges a set of “best management practices” for collaborative 
planning on state trust land. Essentially, this list serves as a comprehensive summary of ideas 
for state trust land managers and other stakeholders interested in creating and/or guiding a 
collaborative process within the unique context of state trust land management. The chapter 
outlines best management practices with respect to:  
 
• Setting the groundwork for a collaborative process 
• Determining membership composition of a collaborative group 
• Tailoring the process to the participants 
• Creating a decision-making structure 
• Effectively managing the people and the process 
• Dealing with information or lack thereof during collaboration  
• Implementing the outcome 
 
 
SETTING THE GROUNDWORK  
 
 Define “collaboration” before initiating a collaborative process to create a common 
understanding about the nature and mechanics of the endeavor. “Collaboration” 
evokes different meanings for different people. Drafting a common definition prior to 
beginning collaborative planning will help people understand what the process should 
and should not entail. Breadth of stakeholders, degree of process transparency and degree 
of influence on decision making are useful starting points for synthesizing a definition of 
collaboration. Include this definition with the other information distributed about the 
impending process.  
 
 Identify preexisting internal and external legal constraints before beginning a 
collaborative process. Some of these legal issues, like the trust land mandate, may be 
obvious. However, other legal constraints may be unclear. With trust land management 
issues and stakeholders in mind, one should survey federal, state and local law to 
determine which regulations will apply to the collaborative planning process. An 





 Determine whether other, potentially-related legal processes are ongoing and 
determine whether a collaborative planning process can occur concurrently. A 
review of preexisting legal sideboards will provide clues as to whether another, 
potentially-related legal process like an Environmental Impact Statement process, zoning 
ordinance review or lawsuit is ongoing or may occur during the collaborative process. 
Whether a collaborative process can take place simultaneously should be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.  
 
 Take advantage of various legal options when crafting and engaging in a 
collaborative process. Strategies such as incorporation as an Internal Revenue Code 
§501(c)(3) “charitable organization” and drafting a Memorandum of Agreement can 
increase a collaborative group’s fundraising capabilities, its ability to enter into legal 
agreements with other entities and potentially its influence over decision making. 
 
 Recognize that collaborative processes take time and skills and allocate resources 
accordingly. Collaboration is often a time-intensive endeavor and can require a variety 
of process management skills, in addition to scientific, technical and even legal expertise. 
These demands should be acknowledged up front so that the necessary financial and staff 
resources can be acquired to sustain the process. 
 
 Collaborate in good faith. Successful collaborative planning requires that stakeholders 
participate fairly and honestly. A stakeholder should not participate in a collaborative 
process knowing at the outset that he or she will leave the table to pursue legal action or 
other contrary efforts. Likewise, a stakeholder should understand and be candid about 
what he or she can and cannot agree to during discussions. 
 
 
DETERMINING MEMBERSHIP COMPOSITION  
 
 Ensure that the person or persons responsible for selecting collaborative group 
members is perceived as legitimate and unbiased. Before beginning the selection 
process, consider how those responsible for identifying and choosing participants are 
perceived by various stakeholders. This assessment may be simply internal reflection, or 
may require inquiry into outside perceptions. 
 
 Identify all “stakeholders” and involve those who are interested in participating and 
are legally-appropriate; however, limit membership to a manageable size. 
Stakeholders include individuals with a financial stake (e.g., beneficiaries, adjacent 
landowners and current lessees), legal jurisdiction (e.g. federal and state agencies, county, 
city, tribes and water districts), or expressed interest (e.g. environmental, recreation and 
industry groups). To assess these stakeholders’ interest in the process given the time 
commitment and other considerations, make inquiries via mail or other communication. 
Those stakeholders who express a willingness to participate should be given an 




A review of preexisting legal constraints like the trust land mandate will help identify 
which stakeholders should be invited to participate in the collaborative process. If these 
legally-appropriate stakeholders do not want to participate or cannot do so, then the group 
should consider how to best work with them to ensure that their legally-significant 
interests are considered during the process. A review of legal issues also may identify 
stakeholders who should not participate in the collaborative process because of 
conflicting legal obligations. 
 
Participation does not necessarily require a seat at the decision-making table. Interests 
may need to be consolidated if the number of stakeholders is unmanageably high or if the 
number of interests represented is unbalanced. 
 
 Involve the trust land decision makers in the collaborative process and work to gain 
support from all levels of the decision-making hierarchy. Involving decision makers 
creates buy-in and thereby increases the likelihood that the final agreement will be 
approved and implemented. While it is preferred that the ultimate decision makers have a 
seat at the table, it is not mandatory. Interaction via frequent updates from the group and 
presentations from the state land agency may be sufficient to engage the decision maker 
in the process. Furthermore, communication about the benefits of collaboration and, 
specifically, the group’s progress can help build support at all hierarchical levels. 
 
 Confirm that the representatives chosen to participate in the collaborative process 
are accepted and trusted by their respective stakeholder groups. If a participant 
selected represents a larger interest group, communicate with that group to verify that the 
individual has their support, as well as the authority to speak for them.  
 
 Anticipate and prepare for potential challenges to membership composition. The 
collaborative group should have a concrete rationale for why each member was selected 
to participate in the process, as well as why certain people or interests were not selected. 
The group also should brainstorm how to respond if excluded individuals or groups 
challenge the process down the road. 
 
 Be prepared to adjust membership composition as the collaborative process 
progresses to account for additional interests, process changes or attrition. Because 
of potential challenges to membership composition, group size may need to expand to 
accommodate additional interests after the process begins. Process changes that increase 
or decrease the range of stakeholders also may necessitate a reassessment of participants 
to ensure that the correct stakeholders are involved. Additionally, because collaboration 
can be time-consuming, attrition may occur. The group should anticipate this possibility 
and create a plan for replacing a stakeholder representative. 
 
 
TAILORING THE PROCESS TO THE PARTICIPANTS  
 
 Identify process objectives at the outset of collaborative planning. Well-defined goals 
can help guide the process and increase the participants’ chances of successfully realizing 
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those goals. Objectives can take the form of a mission or vision statement, guiding 
principles or shared goals. 
 
 Clearly define interests, roles and responsibilities for each stakeholder involved in 
the process. Group members should be candid about the interests they represent in the 
collaborative process. Are they representing personal interests or the interests of a 
particular stakeholder group? The group should explicitly share this information at an 
initial meeting. Likewise, early in the process the group should determine roles and 
responsibilities for each participant. These duties may include a chairperson and/or 
secretary. 
 
 Create ground rules as a group to guide and facilitate interactions among 
participants during the process. Ground rules will vary depending on the stakeholders 
involved and issues under review in the collaborative process. A group can use ground 
rules to encourage productive behavior like common courtesy, candor and listening with 
an open mind. Ground rules also can discourage destructive behavior by prohibiting 
activities like side meetings and allowing for cooling off periods.  
 
 Set and adhere to a timeline and deadlines, recognizing that collaborative processes 
often require more time than initially thought. Because of the variety of stakeholders 
and complexity of issues involved, collaboration tends to be a lengthy endeavor. The 
group should recognize this reality and set a realistic timeline to guide the process, as 
well as feasible deadlines to motivate periodic decision making and provide an end goal.  
 
 Consider the timing and location of meetings to accommodate different 
participants’ schedules and needs. The group should find a location that minimizes 
total travel time of the participants or rotate locations to accommodate for unequal travel 
requirements. The group also should consider participants’ professional and personal 
schedules when choosing a meeting time to ensure greater turnout and hence input at 
each meeting.  
 
 Determine whether and how to share planning costs among participants and keep 
track of these costs as the collaborative process progresses. The group should agree at 
the outset of a collaborative process whether to distribute planning costs among 
participants. These costs may include copying, telephone and travel expenses. If the 
group decides to share these costs, then the group must determine how to do so. Possible 
agreements may include having the “lead” agency pay a larger portion of process costs or 
determining payment based upon which stakeholder(s) ultimately own the product 
produced. To keep track of planning costs, participants should save receipts and keep 









CREATING A DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE 
 
 Develop and agree upon a clearly-defined decision rule at the outset of the 
collaborative process that will guide group decision making. This rule or set of rules 
should explain how the group will make decisions during the collaborative process. Will 
the group vote on issues? If so, will the group require majority approval or unanimity? If 
the decision rule requires “consensus,” be sure to clearly define that term since it evokes 
different meanings for different people. 
 
 Specify voting procedures if the group decides upon that decision-making approach. 
If voting is used in the collaborative process, then the group must decide how to allocate 
voting privileges among members. A process benefits from having equal voting rights. 
However, if a process requires that only certain members be allowed to vote, then the 
group should make that decision jointly. 
 
 Consider using minority reports or decision matrices to make difficult decisions. A 
minority report enables those group members who disagree with the majority on an issue 
to document their opinions. This approach often is used when consensus cannot be 
achieved. Allowing the group to only document substantive differences encourages 
constructive dissent instead of disagreement for the sake of disagreeing. Likewise, 
decision matrices can assist a group in making sense of a complex decision. A decision 
matrix identifies a range of decision options and then enables the group to rank and re-
rank them to meet the goals of the collaborative process.  
 
 Clarify how decision-making power is shared between the collaborative group and 
trust land decision makers. The state trust land decision makers cannot abdicate their 
decision-making authority, however they can share decision-making power. This division 
of power should be explained and accepted from the outset of the collaborative process so 
that group members and the ultimate decision makers understand their respective roles. A 
group charter is one way to clarify this sharing of power. 
 
 
MANAGING THE PEOPLE AND THE PROCESS 
 
 Consider hiring a professional, neutral and knowledgeable facilitator to help 
manage group dynamics and guide the collaborative process. A trained facilitator can 
help the group identify interests and build common ground, in addition to providing 
structure to meetings.  
 
Facilitation is most effective when the group perceives it as neutral, with no 
predisposition towards specific parties or outcomes. To achieve impartiality, the group 
should not select a facilitator who is affiliated with one of the interested parties. Finding 
and agreeing upon facilitator as a group may increase the facilitator’s credibility and 
trustworthiness in the process. Likewise, the group should pay for the facilitator as a 




When researching facilitators, the group should consider the scientific, technical and 
legal issues involved. The group should look for a facilitator with background knowledge 
and relevant past experience. However, if facilitator can quickly familiarize himself or 
herself with the issues at play, then knowledge and experience may be less of a 
determining factor. 
 
 Encourage stakeholders to assume formal and informal leadership roles to help 
manage group dynamics, galvanize public support and guide the collaborative 
process. Agency managers, public officials and informal community leaders often 
assume or are elected to a formal leadership position in the group. Formal leadership may 
include a group chairperson, spokesperson or meeting coordinator to help facilitate 
meetings, reach out to media, represent the group to the trust land agency and/or make 
final decisions when agreement cannot be reached. In addition to formal leadership, the 
group should encourage members to assume informal leadership roles to provide the 
energy and commitment needed to keep members involved in the process and working 
towards an end goal. 
 
 Encourage relationship building through formal and informal activities to help the 
collaborative group overcome stereotypes and foster trust and cooperation. Formal 
group activities like site visits and other field trips can help participants build new 
relationships or mend old ones. Likewise, informal interactions such as carpooling and 
group lunches can help participants get to know each other better as individuals, rather 
than representatives of particular interests. 
 
 Identify and challenge hidden agendas and interests as early as possible to ensure 
transparency and avoid stifling progress. The group should structure the collaborative 
process in a way that enables participants to openly discuss their interests. Setting aside 
meeting time at the outset of the process to share interests and objectives and instituting a 
ground rule that discourages hidden agendas may help a group overcome this challenge.  
 
 Communicate frequently with the ultimate trust land decision makers if they do not 
have a seat at the table. In addition to providing trust land decision makers with 
frequent updates (which may be their chosen level of involvement in the process), the 
group periodically should check in with the decision makers to ensure that the process is 
on track and still has the support of the trust land agency. Meetings between the agency 
and either the entire group or selected group spokespeople are an effective forum for this 
interaction.  
 
 Update the public periodically about the collaborative process and encourage public 
comment to gain additional perspectives and public buy-in. To ensure open 
communication with the public, the group can open its meetings to the public and/or hold 
specific public hearings on particular issues. Whichever approach is chosen, the group 
should advertise these opportunities in the press. The group also should consider inviting 
the press to these meetings to ensure wide dissemination of information about the 
collaborative process. Publishing and distributing a newsletter and creating an 
informative website are additional ways that a group can share information with the 
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public. Finally, to facilitate public input, the group can create an email address to which 
comments can be sent. 
 
 
DEALING WITH INFORMATION OR LACK THEREOF  
 
 Reserve meeting time throughout the collaborative process to learn about the trust 
land mandate and other legal and technical constraints surrounding trust land 
management. Many stakeholders involved in collaboration on state trust lands are 
unfamiliar with the particular constraints surrounding this type of land management. 
Presentations by the trust land agency and other informed groups can educate participants 
about the unique nature of state trust lands. Because these issues are at the core of the 
planning process, this education effort should continue throughout the process to ensure 
group understanding and acceptance.  
 
 Determine from the outset what scientific information is necessary to make 
informed decisions and work to acquire those resources before moving forward with 
the process. Before exploring substantive issues, the group should identify what issues 
are in question, what the group needs to know, and what sources the group will accept as 
legitimate information to move forward. From this assessment, the group should 
determine what resources it needs to begin making decisions. These resources may 
include watershed maps, fire history documents and species data.   
 
 Recognize that scientific information is not a panacea, but rather a tool to assist 
people and policy-makers. While the group should determine upfront what scientific 
information is needed to make decisions, it also should recognize science’s limits. Tools 
like scientific modeling are only as good as the information applied to it.  
 
 Use subcommittees or task forces to take advantage of stakeholder knowledge and 
efficiently research scientific and technical issues for the larger group. Dividing into 
smaller subcommittees or task forces enables the group to capitalize on stakeholder 
expertise and efficiently tackle a variety of scientific and technical issues. Alternatively, 
creating subcommittees or task forces that are separate from the collaborative group and 
serve in an advisory role enables the group to benefit from an even wider knowledge 
pool.  
 
 Hire professionals to help the group process information and develop a feasible final 
product. While group members provide a variety of skills and resources, few, if any, 
may have the expertise necessary to turn ideas into a final product or conduct specialized 
analyses. Trained professionals like planners, economists, scientists and consultants can 
fill that void. For example, many groups attempt benefit-cost analyses, but few are 
equipped with the economic skills needed to value non-market outcomes. 
 
 Request legal or policy clarification from the state attorney general or agency 
officials when needed to move the collaborative process forward. A process may 
become mired in disagreement about legal or policy issues such as the proper relationship 
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between the collaborative group and a state agency or the environmental impacts of a 
proposed action. An attorney general opinion or formal agency opinion can provide the 
group with the certainty necessary to move onto other issues. 
 
 
IMPLEMENTING THE OUTCOME 
 
 Create measures of success in the final agreement to facilitate implementation. 
Features like an implementation committee and milestones can provide a group with the 
structure and incentives necessary to ensure implementation of the final agreement. A 
subset of the collaborative group can form an implementation committee upon ending the 
collaborative process. Another option is to include milestones that measure 
implementation success in the final document. 
 
 Create a final product that satisfies the trust mandate requirements to increase the 
likelihood of implementation. The mandate can be a significant source of power for the 
collaborative group. Helping the trust land agency realize its legal obligations increases 
the likelihood that the agency will implement the final product and hence helps ensure the 
group’s success. Strategies may include identifying revenue generation as a measure of 
success in the final product or including tools that allow the agency to achieve revenue 
goals. 
 
 Use the relationships established and knowledge acquired during the collaborative 
process when implementing the final decision. The collaborative process should be a 
valuable resource for those executing the final decision. Professional and personal 
connections, as well as familiarity with the underlying issues can help transition from 








Overcoming Barriers to Collaborative Planning  
on State Trust Lands 
 
he purpose of this final chapter is to address the broader context of challenges that affect 
collaboration on state trust land, providing bigger-picture and often longer-term 
recommendations to overcome the barriers inherent in this management approach. Informed 
by the eight cases, these recommendations identify areas for change for agencies and other 




• Knowledge and Skills 
• Organizational Structure  




The chapter also suggests a need for continued dialogue and learning among agencies, as 
well as suggestions for future research. Each set of recommendations is preceded by a 





BARRIERS TO COLLABORATION  
 
Collaborative planning often demands significant staff and financial commitments, as the 
process relies on regular meetings in addition to outside research and work and is often 
lengthy. Since state trust land agencies are already engaged in a variety of time-consuming 
activities, they often cannot provide the resources needed to ensure consistent participation in 
collaborative planning. Other groups face similar, if not greater, resource constraints and 
often cannot commit a representative to participate regularly in the process. This challenge 
can dissuade agencies and other groups from joining a collaborative process, or it can make 
their participation less effective. 
 
Once at the table, parties face additional resource challenges. One of the most significant of 
these challenges is the need for trained facilitators. Lack of funding may prevent the group 
from hiring a facilitator or force one party to pay for the facilitator. Both of these options can 
result in ineffective processes due to insufficient group leadership or the perception of bias as 






Recommendation State Trust 
Land Agency 
Other* 
Recognize that collaboration will entail significant time 
and money and ensure that adequate resources can be 
allocated or found before starting a process 
  
Incorporate costs of collaborative planning into 
traditional project accounting 
  
Find funding to hire third party facilitators    
* Encompasses other federal and state agencies, municipalities, community organizations, industry, 
conservation groups and other parties that are affected by trust land management decisions. 
 
 
1. Recognize that collaboration will entail significant time and money and ensure 
that adequate resources can be allocated or found before starting a process. 
 
One way state trust land agencies and other stakeholders can overcome resource allocation 
barriers is to allocate appropriate staff and funding for collaborative processes before 
engaging in the process. Adequate allocation of these resources will prevent the disruptions 
that plague collaboration through inconsistent representation by part-time staff. This 
approach may require that staff workloads be adjusted upon starting a process. Funding for 
collaborative activities may come from agency or organizational resources or from outside 
organizations, such as philanthropic organizations, corporate foundations or area donors. For 
example, the Sonoran Institute’s Resources for Community Collaboration program, funded 
by the Hewlett Foundation, made small grants for collaborative groups in previous years. 
 
2. Incorporate the costs of collaborative planning into traditional project 
accounting.  
 
Another way for state trust land agencies to deal with the challenge of limited resources is to 
incorporate the costs associated with collaboration into the bottom line of management. As 
this research shows, collaborative planning often can result in greater revenue for the trust as 
well as increased efficiencies associated with a more durable solution and greater likelihood 
of implementation. Thus, it makes sense to incorporate both costs and benefits associated 
with this approach into project accounting. 
 
3. Find outside funding to hire third party facilitators.  
 
Outside funding for or provision of a facilitator can help avoid the perceived bias that may 
emerge when a stakeholder involved in the collaborative process pays or appoints the 
facilitator. Consequently, trust land agencies should seek outside funding to pay for 







KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS   
 
BARRIERS TO COLLABORATION 
 
Participants in collaborative planning on state trust lands also may be constrained by limited 
information and skills. Without an understanding of state trust lands and the necessary skills 
for collaborative planning, a process can suffer because time that otherwise could be spent on 
substantive issues must be spent on education, research and trial and error in creating feasible 
management options. Lack of understanding and skills also can fuel disagreements over the 
interpretation of key issues like the trust mandate and environmental costs, which can hurt 
group dynamics. 
 
Members of the public often are unfamiliar with state trust lands, and hence are unaware of 
the unique constraints involved in their management. Likewise, other organizations can be 
unfamiliar with land management policies relevant to trust land and inexperienced with 
collaborative planning.  
 
State trust land agencies may not be equipped with the expertise necessary to fully engage in 
collaboration or may be too short-staffed to commit personnel to these processes. Frequently, 
agencies lack the technical and communications staff to help engage partners, stakeholders 
and the public. Agencies also typically do not have employees trained in group process 
management and negotiation skills, both of which are essential to effective collaborative 
planning. Finally, agencies often do not have economists on staff who are needed to quantify 
the benefits and costs of different planning processes to enable the agency to make informed 




Recommendation State Trust 
Land Agency 
Other* 
Ensure the public is brought up to speed on state trust land 
mandates and other aspects of land management at the 
outset of a process 
  
Educate staff and members about state trust land 
management to understand how this type of land differs 
from others 
  
Expand agency communications capacity   
Provide multiple opportunities for training in collaboration 
and hire personnel with collaboration experience 
  
Assign technical staff to participate in processes or make 
technical staff available for consultation 
  
Access economics expertise to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of collaboration 
  
* Encompasses other federal and state agencies, municipalities, community organizations, industry, 




4. Ensure the public is brought up to speed on state trust land mandates and other 
aspects of land management at the outset of a process 
 
Members of the general public rarely are aware of state trust land and how it differs from 
federally-owned public land. Consequently, the public does not understand the constraints 
under which trust land agencies function. This unfamiliarity can pose a significant challenge 
to collaboration, as the group must spend time during the process on education about state 
trust land management and may struggle with different, conflicting interpretations of 
constraints and consequences. Without an understanding of trust lands, the public also may 
be uninterested in engaging in a collaborative process, instead preferring more adversarial 
and potentially-costly approaches like litigation.  
 
To overcome this barrier, state trust land agencies can engage in two different levels of 
public education. First, passive education such as posting signs that designate trust land 
boundaries and describe the purpose of state trust lands can help educate the public, 
identifying the state trust land agency as a neighbor and member of the community. 
Similarly, developing informative websites detailing land activities and agency involvement 
can help educate the public and reduce the “surprise factor” in collaboration when 
participants realize the true constraints imposed on trust land management. Second, once at 
the table, agencies should inform participants about the trust mandate and the agency’s legal 
and policy constraints to ensure participants understand the boundaries within which they can 
create options for creative solutions.   
 
5. Educate staff and members about state trust land management to understand 
how this type of land differs from others.  
 
To work effectively in a collaborative process involving state trust lands, other organizations 
also must take responsibility for learning about state trust lands and the legal and policy 
issues associated with trust land management. Resources for this education include the trust 
land agencies themselves, as well as several nonprofit organizations that focus on state trust 
lands, such as the Children’s Land Alliance Supporting Schools (CLASS)1 and the Sonoran 
Institute.2 There is also growing literature on state trust lands, which organizations can turn to 
for information. Looking forward, organizations also should seek out employees who have 
expertise in state trust land issues. Developing this understanding within organizations and 
other groups will familiarize potential stakeholders with the management and legal 
constraints within which collaborative processes on state trust lands must occur. 
 
6. Expand agency communications capacity. 
 
To develop a better public understanding of state trust land management and contribute to the 
education efforts in the previous recommendations, state trust land agencies should hire staff 
with communications expertise. Communications expertise can help a state trust land agency 
develop user-friendly internet and printed materials that include engaging descriptions of 
trust land resources and collaborative processes. Using photographs and even interactive 




7. Provide multiple opportunities for training in collaboration and hire personnel 
with collaboration experience. 
 
State trust land agencies and other groups should develop or access programs that teach staff 
and members collaborative planning skills, including effective communication, active 
listening and negotiation. This training can be accomplished in two ways. First, agencies and 
organizations can train staff by sending people to outside workshops, hiring professionals to 
hold internal seminars or distributing informational materials. Second, once parties arrive at 
the table, training for the entire working group can be used to help begin the collaborative 
process. By learning how to collaborate in the working group setting, the training may also 
contribute to increasing understanding of the process and relationship-building among 
participants. Finally, trust land agencies and other groups should look for collaboration 
experience when hiring new personnel.  
 
8. Assign technical staff to participate in collaborative processes or make technical 
staff available for consultation to ensure needed expertise during the process.  
 
Expertise in mapping and geographic information systems, geology, forestry, hydrology and 
wildlife biology is important for collaborative planning on state trust lands to succeed, but 
often is in limited supply. Consequently, processes frequently must scramble to secure the 
funds and time needed to acquire this technical knowledge. Choosing state trust land agency 
and organizational representatives to sit at the table who possess this expertise or making 
technical staff available for consultation during the collaborative planning process can help 
overcome this barrier.  
 
9. Access economics expertise to evaluate the costs and benefits of collaboration. 
 
State trust land agencies and other groups rarely have the expertise to compare the costs and 
benefits of collaboration with a more traditional land management approach. If benefits and 
costs are considered, benefits frequently are estimated conservatively and focus only on near-
term gain. This analysis often discourages agencies and other stakeholders from participating 
in collaborative planning. Accessing economics expertise to conduct a formal benefit-cost 
analysis of the true value of collaboration in a particular situation can help all parties to make 
informed decisions about whether collaborative planning is appropriate to pursue their 
interests in a state trust land issue. In order to ensure that all values of collaborative processes 
are incorporated, agencies should investigate use of total asset management (TAM) to inform 
the benefit-cost analysis. TAM involves managing all the resources of a trust with an overall 













BARRIERS TO COLLABORATION 
 
Because collaboration is new to state trust land managers, the traditional way that agencies 
are organized may be problematic for encouraging more collaborative relationships. For 
instance, the case studies in this report suggest that many state trust land agencies are 
sometimes not in touch with the local communities that live around state trust lands. Within 
agencies, sometimes limited communication between different agency departments may be 
problematic. In both cases, lack of communication can prevent a shared understand of 
problems between communities and agencies, as well as limit the ability to create innovative 
options and leverage community and agency resources. Finally, lack of communication 
between individuals at the table and their constituencies can make a collaborative process 
less transparent and may result in disagreements within groups as to their commitment to 




Recommendation State Trust 
Land Agency 
Other* 
Consider creating regional offices   
Improve communication within state trust land agency   
Improve communications between individuals 
participating in the collaborative process and his or her 
constituency 
  
* Encompasses other federal and state agencies, municipalities, community organizations, industry, 
conservation groups and other parties that are affected by trust land management decisions. 
 
 
10. Consider creating regional state trust land agency offices. 
 
Many state trust land agencies lack regional or local offices dispersed throughout their states. 
This organizational structure results in a significant geographic distance between the agency 
and trust land stakeholders, and also often a philosophical divergence regarding trust land 
management. These tense relationships infiltrate trust land management, both in collaborative 
planning and more traditional approaches, and can pose management and even legal 
problems for the agency. In the context of collaboration, the absence of regional agency 
offices can hinder a community groups’ ability to access trust land information and can limit 
the agency’s understanding of local issues.  
 
To overcome this structural barrier, some state trust land agencies should consider staffing 
regional offices throughout the state. Three state agencies that already model this structure 
are Colorado’s State Land Board, Montana’s Department of Natural Resources and 
Conservation and New Mexico’s State Land Office. In Montana, having regional offices 
gave Department of Natural Resources and Conservation the ability to hold lunch meetings 
and other sessions with participants of the collaborative planning process in the town of 
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Whitefish. Such meetings would have been difficult had the agency been operating solely out 
of its Helena location four hours away. This structural change would ensure that communities 
have local agency representatives to whom they can turn with trust land questions. This 
change also can improve the relationship between the state trust land agency and local 
communities by developing an understanding of each other’s concerns and a shared sense of 
place. 
 
11. Improve communication within state trust land agencies. 
 
To develop management solutions, state trust land agency departments must work together to 
brainstorm ideas, identify ways to share resources and understand each other’s financial and 
technical limitations. Arranging offices in ways that facilitate communication between 
departments and establishing inter-departmental meetings that specifically address the needs 
of collaborative processes can establish better communication between departments. They 
can also provide mechanisms for brainstorming ways to leverage agency resources from 
various departments to develop creative options to bring to the table. Instituting intra-agency 
teamwork as a common practice would draw more staff expertise into a collaborative process 
without having to assign additional representatives to the process. In this way, the agency can 
use all of its resources and expertise to facilitate innovative solutions to problems identified 
in the collaborative process. For example, communication between departments in the New 
Mexico State Land Office (SLO) resulted in Commissioner Lyons placing a moratorium on 
new oil and gas leases near prairie chicken breeding habitat in southeastern New Mexico. 
The moratorium helped participants of the Southeast New Mexico Working Group recognize 
the SLO’s commitment to precluding the need for listing of the lesser prairie chicken on the 
Endangered Species List. Many participants cited the SLO’s commitment and leadership role 
as a major facilitating factor in the process.  
 
12. Improve communications between individuals participating in the collaborative 
process and his or her constituency. 
 
Collaborative planning on state trust lands can suffer if representatives of agencies, 
organizations and other groups involved in the effort do not periodically and consistently 
report back to their offices and constituencies. This structural challenge can result in 
disagreement within the organization about the final plan and, in turn, create an instable or 
even invalid outcome. To overcome this barrier, all organizations should work to facilitate 
communication between representatives involved in the collaborative process, the 
organization and its broader constituency. Updates via periodic meetings, newsletters, email 





BARRIERS TO COLLABORATION 
 
The prevailing philosophies and attitudes within agencies and other groups often deter or 
hinder participation in collaborative efforts. Many of these organizations resist involvement 
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in collaboration because it is seen as outside their realm of standard practice, an abdication of 
authority and tacit acceptance of outside agendas. Rarely do organizations have incentives 
that encourage creative thinking and staff participation in collaborative planning. If agencies 
choose to engage in collaboration, they often view their appropriate role as an observer 
instead of an active participant, which works to the detriment of the process. State trust land 
agencies and other parties also tend to focus exclusively on the economic, near-term benefits 
of land use planning and consequently do not appreciate the long-term gains, and specifically 
the conservation benefits, that can come from a collaborative approach. Finally, as 
communities continue to expand closer to state trust land, agencies find themselves ill-




Recommendation State Trust 
Land Agency 
Other* 
Work to establish collaboration as a standard practice   
Recognize that decision-making power can and should 
be shared, while decision-making authority must be 
retained 
  
Recognize that participation does not necessitate 
acceptance of others’ agendas 
  
Create incentives to collaborate    
Celebrate institutional involvement in collaboration   
Embrace a participant role instead of being an observer   
Acknowledge and incorporate non-economic resource 
values associated with state trust land 
  
Find ways to incorporate new business paradigms   
* Encompasses other federal and state agencies, municipalities, community organizations, industry, 
conservation groups and other parties that are affected by trust land management decisions. 
 
 
13. Work to establish collaboration as a standard agency practice for appropriate 
situations. 
 
State trust land agencies are often comfortable with their traditional decision-making and 
management methods and consequently resist engaging in or pursuing collaboration. 
However, collaborative processes suffer because state trust land agencies are irreplaceable 
stakeholders in decision making. To overcome this barrier and encourage collaborative 
planning when appropriate, state trust land agencies should establish collaboration as a 
standard practice and find ways to assess effective performance. Sending clear messages to 
staff that collaborative planning is a legitimate land management approach in appropriate 
situations and revising agency policies and missions to explicitly recognize collaborative 







14. Recognize that decision-making power can and should be shared, while decision-
making authority must be retained. 
 
A key reason why state trust land agencies resist collaborative planning is a fear that 
participation requires abdication of decision-making authority. As the literature on 
collaboration explains, there is a subtle but important distinction between decision-making 
authority, which an agency cannot and should not relinquish, and decision-making power, 
which should be shared with other participants in the process. All organizations affected by 
trust land management decisions need to understand this distinction. Explicitly 
acknowledging this distinction in agency and organizational policies on collaboration can 
help develop this common understanding as can guidance on how to manage it during a 
process. With greater clarity and guidance, state trust land agencies can feel more 
comfortable engaging in collaboration because they know they retain final authority over 
trust land management. Likewise, organizations and other stakeholders can feel more 
comfortable participating because they know they have an influential voice in the decision-
making process.  
 
15. Recognize that participation in collaboration and even leveraging other parties’ 
resources does not necessitate acceptance of those parties’ agendas. 
 
State trust land agencies also resist collaborative planning out of concern that collaboration 
requires acceptance of other participants’ agendas. These agencies consequently can lose 
important resources that outside parties can provide. To overcome this challenge, state trust 
land agencies should recognize that neither participation in collaboration nor leveraging other 
participants’ resources means that they accept those parties’ agendas. However, given that 
this can be a real perception for all parties at the table, ground rules formed at the outset and 
formal external statements made during the process should clarify that being at the table, 
individual parties do not necessarily support other groups’ individual interests but rather 
agree to look for shared interests through the collaborative process. 
 
16. Create incentives to encourage staff to engage in collaboration. 
 
Agencies and organizations rarely have incentives that encourage staff participation in 
collaborative planning. Without institutional encouragement, employees shy away from these 
approaches, despite their potential to produce better results for all involved. To encourage 
staff participation in collaboration, state trust land agencies and organizations should create 
incentives such as adding participation in collaborative planning as a criterion in performance 
evaluations and creating awards for those employees who demonstrate effective participation 
in collaborative planning.  
 
17. Celebrate institutional involvement in collaboration. 
 
State trust land agencies and organizations should celebrate their involvement in 
collaboration by posting stories and photographs of collaborative processes in the office and 
on the institution’s website and developing a newsletter to inform others of this participation. 
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Internal and public recognition may result in not only an improved working environment, but 
also a better relationship between the agency or organization and community. 
 
18. Embrace a participant role in the collaborative process instead of being an 
observer. 
 
If state trust land agencies choose to engage in collaboration, they sometimes do so from 
afar. This detached involvement can result from agency fear that participation requires 
abdication of decision-making authority, as discussed above. Agencies also tend to prefer this 
level of involvement because it does not require them to work outside their “comfort zone.” 
When agencies merely observe meetings or receive meeting minutes instead of attending, 
they are limited in their ability to shape the process and help others create options that work 
within state trust land constraints. Consequently, the collaborative process may produce a 
product that is not relevant to or implementable on state trust lands. On the other hand, when 
agencies assume a participant role, they actively partake in meetings, engage others in 
dialogue about the agencies’ needs and concerns for options and help create durable 
agreements. 
 
Instituting agency policies that call for active participation can help overcome this challenge. 
Explicitly recognizing the benefits associated with full participation, as well as the problems 
created by assuming an observer role, can help realize this recommendation. 
 
19. Acknowledge and incorporate non-economic resource values associated with 
state trust land. 
 
Some state trust land agencies and other parties tend to focus exclusively on the economic, 
near-term benefits of trust land management and consequently do not appreciate the longer-
term gains, like conservation, that can be realized through a collaborative approach. 
Consequently, agencies and other groups not only avoid collaboration, but lose valuable 
opportunities to generate more value for trust lands. This exclusive focus on economic value 
also can create tense, even adversarial relationships between agencies and other parties which 
prefer a longer-term approach. This tension can hinder or prevent collaborative planning. 
 
Incorporating valuation that includes non-economic outcomes, like ecosystem services and 
conservation, can create greater long-term value for the trust. Indeed, conservation outcomes 
not only can create long-term trust value, but also generate short-term monetary gain if 
allowed in conjunction with permitted public recreation. This approach can provide state 
trust land agencies with an understanding of their total asset value. Furthermore, 
incorporating non-economic resource values acknowledges “outside” interests in state trust 
land and may encourage other parties to be involved in conflict resolution. To realize this 
recommendation, state trust land agencies should recognize conservation outcomes in reports 
of state trust land activities and planning, sending a message to those in the agency that there 
is value to such outcomes. For example, Colorado’s State Land Board is already making 
strides towards incorporating conservation values into its trust management. Amendment 16 
changed Colorado’s constitutional mandate to create a Stewardship Trust that set aside 
295,000 to 300,000 acres for uses that protect beauty, natural values, open space and wildlife 
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habitat. The amendment also directed that agricultural leases promote sound land 
management practices and natural resources be managed in a way that conserves their long-
term value. 
 
20. Find ways to incorporate new business paradigms. 
 
With growing communities and development pressures around state trust lands, new areas of 
business have emerged, predominantly in the commercial and development sector. Agencies 
should remain open to new business models with these opportunities which in essence create 
new potential for partnerships and options for innovative solutions in collaborative planning. 
One way to successfully integrate new sectors of business into agencies is to create a new 
division within the agency. In New Mexico, for example, the State Land Office created the 
Division of Commercial Development to take advantage of development opportunities and 
allow the SLO to become a more active partner and player in commercial properties. The 
SLO’s commitment to commercial development was central to the Mesa del Sol Planning 





BARRIERS TO COLLABORATION 
 
There are two main types of policy barriers to collaboration on state trust lands. First, there 
are barriers to agency involvement in collaborative processes. Because collaborative 
planning is a relatively new land management approach for state trust land agencies, few 
have in place specific programs or policies to guide the structure and process of collaborative 
projects. Agencies also can be unfamiliar with how collaboration fits into traditional federal 
planning processes. In addition, agencies typically lack methods to monitor implementation 
of collaborative planning outcomes to assess their success.    
 
The second type of policy barriers are those that limit the effectiveness of collaboration by 
limiting the problem-solving and management approaches of trust land agencies. Such 
barriers include the lack of agency programs to take advantage of non-traditional or 
“unconventional” trust values identified through collaboration, such as recreation, 
conservation and ecosystem services. Agencies often do not use total asset management tools 
or evaluate ecosystem services when making management decisions, limiting the options 





Recommendation State Trust 
Land Agency 
Other* 
Adopt the Best Management Practices and guidelines 
outlined in this report 
  
Create methods for monitoring implementation of 
collaborative outcomes  
  




Create policies that increase the range of agency 
management techniques so that the benefits of 
collaborative processes are more likely to be realized  
  
 * Encompasses other federal and state agencies, municipalities, community organizations, industry, 
conservation groups and other parties that engage in collaborative processes on state trust lands. 
 
 
21. Adopt the Best Management Practices and guidelines for collaboration outlined 
in this report. 
 
From the collective wisdom of the participants in the eight cases emerged a set of Best 
Management Practices (BMPs) contained in Chapter 21. These BMPs provide practical 
guidance for framing and managing a collaborative process and can set organizational policy 
for engaging in collaboration. The BMPs are designed to help agencies and others interested 
in collaboration develop an effective process. Agencies and other organizations should take 
advantage of these “lessons learned” and work to adopt the BMPs in their organizational 
policies.  
 
22. Create methods for monitoring implementation of collaborative outcomes 
 
Upon the completion of many of the collaborative processes studied in this report, 
participants noted that ultimate success hinges on implementation. Most felt confident that 
the plan will be implemented, yet few agencies have methods in place for monitoring and 
thereby ensuring effective implementation. If collaborative outcomes are not successfully 
implemented, agency and non-agency participants will feel dissatisfied and resist engaging in 
future collaborative endeavors. Failure to implement an outcome also can result in lost value 
to the trust. Agencies and organizations therefore should create programs for monitoring 
implementation. Inclusion of specific criteria and benchmarks to gauge the success of the 
implementation effort can be effective.  
 
23. Incorporate collaboration into traditional federal land management processes. 
 
Many state trust land agencies work with federal agencies in managing trust land and, as 
such, periodically engage in federal processes such as the Bureau of Land Management 
Resource Management Plan Amendment process and National Environmental Policy Act 
Environmental Impact Statement process. Because of the newness of collaboration, both state 
 
559 
trust land and federal agencies typically are unfamiliar with how collaboration fits into these 
traditional federal processes. This unfamiliarity can hinder collaborative planning on state 
trust lands because state and federal agencies are unsure whether the processes are 
compatible. To overcome this barrier, state and federal agencies should work together to 
develop ways in which collaboration can fit into traditional federal planning processes. These 
entities should utilize the institutional knowledge of agencies like the Bureau of Land 
Management, which has already embraced collaborative planning as a viable land 
management alternative. Another way to accomplish this recommendation is to allow 
collaborative processes to set the “preferred” alternative for federal plans and amendments. 
 
24. Create policies that increase the range of agency management techniques so that 
the benefits of collaborative processes are more likely to be realized.   
 
For collaboration to be most effective, state trust land agencies need to be able to provide 
options for new management strategies. Broadening the range of management techniques 
allows for greater room to achieve mutual gains for parties at the table. Such new techniques 
could take advantage of “unconventional” land values such as conservation, ecosystem 
services and recreation and include (1) incorporating total asset management tools and 
evaluating ecosystem services in management decisions and (2) developing a public 
recreational permitting system to generate revenue from the public’s use of state trust land. 
Total asset management involves restructuring economic valuation of land by managing all 
the resources of a trust, traditional and non-traditional, with an overall strategy to optimize 
the entire trust portfolio for short-term and long-term gains. As for recreational permitting 
systems, such a program could produce revenue from the use of state trust lands, as well as 
generate public interest in and ownership of state trust land issues, thereby reducing the 
potential for conflict in the future. While several state trust land agencies like the Montana 
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation currently have recreational permitting 
systems in place, these programs can be unorganized and understaffed. Moreover, many 
agencies lack such programs altogether. To more fully benefit from collaborative planning on 
state trust lands, agencies should develop or improve public recreational permitting systems 





BARRIERS TO COLLABORATION 
 
Collaborative planning on state trust lands encounters a variety of legal challenges. Because 
of the constitutional mandate, collaborative planning inevitably must operate within a set of 
legally defined constraints, which can pose barriers to collaboration. State trust land agencies 
often interpret their mandates to require maximization of revenue for designated beneficiaries 
and thus disregard the value of other non-monetary outcomes. Indeed, judicial holdings 
frequently require this interpretation. This strict reading of the trust mandate can hinder 
collaborative planning on state trust land because it limits creative problem-solving and 





The trust mandate also can stand as a barrier to collaboration because it often requires 
specific procedures for disposing of state trust land to maximize revenue. Typically, although 
not uniformly, states must sell the land to the highest bidder at public auction. This 
requirement again limits state trust land agencies’ flexibility in collaborating with other 
parties. Moreover, the trust mandate can hinder collaboration by preventing agencies from 




Recommendation State Trust 
Land Agency 
Other* 
Recognize conservation benefits in mandate   
Allow state trust land agencies to engage in negotiated 
land sales  
  
Encourage state trust land agencies to consider local land 
use policies 
  
Encourage state trust land agencies to work with local 
governments on land use planning. 
  
* Encompasses other federal and state agencies, municipalities, community organizations, industry, 
conservation groups and other parties that engage in collaborative processes on state trust lands. 
 
 
25. Recognize conservation benefits in the trust mandate. 
 
Many trust mandates do not identify conservation benefits as a measure of land value and 
hence this element is not acknowledged as part of the state trust land agency’s fiduciary duty 
to beneficiaries. Instead, these mandates often focus exclusively on maximization of revenue. 
This focus can hinder the creative thinking needed for collaboration. To overcome this 
barrier, the value of conservation should be explicitly recognized in the trust mandate. An 
obvious, yet potentially controversial, way to achieve this change is through amending the 
state constitution and/or state regulations. For those states whose law already requires state 
trust land agencies to both maximize revenue and consider longer-term environmental 
consequences, the legislative change could explicitly call for a balancing of these dual 
obligations. Obtaining express written consent from the beneficiaries to consider 
conservation outcomes in management decisions is another option. 
 
26. Allow state trust land agencies to engage in negotiated land sales. 
 
Another way to help state trust land agencies participate in collaborative planning is by 
legally allowing agencies to engage in more flexible land transactions like negotiated land 
sales. Being able to consider transactions other than public auctions enables agencies to make 
the trade-offs sometimes needed to successfully collaborate with other parties. This 
recommendation recognizes that the short-term gain of a land sale at auction may not be 
optimal for the long-term value of the trust as a whole. In addition, allowing negotiated land 
sales to organizations such as land trusts allows communities to achieve their conservation 
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goals while ensuring that agencies satisfy their fiduciary responsibility to their beneficiaries. 
Legal change through regulatory and/or constitutional amendments again can secure this 
flexibility. 
 
27. Encourage state trust land agencies to consider local land use policies. 
 
While some state trust land agencies confer with local governments on trust land issues, they 
do not necessarily abide by local land use laws and policies when making a final decision. 
Indeed, some state trust land agencies interpret their legal obligations to trump local law and 
thereby grant them, for example, “super zoning authority.” This interpretation can hinder 
collaboration again by straining relationships between localities and state trust land agencies. 
It also can compromise the effectiveness of final land management products because local 
concerns (as articulated through local law) are not fully considered. To overcome this 
challenge, state trust land agencies should strive to abide by local land use laws and policies 
for trust land planning that falls within that locality’s jurisdiction. Realizing this 
recommendation also will increase the potential for future positive working relationships 
between localities and state trust land agencies 
 
28. Encourage state trust land agencies to work with local governments on land use 
planning that falls within that locality’s jurisdiction. 
 
Because the trust mandate explicitly identifies the state (and via delegation, the state trust 
land agency) as the trustee of these lands, the agency often interprets its fiduciary duty to the 
beneficiaries as superior to other parties’ interests. Consequently, agencies often do not 
consult or work with local governments when making trust land management decisions, 
despite the fact that these lands are within local jurisdictions. This philosophy can pose a 
barrier to collaboration because state agencies do not think they need to fully cooperate with 
local governments. Even if the agency and municipality enter into a collaborative 
arrangement, the process can suffer from differing expectations and tense relationships. To 
overcome this challenge, state trust land agencies should strive to work with local 
governments on trust land planning that falls within that locality’s jurisdiction. State and 
local legislative change can help ensure that both parties come to the table with compatible 
expectations while still protecting agencies’ responsibility to the trust beneficiary.  
 
 
CONTINUED DIALOGUE AND LEARNING  
 
BARRIERS TO COLLABORATION 
 
Ongoing learning and dialogue are vital to effective collaborative planning on state trust 
lands. Even as state trust land agencies and other organizations continue to build institutional 
knowledge regarding best management practices for collaborative processes, there are few 
opportunities for sharing this knowledge with others. The Western States Land 
Commissioners Association (WSLCA) Conference traditionally has provided a venue for this 
sort of discussion, however it does not explicitly draw out collaborative experiences and few 
are shared formally. Furthermore, identifying trust land management issues that are 
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appropriate for collaborative planning is difficult with limited communication between state 





Recommendation State Trust 
Land Agency 
Other* 
Focus more explicitly on collaborative planning at the 
WSLCA Conference 
  
Hold an annual or biannual state trust land agency 
meeting 
  
Create a forum for non-agency interested and affected 
parties to discuss trust land issues 
  
* Encompasses other federal and state agencies, municipalities, community organizations, industry, 
conservation groups and other parties that engage in collaborative processes on state trust lands. 
 
 
29. Focus more explicitly on collaborative planning at the WSLCA Conference. 
 
The Western States Land Commissioners Association (WSLCA) Conference convenes state 
trust land agencies from across the West to share information about trust land management 
experiences and hear from experts in the field. This meeting provides agencies with a great 
sense of community and is a tremendous information resource. The conference thus provides 
a good opportunity for agencies to discuss collaborative planning as an alternative to more 
traditional trust land management. This discussion could be accomplished in a variety of 
ways. For example, collaborative activities could be included in the state “roll call,” which is 
held at the beginning of each conference and highlights major events and transactions 
occurring in each state over the past year. States also could prepare brief summaries of their 
collaborative efforts, noting the strengths and weaknesses of the process, the costs and 
benefits and any lessons learned. Holding sessions within the conference that specifically 
address collaboration on state trust lands is another way agencies can discuss how this land 
management approach fits with their responsibilities as trustees. 
 
30. Hold an annual or biannual state trust land agency meeting.  
 
In addition to engaging in information sharing across states, state trust land agencies should 
facilitate formal discussions closer to home. Holding annual or biannual meetings would 
enable the agency to meet with interested and affected parties, including community and 
organization leaders, to discuss state-specific trust land management issues from a variety of 
perspectives. These meetings could use the WSLCA Conference as a model and incorporate 
such activities as a “roll call” of recent agency and non-agency trust land activities. By 
providing a venue for discussion and information sharing, meetings would help foster 
stakeholder relationships and identify overlapping interests. Including collaborative planning 
as a topic for discussion also would enable agencies and other interested and affected parties 
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to openly discuss the pros and cons of that land management approach and even brainstorm 
about future collaborative opportunities. 
 
31. Create a forum for non-agency stakeholders to discuss state trust land issues. 
 
Interested and affected parties such as local communities and stakeholder organizations also 
can benefit from creating a forum to discuss state trust land issues, including collaborative 
planning. Group meetings are one way to facilitate this discussion. Some of this discussion 
could be in existing forums like the Land Trust Alliance annual Rally. Creating a non-profit 
organization like the Children’s Land Alliance Supporting Schools (CLASS) is another way 
for non-agency parties to discuss important issues. These types of venues would enable such 
parties to learn more about the intricacies inherent in state trust land management and 




FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
BARRIERS TO COLLABORATION 
 
This study of collaborative planning on state trust lands was conducted because the State 
Trust Lands Research Roundtable identified collaboration as a growing, but relatively 
unstudied, trend in trust land management. This report fills part of the void by identifying the 
range of issues involved in collaborative planning on state trust lands and compiling a set of 
lessons and best management practices. Yet, more research is needed to help inform more 
effective processes. 
 
Currently, one of the largest handicaps to understanding the true costs and benefits of 
collaboration is the lack of calculations corresponding to the process and outcome. The 
benefit-cost analyses that currently exist do not incorporate other trust land values, including 
ecosystem services. An additional deficiency in research on collaborative planning on state 
trust lands is a close comparison between collaborative planning and traditional trust land 
management. Finally, while this report provides a valuable collection of best management 
practices distilled from the eight cases, more subtle lessons should be developed by closely 





Recommendation State Trust 
Land Agency 
Other* 
Conduct benefit-cost analyses of collaborative planning   
Examine current research in valuing ecosystem services 
  
Research use of total asset management on state trust 
lands and how it fits into collaboration 
  
Conduct research that explicitly compares collaborative 
processes to traditional management situations 
  
Conduct real-time research on collaborative processes   
* Encompasses other federal and state agencies, municipalities, community organizations, industry, 
conservation groups and other parties that engage in collaborative processes on state trust lands. 
 
 
32. Conduct benefit-cost analyses of collaborative planning on state trust lands. 
 
State trust land agencies need a clear understanding of the costs and benefits of collaborative 
planning to make an informed decision about whether to engage in that land management 
approach. Currently, few agencies have this benefit-cost analysis. Agencies therefore should 
hire economists and/or trained researchers to conduct more precise benefit-cost analyses on 
collaborative planning. Costs incurred during collaboration tend to be more traditional line-
items, including hours spent in the process, number of staff dedicated to the process and 
direct costs (e.g. planning and research) of the project. Conversely, the benefits of 
collaborative planning may be more difficult to quantify, as they may include avoidance of 
lawsuits, improved long-term professional and personal relationships and protection of 
natural resources.  
 
33. Examine current research in valuing ecosystem services and apply it to state 
trust land management, including collaborative planning. 
 
There is growing literature on the monetary valuation of ecosystem services such as clean 
water, clean air, pest control and pollination. A review of this research and possible 
additional study into the true value of ecosystem services would help inform benefit-cost 
analyses of collaborative planning and thereby help state trust land agencies determine when 
this land management approach is appropriate.  
 
34. Research the use of total asset management on state trust lands and how it fits 
into collaboration. 
 
Total asset management (TAM) is a new method of management that recognizes all assets of 
an agency and manages them as one portfolio. In the State Trust Lands Research and Policy 
Analysis Roundtable3 convened by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the Sonoran 
Institute in 2004, TAM was identified as an important concept to develop as applied to state 
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trust lands. Organizations like the Sonoran Institute currently are conducting ongoing 
research on TAM, described as “a holistic and strategic approach to the management of trust 
resources which optimizes management of the total trust portfolio to achieve sustainable, 
short-term and long-term revenue goals.”4 TAM allows for a broader view of state trust land 
assets to incorporate and balance short-term and long-term revenue. However, TAM on state 
trust lands is still relatively new and additional research is needed on its application to state 
trust lands, as well as how agencies can incorporate TAM into collaborative processes.  
 
35. Conduct research that explicitly compares collaborative processes to traditional 
management situations.  
 
To provide state trust land agencies with the best understanding of when to engage in 
collaborative planning, research is needed that explicitly compares collaboration to 
traditional trust land management. This research may be included in a larger benefit-cost 
analysis, as discussed above. Conducting a series of case studies that focuses on this 
comparison is another research option. 
 
36. Conduct real-time research on collaborative processes.  
 
While this report attempted to capture the various issues underlying collaborative planning 
on state trust land and produce a practical list of best management practices, the research was 
limited by interviewees’ fading or selective memories. Many of the interviews conducted for 
this research took place months after the collaborative process ended. Naturally, participants 
forgot some of the more subtle factors that helped facilitate the process. While documents 
like meeting notes and project materials can help capture this knowledge, conducting real-
time research is a better option. Researching collaborative planning as it is ongoing would 
produce a more detailed and potentially more accurate understanding of the issues 
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1. Could you please tell us a bit about how you were involved with this process? 
a. How long were you involved? 
b. At what point in the process did you join? Initiator? Invited? 
c. What issues did you weigh before joining? Risks and benefits? 
d. Did you feel like this process was collaborative? 
e. Have you been involved in a collaborative planning process before? 
 
2. Could you please tell us about how this situation unfolded? 
a. How would similar projects normally be undertaken? 
 
3. Why did you / your organization participate? (benefits) 
a. What did you hope to accomplish? 
b. What were some of the positive outcomes of the process? Anything 
unexpected? (ex: resource sharing, relationships, more effective and stable 
outcomes, common ownership and shared understanding of the issue(s), more 
informed decision making etc.) 
c. What was the quality of the relationships that developed? (face to face? Phone 
or email? Friendships?) 
d. How did relationships within the group evolve over time? Predictions for 
future? 
e. How were discussions structured? (formal bargaining, open discussion, etc.) 
How were decisions made? (consensus, majority vote, by a facilitator, etc.) 
f. How did you feel about the effectiveness of the facilitator? About the structure 
of the process?  
 
4. Was the process successful?  
a. Were your goals achieved? (SLB/school: trust revenue goals met?)  
b. Were other stakeholders satisfied? 
c. What made it successful (or what elements were successful)? (facilitating 
factors) 
d. What made it unsuccessful (or what elements were unsuccessful)? 
e. Was this a fair process? (Did it feel inclusive or exclusive? Was your voice 
heard?) 
f. Would you collaborate again in the future? (Was this a “value-added” 
activity?) 
g. What would the outcome have been under “normal” circumstances? 
h. What did the group do well? 
 
5. What were the costs associated with participating? 
a. Increased demands on resources, time, staff? 
b. Unsatisfactory outcomes? 
c. Anything else you/your org sacrificed by participating?  
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6. What were the challenges of collaborating?  
(Note: allow the person to brainstorm their own list of challenges, but bring a back-up 
list in case they don’t. Also, ask individuals about the critical challenges others 
mentioned in their interviews.) 
a. Challenges group encountered? (brainstorm list) 
b. Did you reach an impasse or stall? (Did anyone threaten to leave, or give 
ultimatums? How was this resolved?) 
c. Challenges you/your organization encountered? (brainstorm list) 
d. Challenges unique to state trust land? 
e. Did you / the group receive outside criticisms? Response? 
 
7. How did you overcome these challenges? 
a. Group challenges (pick from their list)  
b. You / your organization’s challenges (pick from their list) 
 
8. How did you feel about your involvement? (excited, tired, silenced, frustrated?) 
a. Was this a productive use of your time? 
 
9. How did your organization feel about your involvement?  
a. Support or encouragement? Suspicion? (colleagues, superiors) Did this fit in 
with the culture of your organization? 
b. Is your organization structured to be able to do this? Process consistent with 
mission and goals? How different? How reconciled?  
c. Any legal restrictions, or regulatory constraints? 
 
10. What advice do you have for others considering a similar collaborative planning 
process on state trust lands? 
a. What is critical to success? Essential elements? 
b. Anything the group should have done differently? 
 
11. Is collaborative planning on state trust lands different from using the approach 
to address other public lands issues? 
a. What kinds of issues is collaboration useful in resolving, and what kinds is it 
not? 
b. What challenges face STL management in the future? How to address? 
 
12. Anything else to share? Is there something else you think I should be asking 








Ask these to first one or two interviewees to confirm logistics of process. Possibly confirm 
with others, or take note of (and then probe about) responses that offer conflicting 
information.  
 
1. Who was involved? 
2. What happened? 
3. How did this process get started? 
4. Of participants, who played important roles in the process? Who were leaders? 
Obstructionists? 
5. Who were the dominant voices? 
6. Anyone you would like to have participated, but didn’t? Anyone refused? Excluded? 
7. Common goals identified? How?  
8. Initial vision statement? How developed? (copy?) 
9. How did group set agenda? Priorities? 
10. What was decision-making process? (consensus, majority, etc.) 
11. Ground rules established?  
12. Leadership structure? How determined? 
13. Professional moderator? 




Sample Follow-Up Letter 
 
Dear [Interviewee Name], 
 
On behalf of our research team, I would like to thank you for agreeing to be interviewed as 
part of our research project on state trust land management. I am following up in order to 
give you more information on the project and to explain the interview process. As we 
discussed by [email/phone], the interview is scheduled for [date/time] and I will [come to 
your office at address/call you at interviewee’s telephone number].   
 
The interview should take approximately one hour. If necessary, I may contact you a second 
time for further information or clarification. With your consent, the interview will be 
recorded to ensure the accuracy of our research. In addition, please let us know if there are 
other people you believe may be interested in sharing their experiences. 
  
Our research team of eight students formed in March 2005 at the University of Michigan 
School of Natural Resources and Environment to investigate collaborative planning on state 
trust land. Under the guidance of Steven L. Yaffee, the Theodore Roosevelt Professor of 
Ecosystem Management and Director of the Ecosystem Management Initiative at the 
University of Michigan, our team will prepare a series of case studies in seven western states 
of recent planning processes in which state trust land departments collaborated with 
stakeholder groups in the planning and management of specific trust-owned land. Through 
in-depth interviews, our research team will seek to answer a set of research questions 
concerning the challenges, benefits, costs and outcomes of collaborative planning on state 
trust lands. The goal of the project is to identify the advantages and disadvantages of 
engaging in collaborative planning in state trust land management and to define a set of best 
management practices for these processes.  
 
Should you have questions regarding your role as a participant in research, please contact:
 Institutional Review Board  
 1040 Fleming Building 
 503 Thompson Street 
 Ann Arbor, MI  48109 
 734-936-0933; email: irbhsbs@umich.edu 
 
Thank you in advance for your participation! I look forward to speaking with you about 
[city/location’s] trust land planning process. If you have any questions, I can be reached at 
the contact information below. 
 
Best Regards,   
 





Informed Consent Form 
 
Purpose of this Interview: 
 
This interview is being conducted as part of a project exploring the use of collaboration in 
decision making regarding state trust land. As a participant in the interviewing process, you 
will help the research team learn more about the process of collaboration in a specific case 
regarding state trust land. The information given below is intended to clarify your role in the 
interview process. If you have any additional questions, please ask us, the researchers. 
 
Voluntary Nature of Participation: 
 
Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. You may ask questions before, during, 
or after the interview. You may choose to participate or not, skip any questions you choose 
not to answer, or withdraw at any time, without any consequences to you. The only 
foreseeable risk to your participation in this interview is a breach of confidentiality, should 
you wish to have your comments remain confidential. However, all possible measures will be 
taken to ensure that confidentiality is protected. Should you have any questions regarding 
your participation in the interview, you may feel free to contact a member of the research 
team or the University of Michigan Institutional Review Board, whose contact information 
can be found at the end of this document. Benefits of your participation in this interview 
include your contribution to the body of knowledge regarding collaborative decision making 
on state trust land. 
 
Content of the Interview: 
 
Questions regarding your participation in or knowledge about the collaborative effort in 
question will be asked during the interview, which is expected to last approximately one (1) 
hour. Should we need additional clarification regarding your comments, we would like to 
request permission to contact you again in the future. 
 
Confidentiality of Information Collected: 
 
With your permission, we would like to use audio recording devices during the interview to 
ensure accuracy of the discussion. If, for any reason, you do not wish to be recorded, audio 
recording devices will not be used, and you may still participate in the interview, if you so 
choose. Direct quotations used for this project will be submitted to you for your review to 
ensure accuracy. You may refuse to be quoted by name in association with all or part of your 
commentary. 
 
We will keep confidential the notes, recordings, and transcripts from your interview to the 
extent provided by federal, state and local law. The recordings of this interview will be 
erased and/or destroyed after two (2) years of the interview date. 
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Informed Consent Form 
 
Documentation of this Consent: 
 
One copy of this document will be kept together with our research records on this project. 










Should you have any questions regarding your rights as a participant in research, please 
contact: 
 
Institutional Review Board  
Kate Keever 
540 East Liberty Street, Suite 202 
Ann Arbor, MI  48104-2210 
734-936-0933 
email:   irbhsbs@umich.edu 
 
Consent of the Participant: 
 
I understand the meaning of this information. Ms. / Mr. _______________ and Ms. / Mr. 
______________ (names of group members conducting interview) have offered to answer 
any questions I may have concerning the project.   
 
I hereby consent to participate in the project. 
 














































Sign posted in town, Castleton Tower far right (photograph by 
Eirin Krane) 
 
Signs posted at town entrance (photograph by Eirin Krane) 
 
Castle Valley Drive, the only paved road in town; Eagle's Nest, 
Jello Mountain and Colorado River Corridor beyond 
(photograph by Eirin Krane) 
 
Entrance to the town of Castle Valley with Bulletin Board and 
Mail Boxes, Porcupine Rim beyond (photograph by Eirin Krane) 
 
Castle Valley Drive sign in front of Castleton 
Tower (photograph by Stephanie Bertaina) 
 
Round Mountain, surrounded by school trust lands 





Full Text of Senate Bill 5536 
 
CERTIFICATION OF ENROLLMENT 
           SECOND SUBSTITUTE SENATE BILL 5536 
              Chapter 257, Laws of 1999 
                56th Legislature 
               1999 Regular Session 
 
LAKE WHATCOM MUNICIPAL WATERSHED--PILOT PROJECT ON WATER 
QUALITY 
 
              EFFECTIVE DATE:  7/25/99 
 
Passed by the Senate April 22, 1999  
 YEAS 45  NAYS 0 
 
                  BRAD OWEN 
President of the Senate 
Passed by the House April 16, 1999  
 YEAS 95  NAYS 0        CERTIFICATE 
 
I, Tony M. Cook, Secretary of the Senate of the State of Washington, do hereby 
certify that the attached is SECOND SUBSTITUTE SENATE BILL 5536 as passed by the 
Senate and the House of Representatives on the dates hereon set forth. 
 
                 CLYDE BALLARD 
Speaker of the 
   House of Representatives  TONY M. COOK 
                                   Secretary 
 
                 FRANK CHOPP 
Speaker of the 
   House of Representatives 
Approved May 10, 1999                     FILED       
 
                            May 10, 1999 - 4:47 p.m. 
 
                 GARY LOCKE 
Governor of the State of Washington      Secretary of State  
         State of Washington 
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 _______________________________________________ 
 
             SECOND SUBSTITUTE SENATE BILL 5536 
  _______________________________________________ 
 
                AS AMENDED BY THE HOUSE 
 
           Passed Legislature - 1999 Regular Session 
 
State of Washington        56th Legislature       1999 Regular Session 
 
By Senate Committee on Ways & Means (originally sponsored by Senators 
Spanel and Gardner) 
 
Read first time 03/08/1999. 
   AN ACT Relating to State forest lands and municipal drinking water 
protection; and amending RCW 79.01.128. 
 
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON: 
 
   Sec. 1. RCW 79.01.128 and 1971 ex.s. c 234 s 11 are each amended to read as follows: 
   {+ (1) +} In the management of public lands lying within the limits of any watershed over 
and through which is derived the water supply of any city or town, the department may alter 
its land management practices to provide water with qualities exceeding standards 
established for intrastate and interstate waters by the department of ecology:  PROVIDED, 
That if such alterations of management by the department reduce revenues from, increase 
costs of management of, or reduce the market value of public lands the city or town 
requesting such alterations shall fully compensate the department.  
 
  {+ (2) The department shall initiate a pilot project for the municipal watershed delineated 
by the Lake Whatcom hydrographic boundaries to determine what factors need to be 
considered to achieve water quality standards beyond those required under chapter 90.48 
RCW and what additional management actions can be taken on state trust lands that can 
contribute to such higher water quality standards. The department shall establish an advisory 
committee consisting of a representative each of the city of Bellingham, Whatcom County, 
the Whatcom County Water District 10, the Department of Ecology, the Department of Fish 
and Wildlife, and the Department of Health, and three general citizen members to assist in 
this pilot project. In the event of differences of opinion among the members of the advisory 
committee, the committee shall attempt to resolve these differences through various means, 
including the retention of facilitation or mediation services. +} 
 
{+   (3) The pilot project in subsection (2) of this section shall be completed by June 30, 
2000. The department shall defer all timber sales in the Lake Whatcom hydrographic 
boundaries until the pilot project is complete. 
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   (4) Upon completion of the study, the department shall provide a report to the natural 
resources committee of the house of representatives and to the natural resources, parks, and 
recreation committee of the senate summarizing the results of the study. 
 
   (5) +} The exclusive manner, notwithstanding any provisions of the law to the contrary, for 
any city or town to acquire by condemnation ownership or rights in public lands for 
watershed purposes within the limits of any watershed over or through which is derived the 
water supply of any city or town shall be to petition the legislature for such authority. 
Nothing in this section, RCW 79.44.003 and chapter 79.68 RCW shall be construed to affect 
any existing rights held by third parties in the lands applied for. 
 
   Passed the Senate April 22, 1999. 
   Passed the House April 16, 1999. 
   Approved by the Governor May 10, 1999. 





Full Text of Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 6731 
 
FRANK CHOPP 
Speaker of the 
House of Representatives 
Approved March 29, 2000 FILED 
 
March 29, 2000 - 2:59 p.m. 
 
GARY LOCKE 
Governor of the State of Washington Secretary of State 
State of Washington 
_______________________________________________ 
 
ENGROSSED SECOND SUBSTITUTE SENATE BILL 6731 
_______________________________________________ 
 
AS AMENDED BY THE HOUSE 
Passed Legislature - 2000 Regular Session 
State of Washington 56th Legislature 2000 Regular Session 
By Senate Committee on Ways & Means (originally sponsored by Senators Spanel and 
Gardner) 
Read first time 02/08/2000. 
 
AN ACT Relating to Lake Whatcom; and creating a new section. 
 
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON: 
 
{+ NEW SECTION. +} Sec. The Lake Whatcom landscape management pilot project is 
created. The department of natural resources shall develop a Landscape Plan regarding state-
owned forest lands in the Lake Whatcom watershed area. Where appropriate, the department 
will consult with other major forest landowners in the watershed and shall involve watershed 
residents in management activities. The department shall consult with the Lake Whatcom 
management committee on proposed timber harvest and road management activities. The 
department shall establish an interjurisdictional committee for the development of the 
Landscape Plan, to review the site-specific activities and make recommendations. The 
interjurisdictional committee shall include two members of the public who have an interest in 
these activities. The Landscape Plan shall address at least the following topics: 
 
(1) Establishing riparian management zones along all streams, as classified under chapter 4, 
Laws of 1999 sp. sess. The department shall manage lands within such zones to protect water 
quality and riparian habitat. The interjurisdictional committee may recommend to the 




(2) Harvest and road construction upon potentially unstable slopes shall be carefully 
regulated; 
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(3) On unstable slopes, new road construction shall be prohibited and old road reconstruction 
shall be limited; 
 
(4) A sustained yield model specific to the Lake Whatcom watershed that encompasses the 
revised management standards and that is consistent with the sustained yield established by 
the board of natural resources shall be created and implemented; 
 
(5) The department should build on the existing draft Lake Whatcom Landscape Plan and 
incorporate both new information from the community and new scientific information when 
available; and 
 
(6) The development of a road management plan for the watershed. The Landscape Plan shall 
be completed and implementation initiated by June 30, 2001. Timber harvest and all road 
construction in the watershed on state land shall be delayed until the plan is completed.  
 
Passed the Senate March 7, 2000. 
Passed the House March 1, 2000. 
Approved by the Governor March 29, 2000. 




The Lake Whatcom Landscape Plan Charter 
Lake Whatcom Landscape Plan 
The Department of Natural Resources will develop a Landscape Plan for department-
managed uplands in the Lake Whatcom watershed. During development of the Landscape 
Plan, the department will address a number of topics, including: 
• the various issues and concerns to be discussed in the plan (including those topics found 
in Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 6731), 
• a community interaction plan for use during the development of the Landscape Plan and 
for review of site-specific activities, 
• ecological, revenue, and community value assessments, 
• landscape objectives and management strategies, 
• action plans for road management, timber harvesting/trust revenue generation, and other 
potential land uses, and . 
• approaches to monitoring and evaluation.  
• The Landscape Plan shall be completed and implementation initiated by June 30, 2001.  
 
Lake Whatcom Inter-jurisdictional Committee Charter 
The Department of Natural Resources will consult with the Lake Whatcom Inter-
Jurisdictional Committee as the department develops a Landscape Plan for the Lake' 
Whatcom watershed area. The committee will review draft materials as they are developed 
and provide input to the department. 
 
JENNIFER M. BELCHER 
Commissioner of Public Lands 
 






Whitefish Neighborhood Plan Charter 
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Whitefish Neighborhood Plan Charter 
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Source: Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation 
(http://dnrc.mt.gov/trust/Whitefish_neighborhood_plan/)  
Exhibit 8 (cont.) 
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